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William Form and George Putnam

Economic cleavages in the American working class*

ABSTRACT

When the economic organization of strata parallels their social and political organization, the possibility of collective action is enhanced. Therefore, other things equal, explaining earnings with variables that consider the economic organization of strata is preferable to explanations based exclusively on continuous variables that ignore economic organization. This research proposes a five-fold division of the manual working class based on criteria of economic organization: property relations, skill monopoly, sector of employment, and employment marginality. The five strata are: self-employed workers of all skills, craft workers, employees without skills in the core sector of the economy, non-skilled employees in the economic periphery, and the marginally employed. A model containing these strata is compared for its ability to explain earnings against three other models that consider skill as a continuous variable and that ignore employment sector, property, and marginal employment. Using data from the 1970 Public Use Sample of the U.S. Census, the research concludes that since the five strata explain earnings as well as models based on continuous and non-organizational variable, the stratal model is preferable for general research on workingclass stratification.

The working class was shaped by the industrial revolution. With few exceptions,[1] scholars have emphasized the homogenizing influence of industrialization on the working class. Thus, while Marx recognized the 'lazarous layers' of the proletariat he predicted that mechanization would erode artisan skills and would forge a homogeneous class of machine tenders. Many scholars have since elaborated this theme of homogenization.[2] Even orthodox economists have agreed that workers' rising educational levels have increased their job substitutability. Recently some students have predicted that automation will reduce skills further and create a homogeneous class of meter watchers.[3]

Most social scientists have also accepted the idea that class homogenization heightens class awareness and leads to the formation

of working-class parties. Sombart and subsequent scholars explained the failure of this to happen in the USA as resulting from a lack of a feudal tradition, the escape valve of the frontier, rapid economic growth, high wages, and ethnic and religious diversity.[4] Though some of these conditions abated (e.g., disappearance of the frontier, decline in economic growth, slowing of immigration, the declining significance of religion), a genuine labor party did not materialize, possibly because new working-class cleavages emerged.[5]

Important variations in economic experiences still divide the U.S. working class. In some industries the wage ratio between skilled and unskilled labor has not declined in a century.[6] Contrary to conventional wisdom, the relative size of the skilled aristocracy of labor has not declined in over 70 years.[7] The labor movement, far from equalizing working-class earnings, may have split workers into secure and insecure strata. The evolution of economic organization has segmented labor markets and produced gross earnings inequities among employees in different economic sectors.[9] Business, government, and welfare policies may have spawned a permanent underclass of semi-employed workers.[10] Selective tracking of students into technical training has barred some working-class youth from upward mobility.[11] Generations of social scientists have pointed to ascriptively-based labor markets that have perpetuated working-class inequality along racial, ethnic, sex, and age lines.[12] Finally, a dominant ideology has justified these economic inequities with a rhetoric of equal opportunity, merit, and individual responsibility.[13]

Despite considerable evidence of structurally-based economic inequality within the working class, relatively few scholars have systematically organized the evidence or studied the effect of economic inequality on the social and political behavior of working-class segments.[14] Some scholars slight this kind of analysis because they consider class conflict between capital and labor as more important than conflict within the working class. On the other hand, some students fail to investigate stratal inequalities because they see them as reflecting a process of individual mobility and attainment.[15]

The purpose of this study is to propose a division of the working class that is based on criteria of economic organization and *generally* useful for future research on economic status, and political questions. We assume that a proposed scheme should first demonstrate the existence of stratal earning differences, because economic stratification typically preconditions the social and political behavior of strata.[16] The chances that stratal earnings will explain stratal formation increase if the earnings reflect organizational features of the economy. Therefore, this research compares a stratal model of the working class that is based on variables that reflect economic organization with three models based on variables that reflect economic *continua* for their respective ability to predict earnings. If the stratal-organizational

model is as powerful as the individually-based model, the stratal model should be selected because it offers greater promise of also explaining social and political cleavages of the working class.

For this research the working class is composed of all workers in non-farm manual and service occupations as listed in the U.S. Census. Farm laborers and tenants are excluded because their earnings are difficult to estimate and because they interact little with other manual and service workers. Although most office and sales clerks resemble manual workers economically, we reluctantly omit them from this study because two-fifths of them are secondary earners in families whose other workers include owners, managers, professionals, as well as white- and blue-collar workers. Further, the chief earners in blue- and white-collar families do not exhibit common patterns of generational mobility, an important requirement of social class membership.[17]

BASES OF STRATAL INFORMATION

Scholars differ on how they should divide the working class. Marx thought that traditional artisans (the aristocrats of labor) and the lumpenproletariat were temporary vestiges of an earlier economy and that only the industrial proletariat would survive in mature capitalism. This prediction failed to materialize because capitalism spawned new types of skilled, technical, and service-manual occupations.[18] Lynd and Lynd retained Marx's divisions, but they did not consider how new industries might alter class fragmentation.[19] On the basis of their associational patterns, social status, and subcultures, Warner and Lunt divided workers into lower-middle, upper-lower, and lower-lower social classes.[20] But the Warner school slighted the economic and political basis of class membership.[21] Reiss and Blau and Duncan convinced a host of sociologists to reject the idea of discrete classes altogether in favor of locating individuals according to their rank on *continua* of income, education, and occupational prestige.[22] Stostak, like many others, simply divided the working class into skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled employees as defined by the U.S. Census, but he omitted service workers, most of whom are manual workers.[23] Moreover, though Conk offered little quantitative evidence, she attacked the census skill classification as arbitrary and class-biased.[24]

Although all of these stratal divisions are useful for some research purposes, a classification is needed that is both theoretically cogent and useful for a wide range of research tasks. In our attempt to construct such a scheme, we follow the sociological tradition of Weber, Parsons and Smelser, and Stinchcombe who emphasize that differences in the social and economic organization of labor markets

affect workers' life chances as revealed by their property, earnings, and unemployment.[25] Markets vary according to the organizational strength of their component occupations, the economic strength of their industries, and the social status of their workers. The intersections or matchings of the occupational, industrial, and status dimensions of markets should point to divisions of the working class along economic lines.[26] Each dimension is now briefly elaborated.

The organizational strength of occupations is reflected in their work autonomy, social cohesion, and extent of unionization. Work autonomy or work control is higher for self-employed workers, but it also rises with skill level.[27] Autonomy and control are also high in occupations that recruit and train their own members, e.g., craft workers. The social cohesion of occupations flourishes where managers are least able to routinize work, thus permitting workers to move about, socialize, and organize.[28] Social cohesion among low-skilled workers is facilitated when large numbers are crowded in restricted areas.[29] Labor unions, as formal organizations, try to foster social cohesion by limiting management's power to control work. Understandably, unions are more successful where workers are already informally organized and exert work control. Thus, unions typically organize skilled workers more easily than the less skilled. In sum, occupations vary in their organizational strength; some have all three sources of strength (autonomy, cohesion, and unionization), but others have fewer or none.[30]

The economic strength of industries, along with their associated organizational characteristics, also influence the life chances of employees. We used Averitt's crude dichotomy of economic 'core' or 'periphery' because this classification highlights important economic and organizational attributes of industries.[31] Industries in the core sector generally are large, capital intensive, and profitable because they tend to operate in oligopolistic markets, while industries in the periphery are typically smaller, labor intensive, and less profitable because they operate in competitive markets.[32] Though the core-periphery distinction is less adquate for research that considers the entire occupational structure, it is more useful in pointing to earnings distinctions in the working class.[33] Thus, firms in the core sector generally pay low-skilled workers higher wages and provide them with more secure jobs than do firms in the periphery.[34] Skilled workers, because of their short supply, greater social solidarity, and high unionization, can command higher wages in any sector.[35] When low-skilled manual employees are heavily concentrated in relatively few core firms, their unionization is relatively easy, and management is forced to pay them higher wages and fringe benefits. The dispersion of workers in many small firms in the periphery makes their unionization difficult, further enabling employers to pay lower wages and fringe benefits.[36] But even without unions, core industry firms pay low-

skilled workers relatively high wages because the industries need a dependable source of labor to meet long-term production and investment targets.[37]

The third factor that affects workers' market situations is their social status in society. Groups that have status advantages by virtue of their sex, race, ethnicity, age, or other ascriptive attributes, tend to enter self-employment or the skilled trades, gain preferential access into core industry firms, and obtain the protection of strong unions. Workers with ascriptive disadvantages (women, blacks, others) either receive less formal education, less vocational training, less union protection, or less socialization to become reliable workers.[38] Lacking personal networks into good paying firms, they take the left-over and low-paying jobs in the economic periphery.[39]

The above discussion points to several related criteria that stratify workers: whether or not workers exercise work autonomy on the basis of their property (self-employed vs. employee) or skill; whether or not workers achieve social cohesion through their occupational socialization (crafts) and/or unionization; whether or not workers find employment in economically strong sectors (core or periphery); whether or not the workers' ascribed statuses are favorably rewarded in society. The task now is to propose a limited number of strata and justify their selection on the basis of the above criteria. Later we examine whether the factual evidence supports or fails to support our division of the working class. We prefer this theoretical approach to letting the data speak for themselves by using such devices as factor or discriminant analysis.

We propose to divide U.S. manual workers into five divisions or strata: self-employed (SE); skilled or craft employees (SK); semi-skilled and unskilled employees in the core sector of the economy (N-CORE); semi-skilled and unskilled workers in the peripheral sector (N-PERIF); and the marginally employed (ME) who work fewer than 27 weeks a year. In Marxist theory, manual SE are not in the working class because they work for themselves. Yet, with respect to their life chances and in their career and general mobility, they are in the same social class as other manual workers.[40] The available evidence clearly shows that the SE often earn wages in addition to profits; most SE become manual employees when they fail in business; most SE are immersed in manual workers' social networks; and their politics resemble those of other manual workers.[41]

As suggested above, the five working-class strata are economically differentiated by their labor market resources. Thus, the resources of the SE are work autonomy, property ownership (tools, equipment, materials), above average occupational skills, as well as favoured ascriptive status (males, whites, and native born). The SK also have (a) above average work autonomy and work control, (b) social solidarity derived from common training, tightly-knit work groups,

and labor union membership, and (c) high social status as the aristocrats of labor and favored ascriptive status (male, white, native-born). N-CORE employees, lacking autonomy, work control, and high social status, derive their market power primarily from their union's ability to extract concessions from employers and from their male social status. N-PERIF employees lack work autonomy, work control, and union protection and suffer from negatively evaluated ascriptive status (female, black, foreign born, young). They have but one advantage over the ME, that of being higher in the labor queue because of full-time participation in the labor market.

We investigate four hypotheses to determine the empirical validity of these contentions. First, other things equal, self-employment provides greater economic returns than wage labor. Second, the semi-skilled are more closely allied to the unskilled than to the skilled in their wage determination, thereby suggesting that the main skill break is between the skilled and the remaining non-skilled, rather than an equal increase from unskilled, to semi-skilled, to skilled. Third, the economic strength of an industry is a more important determinant of earnings for the non-skilled than the skilled because the skilled have additional sources of occupational power. Fourth, the depiction of the five working-class strata provides as much power to predict earnings as models based on *continua* of occupational complexity such as are those furnished by the Census and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles [complexity of manipulating DATA, PEOPLE, and THINGS on the job, specific vocational training (SVP), and general educational development (GED)]. If the four hypotheses are supported, the stratal model is preferred over the others for research on social and political class cleavages.

DATA AND METHODS

The data source for this research is the county file, 1/1,000 Public Use Sample of the 1970 United States Census. The Census divides manual workers into three skill levels: craft and kindred workers as skilled, machine and transport operatives as semi-skilled, and laborers as unskilled. We removed foremen from the skilled category because they perform little manual labor. Though the Census does not divide service occupations into manual and non-manual, most of them are heavily manual in content: for example, chambermaids, janitors, cooks, waiters, practical nurses, barbers, guards, hairdressers, firemen, policemen, housekeepers, porters, attendants, lay midwives, stewardesses, and dental assistants.[42] We decided to include all service occupations in the working class. They comprise almost 35 per cent of blue-collar workers as defined by the Census or 26 per cent of manual

workers as defined in this study. The working class in this study comprises about half of the total labor force.

Since the Census does not classify service occupations by skill, we allocated them into skill groups to approximate those used for blue-collar workers. On the basis of a factor analysis of 44 occupational attributes provided by the fourth edition of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), Miller *et al.* (1980, Table F-2) calculated the occupational substantive complexity scores of all occupations in the Census.[43] Most crafts or skilled occupations had complexity scores of 3.5 and above and most unskilled occupations scored below 2.4. We placed service occupations with scores of 3.5 or above in the skilled category, occupations with scores of 2.4 to 3.4 in the semi-skilled, and occupations with scores below 2.4 in the unskilled.[44]

The dependent variable is the natural log of annual earnings for 1969. This variable was logged to transform a skewed distribution to a symmetrical one. Earnings were coded in hundreds of dollars. Those who did not work in the previous year or who earned no income or a negative income were removed from the sample to minimize core-periphery differences.[45] Only income from self-employment, wages, and salaries was used. Earnings from self-employment were increased by a factor of 30 per cent because the literature consistently concludes that their profits are underreported to the Census by at least that amount.[46]

The remaining variables were ascriptive worker characteristics (sex, race, marital status), human capital characteristics (education, skill, occupational complexity, experience), extent of labor market participation (hours and weeks worked), and industry strength (core and periphery).[47] The scoring for these variables follow: sex: females = 0, males = 1; race: nonwhites = 0, whites = 1; marital status: not married = 0, married = 1; education, number of years completed; skill level: skilled = 3, semi-skilled = 2, unskilled = 1; sector of employment: core = 1, periphery = 0; hours worked per week: less than 15 = 0, 15–29 = 1, 30–34 = 2, 35–39 = 3, 40 = 4, 41–48 = 5, 49–59 = 6, 60 and over = 7. For weeks worked: 13 or less = 0, 14–26 = 1, 27–39 = 2, 40–47 = 3, 48–49 = 4, 50–52 = 5. Years of experience was measured differently for the sexes. For males, age–education–6 years; for females, .75 × (age–education–6 years).[48] For the strata, a series of dummy variables in which each stratum = 1 and the residual = 0. The DOT occupational complexity variables from low to high are: for handling DATA (0–6), PEOPLE (0–8), THINGS (0–7), GED (1–6), SVP (1–9),[49] (p. 165). Earnings were predicted using structural equations and ordinary least squares.

Model 1 of the working class classifies manual workers into five discrete strata. Self-employment (SE) presents no problem because respondents know whether they work primarily for themselves or for somebody else. The skilled stratum (SK) are craft and kindred

workers as defined by the U.S. Census. Non-skilled core (N-CORE) are semi-skilled and unskilled employees in the core sector of the economy. The semi-skilled and unskilled in the periphery form the non-skilled periphery stratum (N-PERIF). The marginally employed (ME) work less than 27 weeks a year. Models 2–4 contain different measures of skill as a continuous variable and sector as a separate variable. Model 2 of the working class consists of three skill gradations as described in the Census: skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled. Model 3 ranks workers on five DOT *continua* of occupational complexity and rejects the notion of discrete strata. Model 4 is based on scores of two skill factors derived from the DOT continuous variables used in Model 3.

We digress to explain the DOT scores and factors used in Models 3 and 4. Despite its shortcomings, the DOT contains the best data on occupational complexity because its measures are based, in part at least, on direct observation of workers' functions.[50] Five unambiguous DOT indicators of occupational complexity were selected and merged with the Census data. Three indicators deal with complexity of manipulating DATA, PEOPLE, and THINGS on the job. GED (general educational development) and SVP (specific vocational preparation) measure the education and training required to achieve acceptable work efficiency. 'GED includes aspects of formal and informal education that contribute to the worker's reasoning development, the ability to follow instructions, and the use of language and mathematical skills. SVP includes training acquired in a school, work, military, institutional, or vocational environment but excludes schooling without specific vocational content.'[51]

Model 4 includes two skill factors derived from a factor analysis of the five DOT occupational complexity variables. The remaining DOT variables were not used because the 26 that measure aptitudes, temperament, and interests are psychological attributes that do not directly bear on occupational complexity. Five variables that cover physical demands of jobs are quite unreliable and the six working conditions variables do not measure occupational complexity.[52] In the ensuing discussion the reader should remember the direction of occupational complexity scores (see above).

The correlations among DATA, GED, and SVP are high (above .80) and the remaining correlations are moderately high (between .16 and .37). The initial factor mix suggested two factors, the first being more important because its eigenvalues explained 81 per cent of the variance in contrast to 19 per cent explained by the second factor. The factors were then rotated orthogonally using the varimax procedure. The pattern of loadings is clear. Since GED and SVP have large positive loadings (.88 and .98 respectively), and DATA a large negative one (−.83), high levels of educational background, specific vocational training, and handling of complex data go together.[53] This

suggests a skill complexity factor, called, 'skill.' The pattern of loadings on the second factor is less clear. PEOPLE has the highest positive loading (.77), followed by THINGS (.40) and DATA (.33) which have smaller positive loadings; GED has a moderately high negative loading (−.35) and SVP, a small negative one (−.04). Since this factor loads most heavily on PEOPLE and moderately high on THINGS, a socio-technical complexity factor is suggested as in women's manual service occupations in restaurants and hospitals.[54]

PROFIT AND WAGES

We hypothesized that self-employment generates higher earnings than wage labor and that the SE differ from employees in their social characteristics. The SE represent only five per cent of the manual labor force and they enjoy economic, human capital, labor market, and social status advantages over employees (Table I). Not surprisingly, the SE earn 63 per cent more annually than employees, and the SE own houses of higher value and suffer considerably less unemployment. The SE are older, mostly married, and white males with spouse present. They have more work experience and more formal and vocational education than other workers. These favored ascriptive and human capital characteristics translate into more extensive labor market participation in the form of weeks and hours worked.

Although the descriptive analysis strongly suggests that the SE possess a distinct earnings advantage over other blue-collar workers, regression analysis reveals whether this holds when other variables that affect earnings are controlled. Data in Table II reveal that the SE enjoy a nine per cent earnings advantage over blue-collar employees when controlling for ascriptive, human capital, market participation variables. A separate regression analysis not shown here revealed that ascriptive factors (male status, white race, married status) and hours worked contribute relatively more to SE earnings, while skill level and weeks worked contribute more to employee earnings.[55] The higher R^2 for employees (.55) than for the SE (.36) suggests that the SE market is less highly structured.

SKILL AND INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

Many attempts to stratify the working class have relied on a threefold gradation of skill: skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled. Although this scheme serves some research purposes well, we argue that (1) the skill grades are not clearly differentiated by economic and social characteristics, (2) a more appropriate classification dichotomizes manual

TABLE 1 *Social and economic characteristics of self-employed, employees and three skill groups (per cents unless specified)*

Variables	Self-employed	Employees	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Un-skilled
Annual earnings (X$)	8,844[a]	5,570	7,237	5,475	3,245
House value > $12,500	71	64	69	50	49
Gross monthly rent ($)	122	107	116	105	103
Unemployed	2	5	4	6	6
Completed high school	47	46	55	42	40
Work experience ($\bar{X}$ yrs.)	26	19	21	19	18
Vocational training	42	26	40	21	20
SVP ≥ 6 months	71	41	98	17	0
Hours worked ≥ 40	76	73	81	77	58
Weeks worked ≥ 50	70	61	70	63	50
Male	82	70	84	68	55
Chief earner	79	67	80	65	52
Married w/spouse	84	69	79	72	53
Age ($\bar{X}$years)	46	39	41	39	38
White	92	84	91	85	76
Size	5	95	31	36	28

[a]Uncorrected, $7,328.
Source: Public Use Sample. U.S. Census 1970 1/1000 County File

TABLE II *Regression of the natural log of annual earnings on social and economic characteristics for self-employed and wage labor*

Variables*	B	S.E.	Beta
Self-employed/employee	.093	(.016)	.020
Education	.034	(001)	.098
Skill	.163	(005)	.130
Vocational training	.096	(.008)	.043
Experience	.007	(.000)	.110
Sector	.280	(.008)	.140
Weeks worked	.256	(.003)	.397
Hours worked	.106	(.002)	.180
Sex	.345	(.008)	.156
Marital Status	.265	(.008)	.121
Race	.115	(.010)	.041
Constant	.698	(.023)	
N	33,564		
Adjusted R^2	.602		

DATA SOURCE: Public Use Sample. U.S. Census, 1970, 1/1000 County File.
*All significant below .001.

labor earnings into skilled and non-skilled, and (3) sector of employment economically and socially stratifies the non-skilled better than degree of skill.

Data in Table I show that the skill levels are about equally distinct in their annual earnings but that the two lower levels are more alike in their unemployment and property values. Also, for the human capital characteristics of education, SVP, vocational training and work experience, a greater affinity exists between the unskilled and the semi-skilled, while the semi-skilled resemble the skilled more in terms of extent of labor market participation. More of the skilled are males, white, chief earners, married, and older, but the skill levels differ from each other in about the same magnitude. In short, though the semi- and unskilled tend to resemble each other more than skilled and semi-skilled, the three-fold skill gradation does not accurately and systematically depict the divisions of the working class.

An alternative method for examining the utility of the threefold skill grades versus the skill dichotomy for determing earnings is regression analysis. A dummy variable was created for each of the three skill levels and the unskilled were excluded from the regression. For the semi-skilled and unskilled to be combined into a non-skilled category, the unstandardized regression coefficient for the semi-skilled dummy variable should be less than that for the skilled dummy variable and approaching zero. The first condition is met in Table III because the unstandardized coefficient for the semi-skilled is smaller than for the skilled in the prediction of earnings. However, the coefficient for the

semi-skilled does not approach zero. Overall, the data suggest that, although the semi-skilled and unskilled are not identical in their characteristics, they are closely allied.

Our second task is to assess the importance of sector of employment for the earnings of the skilled and non-skilled groups. Students of dual economy disagree on the sector importance of skills. Those who emphasize internal labor markets in core industries suggest that workers may have few skills when first hired, but that skills are developed through company training programs.[56] Small increments in job skills are stretched out in a long continuum, each new job taking considerable time to master. Management therefore, recruits employees who have the greatest learning potentials, i.e., workers with more education, vocational training, and general ability. More radical researchers insist that most workers in both sectors have few skills and that most jobs can be quickly learned, perhaps within a week or two at most.[57] Others agree that the decisive break is between skilled and all other labor.[58] Our research tasks then are to (a) classify industries into sectors, (b) ascertain the importance of sectors for distinguishing earnings within the skilled and non-skilled strata, and (c) determine the extent to which sector interacts with skill to predict earnings.

The assignment of industries to sectors followed a scheme first developed by Bibb and Form and later refined by Bibb.[59] Using the Census 3-digit industrial code, Bibb (1981) reasoned that the industrial organization, market structure, market concentration, and economic performance of industries create conditions that differentially

TABLE III *Regression of natural log of earnings on social, economic, and skill characteristics of the U.S. working class*

Variables	B[a]	S.E.	Beta
D-SK	.344	(.010)	.167
D-SMSK	.268	(.009)	.129
Education	.035	(001)	.100
Vocational training	.111	(.008)	.049
Sector	.265	(.008)	.133
Hours worked	.104	(.002)	.177
Weeks worked	.255	(.003)	.395
Experience	.008	(.000)	.116
Sex	352	(.008)	.159
Marital status	261	(.008)	.119
Race	.112	(.010)	.040
Constant	.816	(.022)	
N	33,564		
Adjusted R^2	.604		

DATA SOURCE: Public Use Sample, U.S. Census, 1970, 1/1000 County File.
[a]All significant below .001

affect employee earnings, unemployment, unionization, fringe benefits, and working conditions. Bibb developed seven indicators of the economic structure of industries: capital intensity, growth or expansion orientation, intensity of research and development, economic scale, degree of concentration, price behavior, and profits. He then subjected the indicators to discriminant function analysis. All variables attained statistical significance at or below the .05 level as measured by the t-test. Two clusters of industries were clearly separated according to their economic structure, with 93 per cent of the industries correctly labelled as falling in the core or periphery sectors. With few modifications, the original Bibb and Form sector classification of industries held up.[60]

Data in Table IV summarize information on the occupational skills of workers in the core and periphery sectors of the economy. All DOT and other indicators of occupational complexity reveal consistent sectoral differences. Jobs in the core require higher skill as measured by DATA, GED, and SVP; jobs in the periphery require higher skill on PEOPLE and THINGS. Understandably, core sector employees score higher on the skill factor, while periphery employees do better on the sociotechnical factor. Though data may not be reliable, they do show that workers in the periphery score higher on motor coordination, finger dexterity, manual dexterity, eye-hand coordination, and color discrimination — job attributes that are associated with non-durable goods, production and the services. Workers in the core score higher on physical strength, an attribute associated with male jobs in the core.[61] In short, employees in the core have slight advantages over those in the periphery in formal education and vocational training

TABLE IV *Occupational complexity of sectors*

	SECTOR	
Variables	Core	Periphery
Data	4.03	4.36
People	7.11	7.08
Things	3.78	3.50
GED	3.17	2.92
SVP	4.94	4.12
Skill factor	.23	–.25
Socio-technical factor	.12	–.12
Training time (months)	20.5	12.3
Strength scale	2.98	2.09
Envir. conditions scale	1.21	.73
Vocational training (%)	29	24

DATA SOURCE: Public Use Sample. U.S. Census, 1970, 1/1,000 County File and DOT 4th Edition Tape.

and they have more complex jobs that require more time to master: 21 months compared to 12 in the periphery.[62]

We now examine the relevance of sector affiliation for stratifying non-skilled workers more than the skilled. As expected, data in Table V reveal that the skilled enjoy higher ascriptive social status, higher levels of human capital, greater labor market participation, and higher earnings than the non-skilled. Only in a few instances are sector differences among the skilled as great or greater than those among the non-skilled. Differences in sex, race, and chief earner status are almost as large among the skilled as the non-skilled. Sector differences among the skilled are trivial for most of the remaining variables, while they run consistently larger for the non-skilled. The most important of these are the advantages that N-CORE have over N-PERIF workers in hours worked, weeks worked, earnings, SVP, and status as married and living with a spouse. In short, employment sector more powerfully divides non-skilled than skilled workers.

The regression analysis in Table VI provides additional evidence that sector more powerfully determines earnings for the non-skilled than the skilled. For the non-skilled, controlling for other variables, members of the core earn 32 per cent more than periphery workers; for the skilled, the difference is 25 per cent. The relative ranking of the betas for the non-skilled suggests that, except for sex, sector provides a stronger independent effect on earnings than do ascriptive and human capital characteristics. For the skilled, the sector effect is relatively

TABLE V *Social and economic characteristics of skilled and non-skilled by sector (per cent unless specified)*

	Skilled		Non-skilled	
Variables	Core	Periphery	Core	Periphery
Size	42	58	40	60
Male	97	68	81	50
White	93	89	84	79
Married w/spouse	85	73	76	57
Chief income earner	90	68	74	50
Mean annual earnings ($)	8,384	5,797	6,199	3,406
Mean work experience (yrs.)	22	20	20	17
Completed high school	56	55	44	40
Vocational training	41	40	22	19
SVP ≥ 6 months	98	99	18	5
Hours worked ≥ 40	86	75	81	60
Weeks worked ≥ 50	72	68	66	52
Mean house value ($)	5,016	4,819	4,285	4,302
Mean gross monthly rent ($))	117	115	107	102
Unemployed	5	3	6	6

DATA SOURCE: Public Use Sample. U S. Census, 1970, 1/1,000 County File.

TABLE VI *Regression of natural log of annual earnings on social and economic characteristics of workers: skilled and non-skilled as control variables and interaction of skill and sector*

	Skilled			Non-skilled			Interaction skill/sector		
Variables[a]	B	S.E.	beta	B	S.E.	beta	B	S.E.	beta
Education	.039	.002	.128	.035	.002	.099	.036	.001	.101
Voc. training	.135	.011	.084	.072	.012	.028	.103	.008	.046
Hours worked	.075	.004	.143	.129	.003	.219	.112	.002	.189
Weeks worked	.239	.004	.378	.265	.003	.426	.260	.003	.403
Experience	.007	.000	.131	.007	.000	.105	.007	.000	.110
Sector	.250	.011	.156	.318	.010	.151	.326	.009	.163
Sex	.444	.016	.200	.337	.010	.157	.358	.009	.162
Marital status	.250	.014	.124	.293	.010	.135	.284	.008	.129
Race	.160	.019	.056	.137	.012	.052	.140	.010	.050
Two skill levels[b]							.210	.011	.102
Skill-sector[c]							–.069	.015	–.028
Constant	1.197			.821	.028		.861	.023	
N	12,358			21,206			33,564		
Adjusted R^2	.484			.583			.594		

[a] All significant below .001.
[b] Dichotomous variable: skilled = 1, non-skilled = 0.
[c] Interaction terms (skilled = 1, non-skilled = 0) X sector (core = 1, periphery = 0).

weaker, especially with respect to human capital and experience variables. On the whole, the core-periphery distinction is a more significant predictor of earnings for the non-skilled, both independent of and relative to the other variables.

Our last task is to determine the extent to which sector interacts with skill to predict earnings. A dichotomous skill variable (skilled = 1, non-skilled = 0) was combined with the sector variable (core = 1, periphery = 0) to produce the interaction term. These variables were entered into the regression analysis along with the ascriptive, human capital, and market participation variables in Table VI. The interaction term produced a small but significant negative coefficient, further supporting the contention that sector is more important for non-skilled than skilled workers. All these data undoubtedly underestimate the greater impact of sector on the earnings of the non-skilled because they do not consider earnings supplements or fringe benefits which account for 37 per cent of total pay. Lord and Falk's national study, the Quality of Employment Survey of 1972, revealed that differences in benefits between primary (skilled) and secondary (non-skilled) occupations in the monopoly sector were small compared to differences in the competitive sector.[63] This suggests that, compared to the non-skilled, benefits for skilled workers were less affected by employment sector.

WORKING-CLASS STRATA

To this point we have established that proprietors differ from employees within the manual class, that the skilled differ from the non-skilled, and that the non-skilled form two strata on the basis of sector of employment. Our model of the working class is comprised of five strata: self-employed (SE); skilled (SK); non-skilled core (N-CORE); non-skilled periphery (N-PERIF); and, marginally employed (ME). The most distinguishing feature of SE, SK, and N-CORE workers is that four-fifths are white married males living with their spouses (Table VII). In contrast, almost half of N-PERIF and ME employees are women, most of whom are operatives in non-durable goods manufacturing and in service jobs. Expectedly, a greater percentage of those in the upper three than lower two strata are chief earners of their families and high school graduates. Moreover, workers in the upper three strata work more weeks per year and more hours per week, and consequently earn substantially higher incomes and own more valuable homes. The SE and SK are superior to the three lowest strata especially in the areas of vocational training and on-the-job training (SVP).

With some exceptions, the variables in Table VII change in a consistent direction from SE to ME. Thus, the SE have the highest

TABLE VII *Social and economic characteristics: working-class strata (per cent unless specified)*

Variables	SE	SK	N-CORE	N-PERIF	ME
Size	5	28	24	31	12
Male	82	84	82	56	52
White	92	91	86	78	84
Married w/spouse	84	79	79	64	42
Chief income earner	79	80	79	61	30
Work experience (years)	26	21	21	20	11
Completed high school	47	55	44	42	46
Vocational training	42	40	21	22	18
SVP ≥ 6 months	71	98	20	12	23
Hours worked ≥ 40	76	84	84	71	48
Weeks worked ≥ 50	70	76	71	67	0
Unemployed	2	3	5	3	15
Mean annual earnings ($)	8,844	7,237	6,883	4,540	1,442
House value > $12,500	71	69	59	47	63
Gross monthly rent ($$\bar{X}$)	121	115	107	103	106

DATA SOURCE: Public Use Sample, U.S. Census, 1970, 1/1000 County File.

earnings and the differences between strata increase as one moves progressively towards the ME. Two types of irregularities occur. In some instances, the values for the SK are higher than for the SE and some ME values are higher than the N-PERIF's. For example, a slightly higher per cent of the SK than SE are males, high school graduates, and chief earners of their families. Similarly, a higher per cent of the ME than N-PERIF are white, not currently married, own property worth over $12,500, and have 6 months or more of SVP. These deviations reflect the greater skill heterogeneity of the SE and ME and greater dispersion in their on-the-job training. Overall, the SK and N-CORE strata are the most homogeneous and most alike.

The aforementioned evidence provides some support for the existence of the five strata but not their independence of one another. If the strata are not independent, then we should expect a good deal of overlap, thereby suggesting that the model does not readily identify important stratifying dimensions in the working class. The correlations among the strata range from −.43 to −.08, indicating a minimum amount of commonality.

The regression of earnings on the stratal, ascriptive, human capital characteristics, and market participation factors further support our contention (see Model 1, Table VIII). Five dummy variables representing each stratum were created and the N-PERIF dummy variable was excluded to avoid perfect collinearity. The unstandardized regression coefficients of the dummy strata variables attest that, controlling for all other variables, the SK and N-CORE

TABLE VIII Regression of log of annual earnings for four models of the working class

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Variables*	B	S.E.	beta	B	S.E.	beta	B	S E.	beta	B	S.E.	beta
Sector				.267	.008	.138	.275	.008	.139	.278	.008	.141
3 Skill levels				.166	.005	.133						
Skill factor										.111	.004	113
Socio-tech factor										.037	.003	.041
D-SE	254	.017	.056									
D-SK	.293	009	.132									
D-N-CORE	295	.010	.116									
D-ME	–.460	018	–.145									
DATA							.040	.006	.057			
PEOPLE							–.005	.005	–.005			
THINGS							.010	.002	.021			
SVP							127	.006	.211			
GED							–.086	.014	–.058			
Education	.038	.001	.109	.035	.001	.098	.038	002	.106	038	.002	.104
Vocational training	.112	.008	.050	.098	.008	.044	.112	.008	049	.104	.008	.046
Hours worked	.113	.002	.190	.107	.002	.181	.112	002	.195	.114	.002	.197
Weeks worked	.174	.004	271	.256	.003	.397	.259	.003	.403	259	.003	.403
Experience	.007	.000	.111	007	.000	.111	007	.000	.107	.007	.000	109
Sex	.415	.008	.187	.346	.008	.157	.328	.009	.150	343	.009	.156
Marital status	.288	.008	.131	.266	.008	.121	.263	.008	.119	265	008	.121
Race	.151	.010	.054	.116	.010	.042	.124	.010	.043	124	010	.044
Constant	1.219	.026		688	.022		.495	.063		.963	.024	
N	34,209			33,564		31,877		31,877				
Adjusted R^2	.593			.602			.609			.608		

DATA SOURCE: Public Use Sample. U.S. Census 1970, 1/1,000 County File and DOT Fourth Edition Tape.
* All significant below .001.

earn the highest incomes relative to the N-PERIF followed by the SE, while the ME have a negative coefficient. The standardized beta of each stratum variable indicates the power of its effect on earning relative to the other variables. The betas reveal not only that the strata are significantly independent of each other, but as a group they affect earnings to a greater extent than any other set of variables.

FOUR MODELS OF WORKING-CLASS STRATIFICATION

In creating the working-class strata, we combined skill level and sector to form the N-CORE and N-PERIF strata. The question arises, Does entering skill and sector separately in the earning equations account for more of the variance? To answer this question, we compared four equations or models that have different terms for skill and sector. The first model combined sector and census skill level to form the two 'non-skilled' strata (N-CORE and N-PERIF), while the remaining three models used different measures of skill and retained sector as a separate variable. If little power is lost by combining skill and sector, support for the working-class model is suggested. Only small differences in explanatory power of the four equations are expected because repeated studies of working-class earnings have shown[64] that labor market participation generally accounts for the greatest part of the variance, ascriptive variables for somewhat less, and the human capital variables the least.

Model 1 uses the five working-class strata; model 2 uses the Census classification of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled; model 3 uses the five DOT occupational complexity variables; model 4 uses two skill factors derived from the factor analysis of DOT occupational complexity variables. In model 1, the working-class strata are four dummy variables: D-SE, D-SK, D-N-CORE, ME, with N-PERIF as the omitted category to prevent perfect multicollinearity. For model 2, craft or skilled workers are coded 3, operatives or semi-skilled as 2, and laborers or unskilled as 1. In model 3 the DOT metric are used (see above). In model 4, standard deviations for the DOT skill factors are indicated.

All four models are equally powerful because they explain approximately 60 per cent of the log of earnings (Table IX). Differences among the models are small; their total explained variances are within 1.6 per cent of each other. When the skill–strata variables are added to the regression, they add about three per cent to the explained variance of the first (working-class) model and one per cent to the remaining three models.

Though skill is measured differently in models 2–4, its impact is

TABLE IX *Regressions of the natural log of earnings on social and economic characteristics of strata*

	Strata									
	SE		SK		N-CORE		N-PERIF		ME	
Variables*	B	b	B	b	B	b	B	b	B	b
Sex	.732	.298	.566	.296	.311	.189	.360	.215	.446	.214
Marital st.	.371	.145	.243	.144	.228	.150	.311	.180	.223	.105
Race	.273	.080	.181	.077	.195	.116	.156	.077	.044†	.015
Education	.031	.101	.046	.181	.037	.164	.029	.106	.046	.126
Voc. ed.	.074**	.040	.136	.102	.032‡	.022	.070	.033	.155	.058
Experience	–.004***	–.060	.008	.176	.006	.129	.006	.111	.012	.188
Weeks	.104	.113	.157	.212	.150	.223	.163	.214	.740	.354
Hours	.079	.173	.068	.143	.071	.154	.150	.302	.134	.250
Constant	1.891		1.532		1.932		1.257		.355	
R^2	.256		.359		.242		.389		.358	
N	1,775		10,783		7,652		10,047		3,823	

DATA SOURCE: Public Use Sample, U.S. Census, 1970, 1/1,000 County File.
* Significance below .001 except where indicated.
** p = .06.
*** p = .01.
† p = .006.
‡ p = > .05.

about the same in all models. In the Census measure (model 2), each skill level raises earnings 17 per cent. In model 3, which uses the five DOT occupational complexity variables, SVP by far has the strongest influence: each unit raises earnings about 13 per cent. In model 4, each additional standard deviation in the skill factor raises earnings 11 per cent; the socio-technical factor, 4 per cent.

Combining skill and sector to form the N-CORE and N-PERIF strata in model 1 has the effect, when compared to the other models, of raising the relative contribution of sex to earnings and reducing the contribution of weeks worked (Table IX). When the regression equation for model 1 is run separately for sector, the R^2 for the periphery explains considerably more variance (.598) than for the core (.425).[65] Differences by sex and labor force participation (weeks and hours worked) are much more important for explaining earnings in the periphery than in the core. When model 1 is run separately for race, the R^2 is larger for whites than non-whites (.620 and .462). Skill, experience, and weeks worked count relatively more for whites, while sex and the accident of sector placement count more heavily for non-skilled non-whites. Expectedly, sex stratification is pervasive in both sub-analyses of race and sector, suggesting the need for further exploration.

Since 45 per cent of periphery employees are women compared to 12 per cent in the core, a possible criticism of building sector into the strata of model 1 is that some women prefer not to work steadily and/or full time. Consequently, their lesser work experience, labor market participation, and lower earnings may not reflect sector 'discrimination', as much as the market's accommodation to women's preferences.[66] If this reasoning is correct, differences in sector earnings should be trivial for fully committed workers. We pursued this question. About 80 per cent of the three top strata (SE, SK, and N-CORE) were chief earners compared to 58 per cent of N-PERIF workers and 29 per cent of the ME. Men constituted 84 per cent of the chiefs and 41 per cent of the non-chiefs. Expectedly, chief earners worked more hours and weeks and had more work experience than non-chiefs.[67] Earnings of chiefs were 2.6 times those of non-chiefs.

A multiple regression analysis of the earnings of chiefs for models 2, 3, and 4 (data not shown here) revealed that sector effects remained substantial: core workers earned about 23 per cent more than periphery employees. In model 1 (for working-class strata), regression analysis showed that N-CORE chiefs earned 72 per cent more than ME chiefs, controlling for all other effects, while N-PERIF chiefs earned 47 per cent more. Earnings regression equations for chiefs and all earners were compared. Differences in the coefficients and betas between the two samples were generally trivial and unsystematic, further supporting the generalization that

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sector earnings effects are not an artifact of the greater presence of partially committed female employees in the periphery. Earnings are determined pretty much the same way for chief and non-chief earners.

DISCUSSION

In examining working-class earnings, we found that weeks and hours worked, male status, and even marital status of males contributed as heavily to earnings as occupational skill, employment sector, and self-employment — the variables that underpin the formation of the five strata. Important as ascriptive and labor market participation are, historically they have not provided as much an organizational basis for stratal formation as occupational skill, employment sector, and self-employment. Women have not formed labor unions capable of confronting management independent of men. Female collective bargaining organizations exist in some clothing industries but are generally ineffective. In addition, if sex were used as a basis of stratal formation, this would place some earners in two earner families in different strata. The same reasoning applies to labor market participation. Except in rare instances, collective action is rarely based on number of weeks worked or hours of employment. But stratal action is often based on common occupational skills, employment in a common industry, and property relationships — the factors that underly our strata.

Not surprising, the five strata differ considerably in their ascriptive characteristics, human capital, labor market participation, and earnings. The three upper strata (SE, SK, N-CORE), though they exhibit distinctive features, resemble each other more than do the N-PERIF and ME. The three upper strata are predominately white males, have relatively high occupational status, experience similar amounts of unemployment, and make relatively large earnings. The N-PERIF stands as a stratum apart, socially and economically more heterogeneous than the upper three. The ME, comprised primarily of secondary earners, is also quite heterogeneous.[68]

Earnings are determined somewhat differently in the five strata. In a separate regression analysis of each stratum (see Table IX), a comparison of unstandardized coefficients shows that ascriptive characteristics (sex, marital status, and race) are largest for the SE, pointing to the ascriptive basis of stratification. Predictably, the main human capital variables of education and vocational training are largest for the SK. ME earnings are also highly influenced by these factors. By definition, labor market participation in terms of weeks worked is largest for the ME, but weeks and hours worked are also large for the N-PERIF.

In each stratum except the ME, the standardized betas for sex rank first or second in size suggesting that sex stratification is endemic. But a different ordering appears for the next largest betas: for the SE and N-PERIF, hours worked and for the SK and N-CORE, weeks worked. In all strata, race and vocational training betas have the lowest ranks, while the order of the remaining variables differ. This regression analysis emphasizes variations in the source of economic rewards in each stratum. For the SE, ascriptive status, hours and weeks worked are important. For the SK and N-CORE, weeks worked and education point to greater rewards, while for the N-PERIF, hours actually worked is critical to economic well-being.

Relatively few students have systematically analyzed the earnings of working-class segments. Wright's important analysis distinguishes semi-autonomous from other workers because the former have skills that enable them to control the labor process.[69] He included professional, technical, and some craft workers among the semi-autonomous, making the stratum more heterogeneous than our skilled workers. Since the SK resemble other manual workers more than they do professional and technical employees, they should remain a separate category of semi-autonomous workers within the working class. Wright's petty bourgeoisie contain all self-employed workers including farmers, professionals, white-collar and manual labor. His data suggest that the stratum is very heterogeneous. Our data suggest that the SE most resemble semi-autonomous skilled workers, but they should be kept as a separate stratum because of their distinctive property relationships.

Edward's working-class fragments bear some resemblance to our strata because he separates the traditional proletariat from the working poor along sector lines, the proletariat dominating the core sector.[70] Edward's working poor includes employees who have an unstable attachment to the labor force (ME) as well as regularly employed workers in the periphery (N-PERIF). We believe that the distinction is worth preserving. In addition, Edwards identifies the third fraction of the working class as composed of a 'middle layer' of professionals, technical, supervisory, and skilled workers who stand between capitalists and managers and the other working-class fractions. Though he does not present detailed earnings data for the occupations that comprise this fraction, surely the earnings of the skilled (SK) are nearer those of the N-CORE proletariat than those of the professionals, administrators, and supervisors of the 'middle layer'? It makes sense, therefore to consider the skilled as a separate fraction of the working class closer to the traditional proletariat than to the 'middle layer'.

The suggestion by Shostak that the working class be divided along three skill blocs (skilled, semi-, and unskilled) has great appeal because of its simplicity.[71] The utility of using skill blocs would

increase if service workers were included, divided along skill lines and dispersed among the three skill blocs as we have done. The major disadvantage of Shostak's classification is that it assumes that the two lower skill blocs are independent and internally homogeneous in their ascriptive, human capital, labor market participation, and earnings characteristics. Our decision to combine the semi- and unskilled and divide them by sector revealed important cleavages along social and economic lines. Importantly, the sectors are also known to divide employees by size of work organization, union membership, and other organizational features.[72]

How large, permanent, and important are the stratal divisions of the working class? SE earnings are more than twice those of the N-PERIF, the SK are 1.77, and the N-CORE, 1.58. Equally important are the stratal differences in weeks worked and unemployment. Unfortunately, our stratal data are limited to those provided by the census. However, since skill, sector, and property underlie the formation of our strata, additional but indirect information about the strata may be derived from information about these three variables.

Some evidence suggests that social and economic cleavages along skill and sector lines are stable or increasing. Lindert and Williamson found that on the aggregate level, despite downward fluctuations, skill earnings differentials remained high in the USA from 1850 to 1948, and Schoeplein showed that differentials stabilized or increased slightly since World War II.[73] Miller estimated that the life-time earnings of skilled male workers were 56 per cent higher than for the unskilled, and Carol and Parry found a slightly higher ratio.[74] Finally, census data reveal that the percentage of skilled who worked fifty or more weeks a year increased from 67 per cent in 1950 to 75 per cent in 1979, while the percentage for laborers remained constant at 50 per cent.

Characteristics of industrial sectors also appear to be stable. Gordon contends that unemployment and underemployment is consistently lower in core than periphery industries.[75] Cullen showed that the inter-industry wage structure, the basis of sector cleavages, remained constant between 1899 and 1950, and national historical data provided by Miller reveal that skill differentials in the industries that we assigned to the core and periphery remained constant or increased between 1939 and 1959.[76] Stinchcombe's intensive study of occupational and industrial mobility in Norway showed that skilled workers in competitive industries dominated by skilled labor (e.g., construction) and skilled workers in oligopolistic industries earned increasingly higher incomes over the years than other employees in competitive free markets and in low-skill industries.[77] Since most workers do not significantly improve their occupational skills after the age of 30, since earnings differentials between skill groups increase with experience, since sector wage disparities remain constant or grow

over time, and since unemployment differentials between skill levels remain constant or grow, stratal economic inequalities probably are stable or increase over time.[78]

To what extent are the working-class strata classes or class segments? In Marxist theory, the strata at most are fractions of the working class. In Max Weber's framework, a social class is that totality of class situations within which individual and generational mobility is easy and typical.[79] Unfortunately, satisfactory generational and career mobility data are not available for all our strata. However, mobility data for different skill levels and sectors provide clues on what may be going on. As early as 1937, Davidson and Anderson noted that sons of skilled workers inherited their father's occupations more than sons of any other occupational group.[80] Rogoff's Indianapolis study revealed that in 1910 and 1940 sons of skilled workers were less likely to leave their fathers' occupation than sons of most other workers.[81] Glass and Hall found that skilled workers in England and Wales inherited their fathers' occupations more than other sons.

Blau and Duncan's national study of male occupational mobility found less change among skilled workers than other occupations except for professionals, proprietors, and managers.[82] The same finding was reported in Featherman and Hauser's replication of the Blau and Duncan study.[83] Moreover, all of the above studies found that skilled workers' children experienced more upward and less downward mobility than children of other manual workers. Though many of these stratal differences are small, they appear to be constant and manifested in several areas. Thus, relatively more of the wives of craft than other manual workers have white-collar origins.[84] Two to three times the percentage of skilled than other manual workers' children enter universities.[85] Skilled workers associate more with each other off the job than do members of other manual groups.[86] These data suggest some basis for differentiating the skilled as a social class. The sparse comparable data for the SE suggest they are similar to the skilled.[87] Perhaps both strata should be considered social class segments of the aristocracy of labor.

The remaining strata (N-CORE, N-PERIF, and ME) probably resemble working-class segments more than social classes. The above analysis revealed that N-CORE and N-PERIF workers differed in their ascriptive characteristics and labor market participation. Since some two earner families have one spouse employed in the core and the other in the periphery, it makes little sense to split families along sector lines. According to our PUS sample, 62 per cent of husbands work in the core compared to 20 per cent of the wives. Husbands in the core have higher earnings and more steady employment than husbands in the periphery. Only 28 per cent of women who head families work in the core compared to 50 per cent of one-earner families headed by a male. Expectedly, the latter have higher

earnings. Thus, it appears that, other things being equal, for both one- and two-earner families, having one spouse employed in the core gives that family a noticeable earnings advantage.

Do employment sectors stratify workers into quasi-permanent groups? Can the advantages of core employment, for example, be intergenerationally transmitted? Harrison, reviewing the literature on poverty, discrimination, and unemployment, concluded that sector inequalities are transmitted intergenerationally through the school system which socializes children of core and periphery workers differently.[88] Children of core workers are taught habits of work regularity and responsibility and are steered toward jobs found in the core, while the reverse happens to children of periphery employees. Tolbert analyzed generational sector mobility with data that combined the Blau and Duncan study and Featherman and Hauser's replication.[89] Tolbert used Breiger's eight occupational classes.[90] Though Breiger's definition of strata (classes) and sector do not correspond exactly to those used in this study, they are similar. Tolbert found evidence supporting dual labor market theory. Not only did the majority of men remain in their father's sector, most of the small intersector mobility was from periphery to core. For craft, manufacturing, and service occupations, sector placement was clearly influenced by father's employment sector. Moreover, the mobility patterns of workers in craft and manufacturing firms in the core were quite similar while patterns in the periphery were more disparate. Because the data deal exclusively with male workers, they probably underestimate sector inheritance among non-skilled workers.[91] In short, the evidence suggests that the N-CORE and N-PERIF strata may have nascent social class characteristics with respect to career and generational mobility.

Data in this study are not sturdy enough to draw firm conclusions about the ME probably because the group includes several types of low employment workers: e.g., high school drop outs, college students, housewives working part-time, and the semi-retired. The limited available evidence on the perennially poor and unemployed suggests that their condition is not generationally transmitted and thus they do not form a social class.[92] A better identification of the ME is called for. Perhaps they should be defined as full-time workers with very low earnings or heads of families who are persistently underemployed.

In summary, a comparison of our working-class strata with other schemes that divide the class suggests that our strata are more readily identifiable in terms of social and economic characteristics. The SE and the SK are quite alike and they have nascent social class attributes. The skilled and the N-CORE are more similar economically than socially, while the N-CORE and N-PERIF are quite distinct along both dimensions. The ME need to be better differentiated from

the N-PERIF, but the need for maintaining the distinction is important. The biggest divide in the working class is between the upper three strata and the lower two.

Ultimately, the most important sociological question is, Does the social and economic segmentation of the working class have important behavioral and political consequences? Current evidence is contradictory perhaps because it reflects inadequacies and/or variations in the definition of working-class divisions or strata.[93] Clearly, the next research task should investigate the extent to which the strata differ in their social cohesion, their labor union membership, ethnic, neighborhood, and other ties and how such differences may affect political behavior. Some evidence suggests, for example, that labor union influence on political behavior varies by strata.[94] A fine-grained political analysis that supplements our economic analysis of strata should shed light on the political dynamics of the American working class. A parallel study of the economic and political divisions is also needed for the white-collar workers as well as the upper-middle class. When these studies are complete, the dynamics of class will be better understood.

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NOTES

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The adjustment of income for the self-employed stratum exacerbates neither its internal homogeneity nor its heterogeneity with respect to other strata. Analysis of variance was conducted on earnings for the five strata using both adjusted and unadjusted earnings (tables available upon request). The mean income difference for the self-employed was $1,500 but the ETA-squared, .2670, and F-statistic, significant below .001, remain constant and the index of variability (standard deviation/ mean) for the two self-employed samples decreases only slightly, .8915 to .8441. Therefore, the 30 per cent earnings adjustment for this stratum is not arbitrary. The research to date supports our decision and our subsequent analysis does not indicate distortion

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59. Bibb and Form, *op. cit.*, Robert C. Bibb, 'Industrial Organization, Market Structure, and Economic Performance: Empirical Foundations of the Dual Economy,' Unpublished manuscript. Nashville, Tennessee, Sociology Department, Vanderbilt University, 1981.

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64. Berg, *op cit.*

65. When the skilled are separated by sector into two dummy variables, those in the core have a higher B, and the difference is statistically significant when the sector interaction term is added to the equation.

66. In 1976, 1,700,000 women were working part-time because they could not find full-time jobs. See Nancy S. Barrett, 'Women in the Job Market: Unemployment and Work Schedules,' in Ralph E. Smith (ed.), *The Subtle Revolution*, Washington, D C., The Urban Institute, 1979, p. 67

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68. This conclusion is supported further by analysis of variance using earnings as the criterion variable (table available upon request). An index of variability (standard deviation/mean) was computed for each stratum. The SK, .4969, and N-CORE, .4922, demonstrate the greatest

degree of homogeneity of earnings, while the greatest variance is found among the ME. Between these two extremes are the SE, .8441 and the N-PERIF, .7066. The position of the latter was anticipated but that of the former needs to be explained. The social characteristics of the SE indicate a rather homogeneous stratum but the inclusion of service workers in our sample introduces a degree of heterogeneity in labor market participation and, subsequently, earnings The per cent of SE working either more than 50 weeks/year or 40 hours/week is less than the SK and N-CORE but greater than the N-PERIF and ME. Despite the variability in SE earnings, the between group variation of these strata is significantly greater than their within group variation: ETA-squared is .2670 and significant below .001. This analysis provides additional support for our contention that economic organization variables provide the basis for identifying strata in the working class.

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79. Weber, *op. cit.*, 1978; Using Blau and Duncan's occupational categories, Breiger found eight classes, three of which were manual· semi-autonomous skilled workers, manufacturing workers, and an 'archaic' class of service employees, operatives and laborers See Blau and Duncan, *op. cit.* Also, Breiger, *op. cit.*

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89. Bennett Harrison, 'The Theory of the Dual Economy,' in Bertram Silverman and Murray Yanowitch (eds), *The Worker in 'Post-Industrial' Capitalism*, New York, Free Press, pp. 269–87.

90 Charles Tolbert, 'Industrial Segmentation and Men's Intergenerational Mobility,' *Social Forces* vol. 61, June 1983, pp. 119–38; Blau and Duncan, *op. cit.*; Featherman and Hauser, *op. cit.*

91. Breiger, *op. cit.*

92. Blackburn and Mann studied a sample of non-skilled male manual workers in a British city who were employed primarily in the core sector. They found that jobs differed according to desirable working conditions, career potentiality, long-term earnings, ethnicity, and other characteristics. They concluded that the privileged and disprivileged were not separate social classes because they did not differ in patterns of occupational inheritance and because labor market careers could not be predicted on the basis of worker characteristics. In short, core non-skilled workers formed a single stratum. See Blackburn and Mann, *op. cit.*

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Raimondo Catanzaro

Enforcers, entrepreneurs, and survivors: how the *mafia* has adapted to change*

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to explain the reasons for the persistence and transformation of the *mafia*, a problem not addressed directly in the literature. The cultural codes of honour and of instrumental friendship are analysed. These codes served to train groups and individuals to competitiveness and to a particular relationship with the state. This led to the emergence of *mafia* when, with the Unification of Italy, the Sicilian periphery encountered the Italian national state. The promotion of economic development over the last thirty years has had the effect of helping the *mafia* to spread rather than that of eliminating it.

The thesis of the article is that the continuity of the *mafia* derives from its capacity to adapt continually to change. This happens because the *mafia* groups are not relics of the past, but were formed as a result of a specific combination of ancient and modern, a mixture of private violence and the legitimate violence of the state, of competition for economic resources in the market and the absence of regulatory standards for economic activities other than violence. In this sense, the *mafia* is a phenomenon typical of what can be defined as a process of social hybridization.

INTRODUCTION

The recrudescence of the *mafia* in the last few years raises disturbing questions. One no longer thinks of *mafia* simply as an expression of Sicilian backwardness; today one wants to ask why the *mafia* and its modes of behaviour have lasted, what its social roots are, and how it has been able to adapt to new economic and social contexts.

The literature on *mafia* has not yet confronted this problem. While interesting analyses of traditional *mafia* exist — of its codes of behaviour and its recent move towards entrepreneurship[1] — the continuity/transformation of the cultural codes and behaviour which

permit the perpetuation of the *mafia* are mentioned only rarely. The limited goal of this article is to make a contribution to the understanding of the ways in which, throughout the *mafia*'s history, its typical codes of behaviour and values have always adapted to changes in socio-economic and political conditions.

The article is organized around four basic points. I will first analyse two traditional codes of Sicilian culture, and particularly of *mafia* culture: the code of honour and the code of instrumental friendship. My argument is that these codes, and their accompanying behaviour patterns, are not traditional, in the sense that they are not feudal or pre-capitalistic vestiges; rather they derive from economic activities and networks of political and social relationships which are modern, even if not industrial or capitalistic.

The second point is that these cultural codes and modes of behaviour have trained individuals and groups both to competitiveness — albeit in a market with such idiosyncratic characteristics as regulation by violence — and to a relationship with the public administration that was particularly useful at the moment of the impact of the Italian nation-state upon the Sicilian periphery.

The third point is that the *mafia* emerged right after the building of the Italian state as a consequence of three aspects of that process. These are: the communication gap between centre and periphery and the consequent delegation to the local ruling class of social control over the peasants; the diffuse nature of the Italian public administration system of the periphery; and patronage system of local government.

The fourth and last point is based on the observation that in the last thirty years the economic development efforts taken by the state in Sicily have not eliminated the *mafia* but, rather, have accentuated its visibility and relevance. The *mafia's* values and modes of behaviour have adapted to the new situation of the welfare state, changing meaning and aims, but continuing to function as cultural tools for the enlargement of the *mafia* and its expansion to the national and international level.

The main thesis of the article is that the continuity of the *mafia*, if only in its capacity for profound transformation, derives from the fact that the *mafia's* behaviour has always been a specific combination of ancient and modern, a mixture of private violence and the legitimate violence of the state, of competition for economic resources in the market and the absence of regulatory standards for economic activities other than violence. Exactly because they are not relics of the past the values and modes of behaviour of the *mafia* have been able to adapt to every form of social change that has taken place in Sicily. Indeed, the *mafia* has sometimes played a leading role in such processes precisely because of its historical ability to hybridize traditional and modern values.

1. THE CODE OF HONOUR

Mafia behaviour is, by definition, determined by honour. The *mafioso* is a man who can earn respect unaided by the law or even by successful violation of it. The code of honour pervades much of Mediterranean culture[2] and, in order to understand honour as the basis of *mafia* behaviour, it is necessary to understand its social connotation. This connotation is double and contradictory. Along with a 'static' notion of honour, which is related to conditions of inequality, there coexists a second, 'dynamic', notion deriving from the subjective pretence of equality. This manifests itself in the competition between individuals and groups.[3]

In its static aspect honour is the socially recognized ability of the head of a family to guarantee his family a standard of living at their level of resources. This is thus related to the ability to care effectively for the family's property and its unity against attacks from outside, with particular regard to the protection of the chastity of the wife and the virginity of the daughters. Honour is thus a socially recognized means of evaluating the distribution of statuses with reference to three aspects of individual behaviour: (1) living at the level of the economic resources possessed; (2) assuring the protection of those resources; and (3) effectively guarding the sexual integrity of the women of the family. A number of anthropological studies[4] show that, in the culture of Mediterranean peoples, these three elements are related. For example, a woman who is a spendthrift or wears clothes or colours not suited to her rank is probably an adulteress as well. If a man cannot guarantee the chastity of his women it is probably because he is a good-for-nothing. And so forth.

Two aspects of this notion of honour should be emphasized: first, treating women and property as equal in terms of honour and loss of honour; second, the social duty of living according to one's means and station. In a society which holds to the principle of living within one's means, property is given, transmitted by inheritance, not acquired through processes of social mobility. This notion of honour is applied to women. As can be inferred from the expressions 'honoured' or 'honest' women, the woman is merely a passive subject of the attribution of honour: honour is a quality that she has at birth and which is lost only by inappropriate behaviour. By this definition, the only one which applies to women — but applies not only to them — honour is a code of behaviour which reflects the fixed distribution of ascribed statuses. A person is honoured because he was born in an honoured family. In this way honour has a purely static connotation; it is a reflection of an ascribed status.

But in Sicilian culture one can be not only an honoured person but also 'a man of honour'. The difference is that one is not born a man of honour but becomes one. In this second sense, honour is a particular

ability consisting in strength and cunning or in some other individual gift which inspires admiration and respect and helps one make one's way in life. For example, the man of honour, even if his origins are humble, has become wealthy and respected by bullying. Or he has killed and been acquitted for lack of evidence; in which case he can count on *omertà*, the silence of others obtained by threat of violence. In this case, honour is conceived of as an extraordinary individual ability reinforced by the accumulation of a capital of successful violence.[5] The more effectively a man is able to use violence the higher he rises on the scale of honour. The struggle for honour is therefore a competition for social mobility in a society that is still a stranger to the capitalistic market. One fights to acquire honour and so to alter the pre-existing fixed distribution of honour. This second is a dynamic conception of honour as an achieved status.

Honour is, therefore, on the one hand an ascribed status deriving from the family condition, and so a typical product of social inequality arising from social stratification. On the other hand, it can also result from an extraordinary individual ability, that is, a status achieved by means of the struggle for honour. In this second aspect honour is related to conditions of social equality.

It should thus be emphasized that the competition for honour is not open to everyone but operates among subjects who either are equal or who can claim equality.[6] If a baron seduced the wife or daughter of a peasant, or appropriated his property, it was not usually an occasion for conflicts in terms of honour. The social inferior accepted these events as part of his earthly lot. But when the offences came from his peers conflicts over honour would break out. These conflicts are particularly violent for two reasons. First, because honour is perceived as a fixed amount; the conflicts are zero-sum games. When someone acquires honour someone else loses it in the same measure.

But there is a second and more pertinent reason why the struggle for honour has crucial importance. In a society in which resources are scarce people who compete successfully for honour win a symbolic resource that permits greater access to material resources. Honour is, in fact, a system of stratification that

> describes the distribution of wealth in a social idiom, and prescribes appropriate behaviour for people at the various points in the hierarchy; it entails acceptance of superordination and subordination . . . Honour stratification invites equals to quarrel, and asserts the cooperative dependence of those who have less honour on those who have more.[7]

Honour is an idiom in the language of competition for access to resources, a competition in the form of physical violence that takes place between individuals and groups. These groups are defined according to networks of kinship, quasi-kinship (*comparaggio*, that is,

co-parenthood, relationships between godparents and godchildren and between parents and godparents of the same children) and instrumental friendship.

2. INSTRUMENTAL FRIENDSHIP

Every friendship has two components. The emotional component consists in the pleasure of the company of friends. When this component is emphasized the friendship is an end in itself. The other is an access-to-resources component which manifests itself in the voluntary exchange of favours. When this aspect is emphasized, friendship becomes an instrument for attaining goals outside the friendship itself. This is nearly the ideal type of instrumental friendship. The essence of instrumental friendship, therefore, lies in the possibility of reciprocity in the exchange of resources, either one's own or acquired; in the potential continuity of such exchange; and , finally, in the largely open nature of the relationship. In fact, each of the friends acts as a potential link with others.[8] But in instrumental friendship there is always an emotional component, even if it is mainly symbolic-ritual.[9] Instrumental friendship is essentially, however, a sort of credit card which takes the form of such expressions as 'Say that I sent you', or 'Mention my name'. This creates bonds structured according to typical networks, which common parlance calls 'friends of friends'.[10]

What functions does instrumental friendship perform? It serves essentially to create non-corporate groups, networks of informal relationships that compete with one another for economic and political resources. In the networks of instrumental friendship, solidarity is based on trust in the fulfillment of obligations on the principle of balanced reciprocity.[11] It is trust, then, which characterizes these non-corporate groups and not the stable network of relationships and impersonal obligations typical of modern corporate groups. Networks of instrumental friendships based on informal relationships of trust played a crucial economic role in pre-unification Sicily. In fact, they made the principal economic and commercial transactions possible. The basic instrument for this was made from *ad hoc* — that is, temporary and task-oriented — coalitions. Such coalitions were destined to dissolve as soon as the task was completed. Naturally this meant that they were largely unstable, and so they continually redefined and re-formed themselves. Moreover, the informal trust on which they were based required constant reconfirmation by actions.[12] Without this the coalition dissolved even before the goal was attained.

Such an informal structure of interpersonal relationships was typical of a society into which the principles of the capitalistic market had not yet penetrated but which, nevertheless, had economic relations with those centres in which the world system of the

European capitalist economy was being formed.[13] In other words, it belonged to the periphery of the European capitalistic system in formation. Let us see how instrumental friendship began.

3. THE GENESIS OF INSTRUMENTAL FRIENDSHIP AND THE CODE OF HONOUR

Before we examine the origins of instrumental friendship and the code of honour it will be helpful to outline some economic and political characteristics of Sicily under the Spanish empire (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). Two very important developments occurred during this period: the reinforcement of the latifundistic structure of landownership; and absenteeism on the part of the barons. These developments, which had a marked effect on western Sicily, gave rise to a particularly active rural entrepreneurship which profited from the increasing demand of Spain and, later, north-central Europe for a foodstuff, durum wheat, whose cultivation was the specialty of the western Sicilian latifundia. Earlier, between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, a structure of human settlements based on agrotowns had progressively taken shape; the rural villages (*casali*) disappeared as the Catalan barons promoted sheep farming as well as the cultivation of grain. The small settlements of agricultural population in the countryside disappeared, as did inter-city markets, roads, and centres of artisanal production. There resulted, particularly in the area of the latifundia, a structure of less differentiated and complex settlements. Sicily, especially in the west, saw the disappearance of a structure in which villages, rural centres, and cities were integrated by means of bureaucratic and commercial hierarchies. Each agrotown became differentiated internally, but all resembled one another; there was neither division of labour nor any hierarchic order among them. Each settlement was connected to the outside world mainly by the export of grain.[14] The agrotowns were isolated and travel in the surrounding countryside was made dangerous by bandits and highwaymen. The administration was not able to guarantee public order. This lack of order spurred the rural entrepreneurs to create a system of self-defence based on the indiscriminate use of violence. The organization of armed bands of guards (*campieri*) and caretakers of latifundia later constituted the operative structure of *mafia* violence.

The absence of links between the agrotowns, the lack of commercial and market hierarchies and the need to get export goods to European markets all necessitated the creation of networks of connections which would be farther-reaching than merely local ones of kinship and quasi-kinship. Without a network of impersonal relationships, as would have been typical of the capitalistic market, the only, or at least the principal basis for trust was instrumental friendship and its main

operative tool the temporary coalition of friends. Both served to define networks of exchange of economic resources. The code of instrumental friendship should, therefore, be interpreted as an organizational response of the rural entrepreneurs to the opportunities for commerce and export which opened up to them under Spanish rule.[15] The necessity of responding in these terms was accentuated by the nature of the Sicilian administrative system under Spain. The system of distribution of offices was prebendary and the behaviour of the bureaucracy certainly did not correspond to the Weberian ideal type. To obtain authorization, licences, concessions, and administrative passes, one needed to have entry to the right offices. One needed to be able to count on the favours of persons whom one would one day repay in kind. In other words, one needed one's own network of acquaintances in order to lubricate the slow mechanisms of bureaucracy.[16] Instrumental friendship was served for this too. In the absence of a capitalistic market and modern state, it functioned as an informal parallel structure which interacted with the administration. In a sense, instrumental friendship was to temporary coalitions as the state was to entrepreneurial associations in early capitalism: 'It lent credibility to contracts and a modicum of predictability to affairs.'[17]

The absence of a capitalistic market and modern state also helps to explain the reinforcement and institutionalization of the code of honour: by allowing the family to defend its property (including the women, for their productive and reproductive functions) against attacks from outside, it was an ideology of defence of the family and kinship groups.

From where does this ideology of defence derive and how has it established itself? One explanation which appears convincing is that of J. Schneider,[18] who adopts a thesis of Wallerstein on the different ways in which the capitalistic and the empire systems control peripheral areas. Unlike capitalistic economies, which use market mechanisms to control society, empires control their peripheries essentially by means of administrative instruments that tend to impede or slow up the private accumulation of capital. In Sicily, various elements threatened the unity and strength of the family with respect to property. In addition to laws dictating the division of property among the heirs at the death of the head of the family, and the dowry for the daughters who married, there were the principles of the Catholic Church. The Church's ban on marriage between cousins impeded the consolidation of property and 'subordinated the community of blood to the community of faith'.[19] Both the Church and political power exerted strong pressures that tended to limit the power of kinship groups in society. Thus the code of honour emerged and grew in strength as a response to the attack of the Church and of political power against the integrity of the family and its property.

The situation of Sicily before the unification of Italy cannot,

therefore, be interpreted either in terms of feudalism or in terms of isolation. On the contrary, conditions developed which trained individuals and groups to both competitiveness and solidarity beyond the confines of the family. Competitiveness appeared in that particular arena in which honour was understood as a social idiom in the language of stratification by wealth. It is important to note that, unlike the market, where the opportunities for gain are formally peaceful and the actors are pledged not to use predatory and violent methods,[20] this is an arena in which the basic means of acquiring resources is violence. This gives business undertakings a temporary life in that possibility of violence precludes long-lasting trust and thus long-term investments. For this reason, *ad hoc* temporary coalitions based on networks of instrumental friendship constitute the ideal corporate tool. They have a flexibility which allows the alliances to orient themselves quickly to the sudden and unforeseeable changes that occur in a market whose main regulative instrument is violence. Furthermore, they provide a modicum of predictability insofar as they permit manipulation of state agencies for private ends. This economic and political system has been called 'broker capitalism',[21] being different from both feudalism and capitalism. In this system the functions of brokerage assume a crucial role.

4. THE IMPACT OF THE NATION-STATE AND THE RISE OF THE *MAFIA*

Throughout roughly five centuries of Spanish rule and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Sicily was the periphery of either the Spanish Empire or the nascent European capitalist economy. After 1860 it became a periphery of the Italian state. This was a change of no small significance. Communication with the centre became crucial, and three aspects of the process of system-building assumed especial importance: 'penetration (state-building)', 'standardization (nation-building)', and 'equalization of the rights of participation (establishment of political citizenship)'.[22] And it is exactly while these were under way that conditions were created for the *mafia* to emerge as the institutionalization of the two codes we have discussed. The *mafia* emerges as the institutionalization both of private violence as means of social control for those who hold the monopoly of honour and of instrumental friendship as means of penetrating the public administration for private purposes (patronage). To understand the rise of the *mafia* it is necessary, therefore, to outline the social structure existing on the periphery and the manner in which the administrative and political system was constructed in the course of the formation of the Italian national state.

The *mafia* is not a relic of the past but a modern product of the process of formation of the Italian national state. To the extent that

violence was used as a private instrument of social control the *mafia* was a means of easing tensions or a form of connection between formal requirements of the national political society and the demands of the periphery. Whoever performs such a function can be called a power broker and, in fact, this is what the original *mafiosi* were. Their role was to control the channels linking the local population with the national society as a whole.[23] The structural conditions for the emergence of the *mafia* can be traced back to the nature of the economic and social structure of west-central Sicily during the crisis of the latifundia and to the state's inability to use its monopoly of physical violence.[24]

The structure of the latifundia of west-central Sicily was atypical, inasmuch as it was based on three social classes: absentee landed aristocracy, agrarian bourgeoisie (represented by the *gabelloti*[25]) and peasants. There was no class of landless rural wage earners (*braccianti*). The liberalization of commerce in land and the sale of Church properties which followed unification did not produce a class of peasant owners; they reinforced the power of the *gabelloti*, who resembled the landed aristocracy in the scale of their landownership and in that they did not exploit their holdings capitalistically. Further, they imitated the aristocracy in their social behaviour. Thus, despite the marketability of land the market remained extremely small. Land was rarely sold and, when it was, it was sold in parcels so large that most peasants were *de facto* kept out of the market. On the other hand, rental contracts passed all the risks on to the peasants.[26] Therefore, the liberalization of the land market did not eliminate — indeed, with the abolition of the rights to use common fields, it accentuated — the hunger for land and competition for its possession. Because the landowners were absent and a class of rural wage earners did not exist conflicts were not between social classes ranked vertically but were largely competition for the possession of land between parallel groups. Land then remained essentially a source of power; and, for this reason, possession of it or control over its use remained conditions for the attributions of honour to individuals.

Under the conditions just described social tensions were aggravated. The years 1812–60 saw the birth of a new class of bourgeois landowners (the *gabelloti*), and increase in the numbers of landless peasants and a growing interdependence of city and country and of social classes.[27] This growing interdependence collided with the need for centralized control typical of a newly formed national state. There were two reasons for this: first, continuing interests of the absentee landowners as the principal force of Sicilian society; second, the strongly segmentary nature of rural Sicilian society which was related to the self-sufficiency of the agrotowns and to the lack of efficient communication networks between them and the society as a whole. One of the most important aspects of this segmentation was caused by the exclusion of the peasants from the labour market, because they

were not yet a labour force, and from the political market, because they did not have the right to vote. As a result, a state superimposed from outside, as the Italian one was, was unable to guarantee effective control and manipulation of social tensions. Recourse to violence certainly was not a novelty; but now, unlike in the past, it occurred in the context of weak authority of a state which formally claimed to hold a legitimate monopoly of physical violence.[28] This, in turn, forced the state, in the context of general choices of alliances among the industrial bourgeoisie of the north and landowners of the south,[29] to come to terms with whoever exercised *de facto* power at the local level, and to hand over to them the monopoly of legitimate violence. When it became understood that the sovereignty of the state did not actually exist violence became generalized. Thus the *mafia* represented a response to the strains among peasants, landlords and *gabelloti*, and between them and the central government. It was a way to manage these strains by means of a particular behaviour in which *mafiosi* specialized as power brokers.[30] Once characterized as holders of the honour monopoly, the *mafiosi* were able to exercise social control legally, playing a role of political and economic intermediaries. Their functions of mediation and liaison were not limited to control of the electorate and prevention of peasants' rebellions (or their repression by violence), but were based on their position of supervision and management on the absentee landlords' estates. In this sense it is possible to say that the economic base of *mafiosi* as power brokers finds an equivalent in the existence of broker capitalism. Thus as broker capitalism rises to fill the gap between agricultural production and marketing, similarly, at the level of social control, the *mafioso* as power broker appears to fill the gap between peasants and state, assuming from the state the management of physical violence. 'In terms of actual control and authority, *mafia* constituted a pragmatic dimension of the State.'[31]

This characterization of the *mafia* was facilitated by the nature of the central Italian administration at the periphery level, as well as by the organization of local administration.

The unified Italian state was characterized, right from the start, by the need to control the periphery with very strong instruments in order to prevent social disorders. This forced the central government to prefer the French administrative system, based on the figure of the prefect, to the English.[32] Nevertheless, the prefect was not an instrument for effecting the inter-ministerial unity of the administration in the French manner. In France, the prefecture controlled the activities of all the ministries at the territorial level, whereas in Italy, the prefecture as extension of the Ministry of Internal Affairs controlled only justice and local government. This led to a lack of administrative integration between centre and periphery and gave a diffuse quality to the Italian administrative system; this meant that

the administration penetrated to the periphery insufficiently and that its control was weak. As a result the liberal élite slowed down the introduction of universal suffrage thus depriving the local opposition of the instrument of electoral representation.[33]

On the other hand, the local government did not manage to mediate between society and the state. The introduction of local autonomy where there had been no political participation and where suffrage was very limited concentrated the resources in the hands of a few local powerful men or their trusted collaborators. This caused competition for the conquest of power at the local level to intensify. Such competition nevertheless could only take the form of particularism and patronage, given that the groups possessed of local political power were the same ones which held the material bases of power at the social level. In general, there occurred a form of patronage-based competition for power. In fact, joining a patronage group was the only means available to protect oneself from the consequences of an illegal and discriminatory use of power.[34] Patronage, which began as an instrument of social control in the absence of political participation, was not the best tool for promoting it. The great masses of the population remained shut out from any relations with the state and their integration was entrusted not to political-administrative tools but to the manipulation of local politics through patronage. In the areas in which *mafia* was developing this meant, essentially, a powerful interweaving of *mafia* and political power both at the level of the local political-administrative system and of the peripheral branches of the central administration. And, besides, the *mafia* groups, trained by the networks of instrumental friendship to move skilfully through the labyrinths of the administration, were certainly not shy about entering the vital nerve-centres of the state. When the Left came to power (1876) suffrage was partially extended (1882) and *trasformismo*[35] became government practice; by then the institutionalization of *mafia* as an expression of the interweaving between state and local potentates could be said to have been completed.

5. THE *MAFIA* AS CAUSE AND EFFECT OF SOCIAL HYBRIDIZATION

The *mafia* was born as a response of the periphery to the impact with the centre; but it could not assert itself without the centre's support. The state authorities' use of *mafia* power indicates that the *mafia* phenomenon should be looked at in the context of systems of alliances among social classes and political interest groups that occurred at the local level but which had to cross the boundaries of the local political system to negotiate at the national level. The regional alliance between the agrarian bourgeoisie (the former *gabelloti*), the intellectual petty bourgeoisie, and the latifundist aristocracy was able to sustain

itself only because of the *mafia's* repression of the peasants. In order that this power might be exercised with impunity, a national alliance was necessary between southern latifundists and the northern industrial bourgeoisie which delegated to the latifundists, through the governing class, the repression of the peasants.[36]

The *mafia* was born of the incapacity of the state to use its monopoly of legitimate violence; but the reasons it was able to take root socially were more numerous. The reasons it was able to persist are different from those of its genesis. The *mafia* has acquired an autonomy which guarantees, automatically as it were, its reproduction and makes it difficult to uproot.

Police repression of the *mafia* under Fascism can supply an example of this.[37] The state's assumption of the monopoly of violence, and the suppression of elections, took away the social bases of *mafiosi* as power brokers. The *mafia*, which had supported the liberal anti-Fascist party at the beginning of the regime, apparently collapsed; small *mafiosi* who did not join the black shirts were eliminated. The large landowners, once the repression of the peasants was guaranteed by the apparatuses of the state, were happy to shake off the economic weight of *mafia* mediation[38] and joined the regime. As a result, when prefect Mori, in charge of the police effort, began to take aim at the landowners, he was promptly dismissed. The *mafia* re-emerged in 1943 with the same apparent characteristics that it had had at the beginning of the century. But some years afterwards a profound process of crisis, transformation, and restructuring would overwhelm it, causing it to re-emerge in new and perennially changing forms from the beginning of the 1960s.

What are the reasons for the *mafia's* ability to persist, to adapt to change, altering forms but succeeding often in becoming even more pervasive?

It has been stressed that one of the fundamental models of behaviour for the *mafia* consists in resistance to social changes but, when these appear inevitable, to exploit them for its own ends.[39] One of the many possible examples would be the resistance to the introduction of co-operativism among the peasants and the subsequent organization of co-operatives by *mafiosi* themselves. *Don* Calò Vizzini, one of the principal *mafia* chiefs of the first half of this century, began to organize agricultural co-operatives among soldiers returning from the First World War. He continued this activity after the Second World War and succeeded, with the use of a typical instrument of peasant unionism, to throw the peasant movement into disorder.[40]

One of the consequences of this model of behaviour is that new institutions come to be utilized for the fulfilment of traditional values. A double process thus occurs: on one side, the modern institutions are modified and employed for ends other than those for which they were originally intended. On the other, the traditional values do not

disappear; they are not replaced by new values, but are adapted to make traditional use of new institutions. This process of social hybridization of which the *mafia* is, perhaps emblematically, at once cause and effect, constituted the basis of the *mafia's* power and of its extraordinary capacity to survive and reproduce. To understand this process better we can examine the example of the co-operativistic organization promoted by the *mafia* chief. He manages to have the regional authorities block a co-operative founded by the peasant movement; then he forms his own. The peasants, who have seen their proposal fail, depend on him for their very survival. Whoever is admitted to the co-operative feels lucky and regards admission not in terms of a normal economic transaction but as a form of unconditional concessions of benefits. Whoever feels thus benefitted 'becomes his protector's man in the feudal sense of the word; he has, in a certain sense, received his life from him in fief, and, from then on, is ready to serve him'.[41]

What are the consequences of the persistence of this pre-contractual[42] conception of the economic transaction and of its combination with relationships which belong to a market economy? The nature of the unconditional concession of benefits is that the party that receives the benefits is not asked for anything specific in return. But, in a social atmosphere like that described in these pages, the vagueness of the repayment is translated into the perpetual debt of proofs of moral obligation — that is, of symbols and pledges of loyalty. The receiver of benefits can thus be asked for a percentage of his economic activities or for a vote for a candidate in elections. He can be asked to become a killer. Thus economic functions and functions of social control and political power combine tightly in the *mafia*-style obligation. In general terms, one can say that economic resources are converted into political resources: that is, into control over people with an increase in resources. In fact, obligations based on loyalty constituted a credit, a potential always and repeatedly due.

This explains why the *mafiosi* were able, ever since first making their presence felt in west-central Sicily, to adapt to processes of economic transformation of a society which, although it was unable to develop industrially, was far from static. Indeed, it showed notable dynamism in economic enterprises.[43] The constant adaptation of this model of behaviour to the changing of the historical conditions has been the *mafia's* strength. It was this capacity that has made possible the remarkable recovery which the *mafia* has enjoyed since the Second World War.

6. THE PUBLIC POLICY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE SPREAD OF THE *MAFIA*

Repression by the Fascist regime did not cut off the *mafia* economic and social roots but struck at its most visible manifestations.

Moreover, at the time of the repression, bonds between the Sicilian *mafia* and American organized crime had existed for some time as a result of transoceanic migration. Today these bonds constitute one of the main organizational tools of the international drug traffic.

The re-emergence of the *mafia* at the end of the Second World War cannot, however, be understood except with reference to the new functions assumed by the Italian state in the context of a more general policy for the development of the *Mezzogiorno*. The basic problem has been that of institutionalization of the rights of social citizenship.[44] In other words, in the post-war period, a policy of redistribution of resources began which was typical of the welfare state. Alongside it existed a policy of economic development. The state then has had two faces in the Mezzogiorno and Sicily. It has promoted development, and thus has allowed the capitalistic market to be introduced into the Mezzogiorno, thereby opening the region to trade and exchanges and to European markets. At the same time it has assumed the welfare-related duties of redistributing resources and of assisting the people of the south with pensions, subsidies, and various other social benefits. The state thus becomes both agent of social change and defender of the traditional balance of power.[45]

In this context, economic and political activities become more and more tightly interwoven, a situation which favours yet again those groups and individuals who were already trained to move through political labyrinths and to penetrate the public administration. But other groups emerge together with these: in particular, new groups of economic operators, typically entrepreneurs whose private economic activities and social rise are guaranteed by a privileged relationship to the sources of public support of such economic activities.[46] From the beginning of the 1950s, in fact, private entrepreneurial groups emerge as a result not of selective functioning of the free market but of state support to firms. The state has promoted an economic policy oriented towards the creation of infrastructures and development of building activities; moreover it has promoted entrepreneurship, granting financing at low interest rates and free subsidies to enterprises. In this way, a relationship of exchange is created between entrepreneurs, the party system (especially the Christian Democrats), and the political-administrative system. The *mafiosi* understand that the essential virtue of modern man is that of acquiring capital through economic activity. They understand the possibility of increasing their volume of business and their economic power by exploiting privileged relationships with the party in power and so with the development apparatus of the state.

But other processes, too, characterize the more recent developments of the *mafia*: namely expanding markets for local entrepreneurs and the opening up of new opportunities in illegal economic activities.

In the course of the 1970s, the assisted entrepreneurs of eastern Sicily, traditionally considered safe from the *mafia*, began to do

business in the markets of western Sicily. They were obliged to come to terms with the relationships between economy and polity existing there. The differences are not many: it is a question of adapting the practice of clientelism in a *mafia*-patronage dimension. In this way an enterprise that appeared 'clean', in that it was immune from *mafia* methods, was 'polluted' by these methods after conquering new markets. For those who had always been *mafia* entrepreneurs the inverse occurred. Their expansion on markets originally not penetrated by the *mafia* set off a process of transformation of local political systems in the *mafia*-patronage sense. These phenomena are important because it is not only a question of changes of quantity or intensity of *mafia* activities. We are witnessing a process of potential depersonalization of the *mafia's* power.

Traditionally *mafia* power had a personal quality. That was because of, first, the role of *mafiosi* as brokers. Moreover, the *mafioso* often assumed public duties including those which represented the community to the outside. This community aspect was related to a third characteristic of *mafia* power; a power with geographical limitations. The decline of its intermediary functions and the *mafia* organization of modern economic and entrepreneurial activities potentially spelled the end of the personal nature of its power. The formation of *mafia* enterprises not only caused the community aspect to disappear but, after the expansion of the scale of activities of the assisted entrepreneurs, the geographical limitation explodes too.[47] *Mafia* power thus tends to become an impersonal market power.

This tendency is limited by the persistence of, and sometimes by the emphasis on, violence as a tool for regulating economic competition among *mafia* groups. The end of geographical limitation of *mafia* power exacerbated the violent struggle between rival *mafia* groups for the conquest of markets or, at least, for economic opportunities.[48] Certain facts which reinforce the process of depersonalization of *mafia* power should not, in any case, be forgotten. These are the pure economic links, thus links of interests, between *mafia* enterprises and others: the other enterprises to which jobs are subcontracted or with which agreements are stipulated or cartels formed; the banks into whose vaults flows money of *mafia* origin in the form of deposits; the many individuals who earn incomes from the circulation of this money. All of these form a constellation of interests on which the impersonal market power of *mafia* groups is based.[49] Even if this process is not unilinear, because of strong counter-tendencies, the anonymity of market forces informs the process of depersonalization of *mafia* power. But, as a consequence of the processes just outlined as well as of the proliferation of the illicit economic activities of the *mafia*, it assumes more of the features of a hidden power.

7. HIDDEN POWER AND ILLICIT ECONOMY

The *mafia's* power was not always hidden; in fact it operated openly. And this was true for both of the aspects of the traditional *mafiosi's* career: the violent destructive one and the institutionalized one legitimized by acceptance by the population as a result of success in the use of violence.[50] In both cases, the open display of power by *mafiosi* derived from the combination of their brokerage functions and the state's delegation of the use of violence. To be a broker, the *mafioso* must enjoy a reputation in society and must be considered as a man of honour; and this derives from his having previously proved himself highly skilled in the use of violence. Having been thus recognized, he no longer needs to use open violence because he can earn an income from normal economic activities which are based on a fortune acquired illegally.

Both of these processes — from violence to legitimization and from illegal to legal economic activities — have slowed down from the 1950s on. The requirements of social control by traditional methods were sharply reduced and both the state's delegation of its monopoly of violence and the brokerage functions of the men of honour have come to a halt. The *mafia* is no longer the pragmatic dimension of the state and, as a result, its power is less visible. Alongside these processes, the growth in importance of the illegal sector of the *mafia's* economic activities has brought with it a tendency to assume the lineaments of a hidden power. Ever since the 1950s, *mafiosi* have constantly been immersed in illegal practices; and not only, as in the past, in the early stages of their career. The organization of increasingly economic activities by the *mafia* is associated with the beginning of the drug traffic in the 1950s.[51]

The expansion of the drug market and the Sicilian *mafia's* rise to pre-eminence in it[52] have a series of consequences the first of which can be seen in the banking system. The direct and indirect conditioning of the banking system by *mafia* groups is evident. On the one hand, private banks grow as a consequence of profits deriving from assisted entrepreneurial activities and *mafia* entrepreneurship. On the other hand, the conditioning power grows as a result of the enormous quantity of cash in *mafia* hands.[53] An idea of the dimensions of this power can be had by considering that by the 1960s the Anti-Mafia Commission set up by the Italian Parliament was finding irregular cases of credit granted to known *mafiosi* not only by small private local banks but also by commercial national banks.[54]

The expansion and scale of *mafia* activities today have upset the traditional relationships between *mafia* and political power. How did this occur? What role do the traditional tools of instrumental

friendship and patronage play in the present structure of the relationships between the *mafia* world and politics? To answer these questions it is necessary to look at the ways in which traditional values have adapted to changes in *mafia* behaviour and to the needs that have grown out of these changes.

8. THE ADAPTATION OF TRADITIONAL CULTURAL CODES

The passage of the *mafiosi* from power brokers to entrepreneurs is a change of great importance. The use of market mechanisms and privileged relationships with the state bureaucracy to construct economic empires combining legal and illegal activities constitutes a further example of the capacity of *mafia* groups to blend old and new, traditional and modern.[55] An old pattern repeats itself in this new combination: traditional values do not disappear but change function and meaning. This holds true for both honour and instrumental friendship.

Once they have joined the game of market competition the *mafiosi* must adapt to its rules. The functions of instrumental friendship, of allowing trust and predictability in economic transactions, are largely reduced and are replaced by legal and commercial guarantees; but not altogether. In fact, in a dependent economy it is difficult for local entrepreneurs to foresee trends in demand, given the unbalanced nature of the commodities market and the marked fluctuations caused by external investments. The problem of predictability is resolved by state policy which, systematically favouring certain sectors of economic activities with its financing, allows the entrepreneurs to identify low-risk opportunities for investment.[56] To ensure predictability instrumental friendship is increasingly changed into both a patronage-exchange relationship between entrepreneurs and politicians and into the formation of groups and alliances between business groups, political factions and parts of the apparatus of the state. The relationship loses all vestiges of its symbolic-emotional nature and becomes purely instrumental.

As for the problem of trust, if the need for recourse to instrumental friendship is reduced in the legal sector of the economy it remains urgent in the illicit sector. Here, however, given the scale of the interests in play, instrumental friendship is no longer able to furnish sufficient guarantees. The functioning of the illicit sector cannot, by its very nature, rest on transactions which are exposed to the light of day and which are based on the normal relationships of trust proper to the market. As long as business must be hidden, the only system for making the illicit machine function is an intense network of fiduciary relationships. For these reasons, *mafia* groups organize themselves by reviving traditional values and basing themselves on relationships of

kinship and quasi-kinship.[57] But, however much these bonds can be extended by means of matrimonial strategies, *comparaggio*, and so on, it always remains necessary to have recourse outside the networks of kinship and quasi-kinship. In these cases, which are very numerous, especially when alliances between different *cosche* are concerned,[58] the traditional code of honour has fundamental importance. Respect for the obligations undertaken and conformity to what has been decided within the *cosca* both demand behaviour which conforms to the code of honour. This code then becomes the main instrument on which relationships of organizational trust in illegal activities are based. Honour loses its cultural significance for regulating standard of competition for social mobility. Now that even the *mafia* is oriented more towards accumulating capital than gaining respect, honour serves to promote internal cohesion within *mafia* groups.

Nevertheless, this cohesion is not easy to maintain because of the many temptations offered by the illegal market. One successful operation is enough to make a fortune: for example holding back the proceeds of the sale of drugs instead of delivering the shipment to the owners. It was exactly an episode of this sort which touched off the violent conflict between *cosche* which characterized one of the many *fasi calde* ('hot phases') which Palermo went through at the beginning of the 1960s.[59] The suspicion that two couriers had withheld part of a drug shipment destined for the USA caused one *cosca* to break its alliance with the others and to kill one of the presumed traitors (the other had gone to ground) and many of their relatives and friends, causing a chain reaction of vast proportions.

One could say about this episode that a sort of 'in-house conflict' was resolved by recourse to violence. Thus violence has become the basic instrument of economic competition among *mafiosi*. It is not that it was not such before; it is that now it assumes a new, more open meaning, without ideological overlays and justifications. Up until the 1950s, *mafia* violence found a legitimacy in three factors: the state's delegation of the use of violence; the community nature of *mafia* power as public management of order; the ownership of its monopoly justified in terms of social attribution of honour. Now that these conditions have been exhausted the use of violence appears for what it is even in the substitution of the machine gun and TNT for the traditional sawn-off shotgun: pure, brutal, often indiscriminate demonstration of the rule of physical force.

The great transformation of *mafia* during the last thirty years has brought with it an upset and a re-adaptation of the traditional cultural codes. Instrumental friendship is no longer a delicate balance between instrumentality and symbolic solidarity. The first is subsumed under relationships of interests and exchange between individuals and groups and specialized brokerage agencies. The second, as far as *mafia* groups are concerned, tends to be replaced by honour. Honour loses

the connotation of an idiom in the language of material wealth and of a regulatory instrument of the competition for social mobility. The ambivalence of the concept of honour is thus reduced. Replaced by wealth as a standard of social status and symbol of power, honour contributes to the institutionalization of trust in the organization of the illicit economy. Its former competitive function is assumed by violence. Violence, in its actual exercise and in the threat of recourse to it, not only regulates competition between *mafia* groups but is asserted as a normative system in relationships between *mafioso* and non-*mafioso* sectors of the economic system. The *mafia* use of violence to discourage competition, in all its forms, from non-*mafia* enterprises is an apt example of the attempt to impose brute force as a general regulatory norm of the market.

9. *MAFIA* AND POLITICAL POWER: FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE CENTRE

Mafia violence, stripped by now of its symbolic cloak of honour, does not present itself only as a regulatory tool of economic competition. It is increasingly becoming a political force entering into open conflict with the powers of the state. For more than ten years representatives of the powers of the state, judges, officials of police and officers of the *carabinieri*, even a president of the Sicilian regional government and a prefect of the Republic, have systematically become *mafia* targets and victims. The phenomenon is completely new; except for rare cases, concerning the rural *mafia* or shootings between *mafia*-gangsters and forces of police and *carabinieri*, the *mafia* had never before attacked the powers of the state.

The causes of this change are rooted in the destabilized conditions of *mafia* existence which we have discussed. In brief, the expansion of the illegal economy, the volume of business sparked off by *mafia* dealings, and the national and international dimensions of the interests involved have led to a double phenomenon: on the one hand the need of the *mafia* groups to take direct possession of the crucial parts of the state machinery; on the other hand, that of openly combatting those parts of the state apparatus which resist such domination and oppose the spread of *mafia*.

A thesis has recently been advanced that the growth of *mafia* power is characterized, as compared with the traditional model of the relationships between *mafia* and politics, by the novel element of the political autonomy of *mafia* power. Such autonomy expresses itself, according to this thesis, in two forms: the 'internalization of political representation of *mafia* groups'; and the formation of *mafioso*-political lobbies based on 'relationships of common economic interest among *mafia* leaders, political leaders, and sectors of the local and national economic and financial world'.[60] This thesis may appear convincing

in the light of the growth of *mafia* power; it does not adequately define the autonomy of *mafia* power and the new forms in which it appears.

In the first place, it is difficult to define what is meant by the political autonomy of *mafia* power. If it means the capacity to affect policies fundamental to the political system, the *mafia* is not autonomous. If, however, it means the capacity to influence policies with reference to a given geographical area or economic sector then, paradoxically, it was so once, but is not now. Traditionally, in fact, the *mafia*, after being delegated the use of violence, became a power with a broad sphere of autonomy both at the territorial level and at the level of management of economic policies for agriculture. As we have seen, this autonomy was realized in the context of a relationship of exchange in which state non-interference with the power of the southern landowners was bartered for support for the government policy of protection of the development of industrial interests in the north. In this sense, the autonomy of *mafia* power existed as a delegated power and was limited to the periphery. That, however, does not mean that interest groups combining political and *mafia* components were not created which combined important economic-financial and political interests at the local and national level. On the contrary, the existence of these groups seems to demonstrate that the phenomenon of the internalization of political representation was present even then.[61]

The autonomy of *mafia* power, intended in this meaning of delegation of dominion over the periphery, runs through its entire evolution up to the 1950s, when the delegation of violence to the *mafia* came to a halt. And it is exactly during this period that a crisis in the autonomy of *mafia* power occurred. The end of the monopoly of *mafia* brokerage and the assumption of the roles of mediation, social control and protection of the traditional sectors of Sicilian society by the Christian Democratic party and by politicians, constituted a formidable challenge to traditional *mafia* power. Its reorganization, in the forms we have discussed in the preceding pages, has been accompanied by the organization of illegal trade and, as a consequence, the end of the *mafia's* being restricted to the periphery, both of which are relevant to an analysis of new forms of *mafia* power.

From this it follows that, perhaps, the newest aspect of *mafia* power is that it is no longer delegated by the state. This begins in the 1950s and it is from the same date that a process of conquest of new parts of the state apparatus begins. Even this is not new: it first occurred with the consensus of the state for managing social control on the periphery in the interests of the local ruling classes. Now, however, the state keeps its monopoly of violence; but illegal economic activity is on such a scale as to surpass interests which are solely or largely those of the periphery — and which have national and supra-national dimensions. Consequently the profound difference between the new *mafia* power

and the earlier form lies in the fact that it has become a phenomenon that involves the entire Italian political system. From the periphery, where *mafia* power arose, it has moved toward the centre seeking to win power there. The killings of judges, politicians, and high state and police officials show that the fight between the *mafia* and those sectors of the state apparatus which oppose this march is far from being won. These crimes can only be read in the light of a violent struggle between power groups which operate from within the state institutions and fight for their control.

The *mafia* has become pervasively part of the economic, financial, and political systems. Its presence is no longer restricted to a limited geographical area within the state, even if its political and economic brain remains in Sicily. The *mafia* can no longer be seen as a special group, but asks to be interpreted as a social sub-system which articulates its own presence in most of the vital nerve-centres of society. And it is exactly this which today constitutes its strength and its danger.

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NOTES

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1. See respectively A Blok, *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village: 1860–1960*, New York, Harper & Row, 1974; H. Hess, *Mafia and Mafiosi: The Structure of Power*, Westmead, Farnborough, Hants, Saxon House, 1973; P. Arlacchi, *La mafia imprenditrice*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1983. See Hess, op. cit., for proof of the inexistence of the *mafia* as a secret society or as a single, rigidly hierarchical organization Rather, there exist *mafiosi* individuals and groups. This idea is by now accepted in the scholarly literature and is the sense in which the term *mafia* is used in this article; hence the use of the lower case 'm'.

2. For a review of the theme of honour in Mediterranean societies, see J. Davis, *People of the Mediterranean*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977.

3 Some references on the duality of the concept of honour can be found in Davis, op. cit., from whom I have taken the materialistic interpretation of honour as social idiom related to the allocation of resources.

4. See Davis, op. cit., p. 92

5. The accumulation of such capital is a consequence of an economy regulated not by the peaceful means of the market but by violence.

6. See Davis, op. cit., p. 93; J. Schneider and P. Schneider, *Culture and Political Economy in Western Sicily*, New York, Academic Press, 1976, pp. 100–1.

7. Davis, op. cit., p. 98.

8. On the concepts of emotional and instrumental friendship, see Eric R. Wolf, 'Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Clients Relations in Complex Societies', in Banton,

The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, ASA Monograph 4, London, Tavistock, 1966, pp 10–13.

9. An interesting description of symbolic rituals of exaltation of friendship is given in Schneider and Schneider, op. cit., pp. 104–7.

10. Blok, op. cit., p. 146.

11. On the concept of balanced reciprocity, see Marshall D. Sahlins, 'On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange', in Banton, *The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology*, A.S.A. Monographs 1, London, Tavistock, 1965, pp. 139–236.

12. On *ad hoc* coalitions in Sicily, see P. Schneider, 'Coalition Formation and Colonialism in Western Sicily', *European Journal of Sociology*, vol. 13, 1972, pp. 255–67.

13. This is the thesis held by Schneider and Schneider, op. cit., taking the centre-periphery model proposed by I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System. Capitalistic Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York, Academic Press, 1974.

14. Taking this analysis from Schneider and Schneider, op. cit., pp. 32–55.

15. Ibid., p. 109.

16. On the characteristics of the Spanish administration in Sicily, see D. Mack Smith, *A History of Sicily: Medieval Sicily, 800–1713*, London, Chatto & Windus, 1968, pp. 115–68.

17. Schneider and Schneider, op. cit., pp. 108–9.

18. J. Schneider, 'Of Vigilance and Virgins: Honor, Shame and Access to Resources in Mediterranean Societies', *Ethnology*, vol. 10, 1971, pp. 1–24.

19. Quoted by S. W. Mintz and E. R. Wolf, 'An Analysis of Ritual Co-parenthood', in Potter, Diaz, and Foster, *Peasant Society: A Reader*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1967, p. 179.

20 M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930, pp. 16 ff.

21. Schneider and Schneider, op. cit , pp. 10–14, 54–5, *et passim*.

22. This interpretative model of the formation of the national state was proposed by Stein Rokkan, 'Dimensions of State-Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations Within Europe', in Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 562–600.

23. Blok, op. cit., p. 7.

24. Ibid, pp. 89 ff.

25. The *gabelloti* were large tenants of the landed aristocracy to whom they paid a sum in rent called *gabella* They in turn sublet land in small parcels to the peasants for higher rent and pocketed the profit. Literary descriptions of the *gabelloti* can be found in G. Verga's *La roba* and *Mastro Don Gesualdo* and G. Tomasi di Lampedusa's *The Leopard*

26. On the characteristics of the production relationships in Sicilian agriculture of the second half of the nineteenth century, see E. Sereni, *Il capitalismo nelle campagne*, Turin, Einaudi, 1948, pp. 184 ff.

27. Taking this analysis from Blok, op. cit., pp. 92 ff.

28. Ibid., pp. 92–3.

29. G. Salvemini, *Scritti sulla questione meridionale (1896–1955)*, Turin, Einaudi, 1955, pp. 46, 62, *et passim*.

30. Blok, op. cit., pp. 95 ff.

31. Ibid., p. 96.

32. S. Tarrow, *Between Center and Periphery Grassroots Politicians in Italy and France*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1977.

33. Ibid., ch. 2.

34. L. Graziano, *Clientelismo e sistema politico: il caso dell'Italia*, Milan, F. Angeli, 1980, pp. 113–28.

35. The Left which came to power after the so-called Parliamentary Revolution of 1876 was composed largely of republicans (former supporters of Mazzini and Garibaldi), opponents of Cavour's liberal Right. Under the government of the Left, a system of forming parliamentary majorities became established which ignored party or political-group loyalties: this was *trasformismo*. The Left could count on the vote of deputies of the Right who would support the government in exchange for favours (usually using the state's administrative structure to intimidate deputies' constituents to ensure the deputies' re-

election). *Trasformismo* is thus a deputy's being elected with a mandate of one sort and then voting another. It was especially prevalent among southern and Sicilian deputies, many of whom became known as 'ministerial' or 'government' deputies for their tendency always to vote in favour of the government, whatever its composition and policy. On this degeneration of the Italian parliamentary system, which had important effects on the origins of patronage in the Mezzogiorno, see G. Mosca, *Partiti e sindacati nella crisi del regime parlamentare*, Bari, Laterza, 1949.

36. Salvemini, op cit., pp. 41–9.

37. See F. Renda, 'Funzioni e basi sociali della mafia', in *Il movimento contadino nella società siciliana*, Palermo, Edizioni 'Sicilia al lavoro', 1956; Hess, op. cit., pp. 172–6; Blok, op. cit., pp. 182–9.

38. See C. Mori, *Con la mafia ai ferri corti*, Verona, Mondadori, 1932, pp. 351, 354, *et passim*.

39. Schneider and Schneider, op. cit., p. 183, E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels. Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1959, ch. 3.

40. See M. Pantaleone, *Mafia e politica*, Turin, Einaudi, 1962, pp. 100, 118.

41. L. Franchetti, *Le condizioni politiche e amministrative della Sicilia*, Florence, Vallecchi, 1974 (first published 1875), pp. 109–10.

42. L. Graziano has called attention to the characteristics of the Mezzogiorno as pre-contractual society: 'Clientelismo e sviluppo politico: il caso del Mezzogiorno', in *Clientelismo e mutamento politico*, Milan, F. Angeli, 1974, p. 339.

43. For an analysis of the dynamic tendencies and of the attempts at development of modern economic initiatives in Sicily, see Giuseppe Barone, 'Stato, capitale finanzario e Mezzogiorno' and Salvatore Lupo, Rosario Mangiameli, 'La modernizzazione difficile: blocchi corporativi e conflitto di classe in una società arretrata', both in Avagliano, Barbagallo, Barone *et al.*, *La modernizzazione difficile*, Bari, De Donato, 1983.

44. On the institutionalization of the rights of social citizenship as process of formation of the state and nation, see Rokkan, op. cit.

45. G. Gribaudi, *Mediatori*, Turin, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1980, pp. 23–8 *et passim*.

46. See R. Catanzaro, *L'imprenditore assistito*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1979.

47. P. Arlacchi, 'Mafia e tipi di società', *Rassegna italiana de sociologia*, vol. XXI, no. 1, 1980, pp. 3–49.

48. Arlacchi, *La mafia imprenditrice*, pp. 180–5.

49. On the concept of domination by virtue of a constellation of interests, see M Weber, *Economy and Society*, New York, Bedminster Press, 1968, vol. 3, p. 943.

50. On these two moments in the *mafioso's* career, see Hess, op. cit., pp. 45 ff.

51. See the biographies of 11 *mafiosi* made by the *Commissione antimafia* of the Italian parliament and published in Li Causi, *I boss della mafia*, Rome, Editori riuniti, 1971, pp. 69 ff.

52. With the present state of documentation we are not able to state whether the pre-eminent position of the Sicilian *mafia* in the world drug traffic was such from the beginning of the 1970s, as Arlacchi maintains (*La mafia imprenditrice*), or was already in the 1950s, as is maintained in the McClellan report, taken by the *Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia in Sicilia*, vol. 4, tomo 13, parte prima, p. 202. It is however, certain that the availability in mafia hands of huge sums of illegal origin should have been noticeable already at the end of the 1950s, if the Commission itself documents payments of 1300 thousand million lire (at current price) by the Americans to a Sicilian mafia group for the supply of 361 kilos of heroin in the period 1958–61.

53. On the multiplication of banking initiatives in Sicily, see S. Ruvolo, 'Mafia e speculazione edilizia', in *Accumulazione e cultura mafiosa*, bulletin of the *Comitato di controinformazione 'Peppino Impastato'*, Palermo, Editrice Centofiori, 1979, p. 5; Arlacchi, *La mafia imprenditrice*, pp 234–5. In-depth research has not yet been done on the subject, however.

54. See Li Causi, *I boss della mafia*, pp. 346–60.

55. For a review of the recent literature on the Mezzogiorno relating to the themes mentioned above, see R. Catanzaro, 'Struttura sociale, sistema politico e azione collettiva nel Mezzogiorno', *Stato e mercato*, vol. 3, n. 8 (1983), pp. 105–49.

56. Catanzaro, *L'imprenditore assistito*, pp 41–51.

57. Arlacchi, *La mafia imprenditrice*, pp. 222–8.

58. The world *cosca* (pl. *cosche*) in Sicilian dialect means the leaf of an artichoke and symbolizes the tightness of relationships between members of the *mafia* groups.

59. See Li Causi, *I boss della mafia*, pp. 241, 272–94.

60. Arlacchi, *La mafia imprenditrice*, pp. 193–4 ff.

61. It should be sufficient to cite only the famous scandal of the murder of Notarbartolo, ex-director general of the Bank of Sicily, in 1893. A deputy to Parliament was convicted of having instigated the crime, but was acquitted on appeal. The case brought to light a series of collusions between economic, financial, and political interests which went beyond the boundaries of Sicily. For an analysis of the relationship between the mafia, the representative system, and economic and political interests which takes off the case in questions, see Mosca, op. cit., pp. 249–56.

Siu-lun Wong

The Chinese family firm: a model*

ABSTRACT

Three aspects of Chinese economic familism are distinguished — nepotism, paternalism, and family ownership. This essay is mainly concerned with the last aspect and the resultant phenomenon of the prevalence of family firms among privately-owned Chinese commercial and industrial enterprises. It is argued that such firms are not necessarily small, impermanent and conservative because they tend to behave differently at various stages of their developmental cycle. Four phases of development — emergent, centralized, segmented, and disintegrative — are identified and discussed. This Chinese pattern is then compared with its Filipino and Japanese counterparts.

The essence of Chinese economic organization is familism. Let us start with this proposition and see how far it can take us in understanding Chinese business conduct. It would not be long before we realize that this generalization might only apply to circumstances where private property is respected and individual pursuit of profit is regarded as legitimate. Even with this qualification, the validity of the statement still depends on the exact meaning of the term 'familism'. It can mean at least one of three things. When Milton L. Barnett characterizes the behavioural pattern of Cantonese entrepreneurs in the USA as familial, he is talking about nepotism or the preferential recruitment and promotion of kinsmen within a firm. 'Priority is given to relatives and fellow villagers when a proprietor engages a staff of employees,' he writes.[1] But in a second usage, the substance of kinship obligations gives way to an ideal image of how superiors and subordinates should interact in a company. 'The principles of family organization were applied in the business unit,' asserts a Hong Kong Chinese businessman. He elaborates as follows:

> There were those who governed and there were those who were governed, each according to his ability but all having an equal interest in the success of the operation. Acceptance of the

> established order, as advocated by the Confucian school, made it possible for persons of diverse origin to fit into a family pattern.[2]

It is clear that what he has in mind is paternalism. In the third sense, the emphasis is on the ownership and control of business assets by the family. Oksenberg is explicitly concerned with this aspect when he observes that 'all the spinning and weaving companies [in Hong Kong] might loosely be labelled "family firms".'[3]

It is important to distinguish among these three possible connotations of familism because, in my view, they are not inherently tied to one another although very often they do coexist. In other words, a paternalistic enterprise may not be nepotistic in its appointments policy, and it is possible for a family-owned firm to be impersonal and universalistic in its internal administration. It is now apparent that we have to break down 'familism' into its various components to see which one of them, if any, forms the core of Chinese economic life. The overblown importance of nepotism has already been punctured by Freedman. 'It is important to remember', he reminded us,

> that outside the family, a kinsman has few specific economic claims, . . . and that in general we must not look to see preference being shown to a kinsman in economic matters on the grounds simply that he is a kinsman.[4]

What is relevant is not the dichotomy between kin and non-kin, 'but between personal and impersonal'.[5] We are less certain of the role of paternalism because of the scarcity of systematic studies. Since its linkage with the Chinese family is basically a metaphorical one, I shall not go into it here except to note that its occurrence probably has more to do with the nature of the labour market and the manpower requirement of a particular industry than with cultural factors. It is the issue of family firms that I shall explore in the rest of this essay as I feel that much of our knowledge about the Chinese family (or *jia*) has not yet been applied to illuminate the nature of this particular mode of business ownership and control.

There is little doubt that family firms have been prevalent in Chinese commerce and industry operating on capitalistic principles. In his study of a Chinese county town in the late 1940s, Morton Fried found three distinct types of financial organization which he called nuclear family enterprises, extended family stores, and partnerships respectively. 'The two most popular forms, regardless of size', he said, 'are family ownership, which in operational actuality might be called the individually owned store, since the head of the family generally operates the store as if it were his alone, and the partnership'.[6] Another anthropological study of a Chinese community carried out in

the early 1960s, this time in the overseas context of the Philippines, revealed that

> most Chinese firms started as a family concern. As the family of the founder increased, the firm often grew into a large corporation which remained in the family. Examples of such firms are: Yutivo Sons Hardware Company, Cham Samco and Sons, Inc. (hardware), La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory, Inc., and practically all of the cigar and cigarette manufacturing establishments in Manila.[7]

This identity between family and business among the Philippine Chinese was reaffirmed a decade later by Omohundro who noted that

> [in] conversation among themselves, Chinese merchants habitually equate the business name, the name of the firm's founder or present head, and the business family as a group.[8]

In the area of finance, a Chinese banker based in Hong Kong said in a recent interview that 'all overseas Chinese banks [are] run by banking families'.[9] I have been able to make a quantitative estimate of the extent of family ownership in the cotton spinning industry in Hong Kong where there were about 1.2 million households, some 98 per cent of which were Chinese by origin, and approximately 38,000 manufacturing enterprises by the end of the last decade.[10] Over 90 per cent of these enterprises were small concerns employing less than fifty workers. Thus the cotton spinning factories, with an average of about 500 employees and 25,000 spindles per mill, constituted the modern, large-scale sector of the economy. Half of the thirty-two spinning mills existing in 1978 had the majority of their stock held by single families, as revealed in their company records filed with the Hong Kong government. This is almost certainly an under-estimation of the number of family firms as eleven of the mills were public companies whose share-holders could remain anonymous. My informants maintained that many of these public companies were actually possessed by families, given the lax company regulation that they were only required to offer a quarter of their shares to the public.[11] On the basis of the above evidence, we may say that the family firm as a major form of Chinese business organization is not restricted to a particular locale or a special line of economic endeavour.

When industrial capital is held by the family as a unit, what effects will this have on the enterprise? While the family may facilitate the establishment of the firm by furnishing the initial capital, it is generally believed that the growth of the enterprise will be hindered.[12]

The family firm, it is often said, is limited both in scale and life span. Amyot asserts that as far as the Manila Chinese are concerned, 'the structure of the family corporation is admirably suited to small, limited enterprises' and 'there seems to be a principle of limitation to the growth of family businesses beyond a certain point'.[13] Two arguments have been advanced to support this assertion. The first rests on the self-evident fact that there is only a finite number of members in a family. Thus expansion would quickly exhaust the supply of managerial competency, and the firm cannot grow any further.[14] Other than this personnel problem, the family enterprise is also alleged to be intrinsically conservative in its financial policy because it is particularly wary of external interferences or takeover. Landes has expressed this view clearly in the case of French family business:

> In such a system, the compulsive urge toward growth inherent in business for the sake of business is either diluted or absent . . . the main objective is to avoid use of credit and to make the highest rate of profit possible on a given turnover; to amortize expenses rapidly and build up huge reserves; and to finance expansion out of such reserves, or by what the French called *autofinancement*.[15]

Despite this purported concern with 'conservation and consolidation', family enterprises in their Chinese guise are apparently short-lived. As common wisdom has it, they seldom last beyond three generations. The practice of equal inheritance among male heirs and the nearly inevitable emergence of the proverbial prodigal son are usually held to be reponsible. In this view, the family is regarded as a poor vehicle for sustaining capital accumulation and the entrepreneurial drive.[16]

It is not hard to find exceptions to the generalization that family firms are limited in scale and tend to be impermanent. We know of the Rong family which controlled nine spinning mills in China in the 1930s with over one-fifth of the entire spindleage of Chinese-owned mills,[17] the Guo (Kwok) family in Hong Kong which holds the Wing On group of companies with the department store business valued at over 300 million Hong Kong dollars in 1979 as its main pillar,[18] and the Huang (Ooi) family which operated the Oei Tiong Ham Concern with offices in nine Indonesian cities and fifteen overseas commercial centres. Before it was nationalized by the Indonesian government in 1961, the Oei Tiong Ham Concern owned at least ten factories, a bank, an insurance company and a construction firm.[19] There are also indications that, when the market situation is favourable, Chinese family firms do not hesitate to make use of external capital supplies such as bank loans to finance expansion. A prominent Hong Kong banker has pointed out that the Colony's firms have a higher proportion of their capital in the form of bank loans than companies in

most other industrial countries except Japan. The average borrowings from banks in Hong Kong's spinning and weaving companies, most of which were family-owned as I have already shown, amounted to 75 per cent of proprietor's funds in the 1960s.[20] The significance of these facts is not so much in falsifying the generalization, but in suggesting that the issues involved have most probably been over-simplified because a static view of the *jia* has been adopted. Family enterprises may appear to us to be large or small, vigorous or enervated, depending on the point in their developmental cycle at which we make our observation.

Let me try to build a model of the evolution of a Chinese family firm, beginning with its formation. It is not surprising that, as Fried found in the town he studied, 'the primary source of capital is either the individual himself or his relatives.'[21] But we should not too hastily deduce from this that 'most Chinese firms [start] as a family concern'[22] because it is unlikely that the funds mustered by an individual and his *jia* alone are sufficient to set up an enterprise other than a very modest one. The common format for a new business to assume, it seems to me, is that of partnership in which financial resources are pooled by persons largely unrelated by ties of descent or marriage.[23] Thus when Fried discovered that partnerships and family enterprises were the most popular modes of commercial organization in his Chinese town,[24] he might actually be looking at firms with varying degrees of maturity. Partnerships are notably unstable. Half of the thirty-two cotton spinning mills in Hong Kong for which I obtained information were actually incorporated by partners, but only four remained as partnerships at the time of my investigation.[25] Most individuals apparently enter this form of business alliance as an expedient, fully aware that one must fend for oneself. As a consequence, this type of economic organization is generally under-capitalized. Partners typically defer paying up on their shares and demand maximum returns for their investments. The Dai Sheng Cotton Mill initiated by Zhang Jian, for instance, had to pay eight per cent 'guaranteed dividend' annually to all partners before actual production started.[26] In the absence of mutual trust, factions and cliques tend to be rife with each partner attempting to place his own men inside the firm. If the business manages to take off despite these obstacles, then we see an asymmetrical growth in the distribution of shares. Some partners are in a more advantageous position to increase their portion of ownership relative to others. The usual method is to capture the key managerial positions as these carry an entitlement to extra 'red' shares as an incentive to effort.[27] Those who have close relatives among the partners will have an obvious edge over others as they can act jointly. This can explain why teams of brothers are so frequently found at this precarious stage.[28] In this initial phase, the family firm is just emergent. It becomes fully-fledged

when a share-holder and his *jia* ultimately attain majority ownership in the company.

In discussions on the foundation of the family firm, the second phase in my model, the term 'extended' family recurs. We can leave aside the loose usage of this concept where it is sometimes stretched to mean a group of kinsmen, and concentrate instead on the connection between this particular form of domestic organization and business activities. It is often assumed in the literature that the extended family precedes the creation of the economic enterprise.[29] The reverse, I think, is more likely to be the case as far as the Chinese are concerned. Given the general patterns in which 'wealth and social standing are associated with family complexity',[30] and landed property used to be a more secure and prestigious form of ownership than commercial or industrial capital, the extended family is hardly the best breeding ground for self-made entrepreneurs. I shall argue that those who pool resources with partners and later found their own their enterprises generally come from the simpler form of elementary families. As they become successful, they are in a position to delay the division of the *jia* estate they have created, thus turning the original elementary families into extended ones. This brings us to the authority of the father-entrepreneur. As a father, the head of the family firm has maximum flexibility in his action. In theory, he can run the business as he sees fit without consultation with other *jia* members, as long as he does not 'rob a son of his inheritance, curtail one son's share of the legacy in order to benefit another son, or reduce his sons' shares unjustly in order to make a bequest or confer a gift on some other person.'[31] Decision-making power is thus highly centralized in the hands of the entrepreneur. Such power is sometimes institutionalized, as shown in the article of association of one of the Hong Kong spinning mills I have studied. There were two kinds of stocks in this mill — the founder's shares and ordinary shares. Only the father-entrepreneur held the 100 founder's shares, and this qualified him to be the 'governing' director as well as the 'permanent' director of the company. The 100 founder's shares were equal in voting power to all of the 99,900 ordinary shares put together. This made the founder an incontestable leader as he could block any decisions of the Board of Directors, which consisted mainly of his family members, or the General Meeting of the Company.[32] Centralization in decision-making entails a low degree of delegation of responsibility to subordinates. As Zhang Jian had complained, the father-entrepreneur is a busy man carrying the entire business on his shoulders. 'Every letter is drafted by me, and every matter depends on my deliberation. For sleep, I can have no more than three hours a night; for meals, I cannot find time even for two bowls of rice.'[33] This highly personalized style of leadership has two major implications for capital formation. The possibility for profits to be retained and re-invested is

much enhanced. When an economist described some family businesses in Hong Kong as 'progressive' and that they 'used *all* their profits to finance expansion',[34] it is almost certain he was referring to those which were in this second phase of their development. Besides reinvestment, the father-entrepreneur is also able to transfer funds from one line of business to another for lateral expansion and mutual sustenance. Capital is mobile within the family group of enterprises because it belongs to a common, unified *jia* budget.[35] But these are just options open to the father-entrepreneur. Whether he will take advantage of them or not rests on the level of his motivation to enlarge the *jia* estate.[36] Although he has nearly absolute authority in utilizing the capital of the family firm, it is not his personal property. He is just a trustee of the *jia* estate which ultimately belongs to his children. But here, the cultural emphasis on the continuation of the family line acts as a powerful spur to effort. A good trustee must create an endowment to the family estate to ensure that there are valuable assets to transmit to future generations. The more successful he is in enriching that endowment, the greater the social recognition and esteem that will accrue to him. But while this encourages exertion, it simultaneously discourages the abdication of managerial power. Retirement from the family firm will remove the very basis on which the entrepreneur's social status and prestige in the wider community are built. A superannuated father is also powerless to contain the centripetal tendency among his sons as inheritors to the business. Yet, even if health permits, he cannot hold on to the reins of the enterprise for too long after his sons have become fathers themselves, lest this be interpreted as a sign of his sons' incompetence and hurt the reputation of the family business.[37] This tug of war between the father-entrepreneur and sons-inheritors usually drags on until fate intervenes by removing the former.

After the father-entrepreneur has relinquished control, the centralized family firm enters the third phase of its evolution and gradually becomes segmented. Traditionally, the legitimate heirs who were normally the sons had equal rights of inheritance. This principle had been modified in Republican China by enlarging the circle of heirs to include the wife/wives and daughters of the head of the family. It is often held that this system of equal division would splinter *jia* properties and dissipate family fortunes. But this depends on what is being divided — whether it is the *jia* estate itself, the profits that it yields, or the responsibility for managing it. Some assets are more amenable to division than others. As Freedman has suggested, 'business property [is] a more effective centripetal force than agricultural property'.[38] In West Town which was primarily an agricultural community, estates were evenly divided among heirs when *fen jia* happened. But Hsu found two exceptions in which *jia* properties were kept intact to be jointly managed by the inheritors.

One family was engaged in horse-trading, and the other was in retailing. Both had little land.[39] Several factors act against the fragmentation of business capital. Industrial and commercial assets are usually in the form of integrated entities that would cease to function once split. Even where subdivision is feasible, efficiency and productivity will suffer as a result because an economy of scale is often involved. Moreover, the worth of a family firm is more than the sum of its physical possessions. There are intangible assets such as its business reputation which cannot be apportioned to individual heirs. The legal framework, at least in Hong Kong, also provides some means for private companies to retain their capital. Most family-owned spinning mills, for instance, have company regulations stipulating that shares cannot be freely sold to outsiders. Boards of Directors are empowered to refuse to register any transfer of shares. If family members want to give up company ownership, they must first offer their portions for sale to existing share-holders 'at fair value'. Since mortgages and outstanding debts are essential components of business capital, the 'fair value' of company shares when converted into cash is substantially lower than their nominal value.[40] It is therefore more advantageous for inheritors to keep their shares with a promise of steady future income. In sum, the likelihood of splintering the estate of the family firm at this stage is not very great.

The same cannot be said of the profit derived from that estate. A common family budget is relatively easy to administer while the heirs are still single. There is no conflict between what Cohen calls the principal of jural equality which states that heirs have 'rights to arithmetically identical fractions of the estate' and the practice of consumer equality that caters for the needs of family members on a *per capita* basis. But once the brothers acquire wives and children, friction arises. It is because '[brothers] marry in sequence; by the time of the wedding of the youngest, some children of the oldest may be students. In addition, the brothers' wives bear or raise to maturity differing numbers of offspring'.[41] Some brothers may then feel that their domestic units or *fang* are getting less than the fair share of the family 'cake'. Pressure to create separate budgets is thus built up. Profit derived from the *jia* estate is the first thing to be divided among the inheritors, often while the father-entrepreneur is still at the helm of the enterprise. Such a division is shown in the allotment of an identical number of company shares to sons in the Hong Kong cotton mills so that they can have independent sources of income in the form of dividends. Daughters generally get smaller allotments than sons, though parity in shares distribution is still maintained among the female heirs themselves. This may indicate a discrepancy between the actual practice of inheritance among contemporary Chinese family firms and the legal prescription of strict equality among both male and female inheritors since Republican times. But it is possible that

the balance between a son's and a daughter's allotment is actually given to the latter in the form of dowry when she marries. We cannot decide which is the case until we have more information on the system of dowries in these business families.

But when it comes to the management of *jia* property, it is unambiguous that the traditional bias against women in the family still prevails. Succession to managerial positions in the family firm is largely the prerogative of male heirs. How are business responsibilities distributed among brothers? Theoretically, they can take turns to play the role of chief executive. But for reasons yet unclear to me, this is rarely done.[42] In actual cases, the eldest son is better able to assume the mantle of chief executive when succession occurs because he has the earliest opportunity to work in the firm and establish himself there. But the younger brothers are unlikely to defer to his authority because of what Margery Wolf describes as 'the inconsistent preparation of the brothers for their adult roles'.[43] As she says,

> Younger brothers learn very early and very concretely that older brothers yield to younger brothers, and yet as adults the expectation is exactly the reverse — the younger is expected to yield to his older brother's decisions and guidance, a situation for which he has been poorly prepared.[44]

To fend for their own interests, the younger heirs normally adopt either one of two strategies. They may anticipate the situation by acquiring skills which are different from their elder brothers. Thus when the eldest brother becomes the chief, they can act as powerful deputies as plant managers, accounting managers, and personnel managers etc. Alternatively, they may press for the creation of new ventures of which they will be the heads. In either case, the result is the emergence of distinct 'spheres of influence' and a proliferation of departments, factory plants, or subsidiary companies within the family concern. This trend of segmentation inevitably leads to decentralization of decision-making. A vivid illustration can be found in the following case of the Kian Gwan Company in Indonesia

> The Concern experienced a great loss with the death of Oei Tjong Hauw in January 1951. According to Chinese tradition the eldest son should have taken over but in this case the candidate chose to reside in Amsterdam and the youngest was elected in his place. Now the highest authority in the entire former Concern was the Board of Managing Directors, consisting of eight shareholders, linked by two co-ordinators, the youngest brother in Singapore and Djakarta and the eldest in Amsterdam. Each office was autonomous except in the matter of personnel where the Djakarta office took all decisions to avoid embarrassments and loss of good faith in family members.[45]

It is clear that consensus among brothers cannot be taken for granted, and the power of the new chief executive is greatly curtailed. He no longer enjoys his predecessor's flexibility in re-investment and transferring funds laterally. His hands are commonly tied by a formal agreement drawn up among heirs as to the manner in which company profits should be distributed.[46] He is closely checked in his entrepreneurial decisions. As noted by Cohen,

> the management of family funds takes on a public character if the eldest son shares with his younger brothers a desire to maintain the family intact. A brother in charge of finances is at pains to justify his activities thoroughly, and he is under far closer scrutiny than was his father. In each of at least two Yen-liao joint families the oldest brother keeps detailed account books, which are frequently inspected by other family members.[47]

We may expect the chief executive to resign himself gradually to the role of care-taker instead of innovator. Thus the characteristic features of this phase are the outward expansion of the enterprise owing to segmentation, and a reduction in the flexibility for re-investment and risk-taking.

The mutual watchfulness among brothers in a segmented family firm is very similar to the relationship among partners during the emergent phase. The same opportunity for the asymmetrical growth in share-holding is present because of the continual existence of the practice of conferring red shares to top executives who succeed in leading the enterprise to prosperity. In some cases, therefore, a brother in a segmented family firm may manage to build up a majority stake and the enterprise is taken over by his *fang*. The firm will then re-enter the centralized phase. If this does not happen and the brothers remain in partnership until it is their turn to yield to their own offspring, then the family enterprise will pass into the final phase of disintegration.

As individual brothers usually produce more than one son, there will be more inheritors in the second succession. The sheer increase in the number of share-holders will by itself heighten the possibility of internal bickering. But the rule of equal inheritance among heirs will ensure that first cousins (brothers' sons) will have divergent interests. Brothers may still co-operate because they begin on an equal footing as owners. But cousins are much less likely to see eye to eye because of the disparity in share-holding created by the differential fertility among various *fang*. This tendency is analogous to the situation in the transmission of ownership rights in ancestral trusts in lineages as described by Freedman

> Once established, this 'trust' was the joint property of all the heirs and its management and fruits fell to be enjoyed by them in turn

> (usually on an annual basis) or collectively . . . if instead of being rotated the estate was managed in such a way that its annual profits were distributed among the owners, then the sharing of the profits was made on the basis of *per stripes* shares. It follows that if at the foundation of the 'trust' there were three or more sons, and after the lapse of several generations the male agnatic descendants of these sons differed greatly in numbers, then the members of the most prolific line enjoyed the smallest shares of the total benefit of the 'trust' and those of the least prolific the greatest.[48]

For this reason, I would argue that although relationships among Chinese brothers are doubtlessly brittle, the most fragile family bonds are to be found among first cousins if they remain in the same *jia*. This may account for the conspicuous absence of groups of first cousins working in the cotton mills of Hong Kong.[49] After cousins have become co-owners, the danger of fission is ever present in the family firm. The economic considerations against the sale of family shares are less inhibitive at this stage. The value of individual portions has become much smaller due to sub-division, and this reduces the attraction of the regular income derived from the shares. Those in a weaker bargaining position may decide to break off the economic ties to the family enterprise, especially when they are brought up with little emotional attachment to it. Family members as share-holders will then be more concerned with immediate, tangible benefits than long term business prospects.

To summarize the key features of the four phases of the Chinese family firm, I shall use the schematic presentation seen in Table I with a plus sign indicating unity and a minus sign representing division.

TABLE I

Phases		Aspects of family firm		
		Estate	Management	Profit
I	Emergent	+	+	+
II	Centralized	+	+	−
III	Segmented	+	−	−
IV	Disintegrative	−	−	−

How effective is the Chinese family firm as an organization for economic competition? Davis has argued that it is superior to its Filipino counterpart because of a difference in the way descent is traced. In his words,

> Kinship among most Philippine groups is reckoned bilaterally; that is, the kin of both of one's parents are equally important, and true

> descent groups are generally lacking . . . Because kinship is reckoned bilaterally from the individual's perspective, and not from a fixed point of remote ancestral origin, membership in kin groups overlaps considerably, so a given individual is a member of the kin groups of many other persons and ideally, at least, owes support (and gets support) from all with whom he reckons a kinship bond . . . individuals may easily be caught by conflicting claims for support in such a system, and except for the nuclear family, kinship alone does not provide the basis for corporate economic activities.[50]

Even the nuclear family will be easily broken up at the time of succession because of the potentially large number of claimants on the family estate, each of whom owes loyalty to several other kin groups. In the Chinese case, because of the principle of patrilineal descent, more discrete and enduring corporate kinship units can be formed for the management of resources and investment.[51] The durability of the Chinese family firm is of course a relative matter. Compared with its Japanese equivalent, it would appear to be transitory. Since the Japanese practise primogeniture in the sense that only one male heir is chosen for succession, it is easier for the ownership and management of the family estate to remain intact. This facilitates the persistence of an enterprise held by the Japanese family or the *ie*.[52] The different degrees of durability of Filipino, Chinese, and Japanese family firm can be tentatively stated in the following ideal types of their life cycles (see Table II).

TABLE II

Family firms	*Phases of development**
Filipino	I→IV I→IV I→IV.....
Chinese	I→II→III→II→III→II→III .....
	↘ ↘ ↘
	IV IV IV
Japanese	I→II→II→II→II.....

* I Emergent phase
II Centralized phase
III Segmented phase
IV Disintegrative phase

There are bound to be many external factors that would alter these cycles. In real life, the family firms can hardly be dissociated from their outside environment. To acknowledge this is to court questions such as the following: Under what conditions will family firms flourish? How would they affect the patterns of social mobility and industrialization? What impacts will they have on the tendencies

towards the separation of ownership and control and the emergence of professionalism in modern business communities? These are all interesting and important lines of enquiry, but they will lead me away from the primary aim here which is 'to escape from reality long enough to be able to grasp [the] underlying principles' of the development of the Chinese family firm.

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NOTES

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8. J. T. Omohundro, 'The Chinese Merchant Community of Oloilo City, Philippines', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1974, p. 231.

9. 'A Retail Boom in Hong Kong', *Asiaweek*, 11 July, 1980, p. 50

10 See Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, *Hong Kong 1981 Census Main Report, Volume 2. Tables*, Hong Kong, Government Printers, 1982, p. 107; C. K Rao, *Hong Kong 1981*, Hong Kong, Government Printers, 1981, p. 224; V. F. S Sit, S. L. Wong, and T. S. Kiang, *Small Scale Industry in a Laissez-Faire Economy: A Hong Kong Case Study*, Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1979, p. 25.

11. See S. L. Wong, 'Industrial Entrepreneurship and Ethnicity: A Study of the Shanghainese Cotton Spinners in Hong Kong', unpublished D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1979, p. 75–6; 286–7.

12. For two representative views, see C. Kerr *et al.*, *Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labour Management in Economic Growth*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, p. 94; E. W. Nafziger, 'The Effect of the Nigerian Extended Family on Entrepreneurial Activity'; *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 18, no. 1, October 1969, p. 33.

13. Amyot, op. cit., p. 119.

14. Ibid, pp. 119–20.

15. D. S. Landes, 'French Business and Businessman: A Social and Cultural Analysis' in Aitken, *Explorations in Enterprise*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967, pp. 186–7.

16. On the Chinese case, see H. D.

Fong, 'Industrial Capital in China', Industrial Series, Bulletin No. 9, Nankai Institute of Economics, 1936, p. 48; and D. E. Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang: A Changing Minority Community in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1960, p. 52. As a general argument, see Kerr *et al.*, op. cit., pp. 94, 151; and W. A. Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1955, p. 120.

17. Wong, op. cit., p. 291.

18. The Wing On Co. Ltd, *Annual Report and Accounts 1978–1979*, Hong Kong, The Company, 1979, p. 9.

19. Willmott, op. cit., pp. 49–50; and J. Panglaykim and I. Palmer, 'Study of Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries: The Development of One Chinese Concern in Indonesia', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1, March 1970, pp. 85–95.

20. P. A. Graham, 'Financing Hong Kong Business', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 April, 1969, p. 152.

21. Fried, op. cit., p. 144.

22. Amyot, op. cit., p. 118.

23. My usage of the term partnership is broader than the British legal definition that a partnership is distinct from a private limited company and does not have limited liability or a separate legal personality. See P. Smith, *The Family Business — Company or Partnership*, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1979, p. 7.

24. Fried, op. cit., p 138. On the high frequency of partnership as a form of business association, see also Willmott, op. cit., p. 54, and Amyot, op. cit., p. 65.

25. Wong, op. cit., p. 288. For other examples, see Y. H. Lin, *The Golden Wing: A Sociological Study of Chinese Familism*, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1947, pp. 133–41; B. E. Ward, 'A Small Factory in Hong Kong: Some Aspects of its Internal Organization' in Willmott, *Economic Organization in Chinese Society*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972, pp. 353–85.

26. S. C. Chu, *Reformer in Modern China: Chang Chien, 1853–1926*, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1965, p. 29.

27. For an illustration of the distribution of these 'red' shares, see Lin, op. cit., p. 99.

28. Examples include the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company, the Shaw Brothers in film-making, the Rong Brothers who started the Shen Xin Textile and flour mills, and the Guo Brothers who founded the Wing On Group.

29. See for example Nafziger, op. cit., pp. 25–33 and Lewis, op. cit., pp. 113–15.

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31. S. Shiga, 'Family Property and the Law of Inheritance in Traditional China' in Buxbaum, *Chinese Family Law and Social Change in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1978, p. 149.

32. Wong, op cit., p. 293.

33. Zhang Jian, *Zhang Sean Xiansheng Shiye Wenchao* (Mr Zhang Jian's Essays on Industry), Nantong, Hanmolin Publishers, 1947(?), pp. 14–15 The translation is mine.

34. D. W. Stammer, 'Money and Finance in Hong Kong', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1968, p. 262, original emphasis.

35. Zhang Jian, for example, 'used a part of Dah Sun's excess profits to support his numerous other Na-t'ung projects, without keeping the accounts absolutely clear'. See Chu, op. cit., p. 35. The same phenomenon is observed by Stammer, op. cit , p. 262.

36. For a definition of the *jia* estate, see M. L. Cohen, 'Developmental Process in the Chinese Domestic Group' in Freedman, *Family and Kinship*, p. 27.

37. For a good illustration of this dilemma, see the case of Mr. Lo, owner of Friendship Store, in Omohundro, op. cit., pp. 309–11

38. M. Freedman, *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*, London, The Athlone Press, p. 30.

39. F. L. K. Hsu, *Under the Ancestor's Shadow: Kinship, Personality and Social Mobility in China*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1971, pp. 115–21. Cohen also finds different propensities for family division between tobacco cultivators and rice farmers in Taiwan in M. L. Cohen, *House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan*, New York and London,

Columbia University Press, 1976, pp. 218–25

40. For an illustration, see The Economic Research Institute of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, *Heng Feng Shachang Di Fasheng Fazhan He Gaizao* (The Establishment, Development and Transformation of the Heng Feng Cotton Spinning Mill), Shanghai, Shanghai People's Press, 1958, p. 35.

41. Cohen, op. cit., p. 197

42. There was a reported case of brothers taking turns to utilize the machinery in paper-making mills in Yunnan, but in effect the management was separate. See Fei and Chang, *Earth-bound China*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1945, pp. 178–81.

43. M. Wolf, 'Child Training and the Chinese Family' in Freedman, *Family and Kinship*, p. 61.

44. Ibid., p. 53

45. Panglaykim and Palmer, op. cit., p. 94.

46. For samples of these contracts, see Economic Research Institute of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, op. cit., p. 35; and The Shanghai Economic Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Economic Research Institute of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, *Nanyang Xiongdi Yancao Gongsi Shiliao* (Historical Materials on the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company), Shanghai, Shanghai People's Press, 1958, pp. 11–12.

47. Cohen, op. cit., p. 217.

48. M. Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society*, London, The Athlone Press, 1971, p 51.

49. I found brothers, brothers-in-law, uncles and nephews working in the same companies, but not first cousins. See Wong, op. cit., p. 277.

50. W. G. Davis, *Social Relations in a Philippine Market*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973, p. 198.

51. Ibid., p. 199.

52 See e.g. J. C. Pelzel, 'Japanese Kinship: A Comparison' in Freedman, *Family and Kinship*, pp. 277–8.

53. The quotation is from M. Freedman, 'The Chinese Domestic Family: Models' in Skinner, op. cit., p. 239.

Evelyn Mahon

When is a difference not a difference?: a reply to J. Murphy

ABSTRACT

This article is a reply to an earlier article by J. Murphy who argued that class disparity in education was not class inequality in education. The stringent research conditions demanded by Murphy are thought to be impossible as they appear to demand a classless society.

Murphy in his article on class inequality[1] in education takes to task several well known authors on class inequality. He contends that class disparity in education is not class inequality in education, but constitutes a difference in educational aspiration which is merely a 'difference'.

To argue that class disparity in education constitutes class inequality in education Murphy claims that two conditions must be satisfied:

1 Universal demand for education needs to be documented and if it is found that such demand is not total, then,
2 differential demand must be seen to be or shown to be a product of structural or cultural inequality.

If these two conditions are not met then class disparity in education remains merely a class 'difference' rather than an index of inequality.

In a review of a number of works on inequality in education, Murphy finds that they all fail to satisfy one or other of the above requirements. Halsey *et al.* fail to meet (2) for although they found differences in aspiration, and explain inequalities (with reference to University entrance) as resulting from decisions taken on the basis of aspirations, they failed to demonstrate that this class disparity in educational aspiration was the product of inegalitarian forces and so failed to comply with Murphy's second requirement. Bourdieu and Passeron show differences in aspiration itself to be a consequence of

inequality but their thesis assumes condition (1). Hussen and Evetts see differences in educational aspiration as an example of educational inequality in itself and thus do not pose questions raised by (1) and (2).

Bowles and Gintis assert the necessity to document (1) but they undermine this assertion by claims that it is difficult to uncover the educational aspirations of 'unorganised' people. Bronfenbrenner sees the need to document aspirational disparity, but he does not do so. Applying Murphy's criteria Bronfenbrenner would have shown (1) to be false and failed to do (2).

Boudon has posed condition (1). He finds class differences in educational representation. This disparity he explains by differences in aspirations which are in turn a consequence of economic inequality and stratification. Murphy claims that Boudon's thesis is problematic because his index of class inequality — viz. chances of attendance at second and third level institutions of education — originates not in inequality but in difference. This contradiction would not be insuperable, according to Murphy, if he had shown that these differences in aspiration were inegalitarian; but Boudon never once shows such differences to be inegalitarian. Murphy does acknowledge that on two occasions Boudon states that such aspriational diversity is the consequence of economic inequality and a consequence of stratification. Murphy takes little notice of the latter as stratification would appear 'to describe a number of differences between people' and as such represents only differences.

Further, even if this contradiction is averted, Boudon still has a sociological conundrum on his hands. For if Boudon assumes aspirational disparity to be inegalitarian, he simply begs the question, since in explaining class disparity in education in terms of differences in aspiration, he does not demonstrate the *inequity* of class disparity. Again, for Murphy differences are mere differences, not evidence of inequality.

Looked at in terms of Murphy's two requirements however, Boudon would appear to have posed the first question of universal demand, found that differences in educational demand did exist and explained them in terms of differences in aspirations, which were in turn due to stratification. The second requirement then was attempted by Boudon, but not executed to Murphy's satisfaction; his explanation was circular, explaining one difference by an appeal to a further difference and then describing this difference as inegalitarian.

Finally Jencks also fails to demonstrate the inequity of class disparity in education, though he does treat seriously class differences in educational aspirations. He even prescribes options and alterations to educational involvement for those who do not avail of education. Jencks did not, however, know whether inequalities observed related to variations in taste or to 'vagaries in the public provision of such

services', he concluded rather that both are involved to some degree.

Thus nobody satisfies Murphy's two criteria. Let us therefore examine these two criteria necessary to illustrate or prove that class disparity constitutes class inequality in education.

To fulfill the first criterion one must find out whether or not there is a universal demand for education. To do this one must identify a method of measuring such demand. Participation rates are one such measure and research findings indicate that participation rates are related to class background. Indeed an alternative measure might be educational aspirations and these too, we are led to believe, differ according to one's class background.

The second criterion demands that we explain this phenomenon. Murphy claims that to demonstrate that such disparity is indeed inequality it must be shown to be a product of structural or cultural inequality. His view of different theorists suggest that none satisfy this demand. Boudon, presumably, went closest to such explanation but he is still accused of supplying an explanation based on differences between classes which could simply be 'differences'. In fact, Murphy proposes simple 'differences' as an alternative interpretation to inequalities. Thus class disparity in educational participation may, then, be a reflection of simple 'difference' or a mere question of taste.

But, there is a problem in taking stratification to mean a number of differences, or in viewing class aspirations as mere differences in taste. Such differences can have much deeper connotations. To have class differences which were real but were not inegalitarian, one would need to establish that differences in aspirations were not in fact class biased, but were, instead, randomly distributed throughout the population.

Differences in taste, educational aspirations, and educational participation are not in themselves inegalitarian, it is only when such differences can be observed along specific class lines that one describes them as inegalitarian. It is the fact that they are class differences rather than simple differences which makes them inegalitarian.

Murphy's argument that Boudon's model is not able to accommodate difference, indifference or dissent as a legitimate educational response is not relevant. The question to ask is whether difference, indifference and dissent are randomly distributed throughout the population or not.

To adequately test Murphy's universal demand for education thesis, one would need to ask: Would this individual seek an education irrespective of class background, or if one could eliminate class background and its effects, would there be a universal demand for education? It is, of course, impossible as things stand to conduct this experiment. It remains significant, however, that educational aspirations are related to class background. The more that educational

credentials are required for better paid, higher status jobs, the more important it is for educational participation to be undifferentiated along class lines, if one is not to produce or reproduce a very rigid class structure. Alternatively, one changes the system whereby occupations are rewarded unequally, and thereby minimizes the returns to education.

Murphy seems to think that to demonstrate inequality exclusionary practices must obtain and some form of class discrimination be noted. He does not give any examples of what would constitute such evidence or how to measure class inequality in that way.

Educational systems do not have to proclaim any exclusionary policies to reduce working-class participation. Cultural capital, parental educational level, etc. promote and support educational participation in a closely integrated legitimate system. Exclusion is not necessary if entrance is not attempted. If working-class children have lower educational aspirations be they due to normative or adaptive responses, then, of course, they will not demand what those with higher aspirations acquire. If in fact there was a universal demand for education, particularly at the higher levels this would have serious repercussions for the stability and class structure of society. It is precisely these 'differences' in taste . . . that help to perpetuate the system in an acceptable, pleasing manner.

Where a disadvantaged pupil is concerned it is, of course, true that, in Murphy's terminology, a school does not disable or exclude him; it might further be said, however, that it does not have to, since he is already disadvantaged. The problem seems to be that the school is unable to counteract that disadvantage. Educational systems, it appears, are unable to overcome the effects of class differences.

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NOTES

1. J. Murphy, 'Class inequality in education: two justifications, one evaluation but no hard evidence', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXXII, no. 2, June 1981, pp. 182–201.

Michael R. Smith

Accounting for inflation (again)

John H. Goldthorpe has asked me (*BJS*, vol. 34, no. 4) to produce evidence that he makes the following arguments in his paper 'The current inflation: Towards a sociological account':

(i) 'both the wage push *and the shift to full employment* (Goldthorpe's italics) had their origins in a more powerful and assertive working class': and

(ii) 'inflation is transformed into a rather cunning instrument of class control. Governments *choose* (my italics) to inflate in order to avoid "action of a more concerted kind, both industrial and political, the ultimate threat of which is to create a major degree of economic dislocation and disturbance"'.

In each case these are quotations from my paper (*BJS*, vol. 33, no. 3), the second of which includes within it a quotation from Goldthorpe. All quotations below refer to Goldthorpe's original paper.

1. In the case of (i) above I take it that Goldthorpe is objecting to the section of the quotation in italics; that is, the section dealing with full employment. Here is what Goldthorpe *says* in his paper.

(a) One of the aspects of the 'working out of the logic of citizenship — on the basis of this new power of labour' is 'moves towards establishing employees' rights in jobs'; including 'rank-and-file pressure for a more general "right to work"' (p. 203).

(b) On the same page he goes on to say that 'So far then as inflation is concerned, the main significance of this development lies in the constraints which it imposes on governments seeking to pursue standard deflationary policies'.

(c) Then he writes 'it must be regarded as an abiding feature of the political situation that governments (of whatever party) whose policies are associated with high unemployment will face not only severe electoral punishment, as opportunity for this arises, but more immediately, perhaps, a loss of trade-union co-operation in economic policy making and implementation, and direct industrial and political action in the form of strikes, sit-ins, factory take-overs, mass demonstrations etc.' (pp. 203–4). Further on the same page he writes, 'a forceful reaction . . . to high unemployment is, on the contrary, a

result of the idea of citizenship being taken more seriously than before' (p. 204).

(d) And, finally, 'it is then scarcely surprising — indeed, entirely intelligible — that workers should react to redundancy and unemployment, or to the threat of these, with something more than the resigned or fatalistic acceptance which they have shown in earlier periods' (p. 204).

I take it that the redefinition of citizenship rights to include a 'right to work' (in (a) above) is an example of increasing working-class assertiveness. I also take it that the assertiveness would mean little unless the working class had the power to put some force behind it, a power based in Goldthorpe's analysis, in 'the emergence of a mature working class' (pp. 204–10). The quotations above make the following points: first that governments cannot pursue standard deflationary policies *or* tolerate high unemployment because of a threat of disorder (in (b), (c), and (d)); and second, that this constraint was not present at some previous (unspecified) time (from (d)).

If all this does not add up to an argument that governments have been forced to maintain full employment by a more powerful and assertive working class, what does it add up to? What was the purpose of the parts of Goldthorpe's argument quoted above if not to claim precisely this? Indeed, without such an assertion Goldthorpe's more general argument would be totally vacuous. For if governments had not been forced to maintain full employment the inflation generating wage push he asserts (I take it that he does not dispute the presence of this argument in his paper) could have easily been accommodated by governments through appropriate deflationary, unemployment generating macroeconomic policies. Without this assertion Goldthorpe would have had *no* account of the British inflation.

(2) In objecting to the second statement from my paper Goldthorpe deplores (parenthetically) that, I couple his argument that inflation has 'positive aspects for government' in that 'a wages "free-for-all" encourages sectionalism rather than solidarity' with an observation from two paragraphs earlier to the effect that the working class has 'the potential for action of a more concerted kind — the ultimate threat of which is to create a major degree of economic dislocation and civil disturbance' (p. 208). Consider the quotations below.

(a) In the paragraph *immediately preceding* his 'sectionalism rather than solidarity' point he writes: 'The problem facing government has now to be seen as that of coping not simply with inflation but also, and more fundamentally, with the conflict that lies behind it; and specifically, with the threat that the social divisions and antagonisms arising from an increasingly delegitimated structure of class inequality will prove no longer capable of institutional containment' (p. 208).

(b) In the paragraph *immediately after* the 'sectionalism rather than

solidarity' point he argues the following: 'a monetarist policy would appear designed to sharpen the social conflict stemming from the unpersuasive character of market criteria, once stripped of their normative camouflage; and at the same time, to structure this conflict on broad class lines, bringing organized labour into direct confrontation with government in defence of its achieved bases of power and security' (p. 209). Note that by a 'monetarist policy' he means a deflationary one.

It should be clear, then, that Goldthorpe's assertion that inflation has 'positive aspects' for governments in that it encourages 'sectionalism rather than solidarity' is located within a sequence of paragraphs making essentially the same point, which is that a mature working class threatens governments with disorder and this threat disposes governments to choose inflationary macroeconomic policies. Goldthorpe cannot *reasonably* claim that I have quoted him out of context and in so doing deformed his meaning. Moreover, what purpose in his argument is served by the section of Goldthorpe's paper I have quoted other than as an assertion that the inflationary macroeconomic policies of British governments were shaped by a concern to avoid disorder? It makes no difference to the argument whether or not governments deliberately chose to increase the rate of inflation or to adopt policies which did nothing about already existing inflationary tendencies. Either way, either the choice was affected by a desire to encourage 'sectionalism rather than solidarity' or it was not. What Goldthorpe *wrote* in his original article makes no sense other than as an assertion that what governments *did choose* was affected by a concern to defuse the threat to social order embodied in a solidary working class. And *that* argument assumes that inflating is a sensible way of preserving social order, which is precisely the point I took issue with in my paper.[1]

In my article on the British inflation I was concerned to make a number of points. One was that inflation creates a larger threat to order than unemployment. Another was that it is not difficult to account for the postwar pattern of inflation and unemployment in Britain without resort to tendencies in the class structure putatively producing more unruly workers. A third was that one could not sensibly set aside 'ignorance and error' as a source of inflation. None of these points is consistent with the earlier argument constructed by Goldthorpe. But, in his reply, Goldthorpe has chosen to ignore these issues of substance that divide us. Instead he has confined himself to an entirely frivolous (and rather allusive and unspecific) objection to the way in which I characterized his arguments. That would be disappointing from anyone but it is particularly so from someone of Goldthorpe's stature.

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NOTES

1. In his comment Goldthorpe also seems to suggest that a reference in his paper to incomes policy as an option for governments when inflation reaches intolerable levels is somehow inconsistent with my presentation of his argument. Frankly, I do not see how. The reference in question suggests that incomes policies are attractive precisely because they explicitly confront the distributional issues raised by a more assertive working class What is important here is that I argued in my paper that incomes policies are, on the contrary, unattractive to governments precisely because they exacerbate distributional conflict and encourage disorder rather than controlling it. Instead of deigning to confront the important issue, which is the defensibility of an assertion which contradicts a premise of his argument, Goldthorpe has chosen to consider the issue as part of an (unjustified) quibble over 'what he really meant'.

M. J. Murphy

Marital breakdown and socio-economic status: a reappraisal of the evidence from recent British sources

ABSTRACT

Alternative sources of information about socio-economic differentials in marriage breakdown in Britain are examined. It is shown that the substantial excess risk of Social Class IIIN over Social Class IIIM which had been reported and widely interpreted is not confirmed in any of four other data sources examined which are based on a variety of approaches. It is also concluded that census occupation-based estimates provide a useful source of information on marital-breakdown propensity. Such analysis shows strong links between divorce, suicide and alcohol-related mortality by occupation, so tending to reinforce Noble's idea of the importance of 'social networks'. In addition, it is shown that occupations with high levels of divorced men tend to have considerably higher proportions of female workers than the average, whereas those occupations identified with very low rates tend to be almost exclusively male. Finally, it is suggested that census-based data on urban-rural differences were more valid than had been supposed.

1. INTRODUCTION

People in different social categories might be expected to experience different rates of marital breakdown. Social class, socio-economic group and occupational variations have been interpreted in terms of social networks, embourgeoisement and perceived social status. Various data sources have been used to generate and/or test alternative hypotheses. However, some of these sources appear to produce incompatible results,[1,2,3] and the reasons for these discrepancies will be discussed before examining the relationship between marital breakdown and wider socio-economic factors.

2. SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCES IN MARITAL BREAKDOWN

The generally-held view about the relationship between social class and marital breakdown is derived from the work of Gibson[4] which emphasized the relatively high rates found in social classes IIIN and V, the lowest groups in the non-manual and manual classes respectively. For example, these data have been reproduced by Chester[5] and interpreted in some detail by Thornes and Collard.[6] Table I summarizes the main findings and is taken from Gibson's Tables II and III.[7]

TABLE I *Social class distribution by occupational structure of the divorcing and continuing-married population, and divorce rate per 1,000 married women aged under 55 in each class, England and Wales, 1961*

	Husband's social class by present occupation					
	I	II	IIIN	IIIM	IV	V
Divorcing	3	14	19	37	16	11
Married	4	17	13	38	20	8
Divorce rate	2.2	2.5	4.3	2.9	2.5	5.1

These results were derived from analysis of 598 1961 divorce petitions by the Legal Research Unit of Bedford College, and denominators for the populations at risk were taken from the 1961 Census of England and Wales.

An earlier and alternative analysis by Noble based on analysis of men classified as currently divorced and married within the 1961 Census Reports came to the conclusion that 'the relationship between marital disruption and social status in Britain is neither inverse nor clear'.[8] In a research note, Gibson criticized Noble's methodology and responded that the 'relationship is inverse, but not clear'.[9] Noble's work has tended to be discounted subsequently. For example, Chester's review of divorce said that 'This argument (i.e. Noble's methodology) is based on Census material which is unsuitable to the purpose, however, and it has been effectively dismissed by Gibson (1971)'.[10] Thornes and Collard's major work contains no reference to Noble's work.

Gibson's critique of Noble's study was as follows

> For instance, 'own account workers (other than professional)' — e.g. self-employed carpenters — are shown as having a rate of 9.0 divorced per 1,000 ever married men, whilst 'junior non-manual workers' — e.g. draughtsmen, salesmen, clerks, etc. — have a

corresponding rate of 7.9 per 1,000. The implication is clearly that the former group are more prone to family breakdown. A national random survey that covered all divorces occurring in 1961 reveals that in fact the 'junior non-manual' group had the greatest percentage difference between the proportion remaining still married and those divorcing in 1961 out of all the Registrar General's socio-economic groups, forming 18 per cent of the divorcing population but only 12 per cent of the still married. A similar calculation shows that the 'own account' socio-economic group formed only 1 per cent of the survey divorcing population but 4 per cent of the still married population. Why then this discrepancy between Census data and survey findings? The probable reason has already been suggested. It is due to varying remarriage rates, which are themselves influenced by age at divorce; whilst age at divorce is affected by the socio-economic grouping of the husband. The socio-economic group 'junior non-manual' is best equated in the Registrar General's *Classification of Occupations* with social class III (non-manual). The Bedford College survey shows that it was this group out of the five following Registrar General's social class groupings — I and II (professional, managerial and intermediate), III (non-manual), III (skilled manual), IV (semi-skilled manual) and V (unskilled manual) — that had the highest proportion of wives (74 per cent) divorcing before their fortieth birthday, whilst 78 per cent of husbands in the same grouping divorced before their forty-fifth birthday. In social classes I and II only 63 per cent of the marriages dissolved in 1961 had husbands aged under forty-five.[11]

The choice of socio-economic group (SEG) 12 'own account workers (other than professional)' as one for detailed validation of Noble's results is questionable. The divorce statistics are based on *occupation* not on employment status. Thus in a case where the wife (the majority of the petitioners were female) put down her husband's occupation correctly as carpenter, the husband would have been allocated in error to the employee category. Only if the wife volunteered information about self-employment would the divorcing husband be classified as an 'own-account worker (other than professional)'. It is *precisely* this group where the greatest reservations about Gibson's results must be made and analysis of the OPCS 1976 Family Formation Survey by the author found that the proportion of female first marriages broken down for couples where the husband was in SEG 12 at marriage was not statistically significantly different from the overall figures. In passing, it should be noted that status at marriage is preferable in case occupational mobility is associated with marital disruption, and also an index based on probability of breakdown by marriage duration (which includes separation at time

of survey as well as divorce) is a better index for making relative breakdown comparisons, but similar results would have been obtained even if alternative measures had been used. The second group chosen by Gibson for comparison was junior non-manual (SEG 6) which is close to Social Class III Non-Manual: in 1971, 88 per cent of chief economic supporters of household classified as SCIIIN were in SEG 6.[12] As Table I shows, Gibson's results suggest that this group has a much higher rate of breakdown than the average. Since a number of alternative sources of data on marital breakdown by social class and socio-economic group are now available, it is possible to subject this result to detailed scrutiny and this will be done in the next section.

3. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE DATA SOURCES

Data have been calculated on social class divorce differentials as follows:

(i) A sample of administrative divorce records for a particular year, with occupation coded to provide numerators, and denominators obtained from alternative sources of 1961 Census[13] and 1979 Labour Force Survey.[14]
(ii) Sample social survey of those divorced around 1971 together with a reasonably matched control group of continuing married couples.[15]
(iii) Sample social survey of a nationally-representative sample of women which collected data on marital histories, the 1976 OPCS Family Formation Survey as processed by the author.[16]
(iv) Use of Census current marital status tables: the 'Noble method' applied by the author to 1971 Census data.[17] The 1961 Census did not split Social Class III, and the 1981 Census has not so far published a suitable table.

Although the Registrar General has published distributions of divorce by social class, neither denominators nor, more importantly in this context, was Social Class III split into IIIN and IIIM, so these data will not be included.[18]

The times at which social class was measured in these four sources were different: (i) is based on status around the time of divorce; (ii) is based on the social class of the breadwinner in the respondent's household at age 16; (iii) is based on status just prior to marriage and (iv) is based on status subsequent to divorce. Apart from (iii) which is based on divorce or current separation, the other sources use divorce as an indicator for marital breakdown. The ways in which the various authors quantify the relative risks are very different. Gibson uses an

estimated divorce rate per 100,000 married women under 55, Haskey uses a 'standardized divorce ratio' which effectively produces relative values for different social groups equivalent to a simple divorce rate such as used by Gibson. Thornes and Collard do not present relative risk figures so these have to be calculated by the author, who is also responsible for the sources (iii) and (iv) calculated values. The Family Formation Survey data are estimated proportions of marriages broken down by 20 years duration using a life table method. Finally the 'Noble' estimates are ratios of divorced to currently married males aged 35 to 59 derived from the Census — Noble himself used ever-married men but the differences in this exercise are negligible. This age group was chosen as the one where there are substantial numbers of divorced males and effects of changing employment either in the early years of employment or around the time of retirement are small. Values calculated for other age groups, of course, gave different values of this index. However, the correlation coefficient between the chosen age group and two others: all men and men aged under 60 was over .997 in both cases, so it must be concluded that the measure is very robust with respect to the age group chosen.

These various measures have relative advantages and disadvantages, but are all *a priori* reasonable empirical indicators of risk, with the possible exception of Noble's method for the reasons set out by Gibson. In order to simplify comparisons, they have all been indexed to SCIIIM = 100 in Table II in order to provide estimates of relative risk. (Note that the *spread*, as measured by the standard deviation, is likely to be affected by the concepts used.)

This table shows that, taken as a whole, the substantial excess risk of SCIIIN over SCIIIM which was found by Gibson is not present in any of the other sources, even Haskey's which is based on the same methodology. However, the substantially higher risk in SCV and the generally lower risk in SCI is common to these sources.

In order to simplify comparisons, correlation coefficients have been computed and are shown in Table III. The correlation coefficients between columns (2) to (4), which includes the census-based estimates, are never below .98, whereas those with (1) are never above .85. It is clear that Gibson's data are out of line with other sources so the reported high risk of class IIIN must be rejected on the balance of probabilities, since the other research designs are so different that taken as a whole they tend to overcome any likely biases or sampling variation which might affect a single study.

The reason for this discrepancy is unclear: as Gibson[19] states, his sample sizes were adequate to show up real differences of this order of magnitude. It seems unlikely that coding discrepancies are responsible for the SCIIIN results, which was suggested as the likely cause of the very low rates of the SEG12 group. In a study of matching occupation recorded on the death certificates of persons dying within 8 months of

TABLE II *Alternative estimates of relative social class marriage breakdown propensity: indexed to SCIIIM = 100*

Social Class	Gibson (1)	Census (2)	Haskey (3)	Murphy (4)	Thornes & Collard (5)
I	76	54	48	70	(6)
II	86	76	86	82	85
IIIN	148	102	111	97	96
IIIM	100	100	100	100	100
IV	86	118	114	105	102
V	176	182	227	179	(98)
standard deviation	37	40	55	35	—

(1) England and Wales 1961, derived from Gibson 1974 Tables II and III (also Table I of this paper)
(2) ratio of divorced to married males aged 35 to 59 in Great Britain in 1971 Census Occupation Tables Vol IV, Table 29
(3) England and Wales 1979 derived from Haskey 1984
(4) Great Britain estimated proportion of first marriages broken by 20 years of marriage duration from Family Formation Survey
(5) West Midlands, 1971 relative risk calculated from sample numbers in Thornes and Collard 1979 Tables 7 and 8, p. 161 according to the formula for i^{th} class
100* (D(i)/CM(i))/(D(IIIM)/CM(IIIM)), where D(i) refers to the numbers in the divorced sample and CM(i) to the numbers in the currently married group for the ith social class. The authors (*op. cit.*, p. 150) reported that 'upper' and 'rougher' elements were definitely more likely to refuse in the divorced sample, and that it was possible that the IIIM group was over-represented. Results for SCI and V should be discounted.

TABLE III *Correlation matrix for Table II*

	Estimate			
	Gibson (1)	Census (2)	Haskey (3)	Murphy (4)
(1)	—	.81	.85	.82
(2)		—	.98	.98
(3)			—	.99

The estimates are based on the values of Table II.

the 1971 Census and the occupation on the Census form, it was found that of 499 men aged 15 to 64 who were assigned to a social class in both cases, 24 per cent were allocated different social classes in the two coding procedures.[20] However, the *net* differences were much less since there did not appear to be a tendency for status to be

systematically 'promoted' or 'demoted'. It may be that the propensity to divorce was indeed higher among SCIIIN twenty or thirty years ago, but if this was the case in 1961 it had probably disappeared by the middle 1960s since the 1971 Census data refer mainly to experience about that time. One possible clue lies in Gibson's comment[21] that 1961 was unusual in that there was an increase in divorce following the uprating of legal aid levels in 1960. It was precisely these middle income groups who benefitted most from this change: the poor already had free or reduced costs, and the rich remained ineligible.[22] Thus, if some of this group had delayed divorce in order to take advantage of these new regulations, they would be temporarily over-represented. The reason why the finding that the occupational distribution of divorcing and continuing-married males was similar in 1951 was suggested as the introduction of the Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949, acting as a stimulus to working-class petitioners[23] — even though it was estimated subsequently that well over 80 per cent of the whole population came within the scope of the scheme on income grounds. Thus the extent to which it applied only to low income groups may have been overestimated.[24]

While no definitive conclusion may be established from the data given here, it emphasizes that data collected over a restricted period of time are subject to such transient factors, whereas data such as those from the Family Formation Survey and even Census data average experience over an extended period of time and should therefore be less subject to such problems.

4 MARITAL BREAKDOWN BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP AND OCCUPATION

A similar but more restricted analysis of breakdown by socio-economic group is possible from 1971 census data, and both Haskey's study and the Family Formation Survey. These data are shown in Table IV.

Given the different approaches (and the case of the Family Formation Survey based estimate (3), the small numbers involved: for example, the value for SEG 8 is based on single marital breakdown) the agreement between these measures is impressive for all groups except two: SEG12 where Haskey's results are much lower than the other two sources, probably for reasons discussed earlier; the other group is SEG16, Armed Forces. In the 1966 Registrar General's study,[25] as many as 16 per cent of divorcing husbands were in the Armed Forces which if taken at face value implied a relative risk of 15 times above the national average, so analysis of Armed Forces data is very problematic. If correlations between the various estimates are calculated for the three sources, the value of the FFS-based estimates with the others is around .9, but .7 for (1) and (2). However, if the

TABLE IV *Alternative estimates of relative socio-economic group marriage breakdown propensity: indexed to national figure = 100*

	Socio-economic group	Census	Haskey	Murphy
1+2	Employers and managers	72	130	108
3+4	Professional workers — all types	53	47	51
5	Intermediate non-manual	82	89	56
6	Junior non-manual	109	119	92
7	Personal service	237	365	235
8	Foremen and supervisors — manual	61	30	12
9	Skilled manual	102	112	92
10	Semi-skilled manual	110	115	103
11	Unskilled manual	177	241	176
12	Own-account non-professional	134	10	91
13 & 14	Farmers	48	65	59
15	Agricultural workers	56	82	67
16	Armed forces	73	270	112
standard deviation		53 (56)	99 (92)	55 (59)

See also notes to Table II.
In this table, the overall figure is set to 100
The figures in brackets in the standard deviation row are values calculated excluding SEGs 12 and 16.

problem SEGs 12 and 16 are excluded, all the correlations are in the range .94 to .98, see Table V.

One methodological point is that the numbers in the FFS sample are rather small in some cases. These estimates are therefore subject to more sampling variation than the other two. Since this variance is independent of the true value, it will tend to depress correlation coefficients as in the standard analysis of measurement errors, and hence under-estimate the strength of association between this data set and others.

These results are gratifying in that it must now be concluded that divorce estimates based on census marital status data are in very good agreement with apparently more appropriate data sources, and therefore they may be used for examining differentials by social and occupational factors. It is reasonable to assume that more detailed analysis of the relative risk of marital breakdown by occupations within SEGs will also be valid (of course, the small numbers in these

TABLE V *Correlation matrix for Table IV*

	Estimate		
	Census (1)	Haskey (2)	Murphy (3)
(1)	—	.69	.89
(2)	.96	—	.88
(3)	.94	.98	—

The estimates are based on the values of Table IV.
Values above the diagonal refer to the whole set of SEGs; those below the diagonal are computed excluding SEGs 12 and 16

groups makes it impossible to validate these data at present using survey data of the sample sizes discussed earlier). In particular, Noble's conclusions should be taken much more seriously than hitherto: for example, his findings that those in stable traditional employment have much lower divorce than persons with jobs such as actors and entertainers, barmen, company directors and journalists.

Noble[26] presented a table showing the 10 (out of 200 occupation codes) with the highest proportion of divorced men in 1961. The 1970–72 Registrar General's Decennial Supplement[27] showed the top 20 occupations (out of 222) for mortality from cirrhosis of the liver, commonly associated with excessive alcohol consumption, and suicide. These data are shown alongside those of Noble in Table VI. It is seen that nearly all of Noble's most divorce-prone 5 per cent of occupations are in the top 10 per cent of occupations with high mortality from cirrhosis and suicide. The association is extremely strong and would be even stronger if those groups who are believed to have high suicide rates because of their easy access to drugs were excluded.

Those occupations with particularly low proportions of divorced men noted by Noble included firemen, policemen, railwaymen, scientists, electrical engineers and clergymen (consisting of codes 250, 251, 290, 292, 180 and 193). Although the relative stability of these occupations was emphasized, they do tend to form an unusual group in that they had only 6 female employees for every 100 males in 1961, whereas the corresponding figure for the divorce-prone occupations was 228, and the overall figure for all occupations was 48.[28] The proportion of women in the occupation is only a partial indicator of the degree of contact between the sexes in the work environment, but the degree of sexual segregation in the low breakdown group is considerable and deserves further study.

Such findings tend to reinforce Noble's conclusions that 'it appears that family breakdown varies not so much with social status as with

TABLE VI *Indicators of mortality from cirrhosis of the liver and suicide 1970–72 among the 10 most divorce-prone occupations in 1961 Census, England and Wales*

Occupation	Rank	*Divorced* Number of men divorced per thousand ever-married	*Mortality of males 15–64* Cirrhosis of liver		Suicide	
			Rank	SMR	Rank	SMR
Stage managers, actors entertainers and musicians (207)	1	42.3	—	—	15	218
Kitchen hands (163)	2	27.1	—	—	17	206
Barmen (155)	3	23.0	3	633	—	—
Lorry drivers' mates, van guards (134)	4	23.0	9	377	—	—
Cooks (162)	5	22.4	10	354	—	—
Company directors[1]	6	19.9	N.A.	N.A.	N A.	N.A
Authors, journalists and related workers (206)	7	19.9	14	314	—	—
Painters, sculptors and related creative artists (208)	8	17.9	—	—	—	—
Restaurateurs, waiters and counter hands[2] (159–161)	9	16 7	8	385	18	204
Lodging house, hotel keepers, house-keepers, stewards, matrons[3] (156–158)	10	16.3	6	506	5	321

The SMR is an age-standardized index of mortality relative to an overall value of 100.
Owing to changes between 1961 and 1971, the following points should be noted:
[1] 'company directors' were not identified separately in 1971; in any case these data are highly suspect since the SMRs in 1961 for the categories above were 2200 and 1925 respectively.
[2] cirrhosis figures refer to OUG159 'restaurateurs' and suicide to OUG160 'waiters'
[3] cirrhosis figures refer to OUG156 'proprietors and managers, boarding houses and hotels' and suicide to OUG157 'house-keepers, stewards,

types of work conditions and possibly their consequent residential patterns' since similar factors might also be thought to be associated with both marital breakdown and alcohol/suicide related problems. It also raises the question as to whether the socio-economic group classification although purportedly containing 'people whose social, cultural and recreational standard are similar'[29] does reflect homogeneity of behaviour outside the work environment.

5 URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENTIALS

Noble also showed that there was a monotonic fall in the proportions divorced by size of residential unit, which he took as support of his thesis concerning social networks. Gibson objected to this breakdown on the grounds that the classification 'into urban/rural divisions does not provide a reliable indicator of population distribution'.[30] Such caveats might be thought *a priori* to reinforce Noble's arguments rather than the opposite since it is implied that the classification employed is crude, yet it shows a clear gradient: a more refined and meaningful one might be expected to show a larger one, although the mobility of the divorced and the particularly high propensity of them to be associated with the privately rented sector will tend to confound conclusions.

CONCLUSIONS

The balance of evidence from different sources is that the crude relationship between socio-economic status and marital breakdown, that is before allowing for factors known to be associated with higher risk of marital breakdown such as age at marriage and fertility history, is best described by a pattern of relatively little variation between social classes II to IV who accounted for 88 per cent of classified males in private households aged under 65 in Great Britain in 1981.[31] On average, there is a slight increase from social class II to IV, but no real evidence of any difference between rates within the breakdown of social class III into manual and non-manual groups. However, these differences are rather small compared to variations in other factors such as age at marriage, where the average risk of marriage breakdown at a given marriage duration falls by about 20 per cent for each year later of the bride at marriage. The extremes of the social class distribution, I and V, do show considerably greater differences, with social class I rates being between a quarter and a half less than average, and social class V having rates roughly double the average.

Socio-economic group analysis throws up more interesting variations, in that groups previously submerged, farmers and agricultural workers show considerably lower rates of marital breakdown, and particularly noteworthy are the very high rates found among personal service workers, those working in areas such as the serving of food and drink (but excluding, for example, shop sales staff). The fact that such employment often has accommodation provided and might therefore be attractive to those experiencing marital breakdown is not an adequate explanation since personal service work is seen to be a high risk factor even for employment at marriage from the Family Formation Survey data. The presence of high proportions of females, the unusual and long hours of this form of employment and its high labour turnover may be factors which are associated with higher risk of marital breakdown for males, the last point being confirmed by Thornes and Collard.[32] These points tend to confirm Noble's view of the importance of work circumstances as opposed to social status on marital breakdown, as does the strong association between occupations with high marital breakdown and alcohol-related mortality and suicide.

It appears that the aggregate classifications derived either for other purposes, such as social class — originally designed to examine mortality differentials — or general purposes such as socio-economic group fail to discriminate between behaviour such as marital breakdown. Indeed, it is questionable whether those included in a particular SEG category do exhibit the similar social, cultural and recreational patterns as the classification supposes. For example, SEG6, junior non-manual, contains occupations as diverse as: professional sportsmen, shelf fillers, police constables, street traders, clerks of works, secretaries and firemen. Progress on detailed analyses at the occupational unit group level is likely to be possible only with sources such as the Census, a method which is likely to be valid for the sorts of reasons set out earlier, and one which, subject to reasonable comparability of occupational classifications, potentially allows examination of changes in trends in relative marital breakdown patterns over time. It is also concluded that multi-purpose social surveys, such as the Family Formation Survey, have considerable advantages over administrative data sources because they are not subject to problems of numerator/denominator biases, they use a more complete definition of marital breakdown and they enable status at various earlier periods to be collected.

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NOTES

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2. C. Gibson, 'A note on family breakdown in England and Wales', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 22, no. 3, September, 1971, pp. 322–5.
3. T. Noble, 'Family breakdown and social networks', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 21, no. 2, June, 1970, pp. 135–50.
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11. Gibson, 1971, *op. cit.*
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16. K. Dunnell (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys), *Family Formation 1976*, H.M.S.O., 1979.
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18. *The Registrar General's Statistical Review of England and Wales for the year 1967. Part III Commentary*, London, H.M.S.O., 1971, Table C14.
19. Gibson, 1974, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
20. *Occupational mortality. the Registrar General's Decennial Supplement for England and Wales, 1970–72. Series DS No 1*, London, H.M.S.O., 1978, pp. 22–3.
21. Gibson, 1974, *op cit.*, p. 80.
22. C. Glasser, 'Summary by Special Consultant of study of financial eligibility for legal aid 1950–1976' in *26th Legal Aid Annual Reports (1975–76)*, London, H.M.S.O., 1976, pp. 78–82.
23. G. Rowntree and N. H. Carrier, 'The resort to Divorce in England and Wales, 1858–1957', *Population Studies*, vol. 11, no 3, March 1958, pp. 188–233.
24. Glasser, *op. cit.*
25. *Op. cit.*
26. *Op. cit.*, p. 146
27. *Op. cit.*, pp. 145–6.
28. *Census 1961: England and Wales. Occupational Tables*, London, H.M.S.O., 1966, Table 1.
29. *Social Trends, op. cit.*, pp. 10–32.
30. Gibson, 1971, *op. cit.*, p. 322.
31. *Census 1981· National Report, Great Britain, Part 2*, London, H.M.S.O., 1983, Table 50.
32. *Op. cit.*, Table 83.

Denis O'Hearn

Again on discrimination in the North of Ireland: a reply to the rejoinder

ABSTRACT

In this contribution to a debate about discrimination in the North of Ireland (*British Journal of Sociology*, September 1981 and September 1983) further evidence is presented to support the case that there was a systematic discrimination against Catholics in the 1960s. A regression of Protestant over-representation (Y) on the log of local council size in Catholic-majority areas (X) reveals a significant positive relationship. A scatter plot shows Protestant over-representation to increase as council size increases, with an 'upper limit' of about 20 per cent over-representation. Bruce Taylor's application of the Hall-Jones occupational status classification to Richard Rose's 'Loyalty Survey' data is presented to demonstrate the evidence of occupational discrimination.

Though it is rare for an author to comment a second time on an article, I find it necessary to do so in the case of Christopher Hewitt's article on discrimination and nationalism in the North of Ireland (*British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, no. 3, September 1981) and his reply to my comments (*British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 34, no. 3, September 1983). Again, he has consistently misused statistics to support an unfounded proposition, i.e., that there is not 'a serious or systematic bias against Catholics' in the six counties.

Hewitt insists that his prime objective was not to disprove systematic discrimination but to show that nationalism *rather than* discrimination was the basis of Catholic uprising in the late 1960s. Even this proposition is ahistorical and incorrect. First, if one wants to show why people rebel, the most important factor is probably not their situation, but *their perception* of their situation. Thus, all of Hewitt's 'evidence' against discrimination is beside the point to his stated objective. Furthermore, his assumption that 'nationalism' is an autonomous concept that appears independently of historical socio-economic variables is highly suspect.

Even assuming that discrimination did not exist in 1968 (which I

shall continue to show was not the case), Hewitt's prized survey research à la Richard Rose shows that 74 per cent of Catholics *thought* they were systematically treated unfairly.[1] In the historical context, it is quite clear that the rise of the IRA and of Catholic rioting was *a direct response* to physical attacks on the Catholic population by the predominantly Protestant RUC, the Protestant B-Specials, and Protestant gangs[2] — e.g., the 'battle of the bogside', the St Matthews incident in the Short Strand, the burning of Catholic Bombay Street by Protestant pogromists. While these activities do not generally show up as part of the statistics on discrimination, an understanding of the history of violence against Catholics is necessary in order to understand the roots of violence in the North of Ireland over the past fifteen years. The one statistic that is available on this matter suggests that 83 per cent of the 3,570 families that were burned or intimidated out of their homes in the summer of 1969 were Catholics.[3]

As for the more important point of our debate — the existence or non-existence of systematic discrimination against Catholics in the North of Ireland — Hewitt is again guilty of gross misrepresentation of the statistical evidence. He totally ignored my Table I on gerrymandering, which clearly showed discrimination against Catholics in the setting of local ward boundaries for voting purposes. The results are made even clearer in the following scatter plot (Figure I), which shows the relationship between local council size and percentage Protestant over-representation for the sixteen local councils with Catholic majorities in 1961.[4]

Figure I shows exactly what we would expect in the case of gerrymandering. The relationship between council size and Protestant over-representation is characterized by a hyperbola because, as our theory would predict, smaller councils are left to Catholics while a greater effort is made to gerrymander large local councils. However, there is an upper level of about 20 per cent in the amount of gerrymandering that is politically or physically possible. When a log transformation is made to approximate linearity, we find the correlation of these two factors (council size and Protestant over-representation) to be positive and very high ($R = 0.75$) and the global F-test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients are zero is significant beyond the .001 level. Thus, we can safely conclude that there is a strong positive relationship between council size and Protestant over-representation.

The only outlier candidate is Kilkeel, and one would need to know more about it to understand why it was not successfully gerrymandered. However, it is a relatively small district. As for Hewitt's query about why Omagh was gerrymandered, but not Strabane, he ignores the fact that Omagh (57.2 per cent Catholic) was gerrymanderable while Strabane (76.3 per cent) was not.

Hewitt's objection that only seven districts were gerrymandered,

FIGURE I *The Relationship between Size of Local Council and Protestant Overrepresentation (Northern Ireland Councils with a Chatholic-majority Population)*



Note df = 15, R^2 = 57, $F_{1,14}$ = 18.22, p = 0008. Standard errors of the coefficients are reported in parentheses.

1 Derry	9 Newry
2 Magherafelt R D	10 Armagh
3 Omagh R.D.	11 Omagh
4 Newry No. 2 R D	12 Otrabane
5 Lisnaskea R.D.	13 Downpatrick
6 Cookstown R.D	14 Warrenpoint
7 Newry No 1 R D	15 Ballycastle
8 Kilkeel R D	16 Keady

and therefore Catholics in all other districts were not discriminated against, disregards the nature of gerrymandering. Not only are wards gerrymandered *within* districts of Catholic majority, but the local districts themselves may be set up in order to ensure Protestant majorities in the maximum of cases. In this respect, control over *where*

Catholics are housed, through the manipulation of Housing Executive allocations, and the ignoring if not encouragement of anti-Catholic pogroms, is very important and requires further study.

Perhaps the final word on gerrymandering should come from Northern Ireland's policymakers. Patrick Buckland's meticulous study of official state papers in the period leading to the 1922 Local Government (Northern Ireland) Act shows clearly that the 'sole concern' of the Ministry of Home Affairs 'was how to give effect to the view of the Unionist rank and file.' According to Buckland, who in previous writings was sympathetic to the Unionist cause, 'the reorganisation of local electoral areas in controversial districts was virtually dictated by local Unionists'.[5] As a result, in the 1922 elections anti-Unionists lost 13 of the 23 councils that they had won in the 1920 local elections.

In the discussion of discrimination in employment, Hewitt 'humorously' refers to 'anti-Protestant bias in the liquor trade' (p. 448).[6] I am sure the same wisecrack would apply to the dockworker trade and the building-labourer trade. Now, Hewitt knows, or should know very well that these are all low-prestige occupations; and his statement is the same as an American joking that there is 'anti-white discrimination in the garbage-collection trade.' Such statements are academically useless, as well as racist, and have no place in as respected a journal as *The British Journal of Sociology*. The same is true of Hewitt's unsupported statements implying that Catholics are poor because they have too many babies (p. 450).

Hewitt's Table II in his reply article shows the opposite of what he says it shows (p. 449). The distribution of Catholics in the North of Ireland is quite like that of blacks in the USA. The differences in percentages of Catholics/Protestants and Blacks/Whites in different occupational categories are all in the same direction — the differences in magnitude in favour of Catholics are due to the fact that they make up a larger percentage of the total population of the North of Ireland (36.8 per cent) than do blacks in the total U.S. population (11.1 per cent). However, these occupational data show *similarities*, not that Catholics are 'blacks in white skins.' To ignore the historical differences between the rise of discrimination in Ireland and the rise of slavery/discrimination in the USA would be a disservice to both oppressed groups.

In terms of Richard Rose's data, Hewitt is guilty of uncritical acceptance. On first inspection, the data tend to show (as Rose says) that there is essentially no difference in occupational status between Catholics and Protestants. However, Rose's occupational classifications do not discriminate adequately in terms of occupational status. When Bruce Taylor applied the 'Hall-Jones Classification' of occupational status to Rose's own data, he obtained a much different, clearer result. Taylor's results, summarised in Table I, agree closely with Aunger.[7]

TABLE 1 *Religion and occupational status 1968, economically active males (Rose data)*

Occupational status	Hall-Jones classification	Protestants	Catholics	Difference
1. Professional/managerial	I/II/III	22.9% (123)	11.8% (44)	11.1%
2. Lower grade non-manual	IV/V(a)	19.5 (105)	14 5 (54)	5.0
3. Skilled manual	V(b)	29.6 (159)	30 4 (113)	−0.8
4. Semi-skilled manual	VI	15 4 (83)	15 1 (56)	0.3
5. Unskilled/unemployed	VII	12 6. (68)	28.2 (105)	−15.6
		100% (538)	100% (372)	

SOURCE: Bruce Taylor, *Brass Money and Wooden Shoes· Protestant Sectarianism and Ethnic Competition in Northern Ireland*, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, 1979, Table 4–4, p. 99.
NOTES: N = 910, df = 4, ^{2} = 45.9, p < .0001.

Taylor's overall chi-square of 45.9 (df = 4) is significant beyond the .0001 level, and indicates a reliable overall relationship between religion and occupational status. Taylor makes several manipulations of the Rose data using the Hall-Jones Classification, and in all cases finds a significance beyond the .001 level. Most importantly, Taylor finds the differences to be widest at the upper and lower extremities of the occupational scale. The Protestant/Catholic percentage difference in the Professional/Managerial category is 11.1 per cent, and in the unskilled/unemployed category the difference is −15.6 per cent.

But this is not the full story: for the data also show that Protestants in the professional/managerial category tend to hold positions that serve the community as a whole; while Catholics in that category serve their own community. Indeed, 34 per cent of Catholics in the professional/managerial category are primary- or secondary-school teachers or clergymen. Furthermore, the majority (56 per cent) of non-manual jobs held by Catholics are filled by women who are teachers, nurses, table-waiters or shop-clerks. These are jobs with little or no chance for advancement, and the women in them tend to quit when they marry. Even within an occupation, such as dock-workers, we find Protestants employed in the cross-channel docks where there is more work and better pay, while Catholics are forced to work in the deep sea docks, where occupational conditions and status are much lower.

One of Hewitt's most apparent mistakes is his statement that 'Catholics had a lower occupational status than Protestants in four countries (UK, USA, Australia, New Zealand) where nobody would seriously argue that religious discrimination existed' (p. 449). First, the implication that Catholics are simply inferior everywhere is sectarian in character, and bears much more documentation before Hewitt should make such a charge. But, factually, he faces a simple problem of *collinearity*, which a college-trained statistician should have avoided. While there may not be anti-*Catholic* discrimination in the UK, there is certainly a history of anti-*Irish* discrimination, not to mention the fact that emigrants (which most British Catholics are) are generally disadvantaged. The case of the USA is even more clear cut, where such a large Catholic population is made up of Hispanics, not to mention ethnic latecomers to the USA such as the Irish, Italians, and Poles.[8] In Australia and New Zealand, there was intense hostility against Catholics, both on the basis of religion and because they were Irish, and therefore 'rebels'. Irish Catholics were also unskilled workers and farmers by background and many were (often political) convicts. In Ireland, the origins of discrimination are not founded in religion so much as in the circumstance that Catholics were the native Irish, while Protestants were the settlers and conquerors.

Hewitt proceeds to blame occupational differences between Catholics and Protestants on differences in education level attained by the two groups — a variable that is itself tied to discrimination and inequality. He quotes a recent study which states that 'research on social mobility in industrialized countries has proved massive evidence of the central role played by educational attainment in the determination of occupational outcomes.'[9] This may well be true for the average industrial society, which means that the existence of differences in occupational level for groups with similar educational backgrounds would support the case for discrimination. Indeed, regressions carried out by Taylor using the Rose data show a significant difference in occupational status attained for a given educational level between Catholics and Protestants in the North of Ireland (see Figure II). Similarly, Covello and Ashby[10] find that Protestants receive $254 in annual income for each additional year of schooling, compared to $159 for Catholics.

Many social scientists would argue that the existence of such inequalities among ethnic groups are not proof of discrimination. They would separate the question of inequality from that of discrimination by invoking 'structural inequality'. This is Hewitt's position when he objects that 'economic differences between Catholics and Protestants' do not necessarily 'indicate discrimination' (p. 449). Theoretically, this is mere academic hocus pocus — a means of shifting the responsibility for inequality away from social groups and

FIGURE II *Regressions of Occupational Status on Age at School Leaving for Protestants and Catholics*



Note· $N_{Prot} = 278$, $N_{Cath} = 250$, $F_{1,79} = 4.47$, $p < 031$
Source:Bruce Taylor, 1979, pp 116, 117.

classes and onto an autonomous, unchangeable, and ideology-free 'structure'.

Finally, I would like to clear up a few minor points made by Hewitt. He claims that 'any introductory text in research methods will stress that you cannot generalize from case studies. If we want to describe the general situation we must utilize general statistics' (p. 446). In the case of gerrymandering in Ulster, this is a nonsensical statement, because we are talking about a very small population of local councils. There is no need to 'generalize' because there is no need to take samples. In addition, his objection was in response to my point that local councils must be examined by the use of categorical (e.g., Protestant vs. Catholic majority) *and* analytical (e.g., population of council) variables, rather than simply looking at a collection of local councils and declaring them all to be the same.

Second, he ascribes to me the quote that 'the median Catholic worker is an unskilled manual worker' and says that I confused the terms 'median' and 'mode' (p. 448). Had he read my comments carefully, he would have noticed that this was a quote from the Fair Employment Agency of Northern Ireland.

In summary, Hewitt failed to answer my objections to his original article on Catholic nationalism and discrimination in the North of Ireland. His reply shows clearly that his analysis is coloured by a way of thinking that could politely be called 'selective', but more descriptively called 'bigoted' or 'sectarian'.

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NOTES

1. Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1971, p. 497. Only 13 per cent of Catholics thought that discrimination was not systematic.

2. In 1969 the 3,000-strong Royal Ulster Constabulary contained less than 11 per cent Catholics. The Ulster Special Constabulary, or 'B-Specials' (8,500 strong), contained no Catholics. See, John White, 'How much discrimination was there under the Unionist regime, 1921–68?' in Gallagher and O'Connell, *Contemporary Irish Studies*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1983, p. 24; and Kevin Boyle, Tom Hadden and Paddy Hillyard, *Ten Years on in Northern Ireland*, Nottingham, The Cobden Trust, 1980, p. 25.

3. 'Displacement of Persons,' in *Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969*, Belfast, HMSO, 1972, pp. 246–49.

4. In the regressions for Figure I I have used Hewitt's corrections of census data for proportion of *adults* population. However, these corrected magnitudes are quite misleading due to (1) the increase of the Catholic voting-age proportions between 1961 and 1967 and (2) the higher proportion of Catholics who were unwilling to report their religion on census forms. According to 1961 census data for proportion of *adult* population. Catholic proportion of voters would have risen from 31.3 per cent in 1961 to 32.65 per cent in 1967. This correction alone would have resulted in the addition of five local councils to the total of Catholic-majority councils, and four of these were *solidly* in Unionist hands (i.e., Catholics were under-represented by at least 15 per cent). Government of Northern Ireland, *Census of Population 1961: General Report*, Belfast, HMSO, 1965, p. 30.

5. Patrick Buckland, *The Factory of Grievances*, Dublin, Gill and MacMillan, 1979, pp. 233, 239.

6. Page numbers in parentheses refer to Christopher Hewitt, 'Discrimination in Northern Ireland: a rejoinder,' *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXXIV, no. 3, September 1983, pp. 446–51.

7. E. A. Aunger, *Social Fragmentation and Political Stability*, Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 1978, p. 156.

8. In 1970–1, Hispanics alone made up about 18 per cent of the US Catholic population. Gallup Opinion Index, *Religion in America, 1971*, Report no. 70, April 1971, p. 57; US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population: United States Summary*, Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1973, tables 48, 190.

9. Alan Kerckhoff, Richard Campbell and Jerry Trott, 'Education and Occupational Attainment in Great Britain,' *American Sociological Review*, vol. 47, June 1982, p. 348.

10. Vincent T. Covello and Jacqueline A. Ashby, 'Inequality in a divided society an analysis of data from Northern Ireland,' *Sociological Focus*, vol. XIII, no. 2, 1980, pp. 87–98.

Christopher Hewitt

Catholic grievances and violence in Northern Ireland

In my original article 'Catholic grievances, Catholic Nationalism and Violence', I proposed a revisionist interpretation of the Northern Irish conflict. I argued that violence was a result, not of Catholic grievances over discrimination, but of Catholic nationalism (i.e. aspirations for a united Ireland).

In both his comments, O'Hearn focuses on Catholic grievances. He sometimes writes as though my position is that there was no discrimination (e.g. 'Even assuming that discrimination did not exist in 1968, which I shall continue to show was not the case'). My discussion of the role of Catholic grievances as a *cause* of Catholic violence was totally ignored in his first comment, and receives only passing mention in the second. In this response, I will first discuss the severity of anti-Catholic discrimination, and then expand my arguments concerning the causes of violence.

THE SEVERITY OF ANTI-CATHOLIC DISCRIMINATION

My finding that only seven Catholic-majority areas were controlled by unionist councils is important in that it shows nationalist claims of widespread gerrymandering were unjustified.[1] O'Hearn argues, however, that my data can be used to show a 'consistent policy' of discrimination by a 'loyalist ruling class' who gerrymander the large districts ('political plums') but 'throw' small districts to the nationalists. His analysis does show that unionist over-representation tends to be higher in the larger districts. The problem is that too many cases don't fit the pattern. Newry Number 1 and Kilkeel Rural Districts, with sizable populations and clearly gerrymanderable, were left under nationalist control. The other two cases, Limavady and Ballycastle Rural Districts, in which Protestant-majority areas were controlled by nationalist councils are even more difficult to explain away. Both in my original article *and* in my response I raised this point specifically. Why does O'Hearn ignore my challenge? The claim that *more* than seven districts were gerrymandered because 'local districts themselves

are set up in order to ensure Protestant majorities in the maximum of cases' is very puzzling. If this charge could be supported, it would provide a telling piece of evidence for the loyalist conspiracy thesis. Yet we are not offered a single example by O'Hearn, nor can I think of one being mentioned in the literature. The local districts and their boundaries have remained virtually unchanged from pre-partition days.[2] When did this alleged chicanery take place?

As to the degree of occupational disadvantage, his new data add little to the original argument. There is undoubtedly a 'reliable overall relationship between religion and occupational status' in Northern Ireland, which nobody has ever denied. O'Hearn, however, seems to confuse *statistical* significance (how likely a difference is to occur by chance) with *practical* significance (whether a difference is important). One standard method of comparing groups is to look at the 'typical' or 'average' case. O'Hearn's position that female workers should be ignored because women teachers, nurses etc. 'tend to quit when they marry' is surely out-of-date. However, even if we use Taylor's data to compare the typical (i.e modal) *male* Catholic to his Protestant counterpart, we find that both are skilled manual workers. If we compare the average (i.e. median) Catholic and Protestant, we again find that both are skilled manual workers. Thus the new data confirm my original arguments. Catholics *tend* to have a lower occupational position than Protestants, but the difference should not be exaggerated. Certainly it is not of the order of magnitude found between blacks and whites in the USA. Using the difference index, we see that 16 per cent of the Catholics would have to change occupations for their distribution to be identical with that of the Protestants. In the USA, a shift of 38 per cent would be required to make blacks and whites equal.

When is a percentage difference between Catholics and Protestants significant? The answer, of course, depends on how the percentage is calculated. In Catholic majority areas, 58 per cent of voters and 52.4 per cent of councillors were Catholic, giving a 5.6 per cent under-representation. (O'Hearn calculates the under-representation as 12.1 per cent). On the other hand, Catholics constitute 29 per cent of all employees but only 12–13 per cent of those holding certain government jobs. Thus there *is much more* under-representation in government jobs than in local councils.

Economic differences between groups can be explained by several factors *in addition to discrimination*, including cultural values, regional distributions, historical experience, educational attainment and demography. The reader will note that nowhere do I suggest that Catholic-Protestant differences are explicable in terms of inherent inferiority. I am therefore puzzled by the silly rhetoric about my 'racist' and 'sectarian' statements. Nor do I believe that Catholics 'are simply

inferior' — a position that would create certain problems for me, since I am married to a Northern Irish Catholic.

Some occupational differentiation in Northern Ireland probably reflects cultural values. Thus the striking number of Catholic pub-owners is usually explained by the hostility of many evangelical Protestants to drinking. (Incidentally is O'Hearn seriously arguing that owning a pub is an undesirable social position?) Similarly since many Catholics refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the state, this somewhat explains their under-representation in the civil service and police force.

I thought that I had 'supported' my argument that their high fertility handicapped Catholics, by citing three Irish studies on the topic. Numerous studies find a negative correlation between family size and occupational achievement. For example, Blau and Duncan[3] say 'occupational achievement is clearly related to the number of siblings in the family in which a man grew up,' and Brittain[4] that 'a large family of origin tend to be disadvantageous.' This finding holds when other factors, such as father's occupation, are included, and several theories are suggested to explain it.[5] It is surely plausible to argue that some significant portion of the economic difference between Catholics and Protestants is accounted for by demography, differences in education etc.

O'Hearn's attempts to account for the lower socio-economic position of Catholics in the USA and UK are absurd. 'Most' British Catholics are certainly not 'emigres'. In 1973, 4.6 per cent of the US population was of 'Hispanic heritage'. Since my occupational data refer to 1957, *before* the period of heavy Hispanic immigration, the proportion must have been even smaller then. As to the Italians and Irish being 'ethnic latecomers', the peak of Italian immigration was in the 1901–10 decade, that of the Irish in 1851–60!

GRIEVANCES, NATIONALISM AND VIOLENCE

Let me conclude by discussing the alleged link between discrimination, inequality and violence. O'Hearn argues that what matters is how people perceive their situation, and claims that Rose's survey 'shows that 74 per cent of Catholics thought they were systematically treated unfairly.' Again he misquotes his sources. The question actually reads: 'People sometimes say that *in parts of Northern Ireland*, Catholics are treated unfairly. Do you think this is true or not?' Furthermore, only 36 per cent had 'personal knowledge' of such discrimination, while 38 per cent had 'only heard or read about it.' Also if perceptions are what matter, how does O'Hearn explain the fact that only 10 per cent of Catholics living in Unionist-controlled districts expected to be treated unfairly by the Council? The survey data on Catholic

perceptions seem to be consistent with my position; a minority of Catholics, in some areas, encountered discrimination, but discrimination was neither widespread nor systematic.

In my original article, I pointed out that the distribution of Catholic violence was not correlated with gerrymandering, and that sweeping local government reforms had no effect. I also noted that cross-national data on occupational differences by religion raise the question 'why socio-economic disparities in these societies have not led to sectarian violence?' Let me expand on this point. Northern Ireland is the site of one of the most violent ethnic conflicts in modern times. Yet minorities in many other societies (e.g. Blacks in the USA, French-speakers in Quebec or New Brunswick) are equally deprived but far less violent. Why — if violence is caused by inequality?

The violence in Northern Ireland closely resembles that in Cyprus and the Basque provinces of Spain, although Greek Cypriots and Spanish Basques were certainly not economically disadvantaged. However, in all three cases there was a strong nationalist tradition maintained by schools, Churches etc. It is this nationalist tradition that explains the violence.

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NOTES

1. For allegations about the extent of gerrymandering see p. 363 of my original article, 'Catholic grievances, Catholic nationalism and violence in Northern Ireland during the Civil Rights period', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, no. 3.
2. The city boundaries of Londonderry and Armagh were extended to include Protestant areas. However, both cases are included in the list of seven gerrymandered districts.
3. Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure*, Wiley, 1967.
4. John Brittain, *The Inheritance of Economic Status*, Brookings Institution, 1977.
5. Blau and Duncan, op. cit., pp. 295–330, Brittain, op. cit., pp. 80–4, and C. Russell Hill and Frank P. Stafford, *Family Background and Lifetime Earnings*, National Bureau of Economic Research.
6. For a comparative analysis of these three cases of nationalist violence, see my book, *The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorist Policies*, University Press of America, 1984.

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Does the difference schools make, make a difference?

ABSTRACT

The enduring debate on 'school effects' is examined. The American research of Coleman, which asserts that 'schools make little difference', is compared with the British research of Rutter which asserts that 'schools make a significant difference'. It is shown that, despite Rutter's attempt to polarize this debate, there is precious little disagreement, at the level of research, between Coleman's data and Rutter's findings. It is shown that, in terms of research, Rutter's claim is simply different from, not opposed to, Coleman's claim. The resulting absurdity of having two valid answers, one positive and one negative, for the same question is noted and discussed. In an attempt to resolve this embarrassing dilemma, it is suggested that the question of school effects be replaced by one which will encourage debate rather than non-debate. The paper concludes by asking 'whether the difference schools make, makes a difference?' It is argued that, when Rutter's claim is examined in such a light, it is unlikely that anyone, except the statistician, will find it significant.

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether schools make a difference has long absorbed the time and exercised the mind of the educational establishment. Giving every impression of being educationally relevant and politically significant, it is a question which has, for some reason, been the subject of much academic dispute.[1] Quite why this question should have divided and polarized the academic community is, however, not at all clear; for whilst the rhetoric is unmistakably that of conflict, the research testifies only to harmony.

It is a matter which can be elaborated by examining the two answers currently advanced by educational research in response to this question of school effects. Both answers are well known, well

documented and, at first sight, radically opposed. The first, emanating originally from the work of Coleman, delcares that schooling or more precisely differences in schooling, have little effect on attainment. The second, emanating more recently from the work of Rutter, maintains in contrast that schooling and differences in schooling have a significant effect on attainment. Given such contrasting views on the matter, it is hard to resist the suggestion that Coleman and Rutter are advancing two fundamentally opposed views of schooling.

It is a suggestion, which, however, is best resisted; for in this debate there is surprisingly no debate whatsoever. Oddly such opposition as appears to exist between Coleman and Rutter does not exist at all; for it is evident, on inspection, that these 'seemingly' opposed claims are, in fact, nothing more than different claims describing the different results generated by different measures of school effectiveness. True, Rutter's treatment of Coleman in 'Fifteen Thousand Hours' and, more recently, in 'School Effects and Pupil Progress' might well suggest that he and Coleman are in some considerable dispute; analysis of his findings, however, shows otherwise. In fact, as will be shown here, such opposition as exists, or more exactly as appears to exist, is purely factitious; for when Rutter claims that 'schools make a difference' he is not actually denying Coleman's claim that 'school makes little difference'; he is merely asserting that, by other measures of school effectiveness, schools do indeed have a significant effect. Indeed when the same measure of school effectiveness is employed Rutter's findings ironically support Coleman's claim. In this rather strange debate, such opposition as exists or, more exactly, as appears to exist, is entirely spurious.

Whatever the reason for this spurious controversy it has, however, had one consequence which is, as far as educational research is concerned, somewhat embarrassing. After decades of blindly asking whether schools make a difference, educational research now finds itself in the absurd predicament of having more answers to this question than it can sensibly handle. Not only is it left, as a result of such a contrived confrontation, with two very different views of school effectiveness but, worse, it is left, in the absence of real conflict, with no objective way of deciding which of these two views best reflects the reality of schooling.

In order to throw light on this more important matter, in order to decide which of these two intuitively plausible and empirically defensible answers best reflects the reality of schooling, a rather different question must now be asked. Since what matters here is not simply whether schools make a difference but, rather, whether that difference is socially significant, it now seems appropriate to enquire whether the difference schools make makes any difference to, say, the educational and occupational prospects of the young. Of course, asking 'whether schools make a difference which makes a difference'

will not change the fact that schools have, by different measures, different effects; nevertheless it will indicate whether such effects are, as Rutter believes, worth mentioning or as Coleman sees it, best ignored.

1. DO SCHOOLS MAKE A DIFFERENCE: THE NON-DEBATE

In a decade which witnessed little more than old certitudes reiterated with new confidence, Rutter's first pages claim that schooling makes a difference provided, or seemed to provide, the makings of a long overdue debate. It was an opposition which Rutter, at least initially, did little to minimize; for, not content in fastening on the prevailing certitude amongst academics that 'schools made little difference', Rutter took to task the main architects of this view, namely Coleman and Jencks. Finding Coleman's measure of attainment 'striking'[2] and Jencks' conclusion 'startling'[3] Rutter set out to show that schooling did, after all, make a significant difference. With the issue so sharply polarized there was clearly no mistaking what was here in contention.

What is rather less clear, however, is why Rutter ever polarized the issue in the first place; for, on the essential facts of the matter, there is precious little disagreement between Coleman's data and Rutter's findings. Both started with the same discovery. In the currency of the debate Coleman, no less than Rutter, found that some schools were indeed more effective than others. In itself, this surprised no one; for, as Jencks put it, this was only to be expected:

> nearly anything can happen in a place called a school. Some schools consist of a single room with a barely literate teacher . . . others are huge enterprises with highly trained staff . . . Given this diversity we did not expect all schools to have precisely the same effect.[4]

As it transpired, it was an expectation which was amply confirmed in America by Coleman and in Britain by Rutter. Coleman found that as far as 'separate but equal schools' were concerned 'the average minority pupil scores distinctly lower . . . at every level than the average white pupil'.[5] In the somewhat different context of British education Rutter found that his otherwise well matched secondary schools 'varied markedly with respect to their pupils' behaviour, attendance, examination success and delinquency'.[6]

With Jencks' expectation confirmed, what now needed to be explained was 'why' such differences in achievement obtained. All quickly discovered that, whatever the source of such school to school variations, it had little to do with what conventional wisdom had long presumed; notably, school to school variations in resources and

facilities. Coleman found, much to his surprise, that variation in school funding and facilities 'accounted for relatively little variation in pupil achievement'.[7] Jencks was more direct. He could find 'no correlation between what a high school spends and its impact on students' attainment'.[8] Rutter agreed that 'earlier work has been consistent in showing the main source of variation between schools in their effect on children did not lie in such factors as buildings and resources. We found the same.'[9]

Having discovered that school differences in funding explained little of the variance in attainment, Coleman, Jencks and Rutter each cast about for an alternative explanation. These searches, though separately undertaken, followed much the same course. Once again all three researchers started with much the same observation and all three ended up advancing much the same explanation. In each case, the critical discovery was the same — 'school to school' difference was never as great as 'within school' difference — a discovery which led all three to make the same inference. For Coleman this discovery meant '. . . that most of the variation in achievement could not possibly be accounted for by school differences'.[10] Jencks followed suit, and made the same point, with characteristic bluntness, 'variations in what children learn in schools depend largely on variations in what they bring to school, not on variations in what schools offer them'.[11]

Rutter's research also led to much the same conclusion. As he put it, 'intellectual characteristics are the single most important predictors of individual differences in attainment — their effect being substantially greater than that of schools'.[12] This warm agreement, however, did not end there; for, having agreed the general superiority of 'within school' differences over 'between school' differences in explaining differences in attainment, all three proceed to put a more precise figure on the relative influence of these two sets of factors. For Coleman differences in school factors, from whatever source, accounted for 'only about 10–20 per cent of the total variation';[13] whilst for Jencks the calculated influence of such difference was a somewhat less generous 2 per cent. As Jencks put it, '. . . qualitative differences between high schools seem to explain about 2 per cent of the variation in students' education attainment'.[14] Given such figures it is, perhaps, not surprising that Coleman and Jencks came to the view that school mattered little. What is rather more surprising, however, is that when Rutter addressed his research to this vexed question he, too, was in agreement with his American colleagues. Indeed, as Rutter has recently admitted, his research actually confirmed Jencks' lower figure.

Jencks in his analysis of school effects asks whether raising the standard of schooling would reduce inequalities in attainment (i.e.

> make children more similar in their scholastic attainment). His answer to that question was that it would not. We agree, and our findings are broadly in keeping with his in that connection.[15]

On this admission there can be no doubt that Coleman, Jencks and Rutter are in subsbantial agreement. In each case, differences in the family background and in the intellectual ability of the student population account for much the greater part of the variance identified. In its conventional usage, then, schools for Rutter, as for Coleman and Jencks evidently make little difference.

What is rather less clear, however, is why, given such agreement, Rutter ever took issue with Coleman and Jencks; why, given as he now admits that his findings were 'broadly in keeping' with theirs, did he berate them for 'underestimating the importance of schooling',[16] and for 'creating the impression that education made little difference'.[17] It is a question for which Rutter has no convincing answer, for the answer he advances ironically explains why they are not in conflict, not why they are.

This crucial point can be developed by looking at Rutter's attempt to 'square' his recurrent claim concerning the significant effects of schooling with his recent acceptance of the American claim to the contrary. In an attempt to 'head off' the looming absurdity of protesting, on the one hand, that schools have a significant effect whilst acknowledging, on the other, that they have little effect, Rutter draws an important distinction. He distinguishes between what he terms 'inequalities' in attainment and 'overall levels of attainment'. It is a distinction which Rutter usually elucidates by citing Tizard's discovery that the average height of London children has increased by 9 centimetres over the last half century. What interests Rutter is that this 'very considerable gain' in average height was made without particularly affecting the variations in height between such children. Average height increased but, as he notes, 'children still vary enormously in how tall they are'.[18] The parallel as far as education is concerned is obvious. As Rutter points out, 'improving school will not necessarily make any difference to individual variations, but it may have a decisive impact in raising overall standards of attainment.'[19] In this context this distinction is crucially important; for, once drawn, Rutter can, without contradiction, accept that schools have little effect in one respect, yet still proclaim that they have a significant effect in another. True such a position is, perhaps, not all that enlightening; the point here, however, is that it is not contradictory since, as Rutter rightly put it, these two claims are the upshot of 'quite different' measures of school effectiveness. In that Rutter's claim pertains to the effect of schools on 'overall attainment', whilst Coleman and Jencks' relates to the effect of schools on 'variations in attainment', the resulting claims are, by this distinction, merely different not mutually

exclusive. By drawing this distinction Rutter can, as he does, accept both claims without contradiction.

This distinction, however, cuts two ways not one, for once it is admitted that 'inequalities in attainment' are logically distinct from 'differences in average attainment' Rutter is left, as a result, with a study which can neither add to, nor subtract from the American account. More pertinently, having drawn this distinction, Rutter is left with a study which cannot support, still less vindicate his charge that Coleman and Jencks 'underestimate' the effects of schooling. It cannot do so; for once this distinction is accepted, once the effect of school on 'variations' and on 'averages' is taken as relating to quite different issues, then all the 'Fifteen Thousand Hours' attests to is that schools have a significant effect on 'average' attainment. It crucially does not, indeed by this distinction it cannot, support the contention that Coleman and Jencks understate the effect of school, for if this distinction is taken as seriously as Rutter presumably intends it to be there is simply no confrontation between the American claim and the British claim. They are merely different claims derived by different measures of school effectiveness.

Whilst at this point one might wonder why, given this distinction, Rutter ever took issue with Coleman and Jencks, the drawing of this distinction has, as far as educational research is concerned, one very disturbing 'knock-on' effect. In drawing attention to the fact that these are merely different answers to the same question Rutter has, albeit unwittingly, drawn attention also to the fact that this question of school effect can no longer be resolved by research or by appeal to research. Quietly and unobtrusively Rutter has, by drawing this distinction, dug the grave for this age-old question, for it is now clear that it admits equally of two very different answers which, together, are quite unenlightening. Since there is evidence enough for both Coleman's dismal view and Rutter's more fashionable account, the question of whether schools have an effect turns not on evidence but on what is preferred as evidence. Subtly but effectively the question of school effect has become, like so much else in educational research, a question of taste.

2. DOES THE DIFFERENCE SCHOOLS MAKE, MAKE A DIFFERENCE? THE DEBATE

One possible way to resolve this impasse on school effects is to see whether the attributed influence of the school endures outside the closed world of statistics: to see whether, in this case, the difference which schools are seen to make, makes any difference, say, to the immediate 'life chances' of those so influenced. As Rutter unfortunately stops short of such analysis, the influence of different schools upon the

students' educational options and occupational prospects is never explored. It is a question, however, which, with varying degrees of confidence, can be answered by placing Rutter's findings alongside what is already known about (a) the educational determinants of ultimate educational attainment and (b) immediate occupational placement.

(a) Ultimate Educational Attainment Since by convention 5 'O' levels (or equivalents) stands as the basic prerequisite for further education, one would expect if Rutter's claim is, in some sense, educationally significant that the differential efficacy of different schools would, at least marginally affect their students' chances for further education; that the school which was in Rutter's terms the best, would have a better record for placing pupils in higher education than the school, which was in Rutter's terms, the 'worst'. Though Rutter, to repeat, has no data on this — some is promised[20] — his findings on the average attainment of pupils in such schools are germane.

In Rutter's study the 'overall difference' in attainment between the best and the worst school is striking: the average examination score — Rutter's central measure of school effect — is nearly 2 'O' levels higher in the best than it is in the worst school. As Rutter puts it, 'the exam score . . . of the most successful school was nearly 4 times as high as that of the least successful'.[21] At first sight then Rutter appears to be on safe ground; different schools have markedly different educational profiles. In the conventional sense of the slogan schools, it would appear, do make a difference. However, even if the debate was about the conventional interpretation of this slogan which, as all three agree, is not the case, Rutter is immediately beset by a problem of some intractability if he is to claim that schools exert an influence, which is educationally as well as statistically significant. The problem can be simply stated. Though the absolute difference in examination scores between the best and the worst is large, it is ironically not large enough to affect marginally, still less significantly, the chance of the average pupil in either school, passing the five 'O' level threshold for further education. It is not large enough because the average attainment, even in the best school, occurs at a point well below the minimal prerequisite for access to institutions of further and higher education. In the best school the average attainment, though considerably better than that of the worst school, fell well short of the regulation five 'O' levels. With the best school averaging just over two 'O' levels equivalents per student (2·30) and the worst average just over a half an 'O' level per students (0·62), neither school by Rutter's own measure remotely reached the minimum entry qualification for higher and further education. As such, neither school particularly affects the chances of their students for further education. In terms then, of its immediate educational consequence, the overall difference

between schools, though significant in itself, is by this analysis of little further significance: the best school like the worst carries none of its average pupils beyond the critical threshold for further education. Indeed unless Rutter found that this two 'O' level difference between the best and the worst clustered around the five 'O' level minimum, it is difficult to see in what sense Rutter's findings do anything but confirm Jencks and Coleman's claims that school and the difference between schools makes little difference.

However the debate over whether schools make a difference is, of course, not about overall differences in outcome at all. In its technical, as opposed to its conventional interpretation, it is, as agreed by Rutter, Coleman and Jencks, only about the 'part' of such overall differences in outcome as is directly attributable to differences in school characteristics *per se*. Analysis of Rutter's findings in this light provides even less ground for believing that schools make a difference. Again the reason is simple. In both the British and American research on the matter other factors are found to be operative in producing this overall difference in attainment. Accordingly, the actual effect of school factors, *per se*, is always somewhat smaller than the overall difference between schools. In both the British and American case it is dramatically smaller; for not only does most of this 'variance' remain unexplained, but most of what is explained is attributable to pupils' characteristics not to school characteristics. As is well illustrated by Rutter's corrected data,[22] only about 8 per cent of the variance in attainment between his schools is actually attributed to institutional effects. No doubt statistically significant in itself, such a discovery, however, underscores the impotency rather than the efficacy of school, for Rutter is now left claiming that school makes a difference, even though such a difference were it eradicated, would reduce the overall variation between his best and worst school by less than 0·1 of an 'O' level.

In that it is difficult to see in the first instance what difference the 'overall difference' in attainment makes to the educational prospects of the pupils concerned, the fact that only 8 per cent of such variance is attributable to 'school characteristics' is less than compulsive testimony for the existence of an educationally significant effect. Judged by its educational significance the difference between schools is nothing to write home about.

(b) School effects and immediate occupational placement Though Rutter has not, as yet, made public any exact data on the effects of schooling on educational advancement he has, however released his findings on the effects of schooling on employment. As he intimates in 'School Effects on Pupil Progress' such findings suggest that schools do, indeed, have an effect on employment. Though such an effect is, as Rutter terms it, 'indirect', it is, in his view, 'long-lasting'. As he puts it more precisely,

> the findings showed that there were school effects on employment in so far as schooling influenced attendance, school dropout, examination success . . . But there were no consistent school effects on employment that did not operate through these mechanisms.[23]

In the terminology of this debate, schools evidently made a difference to the employment prospects of pupils. As Rutter's quote indicates, the critical school differences, in this instance, are those which relate to attendance and to examination performance.

Like Rutter's other claims, this one is nothing, if not plausible. As with his other claims, however, this too warrants scrutiny. As before, Rutter's claim again pertains not to the effect on employment of the absolute difference as exists between his best and worst schools, but only to that part of the effect which is directly attributable to 'school' influences. Unfortunately, in this particular instance, the evidence Rutter advances to sustain this claim is concerned only with the general relationship between school attendance and subsequent employment. No attempt is made, in the report cited, to specify what part of this overall effect on employment is the result of school influences. As such, the actual influence on employment which is attributable to schools is likely to be substantially lower than Rutter suggests.

In one respect, however, such an objection is unnecessary; for, as Rutter's findings indicate, the relationship between absenteeism and employment in general, is not particularly strong, anyway. Indeed Rutter admits as much at the onset of this report, when he declares that, 'it is not entirely clear how far absenteeism from school has effects on employment which are independent of educational qualifications'.[24] By the time has has examined the data on absenteeism and employment, however, he is forced to admit that

> the results showed no association between absenteeism and job skill level, job satisfaction, number of jobs, dismissal from jobs or further training, once examination achievements (had) been taken into account.[25]

Evidently, then, this particular aspect of schooling had little effect in itself on employment. Given the centrality Rutter assigned school attendance in 'Fifteen Thousand Hours' this is, indeed, a frank admission on Rutter's part. In this context, however, it is an admission which has a particularly high cost as well. If, as Rutter now admits, absenteeism is important only 'because of its connection with low scholastic achievement' then the brunt of his thesis about the effects of school on employment rests on his showing that such variations in achievement affect employment. This, ironically, is something Rutter cannot show; for as this report makes clear, such differences in attainment as exist

between these pupils has little effect on their employment prospects. As he put it regarding the early school leaver, 'the fact that they lacked scholastic qualifications was no handicap in obtaining jobs'.[26] Evidently those 'two' factors over which schools exert most influence, attendance and attainment, have little effect on employment. In terms of Rutter's own findings, it looks very much as if Coleman and Jencks are right after all. As Jencks put it over a decade ago, 'even when a school exerts an unusual influence on children, the resulting changes are not likely to persist into adulthood'.[27]

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NOTES

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3. Ibid., p. 1.
4 Jencks, op. cit., p 89.
5. Coleman, op. cit., p. 21.
6 Rutter, op. cit., p. 203
7 Coleman, op. cit., p. 22
8. Jencks, op. cit., p. 148.
9 Rutter, op. cit., pp. 179–80.

10. Coleman, op. cit., p. 296.
11. Jencks, op. cit., p. 53.
12. Rutter, op. cit., p. 297.
13. Coleman, op. cit., p. 296.
14. Jencks, op. cit., p. 159.
15. Maughan, Mortimer, Ouston and Rutter, op. cit., p. 297.
16. Rutter, op. cit., p. 3.
17. Rutter, ibid., p. 3.
18. Rutter, ibid., p. 7.
19. Rutter, ibid., p. 7.
20. Rutter, ibid., p. 48.
21. Rutter, ibid., p. 86.
22. Maughan, Mortimer, Ouston and Rutter, op. cit., p. 296.
23. Rutter, 'School Effects on Pupil Progress', op. cit., p. 14.
24. G. Gray, A. Smith, and M. Rutter, 'School Attendance and the First Year of Employment', in L. Hersov and I. Berg (eds), *Out of School*, Wiley, 1980, p. 347.
25. Ibid., p. 368.
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27. Jencks, op. cit., p. 255.

Liah Greenfeld

Reflections on two charismas*

ABSTRACT

The concept 'charisma' was used by Weber in relation to two different categories of phenomena: proximity (whether of institutions, people, or objects) to the ultimate values of a society (transformed and routinized charisma); and a personal ability to generate and express intense excitement (genuine charisma). The latter aspect of 'charisma' has been largely neglected in sociological literature and is analyzed in the present paper.

The two varieties of charisma fulfill the important social function of providing models for conduct; both are, thus, connected to the human need for guidance in action. However, what makes their influence possible is different in the two cases: the influence of genuine charisma relies on the propensity for unreflective imitation of others, whereas the influence of routinized charisma is based on the propensity for internalization of symbolic constructions. Being ultimately dependent on properties of the human mind both charismas can be found in any society irrespective of its level of complexity.

I

The goal of this paper is to explore the dual meaning of the concept 'charisma' as used by Weber and to bring to the fore a certain aspect of this concept which, though usually disregarded in sociological literature, seems to apply to a class of phenomena universally present in human life in groups and thus fundamental to the understanding of society.

Such an exploration is important not for the scholastic reason of establishing what Weber actually meant, whatever it was, but rather because what he really meant — according to the present interpretation — can be helpful in dealing with the most profound problems in sociology. These are the problems related to the basic question of order: How is society possible? What are the sources of, functions of and conditions for the categorically different types of human behavior

— rational and irrational, institutional and collective? In short, what is the nature of society and man? The re-evaluation of 'charisma' may also be helpful in a critical assessment of sociological models and classical typologies of societies of the 'Gemeinschaft *vs* Gesellschaft' kind.

USES OF 'CHARISMA' IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

The concept 'charisma' was used by Weber in *Economy and Society* to denote two distinct categories of phenomena each of which included a number of sub-species. The term 'genuine charisma,' or 'pure charisma,' was reserved for the first category, which occasionally was referred to simply as 'charisma.' It is this category which will be at the center of our attention here. 'Genuine charisma' denotes an important distinct phenomenon for which no other general concept was used.

When Weber used 'charisma' in relation to the other category of phenomena, which included *Gentilcharisma* (kinship charisma), *Erbscharisma* (hereditary charisma), *Amtscharisma* (charisma of office) and other instances in which the term was used in the context of the routinization and transformation of genuine charisma it was, actually, no more than a stylistic abbreviation. In contrast to the 'genuine charisma,' 'charisma' in this second sense did not denote a phenomenon *sui generis*, different from any other known and named phenomena relevant to the discourse. Rather it referred to the interrelated phenomena such as authority, deference to authority, legitimacy and, less frequently, ultimate values in terms of which this legitimacy was bestowed upon the power-holding persons, lineages, offices, etc., thereby transforming their power into authority.

What distinguished authority, deference and legitimacy in those instances in which the concept 'charisma' was used and what, therefore, justified the substitution of this term for the generally accepted terms in relation to them, was their ultimate character (usually, but not necessarily religious): their being derived from the most fundamental, irreducible definitions of a given order. Since 'genuine charisma' was frequently interpreted in terms of such ultimate, irreducible definitions, Weber sometimes used the concept 'charisma' in the second sense in those instances in which the alleged source of the genuine charisma was appropriated as a legitimating value, namely, when authority was legitimated by some relation to this alleged source of genuine charisma.[1]

In fact, in the second sense of the concept 'charisma' any authority or value is charismatic; this has been noted and emphasized by Shils.[2] Therefore, *Amtscharisma* — the charismatic authority residing in an office — differs from the rational-legal authority which may reside in it only in its degree of proximity to the ultimate source of authority.

The same is true in regard to the difference between *Erbscharisma* and *Gentilcharisma* — the charismatic authority of descent or kinship — and traditional authority of the lineage. Both rational-legal and traditional authority are, so to speak, twice removed from the fundamental definitions of a society, while charismatic authority derives therefrom directly.[3]

The recognition that Weber uses the concept 'charisma' in two entirely different ways makes it possible to resolve the apparent contradiction between his claim that genuine charisma is an extraordinary phenomenon, existing outside the institutional order and only *in statu nascendi*,[4] and his frequent usage of the concept 'charisma' in the discussion of institutional orders, suggesting that genuine charisma is perpetuated, albeit transformed, in institutions. When the concept 'charisma' is seen, in this latter context, as an abbreviation for 'authority related to or derived from ultimate values,' or 'legitimacy in terms of the ultimate values', it becomes clear that what is perpetuated and transformed is not 'genuine' charisma, but the relation to the ultimate sources of authority. One can find support for this view in Weber's discussions of the routinization and transformation of charisma. While he frequently uses the two terms 'charisma' and 'authority' (or 'legitimacy') interchangeably,[5] he never treats routinized charisma as an independent variable in explanations of authority and related phenomena (such as legitimacy, deference, ultimate values). Charisma, in this context, is not treated by Weber as different or even distinguishable from authority.[6]

'GENUINE CHARISMA' — THE DEFINITION

Weber was rather specific in his treatment of 'genuine' or 'pure' charisma. He defined such charisma as 'a personal quality which turned whoever possessed it into an impressive personality.'[7] This quality was inborn and extraordinary[8] and was, in a twofold sense, not a part of the normative order or everyday activity: it had no pattern, it was exceptional in the sense that not everyone could achieve it since it could not be learned; and it had no symbolization preceding its actual occurrence and was thus frequently symbolized retrospectively as extraordinary, meaning 'superhuman.' For example, 'where the idea of God had already been clearly established' it was symbolized as Divine'.[9] The processes of symbolizing and stereotyping this quality, by creating a pattern according to which it could be learned and artificially induced (as in charismatic education[10]), were parts of the routinization of charisma, which actually meant the routinization of an authority structure based upon charisma. According to Weber, this implied the transformation of genuine charisma into something totally alien to its nature. Genuine charisma exists only *in*

statu nascendi and 'every hour of its existence brings it nearer to (its) end.'[11]

'Pure' or 'genuine' charisma expresses itself through ecstasy, manic seizure and other manifestations of utmost excitement. Whatever example Weber chooses to give — a berserk warrior, a prophet, or a demagogue — it is this external expression (including rolling eyes and uneven breath), and not its causes, which is important.[12] This is contrary to the view that a prophet is a paradigmatic example of a charismatic person, which implies that charisma resides in the prophetic vision. Such a view reflects an understanding of charisma in the second sense of proximity to ultimate values. In fact, the best example of a (genuinely) charismatic personality is the 'berserk' warrior. Though he creates a frenzied commitment to the battle among his comrades, the ideal-typical berserk warrior does not have a message to those whom he inspires. His effectiveness is due solely to his overtly expressed extreme excitement. This is explicitly stated by Weber,[13] and it is for that reason that he brings berserk warriors as the first, presumably the purest and most obvious, example of genuine charisma in the two chapters where this concept is defined. To be sure, prophets — who do bring messages — are charismatic personalities too. But if both prophets and berserk warriors are examples of charismatic personalities then charisma must be defined by what is common to both and not by what is characteristic only of one. It is excitement which makes a prophet charismatic, not his message or vision (though this may be the cause of his own excitement).[14]

Strange as it may seem in the discussion of charismatic prophets, the powerful effect of excited behavior is a rather common phenomenon. It is known that all the higher animals are extremely sensitive to a display of excitement, while in sociology the hypnotic qualities of such displays were noted by early students of the human crowd.[15] In episodes of crowd behavior extremely excited individuals become focuses of attention and objects of imitation by others. It is because of this ability to internally generate extreme excitement — which is charisma — and thus become objects of imitation, that charismatic personalities (persons possessing such natural ability) are able to become leaders.

This definition is not to be found in Weber in such explicit terms; however, the interpretation of charisma as a non-cognitive, non-symbolic ability is supported by the fact that Weber did not include charismatic action among the types of social action. Weber referred to charisma in the pages preceding the discussion of the types of social action; and it is safe to say that it was present in his mind all the time. It was not a lapse of memory or lack of consistency which was responsible for his omission. Charisma is not included because it does not belong to the realm of social action. Its expression in the behavior

of a person who possesses this quality, or who is affected by it, is not meaningfully oriented; thus charisma cannot serve as a basis for meaningful orientation in action.[16] 'Meaningfully oriented action' meant for Weber action of a self-conscious actor, action based on knowledge. His awareness of and indeed emphasis on the ideal-typical nature of the types of social action made it all the more possible for him to identify social action with conscious action, to lay stress on this characteristic, so rarely to be met in reality in its pure form.[17] It follows that traditionally oriented behavior is behavior based upon *knowledge* of customs and norms; behavior oriented in an instrumentally rational way is behavior based upon knowledge of practical goals and available means for the achievement of these goals; behavior oriented in a value-rational fashion is based upon knowledge of values ('good,' 'sacred,' etc.) and appropriate ways of living up to them; and affectively oriented behavior is behavior based upon knowledge of one's own feelings and the socially sanctioned ways of expressing them. To say that a person's behavior is determined by his love of someone does not mean that it is determined by a psycho-biological agitation caused by the attraction to another human being. Although this agitation is necessarily present, and is an important condition for the formation of cognitions about one's feelings, a psycho-biological state would not, in some cultures, be interpreted as love at all. Rather it is determined by socially conditioned recognition of the causes of such agitation and its socially conditioned implications. The frequently made assumptions that charismatic behavior corresponds to value-rational behavior or that it corresponds to affective action are equally mistaken. It is of the utmost importance that, speaking of social action, Weber explicitly states that he means only action meaningfully oriented toward others, that is, action based on explicit symbolic representation of the components of the action situation. Charismatic behavior, important as it is for Weber, does not represent a type of social action because it is meaningless in the above sense: not symbolic. It exists together with crowd behavior (which is worth noting) on the verge of the pre-social.[18]

It is important to keep in mind that we are dealing with analytical concepts which do not adequately describe complex social situations but correspond to aspects of concrete reality which usually can be isolated only in theory. In reality the non-symbolic ability to generate excitement is rarely effective if unaided by successful manipulation of value complexes relevant to the situation. (The interrelation between values and genuine charisma will be emphasized below — see pp. 125; 128–9). The isolation of genuine charisma for analytical purposes seems justified since there are significant — albeit rare — cases of purely non-symbolic leadership (berserk warriors, as seen and discussed by Weber, belong to this category, as do spontaneously emerging leaders of the lynching crowds, riots, etc.), and since in

many much more common cases in which both symbolic and non-symbolic elements are present, the effect of the symbols the leader uses is sometimes largely due to his non-symbolic 'genuine' charisma.[19]

THE TWO BASES OF CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY

Genuine charisma thus means the ability to internally generate and externally express extreme excitement, an ability which makes one the object of intense attention and unreflective imitation by others. It is this quality which makes it possible for a charismatic person to become a leader; and it is in this ability to provide a basis for charismatic authority that the sociological importance of charisma lies.

The concept of 'charismatic authority' was derived by Weber from R. Sohm's notion of 'charismatic organization.'[20] Sohm perceived 'charismatic organization' as an authority structure, 'the way in which humans are given to understand what they are — and are not — to do.'[21] Peculiar to this particular type of authority was direct contact between the leader and the led unmediated by previously existing perceptions and laws. A charismatic organization was a teaching organization while teaching was perceived as giving direct guidance in action: teaching of moral commands, of revealed and therefore indisputable truth which should be accepted solely on the basis of faith, an unconditional surrender to the authority of the teacher. It was this directness of contact — disregarding all the previously existing norms and values — and unaccountability of authority which was incorporated by Weber. The other aspect of Sohm's argument — the necessary spirituality of charismatic organization, its embeddedness in the specific meaning of the Christian teaching — was rejected by Weber, in whose opinion it restricted the possibilities of the concept's application.[22]

Although charisma is, of course, a necessary condition for the appearance of an authority structure of the charismatic type, it is not a sufficient condition for it. Charismatic authority is based mainly on the recognition of charisma; that is, on some symbolization of it. Charismatic authority is power made legitimate in terms of the recognition-symbolization of this exceptional quality. (In this sense charisma is attributed.) The revolutionary quality of charisma lies in its potential eventuation in charismatic authority which is the basis of most important revolutionary changes. The question of when (in what conditions) charisma can actually develop into charismatic authority is, therefore, a crucial sociological question.

What makes people susceptible to the hypnotism of excitement displayed by one of them and able to imitate the object of their intense attention without reflection? It is this condition of suggestibility, of

heightened sensitivity to the influence of others, when the ordinarily powerful internalized norms and values lose their authority, that characterize the participants in episodes of crowd behavior. Usually this suggestibility is interpreted as a result of physical-psychological processes (which are also found among animals), such as milling leading to rapport, and of the phenomenon of social contagion, all of which create a feeling of belonging together and of mutual support and increase the individual's sense of power, ego-expansion and rectitude.[23] The susceptibility to influence may, thus, be interpreted as a function of the spatial juxtaposition of people, a product of some 'physical energy' (to use the phrase actually employed by Durkheim for the description of a similar pheonomenon[24]) which is transmitted among people in spatial concentration. But, though the subject of the studies of crowd behavior were indeed actual crowds, most of the early commentators on this subject, including Le Bon, Park and Blumer, espoused the view that more important than the spatial juxtaposition of individuals is the psychological state of each of them, which is actually the defining characteristic of the crowd and which is, therefore, the factor responsible for crowd behavior, so that a nation at some times can constitute a 'psychological crowd' in Le Bon's sense.[25] This psychological state is the loss of critical ability and 'the disappearance of all individual and particular self-consciousness in members of the group.'[26]

Since crowd behavior is not exclusively the behavior of psychically abnormal individuals the question arises of why such psychological states are activated. In theories of collective behavior the answer has usually been some vague postulation of the preceding state of deprivation or social unrest.[27] The theory of mass society offered a different explanation of the heightened susceptibility to influence and pliability of the participants in collective behavior. This theory derived from the concept of 'mass' (as defined by theorists of collective behavior — e.g. Blumer[28]) and, unfortunately, disregarded the concept of 'psychological crowd' with all its implications. The suggestibility of people in mass society was perceived as a function of such society's being a mass of atomized individuals, a result of the process in which the boundaries of collectivities mediating between an individual and the supreme power of central elites are destroyed. The individual thus becomes accessible to the direct influence of these elites and, being alone and unprotected, has no other choice but to surrender.[29]

The reliability of this conclusion is admittedly dubious in view of the exceptionally strong extra-familial primary groups and personal ties — such as friendship — in two major examples of mass societies, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Still, there is some metaphorical truth in the theory of mass society. The pliability of the individuals is indeed due to the fact that they are unprotected and accessible. But it

is not the collectivities which cease to protect them. In collective behavior collectivities become the source of moral support, the source of the feeling of righteousness and ego-expansion of influenced individuals. The theory of collective behavior contains truth too, for these individuals are undoubtedly characterized by the loss of critical ability and self-consciousness. The sociological concept which captures the meaning of the metaphors of unprotectedness and accessibility, and explains the psychological state leading to the inability to use individual judgment, however, belongs to a branch of sociology unconcerned (or at least not explicitly concerned) with collective behavior. This concept is 'anomie.'

'Anomie' denotes a condition of acute inconsistency between different values, norms and cognitions, including the perception of reality, which, as a result of this inconsistency, neutralize each other and lose their authority.[30] It is this destruction of the authority of previously binding values and cognitions which leaves the individual unprotected and makes him unusually susceptible to social influence. His ability to use his individual judgment is impaired by the cognitive confusion in which he finds himself, since it becomes very difficult to account for and defend this judgment. The impairment of this ability destroys the basis for individual action and leaves one hardly capable of being an individual in any but a physical sense; in contrast to the conception of atomized individuals in the theory of mass society, only a collective self, metaphorically speaking, is possible in this situation.

Therefore, what makes people particularly responsive to charisma is the condition of anomie which renders values and norms incapable of guiding people in their actions. The individual is left groping in normative darkness, yearning for the authority of a confident leader to show him a way out of this situation. A charismatic personality provides such leadership, offering through his contagious excitement a badly needed model for behavior and restoring to the confused individual his sense of order.

SYMBOLIZATION OF GENUINE CHARISMA

While lack of values is, itself, a sufficient condition for the receptivity to charisma — so that an individual whose values are confused can be affected by a charismatic personality with no one else present — the presence of others intensifies the effect of charisma. This is so because, as was noted by students of collective behavior, the sharing of the excitement, circular reaction and the sense of belonging and of being a part of a collective self, all lead to feelings of moral righteousness, power and ego-expansion.[31] Furthermore, if the effect of charisma on an individual is not shared and intensified by others it will be no more than a passing emotion.

This is due to the experience of a cognitive dissonance which necessarily arises when others' experiences contradict one's own.[32] Paradoxically, while one way to fight cognitive dissonance is to reconcile oneself to the experiences of others and to forget the impact of a charismatic personality on oneself, the other way is to symbolize charisma. Symbolization of charisma includes systematization of charismatic experiences and their rationalization in terms of some broader symbolic framework (it is not coincidental that, according to Weber, charisma was interpreted as divine only where the idea of God was already well developed[33]). Both are to a large extent a function of the cognitive dissonance aroused by the discrepancy between the unconditional surrender to the influence of a charismatic personality and the lack of ready justification for the bizarre behaviors which are the product of such influence. The influenced person feels a need to rationalize these behaviors to himself; but more than that there is a need to justify them to others. It is through the persuasion of others that one regains the peace of one's mind.[34] Charismatic authority, which presupposes some duration of the effect of charismatic personality[35] does, therefore, also necessarily presuppose a multitude of individuals.

Charisma is recognized because of the excitement (so different from the restlessness of anomie) which it produces. It is this excitement which is symbolised as an extraordinary quality (sometimes as divine) and attributed to the charismatic individual — the primary source of the excitement and associated emotions and the focus of attention. Charismatic behavior is legitimated in terms of the symbolization of this excitement in any particular case; these terms may be and often are provided by the charismatic individual himself (as in cases of prophets or political leaders), but they need not be (as in the case of berserk warriors). The provision of terms in which to symbolize and legitimate genuine charisma and the behavior of those affected by it is a question totally separate from that of the nature of genuine charisma itself and of the responsiveness to it, or susceptibility to charismatic influence, which is responsible for the emergence of charismatic authority. Instead, it has to do with another basic question: namely the question of the nature of human creativity and its relation to society. There is a hint in Weber as to how to answer this question. Weber refers to intellectuals as the creators of creeds and religions (meaning symbolic configurations which lie at their basis) and explains this by the fact that intellectuals have a need for the meaningful organization of life which need is different from the various needs of those who accept these creeds and religions. (It is important to notice that in this context Weber does not speak about charisma.[36] It is also important that for Sohm, intellectuals were not charismatics at all.[37])

The propensities and capacities of the human mind are diverse,

unequally distributed and fairly autonomous. The charismatic propensity (here a propensity for either generating excitement or being affected by the display of it) is different and independent from the propensity for meaningful organization of reality. The same difference between intellectuals (creators) and non-intellectuals may also be conceptualized in terms of sensitivity to inconsistency. Some people, especially intellectuals, are very sensitive to inconsistency and are motivated to try and eliminate it through cognitive reorganization of the world and creation of new world views. Most people are less sensitive to inconsistencies or are sensitive only to gross inconsistencies and thus do not have this need. However, they are able to accept (especially in cases of preceding confusion of values) or slowly adapt themselves to newly proposed systems of values and cognitions if such systems broadly correspond to their social reality and do not place on them unbearable psychological strains in the form of impossible demands. (The necessity for such broad correspondence between social reality and the system of values and cognitions which is to account for and meaningfully organize it is, indeed, the basis for different religious propensities of different status groups, a topic which Weber discusses at length.[38]) Inconsistencies may be more acutely perceived during periods of social change — thus, there may be periods of more and less intense prophetic or other intellectual activity.

It is important to distinguish between these two questions: the nature of genuine charisma and the nature of creativity. Creativity *per se*, when it is not related to charisma and the development of charismatic authority (as in the case of prophets), is not revolutionary in the destructive sense in which charisma is. Creativity may be a basis of gradual, rational change. It is not the intensely creative character of the ideas, or of the experiences of charismatic personalities, which is responsible for the explosive effect of charisma, but the way in which the excitement — that is, genuine charisma as defined here — of such personalities affects others.[39]

KINSHIP OF THE TWO TYPES OF CHARISMA: THE NEED FOR ORDER

In this paper, genuine charisma has been defined as a personal capacity for a certain kind of impressive non-symbolic behavior which, though not very rare in itself,[40] can become sociologically important only in rare cases of extraordinary social situations. But, as was already noted (see p. 118), Weber's use of the notions of routinized and transformed charisma makes possible the perception of charisma in a totally different fashion, as a transcendent symbolic force, an 'awe-arousing centrality'[41] inherent in any authority and representing the connection of authority to ultimate determinants of an order.

In spite of the contrasting nature of the two charismas (one is non-symbolic the other is 'ultimately symbolic'[42]) and the seemingly contradictory relationship between them (the emergence of a genuinely charismatic authority is possible only when there is no longer any — binding — charisma in existing authority structures; genuine charisma is necessarily revolutionary, as it destroys the previous connections to the ultimate sources of authority that constitute routinized charisma), the two nevertheless share one very important characteristic. Charismatic sensitivity — namely sensitivity to charisma — derives in both instances from the same fundamental human need for order. The two charismas — the capacity for extreme excitement which initiates unreflective imitation, and the proximity to ultimate values — are the two integrative forces in society, the two forces which hold society together.

The human need for order is indeed the ultimate cause of social integration, the single most important factor in making human society possible.[43] Society in general seems to be a necessary corollary of life at the advanced stages of biological evolution. The preservation of a species demands co-operation of its member organisms (sometimes with detrimental effects for the individual organisms). In animals, for whom nature provides in the form of instincts detailed 'models for'[44] any ordinary activity, the ability to co-operate, the capacity for integration in general and in particular is inborn. The basic fact of human existence is that humans lack built in 'models for' behavior in groups. Social integration and co-operation are necessary for the preservation of the human species (as well as its individual members), but there is no innate knowledge of how to accomplish such co-operation. Thus, there is a constant search for models, a need for created order among humans. The two charismas — each in its own way, sometimes jointly and sometimes separately — fulfill this need by providing guidance for conduct and thereby sustain human society.

Though sensitivity to charisma in both senses derives from the same need for order, it is based upon two absolutely different propensities (inner capacities and tendencies) of the human mind. One is a propensity to internalize values and beliefs, to justify power and, in general, to view the world in terms of these values and beliefs; this propensity is based on a uniquely human symbolic ability to construct 'models of'[45] situations, to learn these models and to be guided by them. The other is a propensity for unreflective imitation of the excited behavior of others.

Which of the two charismas — the non-symbolic genuine one, or the symbolic routinized one — is the dominant factor in social integration at a given moment is determined by the previously existing social structure, particularly by the ability of the previously constructed symbolic configurations to provide a sufficient sense of order, a sufficient guidance for action. The force that provides the main basis for integration in the newly-evolving society, which is the continuation of or the derivation

from such previously existing social structure, determines the character of this society for a certain period of time.

Certain social structures may be more congenial to one of these two integrative forces and thus create conditions for the realization of only one of the two charismatic propensities. However, there is no society in which either of these propensities is totally extinguished, and therefore, no society is forever insulated from changes in the direction of either kind of charisma, even if one is attenuated and appears non-existent.[46] Both propensities are universal and, in most cases, the two charismas coexist.

Dichotomous typologies of societies — e.g. *Gemeinschaft* (community) vs *Gesellschaft* (society) — rightly point to the existence (in theory) of two pure types of societies. The fundamental difference between these two types lies in the forces which integrate them. In the terms of this paper an ideal *Gemeinschaft* is integrated exclusively on the basis of genuine charisma and imitation; whereas an ideal *Gesellschaft* is based on routinized charisma and internalization of values and cognitions. However, the identification of these ideal constructions with actually existing societies, grounded in the inability to perceive the universal and socially independent (since rooted in the structure of the human mind) nature of the two charismas and charismatic propensities, is a serious mistake which limits the acceptability and analytical usefulness of such theoretical models. In reality there are no societies which closely correspond to such ideal constructs.[47] Genuinely charismatic orders (societies integrated by genuine charisma) are necessarily transient. If not symbolized in terms of particular values, routinized and thereby transformed into an order based on 'social action' (in Weber's parlance), which is charismatic only in the second sense of proximity to ultimate values, such orders can exist only as long as the extreme excitement continues, leading through psychological processes of rapport and suggestion to the merging of individual personalities into a collective self. The existence of a collective self (as Weber pointed out on numerous occasions[48]) implies, among other things, the disregard and insufficient care for the biological needs of individual organisms and is incompatible with the economic activity based on such needs. This incompatibility of purely charismatic orders with economic activity provides a natural time-limit for the existence of such orders. In fact, episodes of crowd behavior are the only examples of such pure, transient charismatic orders which do not reach the stage of routinization through symbolization and are not transformed into 'social' orders.[49]

It is for this reason that genuine charisma is revolutionary. The acceptance of charismatic authority is based on the destruction or complete neglect of all previous norms and values (genuine charisma is sacrilegious in the sense that it pays no respect to transformed and routinized charisma). But genuinely charismatic authority necessarily and very soon leads to the establishment of new values or re-establishment of the earlier ones. This transition, however, is accom-

plished through unrestricted, normless, excited behavior which often takes on violent forms.

Similarly, values, or the transformed and routinized charisma, usually cannot guide action by themselves. Mediating personal (genuinely charismatic) influence is needed for the successful internalization of symbolic constructions. There are a number of basic ways in which transformed and routinized symbolic charisma and non-symbolic genuine charisma interrelate in concrete social situations. Genuine charisma is symbolized in terms of some values, and these values, along with the constraints of the charismatic authority itself, affect the social structure that evolves after a charismatic turmoil. On the other hand, there are values which are conducive to the eruptions of charismatic behavior, in the sense that they heighten responsiveness to genuine charisma. Such values, for example, include the sanctification of particular collectivities (a nation, a religious collectivity, a class). In such cases — as opposed to societies where the 'individual' represents the highest value — the way for unreflective imitative behavior under the influence of a charismatic personality is prepared by an intense feeling of belonging together, of already sharing a collective self.

The *de facto* feeling-of-belonging characteristic of primary groups, even when unsupported by explicit sanctification of participation in collective action, facilitates the perpetuation of symbolic order by means of charismatic behavior (unreflective inspired imitation). In paradigmatic traditional societies the perpetuation of the normative order through habit and custom, when the meaning of the symbolic constructions of which the order was based has faded away with time, is also mainly based on imitation. Such societies may be easily agitated by charismatic persons.[50]

The more rationalized the value-system of a society — the more it is systematized, coherent and inclusive — the more immune this society is to eruptions of charismatic behavior. This implies not that there are fewer charismatic personalities or less genuine charisma in rationalized societies, but only that the sociological importance of the genuine charisma is reduced in those societies. The need for order is more fully taken care of in such societies by cognitive symbolic means; and there are fewer possibilities for charismatic authority to develop. Even in highly rationalized societies, however, there may be sectors congenial to the impact of genuine charisma. Also, the knowledge of alternative normative orders, alternative ultimate values, especially when seen in relativist perspective as legitimate, can weaken or destroy the guiding power of even the most thoroughly rationalized system of values and thus create the opportunity for the rise of the other integrative force — genuine charisma.

An awareness of the dual nature of social integration and, specifically, of the universal propensity for non-symbolic, non-rational behavior which lies at the basis of one of the major types of authority

may be helpful in understanding many apparently inexplicable social phenomena. In fact, such phenomena are amazing only if man is conceived as nothing but a thinking, symbol-producing creature, and social action — even that which does not fall into the Weberian category of 'social action' — as necessarily meaningful action. The ability to create and use symbols is, after all, just one of many human abilities.

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NOTES

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1. M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978, pp. 251–2, 954.

2. Especially in articles included in E. Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1975. 'Center and Periphery,' pp. 3–17; 'Charisma,' pp 127–35; 'Charisma, Order, and Status,' pp. 256–76, and 'Deference,' pp. 276–304

3. M. Weber, op cit, see, for example, pp 216, 218, 262, 1162.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 246, 252, 1120–1, 1113.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 216, 246–51, 1158–68.

6. It is treated as such by later authors (Shils, op. cit.; S. N. Eisenstadt, Introduction, pp. ix–lvi in *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building* Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1968) who seem to use 'charisma' in the sense of 'ultimate sources of authority'

7. M. Weber, op. cit, p. 1133; also p. 242.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 400, for example

9 *Ibid.*, p. 1112.

10 *Ibid.*, pp. 249, 458, 1143–5.

11 *Ibid*, p. 1120

12. It is the lack of 'emotional preaching' which differentiates teachers of ethics and founders of schools of philosophy from charismatic prophets, not their messages, M. Weber, op. cit., p. 444 See also pp. 242, 400, 403, 535–6, 554 for examples of identification of genuine charisma with 'the capacity to produce ecstatic states.'

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 242, 1112. In some cases the behavior of a 'berserk', regularly including such expressions as 'manic seizures' would certainly be considered as detrimental to military discipline and treated as a mental illness. So would be the constitutional epilepsy which proved the charisma of shamans. Societies differ in their evaluation of excitement and its overt expression, and not everywhere is it likely to be effective to a degree that it was among Nordic tribes of which Weber speaks Weber's discussion of the changing attitudes of religions to genuinely charismatic behavior is interesting in this context (*ibid.*, p. 489).

14. It is not excitement about something, but excitement as such which is decisive. Humanists were 'condemned to suffer progressive loss of influence', because 'they remained Erastian or irenic in temper', and though they had a faith to share with others, they lacked excitement to attract others to their faith; M. Weber,

op. cit., p. 514.

15. H. Blumer, 'Collective Behavior' in A. M. Lee, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, Barnes and Nobel, 1951, p. 229.

16. Genuinely charismatic propensity (to borrow a phrase from Edward Shils — Shils, 1975, op. cit., for example in 'Charisma,' pp. 127–8) is not a propensity to perceive the world in terms of transcendental powers, but a propensity, a capacity for excitement totally independent from any perceptions, though sometimes related to them, among other things.

17. 'The ideal type of meaningful action' was defined by Weber as 'action where the meaning is fully conscious and explicit' (M. Weber, op. cit. p. 22). However, he never confused this ideal type with the description of actual situation. He explicitly stated that this ideal type is only a marginal case, while in the 'great majority of cases actual action goes on in a state of inarticulate half-consciousness or actual unconsciousness of its subjective meaning' (*ibid.*, p. 21).

18. '.. the behavior of crowds and imitation stand on the indefinite borderline of social action. The same is true, as will often appear, of traditionalism and charisma. The reason for the indefiniteness of the line in these and other cases lies in the fact that both the orientation to the behavior of others and the meaning which can be imputed by the actor himself, are by no means always capable of clear determination and are often altogether unconscious and seldom fully self-conscious', M. Weber, op. cit., p. 24. In distinction to the four types of social action, genuine charisma is, therefore, non-rational in the specific sense of a practice 'the result of which is not calculable' (*ibid.*, p. 1172).

19. One of the most important of such cases is Hitler. It is true that in the long run the Nazi regime depended on the values in which Nazi leaders believed and which they successfully manipulated. However, the extent of the influence of these values, the enormous power of the Nazi leadership over the minds of the followers, was due to the personal qualities of some of the leaders, especially Hitler's own charisma. Descriptions of the effect of Hitler's personality and speeches in Nuremberg and in the Reichstag on the audience (see for instance W. L. Shirer, *The Nightmare Years*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1984, pp. 119; 127–31;) makes it clear that it was not what Hitler said, but how he said it, not the content of his speeches, but the musical qualities of his eloquence, the 'orgasm of sound and fury' (*ibid.*, 128) that he displayed, which made his listeners hysterically enthusiastic and which united them in fanatic devotion to 'the cause'.

20. R. Sohm, *Kirchenrecht*, Leipzig, Dunker and Humblot, 1892.

21. P. Haley, 'Rudolph Sohm on Charisma', *Journal of Religion*, vol. 60, no. 2, April 1980, p. 186.

22. M. Weber, op. cit., p. 1112: 'It is to R. Sohm's credit that he worked out the sociological character of this kind of domination; however, since he developed this category with regard to one historically important case — the rise of the ecclesiastic authority of the early Christian church — his treatment was bound to be one-sided from the viewpoint of historical diversity.'

23. H. Blumer, op. cit., p. 237.

24. E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, New York, The Free Press, 1965, p. 237. It is interesting to compare Durkheim's description of collective effervescence out of which the religious idea is born (pp. 235–45), with Weber's description of genuine charisma.

25. G. Le Bon, *Psychologie des foules*, Paris, F. Alcan, p 12.

26. R. Park, *The Crowd and the Public*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1973, p. 12.

27. See M. Weber, op. cit., pp. 242, 1115, 1117, 1132. The most systematic sociological effort to explain crowd — or collective — behavior was Smelser's value-added approach (N. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962). According to this approach, any case of collective behavior is a result of a specific combination of the six determinants, none of which alone can explain the occurrence of collective behavior and is not connected logically to any of the other determinants, but a combination of which has an explosive

effect. Being very systematic, this attempt is not entirely successful for, although the conditions for the cases of collective behavior are viewed in it as social and sociologically analyzable and abstractable, the explanation of any particular episode in this framework will always be historically idiosyncratic.

28 H. Blumer, op. cit.

29. A. W Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1959.

30. E. Durkheim, *Suicide*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952, p. 258; R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Practice*, Glencoe· The Free Press, 1955, p. 136; T Parsons, *The Social System*, Glencoe· The Free Press, 1951, p 39

31 H Blumer, op cit., R. Park, op. cit.

32. For a survey of research in the area of cognitive dissonance see J. W Brehm and A R. Cohen, *Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance*, New York, Wiley, 1962, and L. Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962.

33 M. Weber, op. cit., p. 242. In this connection the discussion of religious disinclination of the modern proletariat (*ibid*, pp. 488–90) is also significant. According to Weber, the religious position of the modern proletariat is characterized by indifference or rejection of religion due to the fact that the sense of dependence on one's own achievements for this stratum is supplanted by a consciousness of dependence on purely social forces, market conditions, and power relations guaranteed by law. Thus, charisma is not likely to be symbolized in religious terms in the case of the proletariat, instead it will be perceived in terms of 'ideological surrogates' of religion.

34 L. Festinger, H. W Riecken and S Schacter, *When Prophecy Fails*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1956.

35. M Weber, op. cit., p. 1119.

36. *Ibid*, p 506.

37 P Haley, op. cit., pp. 192–3.

38. M. Weber, op. cit, pp 468–500

39 According to Weber (*ibid.*, p. 1116), 'the decisive difference (between charismatic and rational orders) is not in the creator of ideas or of "works", or in his inner experience; rather the difference is rooted in the manner in which the ruled and led experience and internalize these ideas.'

40. Notice the traditional Russian attitude of respect toward the insane (especially the excitable insane such as hysterics, epileptics and others), one of the words for which is 'blajeny' — 'blessed'

41 E. Shils, 'Charisma, Order and Status' in *Center and Periphery*, op. cit., p 257

42. *Ibid*

43 This assertion is made by Edward Shils in 'Center and Periphery' and in 'Charisma, Order and Status,' both in *Center and Periphery*, op. cit., pp 7, 261.

44. C. Geertz, 'Religion as a Cultural System' in his *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York, Basic Books, 1973, p 93.

45. C. Geertz, op cit.

46 Specifically, there is no such thing as the withdrawal of charisma from the world, which is the usual interpretation of the Weberian 'Entzauberung' Any society can, therefore, experience either positive or negative effects of genuinely charismatic behavior.

47. These models always revolved around the existence and the difference between the two fundamental varieties of human behavior which were conceptualized in many ways, most common being 'rational *vs* irrational,' and 'institutional *vs* collective' behavior The relationship between the two varieties was usually perceived as mutually exclusive, which, as is claimed here, it is not.

48. M Weber, op cit., pp. 244–5; 252–4, 1120.

49 But note the importance of such behavior in enduring social structures, for example, in Nazi Germany. The ability of unreflective imitation and susceptibility to charisma is an ever present capacity of the human mind, it can be activated — and exploited — in any social structure.

50. M. Weber, op cit., p. 245

BOOK REVIEWS

Irish Peasants: Violence and Political Unrest, 1780–1914 *Samuel Clark and James S. Donnelly Jr* (eds) The University of Wisconsin Press 1983 454pp. $35.00

This is a formidable, meticulously documented exploration of a remarkably underdeveloped aspect of Irish history: class alliances and conflicts over land and religion in Ulster, and the relationship of the peasantry to modernization. This American collection of essays, with some significant contributions from Queen's University Belfast, attempts to place the concept of an Irish peasantry into wider debates in the social sciences with the particular aim of drawing attention to the research possibilities in Ireland. The recondite character of some of the contributions is set off by the excellent introductions to each of the three sections and by a conclusion that lists many areas of Irish social history yet to be explored. The weight and detail of the contributions (all heavily footnoted to display an intimate contact with Irish archives) might put off those unfamiliar with Irish material who might be looking for some facile generalizations on Ireland. The attempt to translate the complexities of Irish peasantry into the expectations of sociology does not quite succeed: mainly because, as the conclusion indicates, there are so many areas still unexplored that could make such an interpretative framework possible.

The most accessible contributions are those on agrarian opposition in Ulster Politics 1848–87; the Irish rural labourer; and the class position of farmers and traders in the early twentieth century. The other contributions, on taxation and disaffection in the late eighteenth century, local elections and the Whiteboy movement, are significant but orthodox essays. The most unexpected entry is by one of the editors, James Donnelly, with the splendid title: 'Pastorini and Captain Rock: Millenarianism and Sectarianism in the Rockite Movement of 1821–4'. This successful discovery of a millenarian phenomenon amongst the Catholic peasantry in the south is likely to cause a sound of historian's trumpets, for seldom does archival material match sociological expectations so closely as in this essay on prophecy and rural agitation that discloses much that is unexpected.

This collection ought to stimulate further debate; especially amongst English sociologists all too ready to generalize about distant lands in ignorance of the wealth of material adjacent to their doorstep.

Kieran Flanagan
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Lukács Revalued *Agnes Heller* Basil Blackwell 1983 204pp £17.50

This volume of essays, written by members of the so-called Budapest school of humanist Marxism (Agnes Heller, Gyorgy Markus, Ferenc Feher, Mihaly Vajda) seeks to establish what is living and what is dead in the work of their former teacher Georg Lukács. The essays cover such topics as Lukács's relationship to other, contemporary humanist Marxists such as Bloch and Gramsci, his critique of Husserlian phenomenology, his early writings on aesthetics and art, his last writings on ontology; and Agnes Heller provides a fascinating biographical miniature on the pre-1941 world of Hungarian Jewish culture focusing on the tortured, ascetic relationship between Lukács and Irma Seidler Instead of the intelligent and sensitive Irma, Lukács chose Karl Marx

Not surprisingly *History and Class Consciousness* is regarded as the key document

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in Lukács's passage from Idealism to Marxism The pre-Marxist Lukács emphasised the tragic relation of 'souls' to bourgeois culture; the Marxist Lukács identified the capitalist mode of production as the specific historical cause of human alienation. Thus for the Budapest school there is no break between the concerns of the early and later Lukács with his conversion to Marxism merely a development of a critical standpoint that originally owed much to the anti-positivism of Dilthey, Simmel and Weber In effect Lukács integrated Marx, especially his concepts of alienation and 'species being', with the conceptual framework of German philosophy and sociology. It is thus Lukács's concern with the 'problem of the unity of the species' which runs throughout his whole work

For the Budapest school, then, Lukács is interpreted as a humanist critic of capitalist culture, a romantic, anti-capitalist rebel and to that extent these essays fail to probe the problems associated with Lukács's essentialist rather than historical-materialistic framework. Furthermore, Lukács's relationship with Stalinism, especially his role as a cultural bureaucrat during the 1930s and 1940s, is glossed over. In general, while these essays contain some useful criticism of Lukács's aesthetic and philosphical arguments they are unlikely to convince a generation of social and cultural theorists reared on the anti-humanism, anti-essentialism and anti-historian of modern structuralism.

Alan Swingewood
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New Religious Movements: A Perspective for Understanding Society *E. Barker* (ed.) Edwin Mellen Press 1982 398pp. $44.95

Messianism, Mysticism and Magic: A Sociological Analysis of Jewish Religious Movements *S. Sharot* University of California Press 1982 306pp. n.p.

The English Churches in a Secular Society: Lambeth 1870–1930 *J. Cox* Oxford University Press 1982 322pp. £22.50

Religious Change in Contemporary Poland: Secularization and Politics *M. Pomian-Srzednicki* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1982 227pp £12.50

Editorial attempts to produce coherence in books with many authors represent one of the triumphs of hope over experience. Particularly perhaps when the contributors, 18 of them in this case, are sociologists, British, American and Israeli. It is glaringly obvious in the Barker volume that any attempt to get contributors to comply with the editorial brief has failed, in spite of the fact that thirteen of the essays were written specially for this volume, two were adapted for publication in it, and only two were reprinted from earlier publications.

Admittedly the brief was ambitious. New religious movements were to be so analysed as to throw light on three problems· the nature of man as a social animal; the social processes shown by a new movement coping with the problems of persistence and change of personnel, and the light which new religious movements can throw on the nature of their host societies On the first question one contributor, Campbell, comes out boldly with the view that the question is unanswerable. All the others avoid it or operate with hazy ideas that man is really a *gemeinschaft*-loving creature who, somehow, keeps creating very *gesellschaftlich* structures and, then, runs away from them into new religious movements.

On the second point, the failure arises from the freedom of choice allowed by the editor as to what constitutes a new religious movement. If there had been a restriction to movements which were truly new, or whose origin and development were very well documented, some interesting comparative material might have emerged. As it is, nothing of importance is substantiated because of the vast difference in size, definition and time-scale of the movements studied.

On the third issue — the claim that the study of new religious movements can lead us to a better understanding of their host societies than we could otherwise achieve — there is much more directly relevant material. Some of this is carefully assembled: e.g. King's essay

on 'fringe' religious groups in Nazi Germany and the chapters by Beckford, Hardin and Kehrer, and Bromley *et al*, all dealing with aspects of the reactions of host societies to the Unification Church. Equally relevant are the essays by Whitworth and Shiels on Hare Krishna and Vedanta societies in America and that by Wallis which sets out a useful way of analysing the possible connections between contemporary new religious movements, instrumental rationalization and the counter-culture in western societies. In the rest of the book there is very little to bite on. Werblowsky, Martin and Campbell have some interesting suggestions that modern affluent societies engender a particular youth culture from within which recruits to new religious movements may be found; though they do not agree whether the young converts react against contemporary youth culture or follow it to more extreme conclusions or, if both, in what proportions. Campbell, at least, has his feet on the ground in pointing to the very tiny proportion of young, or for that matter older, people who are in fact attracted to new religious movements even when the initial rate of increase in membership is steep.

In the remaining essays there is no question or hypothesis about the host societies which could not have been put or stated without any reference to the new religious movements within them. As far as contemporary societies are concerned, generalisations about alienation and anomie, rationalisation, purposelessness and materialism abound; but none of the authors except Campbell seems to grasp the point that if there is a connection between these supposed attributes of modern society and new religious movements the tiny size and ephemeral nature of many of them suggest that these attributes are not 'problems' in any important sense. It is ironic that Nordquist, having shown conclusively that all the new religious movements have effectively failed to establish themselves in Sweden, goes on to say 'despite the alien nature of the new religious movements, the intrinsic problems and existential questions which they address can be seen as symptoms of deep underlying problems within Swedish society, and in this respect they should be taken seriously'.

In many of the contributions there seems to be an adaptation of the slippery notion of 'false consciousness': people in the rich west are 'really' unhappy, 'really' agonizing over existential questions and 'really' dissatisfied with traditional religious answers to them but are either brainwashed into loving their deep-freezes and transistors and foreign holidays or deceived into thinking that secular protests or traditional theologies can help them when transistors or TV or tourism pall. Quantitative insignificance is not, of course, the same thing as qualitative unimportance; and it may be that these tiny groups can tell us more about our modern societies than, say, the massive total participation in spectator sport, political parties, trade unions, protest groups and voluntary organizations of all kinds, not to mention the continuing level of support for mainstream Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and the rest. But certainly the essays in this book do not convince me that this is so. The picture of modern society seems to be drawn predominantly from the perceptions of the converts, to the exclusion of the view of the apathetic or resistant.

In the search for enlightenment about the relation to the host society, four of the contributors go far beyond the here and now of western Europe and North America. Lewis gives us a run-through of Protestant USA, from Joseph Smith to Jerry Falwell, complete with biological analogies which are quite unacceptable, Oden confidently asserts strong similarities between Protestant Pietism, Hasidism and 'encounter culture'; Smart tries to compress into 15 pages a comparison of Hindu and Chinese reactions to western Christianity and imperialism and Wuthnow spreads before us in 22 pages a grand theory of world social development in its religious aspects. The best that can be said for these chapters is that their subject-matter just cannot be handled with such brevity; the worst, that they are the sort of writing which gives

sociology, deservedly, a bad name among historians. And they all stretch the meaning of 'new religious movement' so far that they are no help to the comparative study at which the book ostensibly aims.

The proper use of comparative method is stressed in the editor's own essay, 'From Sects to Society', and a schedule of questions which might serve as the basis of structured comparison forms a tail-piece to the book. If and when these rigorous methodological demands are met by the students of the new religious movements, we shall see whether their claim to a 'new perspective in understanding society' is justified. The present volume is a long way from meeting these demands.

I found great relief on turning from the overblown claims of the sociology of 'new religious movements' to Sharot's sociologically-informed history of messianic and millenial movements in popular Judaism. It begins with a study of small-scale movements before and during the Crusades and moves on to a careful analysis of millenarianism among the Iberian communities, including the *conversos* and *marranos*, in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries Then follows an account of the Sabbataian and Frankist movements, of Hasidism in eastern Europe and the modern west, and of Zionism with special attention to religious attitudes to, and participation in that movement. Sharot uses the deprivation argument in a very careful and well-informed way, avoiding the circularity that it often leads to. To my mind he makes a powerful case for the view that religious doubt, arising from the crossing of cultural boundaries and the loosening of communal ties, is as likely a cause of millenarian fervour as any form of material deprivation or loss of social status. Religious tradition largely determines the form and content of a movement, whether this is interpreted as a compensation for deprivation or, in Durkheimian terms, as a symbolic expression of changes in social structure. Sharot makes effective use of Douglas's grid and groups concepts in accounting for the appeal of Hasidism in its early days Since, as he shows, the themes of messianic millenarianism recur in very similar form in movements springing from very diverse social conditions, he argues that 'diversity of social experiences appear greater than the variety of religious symbols in which they were expressed. This points to the power of messianic and mystical symbols to encompass, to condense and to provide a focus for the complexities of the human condition'.

Of the three themes announced in his title, Sharot gives his greatest attention to messianism and mysticism, the latter in connection with the rise of kabbalistic studies. Magic he acknowledges as an important part of popular Judaism; but he does not attempt to chronicle increase, decline or change in magical practices except in the context of Hasidism. Does he simply accept, as Weber would have it, that folk religion is always full of magic or has he another interesting book to write on this theme in Judaism?

Cox paints on yet a smaller canvas, but his book, to my mind, justifies its main title as well as its subtitle. It is relevant, as he intends it to be, to any attempt to sum up the impact of industrialization and urbanization on Christian practice the impact of suburbanization too, for Lambeth in the period studied stretched from the closely-settled inner city riverside area to leafy middle-class suburbs.

Cox prefaces his account of Lambeth with a strong criticism of sloppy uses of the term secularization, particularly when it is used as an explanation rather than a description, and argues for much more careful attention to historical detail before plunging into generalization about religion declining with industrialization and urbanization

His study of Lambeth covers a period when, after a significant rise in the membership and variety of functions of religious bodies, decline did set in. He charts this demographically, by reference to the 1851 Census, Booth's London Survey and the Daily News survey of 1902, and a close study of local archival material Where this last is inadequate, he allows himself, on the whole carefully and convincingly, to go beyond the borders of Lambeth in search of data. Against these data, he tests various

hypotheses about the reasons for overall decline and for the varying rates of decline in different denominations, paying particular attention to the fortunes of evangelical churches and to the changing social context of nonconformity as it achieved numerical success and social status. He shows the tremendous variety of 'church work' in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and its change and gradual reduction as the welfare state was created. He also shows the degree to which different congregations relied on a national structure, on outside patronage or internal autonomy. The picture is of a set of voluntary institutions which, even in a period of decline, had members and influence beyond that of any other kind of voluntary association. At least in the nineteenth century their 'failure' was a failure only in the context of the unattainable goal they had set themselves: the bringing into the churches of the mass of the urban working class.

Inevitably, in presenting his material, Cox interprets it. He is faced with the familiar difficulty that records are written by the educated and articulate and that their view of the inarticulate may be selective and inaccurate. In one section he perhaps exacerbates this problem when he takes a clutch of autobiographies of men and women who had left the nonconformity of their childhoods and builds upon this a theory of a particularly wide generation gap affecting Dissent. Another kind of evidence that might have been useful he neglects — the record of the building up of the Labour movement in Lambeth. There are a few references to this where contact with the churches occurred but a more thorough attention might have illuminated the question of whether, despite their small numbers, political and trade union organization did not draw off the sort of working-class leadership which had earlier initiated and maintained the smaller dissenting groups. Another factor which is mentioned, but not fully treated, is the changing structure of local business and employment. How far did bigger firms begin to predominate in the local labour market so that fewer men and women were employed in small working groups? How far did the growth of commuting affect local organizations such as the churches? Did the most successful business families move right outside the area, thus ceasing to be either participants or patrons? And, finally, what was the effect of World War One? Other analysts have seen this as a crucial watershed; but Cox does not consider it.

His final chapter seeks to put forward a more nuanced view of the decline of religion, taking full account of the peculiarities of the English scene. He distinguishes 'diffusive Christianity' from 'active church-oriented Christianity'. He argues that the severe decline in the latter is due to the loss of all functions save public worship, expression and the defence of ethnicity. This last is hardly necessary to Protestantism, while 'church work' has been lost to the specialized professionals of the welfare state. Thus the 'combined sense of altruism and piety and civic duty' to which the churches had appealed with some success no longer obtained. These components of attitudes were now separated and there were plenty of diverse secular activities in which altruism and civic duty could be expressed. But all these conditions had to be present, secularization is not an inevitable or irreversible process accompanying industrialization.

It is a contention of Pomian-Srzednicki's book that, despite the vast progress of industrialization in Poland since 1945, there has been a significant process of desecularization: that is, of a return to the Catholic Church in Poland. What has been missing there is, of course, the pluralism and tolerance of ideas and organizations by the state

A study of the Church in Poland today cannot fail to be of interest; so, despite a pedestrian style and a somewhat tedious account of the sociology of religion in pre-war Poland, the book is worth reading if only as a backdrop to the events of 1980 and later.

One important point in the writings of pre-war sociologists is made at the outset; that their approach was positivist and largely Durkheimian, and that this allowed them to be very critical of Polish Catholicism and contemptuous of peasant religi-

osity. Religion was debunked by the positivists before it was attacked by the Marxists. Within the Church a sociological approach had apparently not yet been developed

The author summarizes the 40 years of co-existence between Church and Communist state as repression between 1946 and 1956 and then as a reduction of the pressure against religion, a key moment being the millennial celebrations of Polish Christianity in 1966. Since it was the intellectuals who first became disillusioned with the Communist Party and regime in Poland there was some movement back to the Church from the groups which had previously tended to be alienated from it.

During the 1960s and 1970s two schools of sociology of religion grew up: one based on the Marxist critique the other carried on within the ambit of the Church. Methods of research were often quite similar: e.g. opinion surveys about beliefs and classification of believers and non-believers, practising Catholics and non-attenders, by age, sex, education, occupation and rural or urban residence. But the interpretations were different and no dialogue seems to have taken place between the Marxists and the two Catholic academies where research was centred. According to Pomian-Srzednicki there was only a one-way traffic — and that not between scholars — in the form of unattributed publications sent to known believers attacking the Church as socially conservative, describing priestly scandals and criticising the Church both for resisting the changes of Vatican II and for accepting changes which by traditional standards smacked of heresy. In the author's view the official sociology of religion is overly restricted by its Marxist straitjacket, even though it uses the concept of secularization as developed by western sociologists. And the Catholic work is weakened by its unwillingness to develop theoretically and its lack of comparative studies with Catholicism elsewhere The emphasis is on working-class and peasant piety, carrying on the tradition of the Church as defender of the poor against the rich, of the Pole against the non-Pole. Catholic sociology is said not to attend sufficiently to the varieties of social experience in modern Poland. Though a process of desecularization has occurred the new church is not like the old one. There is now an elite lay religiosity with various aspects — intellectual, charismatic and experiential and, of course, political

While the book does help an outsider to understand the current position of the Church in Poland — its internal differences over Solidarity and its difficult relations with the government — it is limited in its perspectives. There is little material on parish life, on pilgrimages, on social welfare and educational institutions. It concentrates on other people's writings about the Church, on the articulate attackers and defenders and on their interpretation of the situation as it has developed.

Betty Scharff

The Family and Industrial Society *C. C Harris* Allen & Unwin 1983 260pp. £12.95 (£5.95 paper)

This is a new and slightly longer version of Harris's successful introductory text on the sociology of the family The book is divided into five uneven sections. Part One is a shortened discussion of the concepts kinship, marriage and family that appeared in the original volume. The second section covers the familiar ground of functionalist theories concerning the 'fit' between family and society. The essentially ahistorical nature of such theories is emphasized. This is followed by a lengthy consideration of family life before and during industrialization in Britain. This new and interesting section represents a strong case against 'great divide' theories of social history.

The section entitled Marxist Perspectives includes only one chapter and should perhaps have come immediately after the section on functionalist theories which it complements. Harris suggests that 'If Parsons has a very clear theory of the modern family but an inadequate theory of the nature of industrial society, the opposite is true of those who work in the Marxist tradition'.

The final section contains a relatively

brief and selective account of changes in family life in modern Britain with special reference to demographic factors and elementary family relationships.

In many respects this is an impressive book reflecting the impact that historians, Marxists and feminists have had on this subdiscipline over the past decade or so. Inevitably some topics are given a great deal of attention (e.g. marital relationships), whilst others are somewhat neglected (e.g. the family life of old people). Overall, however, this enthusiastically written book is a welcome addition to a field not renowned for its choice of introductory texts.

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Religion and Social Theory: A Materialist Perspective *Bryan S. Turner* Heinemann Educational Books 1983 264pp. £15.00 (£5.95 paper)

This perceptive and wide-ranging book embraces a number of distinctive themes. Among them is the idea that the sociology of religion has unduly neglected death and human sexuality; that religion in pre-capitalist society was centrally concerned with controlling sexuality as a way of ensuring the smooth transmission of property through the family; and that in post-capitalist society, public ownership introduces new forms of social control which render religious controls otiose. In part, this last argument is a reworking of the secularization thesis, particularly as this is sometimes rendered as a documentation of the changing balance of reliance on social control and socialization in the course of religious evolution (the present tendency being towards greater social control and reduced dependence on socialization).

Turner pursues his themes by cutting an unusual and rewarding swath through a wider terrain of sociological, social, and political theory than is usual within the sociology of religion. If his criticisms of that sub-discipline are at times a trifle captious and not always totally informed, none the less, his bold attempt at their remedy has produced one of the most stimulating books in the field for a long time.

B. R. Wilson
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Freud and Human Nature *Ilham Dilman* Basil Blackwell 1983 207pp. £15.00

This books appears in the publishers 'Values and Philosophical Inquiry' series, and unlike many other books on philosophy this one does not operate at the level of epistemological argument. Rather it concentrates on substantive issues concerned with Freud's theory of sexuality in particular. In one sense this is a welcome innovation, but in another it gives rise to some problems. The reader is never sure at what level the argument is pitched. For example, Dilman argues that it is important to retain the notion of love as being separate from infant sexuality. We can connect the infant's response to his mother at her breast with love, but we should remember that if this is described as being in any way sexual then it is a very elementary notion of sexuality which is being suggested.

Babies are also aggressive at the breast but we must be careful not to make this a component of the notion of sexuality, Dilman argues, for this is the kind of error which Freud made in his over-expansion of the concept of infant sexuality. The author does not deal in detail with the changes which Freud made to his theory after the introduction of the death instincts as a conception.

The technical aspects of psychoanalytic theory and practice are not dealt with in the book. Rather the author uses examples from either ordinary English of the late twentieth century, or from literature. Proust and D. H. Lawrence are both mentioned, for example, but no criteria are given for why these are referred to in the argument but not, say, Hesse. M. Klein is mentioned, and Malinowski's critique of Oedipus is fairly uncritically used in the main argument.

The literature just mentioned is used by Dilman to establish the importance of the notion of love not being sublimated

sexuality as Freud treats it as being. This kind of comparison of the technical theoretical language of psycho-analysis with concepts from other language games or from ordinary speech is fundamental to the arguments in this book. This is not a very rigorous way to proceed even if it is interesting and more lively than more epistemologically based types of philosophical argument.

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Philosophical-Political Profiles *Jurgen Habermas* Heinemann 1983 211pp £16.50

This volume of selected essays of Habermas, all of which were written during the period 1958–79, covers a remarkable range of topics including philosophy, language and communication theory, art and revolution, aesthetics, Jewish mysticism, power, neo-Kantianism and existentialism Mostly written for particular occasions each essay discusses the work of a partciular German thinker including Jaspers, Heidegger, Bloch, Löwith, Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Gadamer and Arendt. The essays are criticism not commentary or exegesis: Habermas is not concerned with seeking out 'authorial meaning' or producing a 'textual interpretation' but engaging in a dialogue with different theorists in terms of his own theoretical problems. As the useful introduction makes plain, Habermas's main concern lies with the contribution of each thinker to the development of an emancipatory social theory grounded in interpretation and critique. The essays trace Habermas's development from his early conception of philosophy as a transformative practice based on the tradition of historical hermeneutics and phenomenology to his later, more specifically sociological and historical concerns with evolution communication, and domination in late capitalism. The essays on Adorno, Benjamin and Arendt are especially valuable both for illuminating the work of these writers and for showing the debt owed by Habermas to German Idealism and the speculative philosophy of the Frankfurt School. Thus Habermas's materialist theory of communicative practice assumes, through his notion of 'distorted communication', an essentialist conception of social interaction. The materialist Habermas is best exemplified in the brilliant essay on Arendt's communicative concept of power in which many of Habermas's recent theoretical preoccupations are used to illuminate Arendt's valuable but restricted conceptualisation. For Habermas power must be analysed both in terms of action (Arendt's standpoint) as well as system. The necessity for action and system to be integrated into critical social theory is a major theme of these essays. A stimulating and rewarding collection which should be read by everyone concerned with the possibilities of modern social theory.

Alan Swingewood
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The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Social and Moral Thought of Max Weber *R. Brubaker* George Allen & Unwin 1984 119pp. £12.95 (£4.95 paper)

If 'systematic', 'methodological', 'scrupulous', 'precise', 'consistent', 'sober', and 'logically intelligible', are some of the meanings of the term 'rational', then Roger Brubaker's study can honestly be said to fit the cap most aptly. *The Limits of Rationality*, an essay extending over only about 119 pages, relentlessly pursues with inexorable logic Weber's usage of the term 'rational' in his empirical and methodological writings, as well as in his political and moral reflections. The task Brubaker has set himself is to separate out the nuances of the term and to show how, despite the apparent confusion, Weber's usage is consistent This task assumes importance given the centrality of the term 'rational' to Weber's intellectual work.

The chapter schema that Brubaker has developed follows a systematic sequence, beginning with an examination of the term through the sociological, historical and political investigations, then moving on to the methodological

writings and finally bringing these distinctions made earlier to bear on the examination of Weber's ethical reflections.

The first section discusses the usage of the term in Weber's investigation of the various sectors of western capitalist society: the economy, the legal order, the bureaucratic apparatus and the religious sphere. In doing so it effectively illustrates the distinction between 'formal' and 'substantive' rationality. A social structure may be formally rational but not substantively rational, with the reverse being also equally true.

Three themes of knowledge, impersonality and control are also identified. Knowledge is that which displaces the magical and religious view of the world by the scientific view of the world and which sees it as a causal mechanism. It is hence open to calculability and mastery. Impersonality is the defining feature of the institutions which exist in the political and economic share and control is seen as the ability to order nature and relationships between human beings. Calculability becomes an important characteristic. It results in external and internal rationalization, a process Weber considers as an essential pre-condition for the growth and development of Capitalism in modern western societies.

The selection on methodological issues provides a clear distinction between the following three aspects: 'rational' and 'non-rational' action, between *Zweckrational* action (*i.e.* corresponding to calculable expectations) and *Wertrational* action (*i.e.* corresponding to consciously upheld values) and, lastly, between 'subjective' and 'objective' rationality. These distinctions effectively highlight Weber's conception of the rational person as one whose actions are not based on habit, custom or feeling, but on deliberate and conscious choice.

The last section of the study imaginatively portrays Weber's concern with ethical issues. It shows how Weber, though quite emphatically accepting the fundamental Humean distinction between 'is' and 'ought', between 'science' and 'values', then goes on to colour the grey areas in this logical gulf by formulating the concepts of 'value-orientation' and 'value-sphere'. These are discussed within the general theme of the role of 'meaning'. Brubaker interprets Weber as seeing meaning as the 'essential property of human action; it is what distinguishes human actions from other natural events . . . Meaning is intrinsically linked with rationality' (p. 92). In his discussion of this central concern of Weber's he highlights the paradox which is at the heart of Weber's moral philosphy: *i.e.* that every rational life is built on a non-rational choice.

The book exhibits a sophisticated level of scholarship, showing an evident familiarity with Weber's writings. The references to texts are easy to follow, and the comparisons that are made of the different usages of the concept in different studies are both informative and well-informed.

Another positive feature of this study is that every time Brubaker uses a term in German he gives, in brackets, the approximate meaning in English. This may seem minor, even trivial, but it enables a reader who doesn't know German to follow the substantive issues of the discussion. This is refreshingly unlike the arrogance of some commentaries on Weber, where such equivalent translations are not given on the implicit presumption that all students interested in Weber must read German.

Even though the book competently shows the centrality of rationality to Weber's concern with human freedom, it has one major failing. It divorces the work of art from the artist. It does not provide the contextual backdrop to the origin and development of these ideas. Reading the book one gets the impression that Weber's sociological investigations and moral reflections were the work of a man who calmly and dispassionately did his philosophy. It doesn't suggest a personality distraught by existential circumstances, discontented with the situation in post-Bismarckian Germany, and overwhelmed by a personal crisis which ultimately resulted in a mental breakdown.

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Crosses on the Ballot: Patterns of British Voter Alignment since 1885 *Kenneth D. Wald* Princeton University Press 1983 264pp. £21.60

This book is the fascinating outcome of what must have been a prodigious feat in quantitative history. Although it is somewhat confusingly subtitled (the material on the period after the First World War is minimal and mostly secondary), the book presents an exhaustive analysis of the relationships of class and of religious affiliation to voting behaviour in Britain from the Third Reform Act and the 1885 general election to the election of December 1910.

Undeterred by the purported difficulties that have discouraged others from attempting large-scale ecological analyses of the social and economic factors behind British voting before 1914, Wald constructed a set of areal units for which he had or could calculate election results, a variety of religiously based data, and several class-related indicators (proportions of non-agricultural labourers, of manual workers, of skilled-manual workers, of industrial workers, and of workers organized into trade unions). Wald's method of analysis applied to most of his data is numerous multiple regressions, from which he feels able to conclude (p. 161) that there is 'little doubt that religion was the major electoral factor in elections from 1885 to 1910' (Conservative/Unionist voting being higher in areas with fewer Nonconformists, more Anglicans and more Roman Catholics) and that 'class played an important role but was secondary to religion in its capacity to structure the vote' (Conservative voting being negatively associated in particular with levels of unionization).

A chapter on religious beliefs and political behaviour attempts to assess the various ways in which denominationalism affected voting Wald then proceeds with an interesting attempt to refute arguments that class-based voting dominated in Britain before 1918 (notably, it has been argued by some, in the 1906 general election) and that the elections of 1886 and 1906 were 'critical elections' in the sense intended by V. O Key, the originator of the term The question left by the analysis that comprises most of the book is why religion declined as much as it did as a factor structuring voting behaviour, a particular puzzle since it continues to make a unique contribution to the prediction of voting even in countries (such as the U.S A.) where there are no major overtly religious issues in the political agenda. Wald makes the convincing argument that in Britain, largely ethnically and linguistically homogeneous (though there has always been a degree of Celtic-fringe distinctiveness about voting patterns), class emerged as a 'residual cleavage' that structured voting because the growth of the Board Schools from 1870 removed the religious bias in the education being received by increasing proportions of the electorate.

In general, Wald makes an interesting and convincing case, addressing his hypotheses with appropriate data rather than with unsystematic assertions or mere surmise. I commend Wald for his diligence, his industry and his contribution to the historical study of British voting behaviour.

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Introduction to Race Relations *E. E. Cashmore and B. Troyna* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983 272pp. paper £5.95
Race, Ethnicity and Power: A Comparative Study *D. G. Barker* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983 243pp. £14.95

Anybody confronted with the task of teaching courses on the sociology and politics of race and ethnic relations is faced with a basic problem, i.e. the paucity of adequate introductory textbooks which can be used as a way of making the subject more accessible and allowing students with little knowledge of the field a way to catch up with recent debates and empirical research. There are a few valuable collections of articles and some classic sociological studies of race relations in specific contexts, but these can be difficult to use as teaching texts because of changes since they were written and their narrow points of refer-

ence. The need for introductory texts is therefore plain to see, and attempts to fill this gap are welcome from a practical point of view.

Both of these volumes are intended as introductory, though in somewhat different ways. *Introduction to Race Relations* is largely a study of different aspects of race relations in Britain, with a certain historical and comparative input. Apart from the first introductory chapter, there are substantive chapters on the migration process, employment, cities and race, education, youth, racism, and the media. Many of these chapters are an overview of recent debates and empirical findings, combined with an attempt to locate these in a somewhat broader social and economic context. The authors emphasize three aspects in their theoretical model of race situations: race, class and power. Thus although they accept recent arguments which have pointed to the way 'race' is socially constructed, they argue that 'race' is real in its consequences: 'Race is not a problem: it is something that people created as a problem'.

Those readers who were not happy about the authors' previous book on black youth (E. Cashmore and B. Troyna (eds), *Black Youth in Crisis*, RKP 1982) will find this volume rather different in tone and less contentious in its generalizations. Given its basic aim, of being accessible to both beginners and undergraduate students, it is written in a very economical and plain style, and avoids too much jargon. Some of the chapters work much better than others. The chapters on the media and education are worth singling out in this context, because they summarize existing research and debates and provide useful criticisms of existing policies. But I still finished the book with a feeling that even for introductory courses the authors should have attempted to provide a somewhat broader overview of other theoretical paradigms of race relations, e.g. recent Marxist contributions. This is why I think it may be useful to see some more introductory textbooks on this subject from a variety of theoretical and political perspectives. Such a plurality of texts may make students more aware that there are many gaps in our knowledge of how racial divisions have been produced and are reproduced in contemporary societies.

Race, Ethnicity and Power is a much more ambitious text, aiming as it does to introduce the reader to race and ethnic relations in six countries which the author sees as having a common English or Anglo cultural heritage: the U.S.A., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The problem of trying to cover such a broad canvas lies not so much in the overall perspective, which is to show the importance of power relations in all these specific contexts, but in the lack of an adequate comparative explanatory model within which to analyse the comparative experience of all these countries. Although the author shows quite clearly how power relations have shaped race and ethnic relations in all six countries, he spends very little time on how other determinants may have shaped these relations. In addition the emphasis on forms of racism in 'Anglo' societies does not tell us much about how other forms of European racism compare with it.

The above criticisms are not meant to be dismissive of this volume as a whole, since there are individual chapters which provide an overview of how individual countries have experienced the development of racist power relations. Chapters 4 and 5, which provide an overview of the situation in North America and Southern Africa, are particularly useful. In addition the two introductory theoretical chapters are useful attempts to examine how the concept of power can be utilised to study comparative race and ethnic relations. Unfortunately the ambitious nature of the project as a whole prevents a full exploration of all the questions to which these theoretical chapters give rise.

The study of race and ethnic relations, whether from a national or comparative perspective, will no doubt become more important in the coming decades. Given the virulence of racism in many advanced capitalist countries and the persistence of social and political inequalities, there is an undoubted need to develop further historical and contemporary sociological

and political research. In addition to such research there is an urgent need for social scientists working in this field to take more seriously the task of making the subject more accessible to all students rather than to specialists in race relations as such. This requires a certain broadening of the contours of the subject and a dialogue with other related areas of study. It also requires us to take more seriously the argument that racism determines the life chances of minority groups in a very material sense and is not just an academic issue. Both of these volumes should prove useful as teaching texts, but it is to be hoped that they also give rise to debate and the production of volumes from other theoretical perspectives. That would be a development that should be welcomed by teachers and students alike.

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Foucault, Marxism and Critique *Barry Smart* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983 144pp. £5 95
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics *Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow* Harvester Press 1983 231pp. £17.50

These two books seek to show how important Foucault's work is becoming for modern social theory. For Smart, Foucault's analysis of the power/knowledge relation and his 'genealogical' mode of research (a term derived from Nietzsche which emphasizes the lack of continuity and stability to history, its complexity, contingency and fragility) constitute a significant alternative to an 'exhausted' Marxism and a 'discredited' socialism. His short book is a hurried survey of recent Marxist writings on issues such as the state, ideology, the party, empiricism and science (brief summaries of Althusser, E. P. Thompson, Perry Anderson, Raymond Williams), as well as an excursion into contemporary debates on the problems of modern socialist practice (the work of Mandel, Bahro and the French 'new philosophers' such as Andre Glucksmann). Smart concludes that the Marxist tradition together with the 'specificity' of Marxism (discussed with hardly any reference to Marx's own works) is no longer capable of providing a viable analysis of modern, complex industrial societies. The second half of the book lays out some of the main themes of Foucault's recent writings especially those dealing with discipline, the body and power. Smart's main point seems to be that while Marxism reduces the complexity of power to a reflex of class interests, Foucault reconstitutes power in non-economic terms precisely in order to grasp the subtle link between the economy and politics. Smart concludes by comparing Foucault with Weber, Habermas and Poulantzas.

In general Smart fails to engage in a serious debate both with Marxism and Foucault. Important sociological issues are introduced, briefly discussed and then dropped. Thus although Nietzsche's influence on Foucault is noted (p. 75) it is not discussed in any depth. In contrast, Dreyfus and Rabinow offer a more thorough account of the development of Foucault's work summarizing the main writings and discussing the influence on them of structural linguistics, phenomenology and hermeneutics as well as individual philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. Foucault emerges as a modern sceptic whose work owes little, if anything, to classical Marxism. Rigorously anti-essentialist, anti-reductionist and anti-historicist, Foucault's project is described as the study of the relation of the human subject to power and the analysis of the various mechanisms which industrial societies employ to control human action. Clinics, military institutions and factories produce a disciplinary technology and a docile body. Power is defined as the operation of political technologies throughout the social system: power is neither an institution nor a structure 'but the name that one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a particular society' (Foucault, Quoted, p. 187). In this situation social science becomes closely involved with the technologies of power, and ideological practice.

Having introduced Foucault's major themes, Dreyfus and Rabinow conclude

with some rather weak criticism. They fail the grasp the anti-sociological elements in Foucault's work, that this return to grand theory is highly speculative and anti-historical. Sociologically power is closely bound up with specific social groups and institutions: some groups have overwhelming power while others do not. Such a view does not imply reductionism but it does emphasize the specific historical and institutional basis of power. Foucault's abstract, ahistorical approach has the effect of eliminating the principle of social specificity and the fact of contradiction. To conceptualize power in Foucault's terms, as a total process involved in all social practices, effectively removes the possibility and the reality of struggle against the power-holders. To use Marxist language, Foucault has no conception of the dialectical nature of power.

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Race, Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status *C. V. Willie* General Hall Inc. 1983 279pp. $25.95 ($10.95 paperback)
Racial and Ethnic Competition *M. Banton* Cambridge University Press 1983 434pp. £25.00 (£8.95 paper)

The social scientific output on race and ethnic relations has grown at a fast rate over the last few years. Much of this literature can be classified under the broad heading of empirical studies, and many of the ones carried out in Britain have been local case studies of specific black communities or minorities. A small number of studies have attempted to provide a theoretical grounding for studies of race and ethnic relations, from a variety of ideological and political perspectives. One noticeable gap in the literature, however, has been the absence of texts which develop theoretical insights at the same time as attempting to use such insights to explain or analyse specific examples of racial or ethnic exploitation and domination. Both of these volumes, from rather different angles, are concerned with the need to develop theoretical insights as well as models that explain concrete situations.

Race, Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status is subtitled 'A Theoretical Analysis of Their Interrelationship', and this in many ways sums up the intent of most of the individual chapters. The author's intention seems to be to combine detailed statistical data relating to the demography of minority communities in the USA with theoretical analysis and speculation. It has three substantial sections (on demography, institutions and social movements) and a short concluding section which is largely theoretical. There is much that is of value in all these sections. The demographic section shows up the highly politicized and contradictory nature of much of the literature which aims to analyse such issues as delinquency, poverty and the family among minority communities. In the section on social movements there is a fascinating and valuable discussion of the interrelationship between the civil rights movement and sociology, and some valuable insights about the achievements and limits of black struggles over the last twenty-five years. As a backdrop to these debates there are also valuable interventions into the long running discussions about the black family, about the linkage between poverty and certain delinquent forms of behaviour and about the contradictions of reform strategies in relation to racial and ethnic inequalities.

Racial and Ethnic Competition is a book of a rather different kind, since it is more of a manifesto for a specific approach to the study of racial and ethnic divisions than an analytical book. Consisting as it does of a number of theoretical chapters and historical and institutional case studies it holds together much better than *Race, Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status*. This is partly because it develops at length its theoretical presuppositions and applies them to specific historical situations in order to show how they provide a better explanatory model than do other approaches. Given the broadness of the task Banton sets himself there is much in his approach that will not satisfy the specialist (the chapters on the USA and South Africa are very partial), and it seems to me that other approaches to race and ethnic relations are not dealt

with adequately (e g. the treatment of Marxism does not seem to take account of recent debates). There is, however, some merit and value in the forcefulness with which Banton presents his arguments and the scope of his comparative framework.

Apart from the partiality of some of the chapters, there is however a more fundamental problem with the theoretical line which *Racial and Ethnic Competition* takes· namely the attempt to fit all types of racial and ethnic relations within a model which emphasizes (a) the centrality of competition between individuals and groups, and (b) that individuals try to make the best use of the available resources in order to attain their objectives, within existing alternatives This is what Banton calls a Rational Choice Theory of Racial and Ethnic Relations. My problems with this approach begin with the very conception that one can fit complex historically determined processes into a 'rational choice model', and continue through the way in which it seems to me the book fails to show how the alternatives within which individuals are supposed to act have actually come about. More seriously, perhaps, there does seem to be a kind of circularity in the argument that individuals can somehow be seen as acting to maximize their objectives when these objectives are in turn defined as resulting from competition.

In a review of this size I shall refrain from pursuing these points any further, but I do wish to add one final point. Both of these volumes contain some attempt to link theoretical argument with policy recommendations, though Willie seems to me to make somewhat clearer arguments on this than does Banton. Perhaps this is a change for the better, since it seems quite implausible to see theoretical debate on these issues as separate from political issues.

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Applied Sociology: Roles and Activities of Sociologists in Applied Settings
Howard E Freeman, Russell R Dynes, Peter H. Rossi & William F. Whyte (eds) San Francisco Jossey Bass 1983 490pp. £23.95

Partly as a result of the existence of academic social administration, applied sociology is a term not much used in Britain, even though a good deal of it is conducted This collection ought therefore, potentially, to be of interest to British readers. The proceedings of an American Sociological Association conference stimulated by Rossi and Whyte in December 1981, it reflects the recent growth of American graduate programmes in the subject as the academic job market has shrunk With characteristic drive and efficiency, the field has been rapidly developed and this volume can be looked upon as an attempt to assess the state of the art

There are three sections In the first, Rossi and Whyte set the scene with a thoughtful review of the applied side of the discipline, followed by chapters on theory in applied work, and on employment trends in the discipline. The second section looks at work of sociologists in diverse settings, including urban planning, law, health services, consumer research, industrial consultancy, as an aide to legislators, and in the federal civil service The third section comprises a number of papers on academic preparation for applied sociology. As a summing up, Albert Gollin provides a stimulating overview of the past and future of applied work, writing after a career as a sociologist outside the university

The collection invites comparison with Lazarsfeld *et al* (eds) *The Uses of Sociology* (1967) and it must be said that it is inferior. There is a lack of breadth, and a remarkably ethnocentric focus upon American higher education Several major intellectual issues concerning the application of sociological knowledge are simply passed by on one side, and the utilizability of sociology is taken for granted by most contributors. This said, the collection gives pause for thought to British sociologists. At a time when departments struggle to cobble together doctoral programmes for E.S.R.C , study from the third section of the strengths (as well as the well-known weaknesses) of American

graduate teaching would be instructive. Perhaps most illuminating is the very wide range of practical contexts in America to which sociology has made a contribution. To take but one example, why has there been so little sociological interest in, and contribution to, the military in Britain? David Segal's first conclusion from his review of military studies in America, that it is important for sociologists to feel it is legitimate to leave the university, might be heeded in this country. In so many sectors of our society, sociology is either perceived as irrelevant or used as a term of opprobrium. This is not unconnected to the reluctante of academic sociologists and their students to step outside the academy.

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Accounts and Action: Surrey Conference on Sociological Theory and Method 1 *G. Nigel Gilbert and Peter Abell* (eds) Gower 1983 190pp. £14.50

Epistemology, the problem of how we know what we know or, to be more precise, what we think we know or can otherwise treat as knowledge, has an intimate relationship with methodology. All too often, however, that relationship is obscured, on the one hand, by methodology texts which treat the collection of data as merely a technical exercise and, on the other, by discussions of epistemology which never descend to a consideration of the vicissitudes of actually doing research This volume, the result of the first Surrey Conference on Sociological Theory and Methods, is a welcome and much-needed step in the direction of reintegrating methodology and epistemology in social theory

As Abell points out in his brief Epilogue there are at least four different positions which can be adopted with respect to the relationship between the meaning of what people say (accounts) and the meaning of what they do (actions). The contributors to this volume tend to adopt one of two of these positions. They either insist that the meaning of actions is irredeemably hidden from the analyst and that no link can be established between actions and accounts of actions (Gilbert and Mulkay, for example) or that, while it is possible to make inferences about actions from accounts, both are important and there is no necessary agreement or congruence between them (as in the contributions from Abell and Brown, for example). It is in the tension between these two epistemological positions that the central theme of the volume, i.e. what can we usefully do with actors' accounts *qua* social science data?, is worked out.

In the course of this debate a wide variety of substantive topics is addressed. Gilbert and Mulkay open the proceedings with an interesting discussion of their research into the manner in which scientists talk about their scientific practice, following which Brown presents a closely-argued defence of the continuing relevance of *Verstehen* to the sociological enterprise. Collins, in the shortest, although, to this reviewer the most interesting, chapter, explores the differences between 'unobtrusive observation' and 'participant comprehension' as elements of the participant observation approach. Two chapters, Beckford's discussion of the apostasy of ex-members of the Unification Church (Moonies), and Hornsby-Smith's report of research into the nature of Roman Catholic belief and value systems, focus on problems in the sociology of religion. Beckford's paper, inasmuch as it adopts a very loosely-bounded organizational model of religious movements, has something in common with Strong and Dingwall's discussion of organizational theory. In a useful and suggestive discussion of competing paradigms of the organization, they advocate an approach which lies somewhere between abstract formalism and interactionist analyses. The chapter by Heritage, on 'Accounts in action', draws upon Wieder's well-known analysis of a halfway house for paroled drug offenders to argue that sociology has yet to exhaust the possibilities inherent in the intensive ethnographic exploration of small-scale social situations. Finally, Coxon presents some of the data from the Occupational Cognition project, in what is perhaps the least conclusive of the contributions to

this collection. He does, none the less, have some interesting things to say, not the least of which being his reminder that folk models are, on some occasions, *at least* as coherent as the analytical models constructed by sociologists.

In summary then, this is a useful and challenging collection of papers, addressing a complex and important topic from a variety of directions. As such, it is impossible to do it justice in a brief review. I can think of few practising sociologists who would not benefit from a critical and open-minded engagement with the issues raised herein. One can only look forward to the volume which will hopefully result from the second Surrey conference.

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The Sociological Domain: the Durkheimians and the Founding of French Sociology *Philippe Besnard* (ed.) Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1983 296pp. £24.00

'Schools' of sociology are rare enough to be counted on the fingers of one hand. Although there are a few other examples — from social anthropology, economics and political science — the coming into being of such collective and tightly integrated scholarly enterprises is rare enough to demand explanation. This important collection is the product of the *Groupe d'Etudes Durkheimiennes*, based at the *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme* in Paris. It is a study, in twelve original essays, of the institutionalization of Durkheimian sociology in France. Six of the authors are French; four North American. All take a scholarly approach to the history of sociology, using original sources.

The editor's introduction delineates the Durkheim circle and sets out the main themes. The 'school' was integrated around the *Année Sociologique*, which Durkheim founded and edited. The other key figures in this network were Mauss, Bouglé, Hubert, Fauconnet, Richard, Simiand, Halbwachs and Bourgin That several are not household names reflects the interdisciplinary character of the network, extending into philosophy, linguistics, aesthetics, history of religion, geography, economics and law. For all Durkheim's supposed sociologism, he was exceptionally encouraging of links with other disciplines. The structure of the school was rather like a web with Durkheim at the centre. Many members did not know one another, and the journal (particularly in its very extensive book reviewing function) was the main collaborative activity.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter after the first is an intellectual self-portrait by Marcel Mauss, written in 1930 when being considered for a chair at the College de France. This again brings out how deeply involved the Durkheimians were in work of other disciplines. Mauss's own *Le Don* is read today more by anthropologists and unjustly neglected by sociologists. Other chapters analyse in detail the location and influence of the Durkheimians within the French university system. The focus is more on Durkheim's associates than on Durkheim himself, which renders the account all the more valuable since their role has in the past been less clear. Detailed attention is given to the work of Hubert on folk religion, Lapie on social mobility, Bouglé on philosophic rationalism, Simiand on economic history, and the influence of Halbwachs in the second generation in ensuring the survival of the Durkheimian influence.

The strongest impression one gains of the sources of strength of the group lies in its deep intellectual seriousness and commitment, with an overriding emphasis on inter-related research and breadth of interdisciplinary perspective. Influence within the French university system was also important, but central figures such as Mauss and Simiand were academically marginal for much of their careers. Is it not unlikely that such a phenomenon will occur again?

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Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics *Hubert L. Dreyfus and*

Paul Rabinow The Harvester Press 1983 231pp. £4.95 (paper)

Cultural Analysis: The Work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas *Robert Wuthnow, James Davison Hunter, Albert Bergeson, Edith Kurzweil* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1984 273pp. £13.95

For those who have struggled to come to terms with the ideas of Michel Foucault and have found the writings of some of his commentators even more impenetrable than that of the man himself, help is at hand in the form of an excellent book by Dreyfus and Rabinow. Writing clearly and cogently the authors manage to do justice to the significance and complexity of Foucault's challenging, but sometimes elusive ideas, whilst giving them a remarkable coherence and intelligibility. The book is organized chronologically and is, thus, able to mark the developments and changes in Foucault's thinking as well as to summarize his major themes and concepts. However, Dreyfus and Rabinow are not merely concerned with exposition. Part of their project is to tackle some of the questions that continue to bedevil an understanding of Foucault's work. These are particularly concerned with its relationship to structuralism and the status of the knowledge-claims Foucault produces through his own methodological archaeology or genealogy.

Although Foucault himself has denied any affinity with structuralism, Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that his earlier work is a form of quasi-structuralism, although it never fully embraced that form of analysis. This explains why Foucault's own work is unable to escape some of the pitfalls he identifies as central problems for the various human sciences, and which his analysis claims to be able to avoid In Dreyfus and Rabinow's view this is partly due to Foucault's early insistence that discourse should be treated as autonomous but also to his failure to acknowledge the importance of non-discursive practices on discourse However, this difficulty is resolved in later work where the frame of reference is extended, also in his more recent books, Foucault's emphasis on knowledge-power enables attention to be directed to the epistemological status of his ideas.

As Foucault's work is very much 'in progress', Dreyfus and Rabinow conclude their arguments not with a list of criticisms or evaluations but, as is fitting, with a series of questions and dilemmas which seem to emerge from it. Since the final chapter is, in fact, an afterword by Foucault himself, we must conclude that this impressive book can claim his approval.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to be as enthusiastic about *Cultural Analysis* by Wuthnow *et al.* This mainly comprises descriptions of the central concerns of the writers Peter Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas. However, there is little which is novel or stimulating here and even the criticisms seem to be derived from other secondary sources. Compared to the Dreyfus and Rabinow text it is rather dull.

The aim of the book is to look at four major contributors to a sociological analysis of culture, the argument being that in their own ways each of the authors selected have moved beyond the traditional dualist and reductionist approach. Such a claim, while hardly original, would be acceptable if the authors had not extended it to suggest that this means a new and distinctive approach to the analysis of culture is emerging. The problem here is that since the theorists chosen come from four distinct intellectual traditions, the work examined here focuses on different levels and kinds of culture as well as utilizing different concepts and methodologies. In fact, these authors seem to have little more in common than their rejection of past efforts at cultural analysis. This hardly constitutes grounds for claiming that, together, their contributions comprise an innovatory framework. Unlike the book by Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Cultural Analysis* therefore fails to fulfill its promise.

Mary Maynard
University of York

Social Research in Developing Countries *Martin Bulmer and Donald P. Warwick* (eds) John Wiley & Sons 1983 383pp £19.50

If there is any truth in the old proverb that practice makes perfect, then this text should surpass all others in the field. *Social Research in Developing Countries* is yet another edited book of readings from the Martin Bulmer production line (he actually names the date on which this latest product was conceived). On this occasion he is joined by Donald P. Warwick, himself no stranger to the editorial role in collections on comparative method In fact, one's verdict must be more of the order that custom breeds incompetence, in that they have produced a worthy but very much a 'formula' book, marked by Bulmer's tidy sectional introductions and a wide ranging and original choice of materials.

There are signs that the authors struggled in deciding upon the book's scope and intended audience and perhaps they have, in this respect, fallen between two stools. The library shelves in this area are full of thickish American 'comparative research' texts which reflect the one-time dominance of the large scale survey in sociological research and repeat lock, stock and barrel the logic and practice of the quasi-experimental, variable-sifting approach. The current and, I think, healthier trend is for 'field handbooks' which address, in detail, the means of actually conducting research in specific Third World contexts. The tension between these styles is revealed through the various sections of the book, the best of which concentrate on examplars and errors of fieldwork and practice, the worst of which offer rather sterile overviews of basic research objectives.

On content, Section I is Bulmer's General introduction. Section II is the worst of the lot and covers 'research strategy' by which the authors really mean the planning and organization of surveys. Here we are offered mundane advice about the importance of training staff and the need to tackle the questionnaire first as well as near banalities, reminding us that 'all people are not "just like us"', few of them are! Section III is on sampling and varies between an 'idiot's guide' to the available techniques and more interesting examples on how to sample without a pre-existing frame as well as a plea for purposive sampling. Sections IV and V on data collection, interviewing and field-organization represent the heart and the strength of the book. There is much splendid detail here on how the standard survey assumptions can be rendered meaningless via problems of translation, cognition, custom and culture Section VI centres on Warwick's plea for 'methodological marriages'. No wonders of paradigm synthesis are performed here, the claim for triangulation boils down to a sensible enough claim for the use of more and wider ranging data. Section VII is the old favourite on ethical and political issues in which we learn that, two decades after Project Camelot, social scientists working in developing areas have not exactly mended their ways.

Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of all the selections is the lack of any discussion of how strategy, selection of cases and instrumentation might be influenced by theoretical and policy concerns. It would seem that the 'theory/methods gap' is alive and well in the sociology of development.

Ray Pawson
Department of Sociology
University of Leeds

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Bryan S. Turner

More on 'The government of the body': a reply to Naomi Aronson

Naomi Aronson's comment on my 'The government of the body' makes some useful observations which serve to develop a sociological perspective on dietary practices. Unfortunately Aronson frequently misunderstands and misrepresents my argument, but rather than engage in the usual bickering which characterizes academic exchanges, I intend to use this reply as an opportunity to extend the analysis of the rationalization of the body. In the original article, it was implied that Cheyne's metaphor of the body as a system of pumps represented a transition in conceptualization under the impact of iatromathematics. Aronson is correct to point to the historical continuity of Cheyne's dietetics with previous practice. For example, the view that we have a religious responsibility to exercise a stewardship over our bodies had its origins in the work of writers like Leonard Lessius (1554–1623) and Luigi Cornaro (1475–1566). Thus, Lessius's *Hygiasticon or the right course of preserving life and health unto extreme old age* and Cornaro's *Trattato della vita sobria* had an influence on the religious outlook of George Herbert, George Cheyne and John Wesley.[1] The crucial difference between traditional and modern views on diet probably hinges on religious rather than scientific issues. Religious dietaries sought to control the inner body in order to restrain and discipline desire. Modern systems of health care (through diet, exercise and health foods) seek to promote longevity and sexuality. There is, therefore, an important difference in the focus of diet and in order to grasp this transition we need a new conceptualization of the sociology of the body.[2] As a preliminary step, one might distinguish, at least for heuristic purposes, between the inner and the outer body. Traditional diets of the Cheyne variety sought to control the inner body to promote the health of the individual and the stability of society. Modern diets, cosmetics and body-maintenance schemes aim to enhance the attraction of the surface of the body. To feel good, we need to look good, because the modern self is a representational self.[3] The nature of the narcissistic personality was brilliantly captured by C. H. Cooley in the notion of the 'looking-glass self'. If the original *persona* in the classical culture was the collective mask, the modern self

is constructed through the ensemble of body surfaces which are products of cosmetic engineering.[4] The body has become a product of consumer society. There are, as Aronson indicates, a variety of rather contradictory forces bearing on the history of diet. There are the 'rational' systems of the asylum, the army and the prison. There is a process of secularization whereby the ascetic practices of the monastery within a theological view of the relationship between food and passion were replaced by diets which were designed by reference to the principles of thermodynamics. There have been clearly major changes in the economics of food production, distribution and consumption which have determined what and how we eat. Finally, the body is also part of a cultural system of consumerism, in which we inhabit a Goffmanesque world of social drama. To present ourselves, we need to manage our bodies which are potent forces of embarrassment and stigma.[5,6]

One aspect of Aronson's critique was to indicate a gap between the theoretical claims of my account of diet and the supporting historical evidence. However, by concentrating narrowly on the problem of historical evidence, Aronson failed to comment on the theoretical point of the original article which sought to open out an area of sociological inquiry rather than to close off an existing investigation. Given traditional critiques of biologism and sociobiology, contemporary sociology lacks a genuine sociology of the body. By drawing on Foucault's studies of the discipline of the body, the article attempted to show, for instance, a new perspective on Weber's classical preoccupation with rationalization as a master social process. The problem of diet is, from this perspective, a particular example of the secularization, intellectualism and rationalization of western culture around highly individualistic norms. Diet is one facet of an empirical study which would have embraced the history of gymnastics, cosmetics, clothing, corsets and the civilization of the table.[7] These empirical projects presuppose a new conceptualization of embodiment and my original article was a modest preface to such an inquiry rather than a narrowly conceived history of dietetics.

Metaphors of the body throw a fascinating light on social relationships. At one level, my 'the government of the body' was a play on words within a Foucauldian perspective. The medical regimen of the body suggested a government of persons, just as *diaita* was a 'mode of living'. To diet in the full sense of the term is to adopt a mode of living which is a regimentation of the body and a discipline of the person.

It was in terms of these metaphors of the body politic that I originally became interested in the dietary management of Cheyne in whose gutsy language the body is a system of pumps and pipes. Aronson has pointed out yet another interesting parallel between the notion of medical rationalization and the concept of 'rations'. To

ration is both to limit and to reckon, indicating an interesting conjunction of knowledge and power. It has been suggested that 'cosmetics' from *kosmetikos* is thus an ordering of the surface of the body which reinforces the point that metaphors of the body appear to be deeply grounded in the politics of society.[8]

To show that there exists an ideology of the body which is expressed in metaphors of order and discipline is not, of course, to demonstrate that such ideologies are effective or normatively accepted. Ideologies tend to integrate the dominant class rather than incorporate subordinate groups.[9] The thrust of my article was to look at medical ideologies of the London elite through the publications of George Cheyne and to suggest that it was only under rather special circumstances (primarily mass warfare) that the health of the working class was of any interest to dominant social classes. I am grateful that Aronson reinforces this point by arguing that working-class communities resisted scientific management and engaged in public debate against regulation via nutrition.

In part some of the differences between Aronson and myself might hinge on the difficult problem of what constitutes continuity and discontinuity in the history of science. There is clearly a difference between medical theory and clinical practice so that discontinuities in medical metaphors might mask real continuities in practice. Furthermore what appears to be a short-run discontinuity in theory might prove to be a long-run continuity. It may also be the case that what has the appearance of a new idea in social science turns out to reproduce an old debate from a previous epoch. In my view, the current enthusiasm for Foucault is largely misplaced in the sense that Foucault's ideas about panopticism and disciplines were very much part of Weber's perspective on the iron cage and bureaucratic regulation.[10] For Weber, rationalization required discipline because this regulation of persons was the only basis on which modern forms of calculation could be fully developed. From a longer perspective, it may also be the case that the sociology of food (which is the real point of Aronson's paper) has its origins in Ludwig Feuerbach's critique of idealism. Under the influence of Jakob Moleschott's *Lehre der Nahrungsmittel* (Theory of Nutrition) of 1850, Feuerbach came to develop a philosophy of sensualism in which eating is par excellence the sensuous praxis by which humans appropriate and transform nature. In short, 'man is what he eats'.[11] Had Feuerbach not been eclipsed by Marx, perhaps gastronomy rather than political economy would have become the organizing principle of radical thought in capitalist societies.

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NOTES

1. Naomi Aronson, 'Comment on Bryan Turner's "The government of the body: medical regimes and the rationalization of diet"', *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 35, 1984, pp. 62–5

2. Bryan S. Turner, 'The discourse of diet', *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 1, 1982, pp. 23–32.

3. Some features of this perspective are developed in Bryan S. Turner, *Religion and Social Theory, a materialist perspective*, London, Heinemann, 1983.

4 M. Featherstone, 'The body in consumer culture', *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 1, 1982, pp. 18–33.

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8. On cosmetics, F. E. Wall, *The Principles and Practice of Beauty Culture*, New York, Keystone Publications, 1946.

9. N Abercrombie, S. Hill and B. S. Turner, 'Determinancy and indeterminancy in the theory of ideology', *New Left Review*, no. 142, pp. 55–66.

10. There may also be an interesting parallel between Erving Goffman's treatment of 'total institutions' and Foucault's view of panoptic institutions. On this comparison, Edith Kurzweil, *The Age of Structuralism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1980, p. 225.

11. This analysis of Feuerbach's sensualism is extended in Bryan S. Turner, *The Body and society, explorations in social theory*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984.

Jim Faught

Neglected affinities: Max Weber and Georg Simmel*

ABSTRACT

Most commentaries on the history of sociology have pointed out that Weber and Simmel developed strikingly divergent sociologies. Although there are undeniable differences in their views, the neglect of important affinities in their writings on political and economic rationalization has contributed to an unproductive distancing of these major figures in twentieth century sociology. The identification of neglected affinities raises questions about: the reasons for the divergent reception of Weber and Simmel into American sociology; the way the history of sociology often has been written, and; the development of sociology.

INTRODUCTION

Max Weber and Georg Simmel are generally regarded as the two most significant contributors to early twentieth-century German sociological thought. Despite the range of their influence, especially Weber's, on the subsequent development of sociology, relatively little scholarly work has examined the relationship between their perspectives. The following discussion is an attempt to identify affinities between Weber's and Simmel's responses to theoretical questions that were central to their contributions to the discipline of sociology. Since commentators almost invariably emphasize discrepancies between Weber's and Simmel's perspectives, the discussion of affinities in their writings is presented as a corrective to the prevailing tendency in the history of sociological thought.

Although a comparison of Weber and Simmel is long overdue, and on the surface seems worth doing, there are two specific reasons that justify this analysis. First, there are the possible insights to be gained from seeing a scholar's writings as embedded within a context of discourse that sets forth what is considered problematic and, hence, needing further discussion. In the instance of Weber, studies of his

intellectual 'conversations' with Marx,[1] Burckhardt[2] and Rickert[3] have served to clarify his position on important issues. Likewise, an analysis of Weber's and Simmel's responses to questions bearing on the grounding of sociological inquiry offers the possibility of broadening our understanding of each man's thought. This seems all the more promising since their mutual regard[4] for the other's accomplishment was augmented by personal association, which gave an occasion for furthering their understanding of issues in dispute.

The present study also has potential value for clarifying the development of American sociological thought. The introduction of Weber's and Simmel's ideas into American sociology took place through what have been identified as two dominant sociological schools.[5] Simmel entered by way of the efforts of Small and Park (and Burgess) as representative of the 'Chicago School', while Weber was presented through Parsons's translation of the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* and interpretations of his general sociology. If some of the divergence between the sociologies of Park and Parsons is attributable to the influence of Simmel and Weber respectively, then this would suggest that to the extent that affinities between their writings existed they either were not recognized or were dismissed as insubstantial. Should fundamental correspondences between Weber and Simmel be identified, this would support the hypothesis that *one* reason for the diversity and development of American sociology is a selective reading of Weber and Simmel, one that has ignored points of agreement.[6]

Simply stated, this paper attempts to verify the absence of systematic, comparative analyses of Weber and Simmel, to describe certain affinities that exist in their studies of the rationalization of political and economic life that suggest the need for further research on this question, and to identify some of the implications of the neglect of these affinities for the development of American sociology and for the way that histories of sociology are written.

THE STATUS OF WEBER-SIMMEL RESEARCH

A review of the literature on the history of sociological thought will quickly verify that the relationship between Weber's and Simmel's perspective has received scant attention. This is evident as early as the publication of Park and Burgess's *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*,[7] which among other things served as an important vehicle for introducing European writings in the cultural sciences to two generations of American sociologists. In light of the extensive literature on Weber today, it is instructive to note that he is referenced only three times by Park and Burgess; two references are bibliographic and the third, a one sentence comment on his distinction between

factual and normative statements. By contrast, a more extensive treatment of Simmel includes nine selections from his writings and numerous references throughout the text. In Parsons's highly influential interpretation of European sociological thought, *The Structure of Social Action*,[8] Weber's conceptual legacy is analyzed in several chapters, numbering nearly 200 pages, while Simmel is excluded from consideration in one paragraph. If nothing else, the extremely divergent reception of Simmel and Weber is one of the curiosities of early twentieth-century American sociology.

More recently, Martindale[9] has directly compared Weber and Simmel by discussing how each incorporated elements from neo-Kantian philosophy. Nisbet[10] does not compare Weber and Simmel, but he does indicate how they individually responded to 'unit ideas'. Others[11] are either silent on the Weber-Simmel relationship or briefly note their neo-Kantian heritage, their pluralism, or their interest in the issue of societal conflict. Coser[12] indicates that Simmel's influence on Weber is 'easily traced' and goes on to identify some of these influences, including the comparability of forms and ideal types, the place of money in a rationalized economy and the problem of assigning meaning in an historical context.

The gap in our understanding of conceptual linkages between Weber and Simmel has prompted Frisby to remark that

> In particular, further re-examination of Simmel's social theory would have to confront Simmel's relationship to Max Weber, whose work has tended to completely overshadow Simmel's, despite the fact that Weber probably owed much to Simmel. This would have to avoid the trap of evaluating Simmel merely as a precursor of Weber and neglecting him as a social theorist in his own right. It would have to investigate both writer's attempts to establish sociology as an independent discipline after both had emerged out of other disciplines, their establishment of a framework for sociology and the development of its basic categories, their respective critiques of Marxism and their, in some ways, parallel development of a pessimistic philosophy of history.[13]

As Frisby's statement makes clear, the present condition of Weber-Simmel scholarship is not unlike that of a decade ago when Levine[14] encouraged a systematic study of the mutual influence of Weber and Simmel as a means of coming to an understanding of the development of sociology. Since that injunction, analyses of Weber have continued to multiply, those of Simmel have increased slightly and those of their reciprocal influence remain notable in their absence.

This is not to say that scholars are unaware of the personal and intellectual relationship between Weber and Simmel, for many have noted the development of similar themes in their studies. It is difficult in this respect to account for the current neglect of the Weber-Simmel

relationship, although in part it simply may be due to the dismissal of Simmel's work as 'formal' sociology, which by definition is incompatible with Weber's social action theory.[15]

Contrary to the prevailing tendency, several recent studies (without elaborating) do identify some correspondence between Weber's and Simmel's perspectives. Levine[16] notes that Simmel provided insights into the construction of ideal types, the use of *verstehen* and the character of rationalization that were eventually to appear in Weber's studies of historical civilizations. In her biography Marianne Weber also calls attention to Weber's appreciation of Simmel's analysis of the concept of understanding. Honigsheim[17] points to the importance of Simmel's observation on the resemblance of developments in science and capitalism as each underwent an intensive rationalization.

Mitzman[18] has offered some of the most penetrating comments on the linkage between the thought of Weber and Simmel. He regards the complementarity of their ideas on reification of modern society as crucial for understanding important Weberian themes,[19] particularly the historical significance of the denial of emotional and aesthetic gratification,[20] which of course is central to Weber's vision of developmental processes in western civilization. The idea of the increasing domination of objective forces over subjective consciousness is another theme that weaves through the core of Weber's and Simmel's studies.[21] Also, both authors hold, what have been termed in Simmel's case, a tragic view of culture.[22] And, finally although Weber raised objections to Simmel's psychologizing, the latter is attributed to have provided an intellectual stimulus for Weber's notion of interpretive understanding.[23] It is worth repeating that none of these observations receives systematic analysis, although Mitzman provides a more extended discussion than others.

In what follows I do not attempt to demonstrate that Simmel developed an interpretive sociology, certainly not in the sense that Weber did in his methodological writings. The point to be emphasized is that there are elements within Simmel's perspective that are consistent with Weber's conception of voluntarism. In addition, it is hypothesized that the integration of Simmel into early American sociology, to the extent that it occurred, involved a selective response to his writings. Those elements of his analyses that were more or less consistent with Robert Park's interest in studying a multitude of everyday activities and also proved fruitful for stimulating insights into the meaning of social reality were accepted. Others, less consistent with the 'Chicago School' paradigm as constructed by Park, were rejected.

What intrigued Park about Simmel were his insightful analyses of frequently ignored life processes that ultimately had become crystallized into social forms. Park found Simmel's general sociology (historical sociology) and parts of his philosophical sociology valuable for developing his own theoretical strategy within the context of

American pragmatism. However, he dismissed sociological formalism in favor of the analysis of social roles that were conceived as continuously open to interpretation and revision.

THE RATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE

As noted above, most commentators have either alluded to correspondences between Weber and Simmel without elaborating on them, or have classified their theoretical perspectives as incompatible. The task at hand, then, is to identify points of congruence that would be accepted as credible evidence of an, as yet, undocumented compatibility between their perspectives. As a preliminary statement on the degree of affinity that exists between the ideas of Weber and Simmel, I will examine some points of similarities in their conceptions of the rationalization of political and economic life.

Weber was undoubtedly more interested and involved in contemporary politics than Simmel. Yet, each was aware that the development of the modern bureaucratic state created a foundation on which the general populace could be more effectively reduced to mass political subservience.

The political context of modern society, for Simmel, is shaped by the perpetual tension between the individual and the mass. Although the internal and external conditions for mass behavior are not unique to modern history, the process of urbanization, the increasing penetration of a money economy into all spheres of life and the standardization of production have made expressions of mass behaviour more visible, if not more commonplace. According to Simmel, a mass arises when there is an exclusive concern with the shared characteristics of its individual components. Under these circumstances, only those personal attributes common with others and, hence, those which are least developed are relevant from the perspective of the mass.[24] From this view, a person becomes part of a mass only to the extent that the characteristics of the *total* person are ignored.

An important political consequence following from the emergence of a mass is the denial of personal responsibility and a corresponding susceptibility to a variety of appeals that otherwise would not be credible.[25] Because individuals ordinarily commit only part of their selves in mass behavior – that which is indistinguishable from others – the mass can easily be dominated by a single individual who injects his entire personality into the activity. The implication of this line of reasoning is that masses arise not from the manipulation of leaders who play upon unconscious desires, but from the segmentation of society, which often precludes or at least impedes a more complete participation in everyday life.

Weber's account of mass action, in contrast, is more likely than not to emphasize the extraordinary attributes of leaders that enable them to make charismatic appeals to their followers.[26] While acknowledging this point, it should also be noted that the experience of charisma is rooted in a social psychological dependency between leader and followers. The followers must accept – that is, recognize – the charismatic character of the leader's words and deeds; it is not imposed on them. In this respect, Weber's statements on the nature of charisma are not inconsistent with Simmel's conception of the nature of the mass, since recognizing the extraordinary characteristics of a leader is partially contingent upon the absence of distinguishing or exemplary characteristics among the masses. From this argument we might anticipate that in de-individualized societies the incidence of charismatic appeals would increase, even though the traditional religious and mythic bases of such experiences have been undermined by secular science and bureaucratic rationality.

Beyond their analyses of transitory mass and charismatic phenomena, Weber and Simmel also provided complementary discussions of the social and political impact of stabilized ethical codes of action. In the case of Weber, his comparative analyses of world religions identified an underlying connection between different religious and ethical beliefs and the political community. In the Occident the nexus between religion and politics was manifest in Christianity's conception of 'this worldly' activity, which contributed to the fabrication of a universal code of ethics with other-worldly sanctification that was considered applicable to all people, regardless of time or place. Weber argued that although local traditions and status arrangements often endured for centuries, the tendency of the Judeo-Christian ethical tradition was to advocate a conception of equality under an objective system of constraints. This, of course, meant that Judeo-Christian ethics left open the possibility of changing the world so as to bring the political community into closer conformity with a standard that had been sanctified by religious traditions. The positive attitude toward intervention in everyday life intrinsic to this perspective was unlike, say, Confucianism which committed itself to a pacifistic accommodation to the natural and social world.[27] Since Weber hypothesized that social change normally occurs as a result of imposition (after a clash of interests) or from the mass acceptance of a charismatic message, he concluded that Confucian ethics impeded opportunities for altering the existing social structure. If change occurred within the Confucian system, it was through a prudent, pragmatic mastery of the world that took into account the inevitable order of things. This view of the social order was reinforced by a negative attitude toward individual liberties, a basically arbitrary law and the absence of rational specialization.

A somewhat similar set of conditions existed in India, where

philosophical and religious thought was largely 'indifferent to the actualities of the world.'[28] For example, Hinduism defined an order in which humans are fixed within their social positions and individual effort is useless for attaining salvation in another world.[29] If humans are located in such a purely deterministic universe, then political action is bound to be devalued as a method of coping with the circumstances of everyday life.

Simmel's analysis of the universalizing tendency of Christian ethic exists only in scattered fragments through his writings. But, on the whole, it is consistent with Weber's conclusions. As is often the case, Simmel relied on a spacial metaphor to convey his conception of the relationship of the human community to divine powers. He contended that the feature of the Christian code of ethics that ensured its efficacy in this world was its definition of the relationship of man to God. The highly personal and, hence, potentially capricious action of divine beings in primitive religions made it difficult to establish a standardized set of rules.[30] In contrast, Christians saw their God as distant from the mundane affairs of everyday life and demanding rigorous conformity to articulated standards.

Related to the standardization of ethics is Simmel's contention that as normative codes become more objective and set apart from personal considerations, it is possible for a society to become more brutal and repressive. Under this condition individuals may no longer appeal to custom for restraint of force. Instead, they find themselves left to their own devices for defence against the threats of others. Simmel added that objectivity makes it possible for the ruler to 'soothe the conscience' by claiming to be acting for the totality rather than expressing personal interests. Weber, too, saw the chance that bureaucratic organizations, the pinnacle of rational objectivity, could be used for personal goals. This was a dilemma that modern society was forced to submit to, since bureaucracy was also the most effective means of exercising force within a collectivity. Although Weber and Simmel identified the benefits that accrue to a larger proportion of the population as a result of the shift from personal rulership to bureaucratic domination, each was anxious (although this is more subdued in Simmel) about the potential for the more efficient suppression of the individual in modern society.

In his political writings Simmel distinguished between objective and subjective rule. Subjective, or personal, rule always involves an element of reciprocity, since even under repressive circumstances the powerful must take account of the unique history or personality of those subject to rule. Simmel contended that followers find it easier to identify with such a ruler and to locate themselves within the context of ruling decisions. Today, by contrast, 'the person' is separated 'from his achievement' and objective subordination is deemed acceptable.[31] The possibility of an impersonal, detached judgment is contingent

upon disregarding or minimizing those features that make a person different from another. To be objective is to deny that which is most distinctive of ourselves, with the hope that the resulting social order will be more predictable and congruent with societal wide interests.

This judgment reflects Simmel's general attitude toward the dynamics of modern society and hints at what some commentators have referred to as his tragic view of culture.[32] His understanding of culture singles out a common human predicament, but one which is probably more visible in democratic societies with an intense division of labour. Under these conditions it is easier to clearly perceive the 'tragic ambiguity' of all social formations; that is, the obligation of an individual with distinctly personal values to submit to the demands of the group. This is particularly manifest in the outcome of democratic elections.

> It appears nonsensical that a man subjects himself to an opinion which he holds to be false, only because others hold it to be true – while, following from the very premise of the election, every one of these others has the same right and the same value as he does.[33]

Simmel adds that the 'autonomous' individual and society are 'often harmonized' but 'in principle' are 'irreconcilable.'[34] While individuals may strain to assert what is personally valuable, they find these ends suppressed by majority decisions.

In Simmel's view individuals are never entirely committed to the restraints of a social order. Weber, too, described the persistence of conflict and change in any social order, even though some societies, for historically specific reasons, may more effectively control dissent. Thus, at least theoretically, Weber and Simmel leave open the possibility that an exemplary individual may, under any circumstances, set in motion social change that eventually results in a new social order.

Of particular importance for Simmel's conception of political regulation is his discussion of the process of liberation. Here, he attempted to respond to the question, to what extent is freedom from restraint possible in human societies? Ironically, the historical record shows that liberation often manifests itself in the attempt by the liberated group to bring others under its newly acquired power.[35] Hence, liberty should be conceived as a transitional phenomenon that tends toward subordination or superordination. Liberty is always vulnerable to the exercise power by those who want to protect existing liberties as well as those who claim they want to extend them. While Simmel did not presume that humans have a will to power, he did suggest that power is an enduring form of sociation. One may speak of freedom, but domination is often its practical expression. Simmel writes,

> the quest for freedom and the attainment of freedom – in the various, negative and positive sense of this word – at the same time has, as its correlate or consequence, the quest for domination and the attainment of domination.[36]

However, Simmel did hold out the possibility for the emergence of a less oppressive form of superordination and subordination.[37] Such an arrangement of power would require shifting positions within the structure of domination so that the opportunity for participation in the ruling hierarchy is within the realm of possibility for those interested. He did not entertain the question of whether this would consistently result in a rule by the few.

Simmel repeatedly argued that the origins of inequalities of power reside in the differences between individuals. None the less, these personal forms of power are increasingly superseded by more permanent structures that may be less reflective of personal attributes.[38] The source of this change in the organization of power is an advanced division of labor, a process that lies outside the personal interests of any individual. In this context, Simmel proposed that in modern society one's *position* largely defines the range of choices available to a person. There is little reason to expect these circumstances to be altered since 'for the majority of men, coercion probably is an irreplaceable support and cohesion of the inner and outer life.'[39]

Parallel to the notion of objectification in Simmel is Weber's idea of rationalization. In Weber's political writings the theme of the dominance of objective conditions over subjective motives is most evident in the analysis of bureaucracy as a type of social organization based on legal-rational principles. By referring to certain elements of Weber's concept of bureaucracy it should be possible to verify the comparability of his general position with Simmel's statements on objectification.

As a preliminary point it is important to note that Weber emphasized that a distinction should be made between bureaucratic domination and inequality that results from the unintended consequences of a free market. In his view, the latter may be purely accidental. Domination, in contrast, occurs only through the intended action of an individual, whether representing personal interests or those of a class.

> *Domination* will thus mean the situation in which the manifested will (command) of the *ruler* or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake.[40]

The response of the subject to the ruler establishes the validity of the command, even though the subject may be acting merely out of habit. As domination is legitimated, conformity is more or less assured since the ruler's command is implied within the content of the roles of subordinates.

Although Weber wanted to maintain a clear analytic distinction between market forces and domination, he also made the point that most historical cases of domination have their roots in economic conditions.[41] Specifically, he indicated that the economic structure often exerts a 'determining' influence on the structure of domination. It would not seem unreasonable to argue, then, that the requirement of capital for an orderly, peaceful market may have been more influential in shaping the growth of bureaucracy, including the nation state, than were the varied monetary, power and status interests of specific rulers. As economic organization was rationalized to insure profits, the state organized to insure a context of stability for extensive market relations. Both political and economic life were being subjected to an objective rule in which the particular (usually non-rational) desires of the individual were reinterpreted within an objectified process.

Bureaucracy is a form of administrative domination organized according to rational principles corresponding to those calculative procedures found in capitalistic markets. Typical of bureaucratic organizations is the division of tasks and assignment of responsibilities to offices in which an individual makes decisions with reference to abstract norms.[42] Contrastingly, other forms of domination fuse personal and impersonal duties in such a way that individuals are inclined to believe that their positions are personal property. The erosion of subjectivity that takes place within the objectified bureaucratic environment was obvious to Weber when contrasted with the prebendalistic practices of feudalism that made personal privilege a right of position. Bureaucracies, with their occupational specialization, separation of offices, hierarchical arrangements, application of rules to specific cases and the distinction between office and person, tend to be the most durable and effective form of domination. Although traditionalistic practices may persist in various guises, they are fundamentally incompatible with bureaucratic rule since it depends upon rationally calculable outcomes based on universal norms. Since bureaucratic principles are technically superior to all other modes of subjective rule, they tend to level or devalue forms of association organized on those non-rational principles.

Despite the extensive objectification of the political order and the acceptance of legal-rational principles of organization as the foundation for a contemporary belief in progress through secular rationality, Weber and Simmel were not convinced that rational organizations could solve human problems. Both argued that humans are usually

frustrated in their efforts to achieve preconceived ends. Simmel, for instance, contended that all activity is ultimately in tension with its opposite – e.g., individualism versus socialism – and success in pursuing a goal undercuts the conditions that made its realization possible. Human achievements are, at best, relative and may well have consequences entirely different from those anticipated.[43] Weber's studies of the fate of religious ethics in 'this world' certainly lend support to Simmel's judgment.

As Weber did before him, Simmel described the process of rationalization as the conversion of conditions into means that are entwined in an expanding web of associations. Simmel, too, underscored how rationalization required the atrophy of emotion in social relationships in order to create the conditions for 'calculable social relationships.'[44] In the course of western civilization, this transformation had been most apparent in economic life, but it was by no means restricted to it. The entire range of human activity had been suffused with the principle of calculation and, as a consequence, an individual's values were no longer considered valid standards for judgment. Process and function weighed more heavily on contemporary scales of justice than did unique personal attributes.

While recognizing the negative consequences that result from the objectification of life, Simmel still held that human freedom is expanded when personal subordination is replaced by objective dependency, if only because subordination is limited to specific roles.[45] Historically, personal freedom became possible when personal obligation and payments in kind were relaced by money payments. As Simmel says, 'It is not the bond as such, but being bound to a particular master that represents the real antipode of freedom.'[46] The quiescent implications of this view were never acknowledged in Simmel's writings and stand in stark contrast to Weber's chilling vision of the 'iron cage' of rationalization as the potential negation of human freedom.

Although the rationalization (or objectification) of life is apparent in most realms of human activity, it receives its most visible and practical expression in the reorganization of economic activity. It is here, in modern economies, that lawlike regularities render human products expressible in terms of a price.[47] Barter and personal values find little room to sustain themselves under conditions that demand increasingly sophisticated means of calculating costs. Underlying the entire market system is the contract, a relationship that may be taken as the archetype of objectification. For comparative purposes, the decisive element of Simmel's conception of the contract is its definition as a constructed rule which, owing to interpersonal agreement, becomes as 'objective norm above both parties.'[48] The power of the contract is evident when parties of unequal status feel bound by an agreement on the conditions of exchange, even though

one could unilaterally demand and receive compliance from the other(s).

An increased rate of exchange, of course, is commonplace under rational capitalism, and its consequences reverberate through the social order. Interaction in all spheres of human activity, following the rationale of economic exchange, becomes less 'directly reciprocal'; that is, interaction does not focus on objects intended specifically for parties involved in the exchange.[49] Hence relationships become more objective and tend to be perceived as having an existence independent of the persons engaged in interaction. It should be noted that Simmel was not entirely distressed about the expansion of objectified social relations. After all, 'man is the *objective* animal,' at least in the sense that he is able to reflect upon and respond to things outside himself. Furthermore, the capacity to respond to objective conditions makes possible a world with diminished conflicts, since humans may then acknowledge that life is more than a zero-sum game.

Purposive action takes its purest form in a money economy in which individuals consciously pursue clearly specified ends that are quantitatively comparable. In a barter economy value is intrinsically linked to personal characteristics, while in a money economy the individual is only indirectly linked to the determination of value. Despite the growing distance of individuals from the assignment of value, Simmel emphasized that all rational economic exchange depends upon the existence of a community. The community acts as a third party to all exchanges and guarantees the relative value of currency.[50] As a consequence, an ostensibly private exchange becomes a public matter. For this reason Simmel concluded that

> It seems clear to me that the basis and the sociological representative of the relation between objects and money is the relationship between economically active individuals and the central power which issues and guarantees the currency.[51]

Money enables individuals to build upon and expand the range of community activities since, in its capacity as a symbol, it may represent diverse groups and relationships in a common arena.[52]

Similarly, an advanced money economy also tends to level or undermine the power of closed status groups that historically have achieved exclusive control over resources on non-rational grounds. Hence, at least initially, a money economy encourages a fluidity of exchange that integrates society. In Simmel's view, the objectivity and complexity of money economies, on balance, are not inimical to the extension of human freedom, since under these circumstances individuals become detached from the will of specific persons and have the opportunity to select associations from a vast array of similarly independent persons.

Weber, too, was acutely aware of the manifold consequences that

arise with the advent of a widely accepted money economy. Although he did not grant exclusive priority or influence to the growth of money economies in guiding the development of western civilization, Weber did recognize the tendency of monetary exchange to dissolve social relationships founded on other principles. This conclusion was apparent even as early as his perceptive essay on the social and economic conditions of agricultural workers in East Elbia. In the late nineteenth century, the strongest remnant of the German landholding nobility, located in East Elbia, found itself increasingly being drawn into participation in a world market in which its cereals, potatoes and livestock were in demand. To maintain a semblance of their competitive position, these large landholders had an economic incentive to intensify production, dismiss all but the most necessary resident labor and institute payment in wages rather than in kind. In effect, the institutionalization of 'commercial principles' was also a means of saving their status.[53] But in carrying out this policy landowners altered their relationship with peasants and made it possible for the latter to become less politically submissive. In describing the change Weber writes

> All that is being claimed is that a secure common bond of interest tied labourer and landlord into a relation where patriarchal direction of the communal economy was effective, whereas the displacement of this relation through money-wages abolished the common interest and rendered such direction ineffective.[54]

Weber's examination of the relationship of employer and laborer in this case demonstrated the interpenetration of economic and political forces. That is, the status and political standing of the East Elbian nobility was contingent upon an ability to maintain a secure economic base. When this was disturbed by uncompetitive practices, its disproportionate influence in national political affairs became questionable. Furthermore, the economic solution to this problem exacerbated the difficult condition by undermining the laborer's household as a result of the institutionalization of intensive agricultural methods. The cultural impact of the change to wage labor was an increasing sense of freedom on the part of laborers, even when they might have been economically better off to have accepted payment in kind for their work.

As Simmel, Weber saw that an expanded money economy could be a condition of freedom, but only what might be called formal freedom, since economic rationality is concerned only with technically efficient means for achieving profit and is not a substantive end in itself. In his view, the pursuit of purely rational economic ends may, in fact, inadvertently destroy the social, cultural and political conditions that support unimpeded economic exchange. Weber, as Simmel, claimed that the rationalization of the market (and money was a condition of

an advanced market) led to an increasing depersonalization of economic relations. As a methodological stricture each refused to limit the scope of his analysis of money and the market to purely economic relations and instead advocated a more complex description of the causes and consequences of economic action.

The rationalization of economic activity is one of the distinctive features of modern societies. For Weber and Simmel, the process of rationalization meant the emergence of a calculative principle that came to be applied in all forms of social relationships. Traditional routines were unable to withstand the practical success associated with the adoption of this principle. This was most apparent in the city, where freedom and indifference were synthesized in a way that made it seem that human freedom was intrinsically dependent upon the complete erosion of non-calculative social ties. Weber and Simmel saw this as one of the dilemmas of modern society, a dilemma that tempered their enthusiasm for the expansion of individual choice. Their ambivalence was compounded by an awareness that increased civic indifference and the undermining of traditional intermediate social groups also made domination potentially more extensive.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT

Weber's and Simmel's substantive studies were oriented toward examining the causes and consequences of the rationalization (or objectification) of social action. Their accounts of institutional regulation, particularly political and economic, in the modern world are closely complementary. Each called attention to how social action becomes crystallized into patterns that appear to have a dynamic of their own. According to their analyses, the outcome of the rationalization of life for human freedom is a central problem for modern societies. Despite his tragic view of culture, Simmel was at times more optimistic about the ultimate prospects for human freedom than was Weber.[55] In their analyses, both were sensitive to the external constraints on social action and the fact that individuals must make choices even when they do not control most of the conditions that impinge upon them. In this regard, both recognized the historical significance of domination in bringing about the distribution of opportunities within a social order.

The history of sociology is replete with commentaries that assert the existence of antinomies in the writing of Weber and Simmel, while, for the most part, neglecting affinities in their substantive analyses. In contrast, I have argued that the affinities in Weber and Simmel are demonstrably significant, even while acknowledging important differences in their perspectives. A recognition of their parallel and comparable development of a concept of rationalization has several

implications for constructing histories of sociological thought.

(1) At the very least, the present study suggests the need for further investigation of several points of agreement between Weber and Simmel. Until now, the classification of Simmel as a sociological formalist has mitigated against a thorough examination of any intellectual affinities he may have shared with Weber's problematic. The use of broadly inclusive categories, such as idealist, positivist or evolutionist, is certainly a legitimate device for organizing a vast array of intellectual history. But classification procedures unfortunately may intrude into analyses and impede our grasp of comparative similarities that exist in the writings of individuals identified as exemplars of different modes of thought.

(2) Although histories of sociological thought have little to say about affinities between Weber and Simmel, one of the more puzzling omissions of this sort occurs in Parsons' *The Structure of Social Action*.[56] In his interpretation of the convergence in sociological thought in the early decades of the twentieth century, Parsons explicitly excluded Simmel from consideration for reasons that remain unclear. If Simmel had been included in Parson's account of the convergence of sociological thought, he might have been encouraged to place more weight on other elements of the action frame of reference, e.g., the often critical role of 'conditions' in shaping the outcome of social action.[57] Levine[58] notes that Parsons prepared a draft on Simmel to be included in the text of *The Structure of Social Action*, but this part of the analysis was omitted in the published work. Whatever else may be attributed to this decision, it undoubtedly has influenced the way in which Simmel's sociology has been received in the USA.

(3) Simmel first entered American sociology through the writings of the Chicago School. The pragmatic approach to the study of society typical of this 'school' engendered a willingness to select elements from a variety of perspectives. Robert Park was an exemplar of this type of eclecticism, and extracted from Simmel only those ideas most compatible to the empirical study of the multiple patterns of urban life. Park did not consider Simmel's formalism a barrier to sociological insights. Park's flexibility on this count was probably related to his lack of interest in technical scholarly disputes and to his desire to push ahead with sociological research. The partial inclusion of Simmel's ideas into Park's sociological perspectives enjoins histories of sociological thought to be more conscious of the selective borrowing that takes place across intellectual disciplines and between apparently incompatible perspectives.

(4) Since Parsons and Park were strongly influenced by the German sociological tradition through the writings of Weber and Simmel, and since important affinities in their writings have been identified, this would suggest there is a need to reconsider the nature of the differences between Park's and Parsons's perspectives. This would be

especially pertinent to Parsons's writings before the publication of *The Social System.*[59] A study of Park and Parsons, in this respect, could contribute to a better understanding of the development of American sociology in the first half of this century.

SELECTIVE INATTENTION AND SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT

In order to justify the status of sociology as an academic discipline and place it on equal footing with economics, political science and law, American sociologists routinely have turned to their European predecessors for ideas to organize their conceptual frameworks. Robert Park and Talcott Parsons exemplified this attitude by deriving constructs from the German sociological tradition that were pivotal in the development of their own theoretical perspectives. Park's conception of society and social interaction was drawn from his review of Simmel's writings, while Parsons' analytic theory of action incorporated elements from Weber's definition of social action. Despite the advance in sociological theory and research that may be attributed to this intellectual exchange, their *selective* borrowing from Weber and Simmel did contribute to the failure to perceive affinities in the writings of these two major figures of twentieth-century German sociology. Their selectivity in this respect also is the source of some of the differences between Parkian and Parsonian sociology. For example, Park's reading of Simmel often came to be expressed through his student's studies of community and occupational settings, and conflict and accommodation in urban environments. Parsons's reading of Weber was manifest in his effort to construct a general analytic theory and studies of the institutional regulation of action.

An interest in Simmel's sociology predated Park's arrival at the University of Chicago in 1915. Several of his essays already had been translated by Albion Small and published in the *American Journal of Sociology*. But Park focused this interest by selecting elements from Simmel's sociology that were amenable to a research program that conceived the city as a sociological laboratory. As a consequence, an important segment of research in the Parkian tradition gravitated toward the study of types of social relations and processes of group contact that were common to city life. Urban research, so conceived, required extensive participant observation and data collection on a scale unlike that typical of German sociology.

Parsons' encounter with European sociology, particularly Weber's writings, was guided by a quite different purpose. He presupposed that if sociology was to become a science, it first had to reach agreement on a unified analytic theory. After examining the writings of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber, Parsons concluded that these authors had achieved a theoretical convergence on a voluntaristic

theory of action; however, in this conception he relied heavily on Weber's definition of social action and his conception of legitimacy as a basis of social stability. Parsons's action theory and his later discussion of the 'social system' were intended to provide an analytic framework for the study of all forms of social organization, ranging from two person groups to inter-societal networks. In his own work, Parsons was inclined either to elaborate on his analytic theory or to examine social organization at a high level of abstraction.

On the basis of the affinities between Weber and Simmel identified in this paper, it appears that had Parsons given Simmel more serious consideration in developing his voluntaristic theory of action or had Park been more aware of Weber's conception of society, American sociology might well have established a foundation for a more critical perspective toward social institutions. For instance, Parsons would have found it difficult to construct his theory of action without giving greater emphasis to the influence of external conditions, and thereby reduce the significance accorded to the normative organization of action. By disregarding the affinities between Weber and Simmel, it was not as difficult for Parsons to reduce the importance of material conditions in his analytic theory, even though Weber himself had clearly accented the salience of material conditions in his studies of religious ethics. Since Weber and Simmel emphasized the constricting effects of rational, objectified structures, a perspective drawn from both would have been more likely to assign greater prominence to the problem of increasing entropy in contemporary societies. This notion also would have provided an impetus in American sociology for comparative historical research. Finally, the selective channeling of Weber and Simmel into different research traditions diminished the impact of their complementary insights into institutional conflict and domination in highly rationalized societies.

In contrast to the conventional separation of Weber and Simmel in American sociology, an alternative interpretation would use the affinities in their writings, affinities that seem to push sociological inquiry toward a comparative, historically informed sociological analysis of political and economic structures, and the capacity of humans to control them. The absence of a strong research tradition of this sort in the 1960s and 1970s made it difficult for American sociology to make sense of such diverse observations as: (1) the increasing control of economic production by large corporations; (2) the psychological ambivalence arising from the distance between traditional beliefs about American pluralism and the concentration of political decision making in the nation state; (3) the juxtaposition of affluence and inequality, and (4) the general distrust of institutional regulation by many young people. Ahistorical survey research, or sociological investigations of a single setting, or analytic theories of 'strain' and 'disequilibrium' were not persuasive in accounting for the

experienced malaise. Theory and research seemed to ignore those experiences that harshly intruded on people who had come to expect economic progress and political civility. In this relative theoretical vacuum, sociologists began to search for alternative perspectives that granted more attention to the incongruity and precariousness of social existence. Marxian interpretations were only the most visible beneficiaries of the quest for a renewed theoretical foundation for sociology.

Upon reflection, it may be proposed that the possibility of achieving a greater understanding of contemporary society was present, though unexamined, in the writings of Weber and Simmel. Because affinities in their perspectives remained undiscussed, our understanding of their individual writings often bore the stamp of conventional interpretations as transmitted through Parkian and Parsonian sociology. None the less, if the affinities identified in this paper constitute an acceptable interpretation of Weber's and Simmel's ideas, then it would seem that they could form the basis for a theory of social organization that could conceptualize the ambiguity of social life entailed in the dual process of constructing meaningful 'worlds' and at the same time experiencing the structural constraint of these forms. The Parsonian interpretations of Weber and the Parkian interpretations of Simmel have not proved entirely acceptable to contemporary sociologists, as is reflected in the continuing search for alternative theories. However, the affinities between Weber and Simmel provide a point of departure that may well offer sociology an as yet unconsidered perspective, one that builds upon elements of two traditions that permeate our conceptions of social life.

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NOTES

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1. Norman Birnbaum, 'Conflicting Interpretations of the Rise of Capitalism: Marx and Weber', *British Journal of Sociology*, 1953, 4, pp. 125–41. Benjamin Nelson, 'Weber's Protestant Ethic· Its Origins, Wanderings, and Foreseeable Futures' in Glock and Hammond, *Beyond the Classics?*, New York, Harper & Row, 1973, pp. 71–130, attempts to place Weber's historical research within a broader context, one which de-emphasizes his alleged continuing debate with the 'ghost of Marx.'

2. Reinhard Bendix, 'Max Weber and Jacob Burckhardt,' *American Sociological Review*, 1965, 30, pp. 176–84.

3. Thomas Burger, *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1976.

4. Weber's evaluation of Simmel's scholarship is exemplified in his relentless effort to secure a university position for him. See Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: A Biography*, New York, John Wiley, 1975, p. 358; Paul Honigsheim, *On Max Weber*, New York, The Free Press, 1968, pp. 9 and 13. Marianne Weber, *op cit.*, p. 252, also notes that Simmel's *Philosophy of Money* was one of the first books that Weber chose to read after sufficiently recovering from a prolonged illness to return to a more rigorous scholarly routine.

5. Edward A. Tiryakian, 'The Significance of Schools in the Development of Sociology' in Snizek, Miller and Fuhrman, *Contemporary Issues in Theory and Research: A Metasociological Perspective*, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1979, pp. 211–33.

6. Henrika Kuklick, 'Restructuring the Past: Toward an Appreciation of the Social Context of Social Science,' *Sociological Quarterly*, 1980, 21, pp. 5–21, has called attention to how interpretations of classic texts may be used to justify a particular theoretical perspective. That is,

> Carefully tailored versions of the past are used to defend the claims of rival intellectual schools to disciplinary supremacy, and are retailed to show the inevitability of their triumph . . . Hence, in their approaches to such classics as Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, all sociological schools have found anticipatory formulations of their own distinctive theories.

Kuklick, ibid., p. 9.

7. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1921.

8. New York, The Free Press, 1937.

9. Don Martindale, *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1960.

10. Robert A. Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition*, New York, Basic Books, 1966.

11. See Ronald Fletcher, *The Making of Sociology*, London, Michael Joseph, 1971, Geoffrey Hawthorn, *Enlightenment and Despair*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1976; Jonathan H. Turner, *The Structure of Sociological Theory*, Homewood, The Dorsey Press, 1974; Roscoe C. Hinkle, *Founding Theory of American Sociology, 1881–1915*, Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980; Daniel W. Rossides, *The History and Nature of Sociological Theory*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1978; Julien Freund, 'German Sociology in the Time of Max Weber' in Bottomore and Nisbet, *A History of Sociological Analysis*, New York, Basic Books, 1978, pp. 149–86.

12. Lewis A. Coser, *Masters of Sociological Thought*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971.

13. David Frisby, *Sociological Impressionism*, London, Heinemann, 1981, p. 165.

14. Donald Levine, 'Introduction' in Simmel, *On Individuality and Social Forms*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1974, pp. ix-lxv.

15. Simmel has also been criticized for an intuitionistic-aesthetic attitude toward social phenomena and for an unsystematic method of analysis. Charles David Axelrod, *Studies in Intellectual Breakthrough; Freud, Simmel, Buber*, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1979 and Murray S. Davis, 'Georg Simmel and the Aesthetics of Social Reality,' *Social Forces*, 1973, 51, pp. 320–9 have examined the *value* of such methods, to the extent they are present in Simmel's writings. Since this paper argues for the correpondence of parts of Weber's and Simmel's perspectives, a point that is usually denied, it is ironic that an early commentator on Weber's theory of capitalist development charged him with constructing an *aesthetic* history of capitalism. See the reference in Talcott Parsons, 'Capitalism in Recent German Literature: Sombart and Weber (Conclusion),' *Journal of Political Economy*, 1929, 37, p. 50 to Young's characterization of Weber's perspective.

16. *Op. cit.*, 1971, p. xlv.

17. *Op. cit.*, 1968, p. 131.

18. Arthur Mitzman, *The Iron Cage*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1970; Arthur Mitzman, *Sociology and Estrangement*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1973.

19. Mitzman, *op. cit.*, 1970, p. 4, note; Mitzman, *op. cit*, 1973, p. 9.

20. Mitzman, *op. cit.*, 1973, p. 32.

21. Mitzman, *op. cit.*, 1970, p. 176 and p. 275.

22. *Ibid*, p. 209, note.

23 See Marianne Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 311–13, and Freund, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

24. Georg Simmel, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, edited by Kurt H. Wolff, New York, The Free Press, 1950, p 32.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

26. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, 3 vols, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, New York, Bedminster Press, 1968, pp. 241–5.

27. Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1951, p. 169.

28. Max Weber, *The Religion of India*, New York, The Free Press, 1958, p. 162.

29. *Op cit*, p. 332.

30. Simmel, 1950, *op. cit.*, p 223.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 251. The nature of scientific work, according to Simmel, was also experiencing change as scholarship became more specialized and labor was divided according to disciplinary boundaries. As a consequence, the correspondence between subjectivity and objective scientific facts diminished, and there arose a greater reliance on the observations of others. This dependency makes scientific output seem more objective. See Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, pp. 456–7.

32. See Georg Simmel, *The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays*, New York, Teachers College Press, 1968, pp. 27–46.

33. Simmel, 1950, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

35. *Ibid.*, pp 273–5.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 282.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 285.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 292.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 299.

40. Weber, 1968, *op. cit*, p. 946.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 941.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 956.

43 Simmel, 1978, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 431.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 335.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 299. Since the pursuit of societal goals depends on hierarchy, Simmel regards some form of superordination and subordination as indispensable. As a method of compensation he argued that humans should strive to eliminate 'those psychological consequences that make such relationships abhorrent ' See Simmel, 1978, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

47. Simmel, 1950, *op. cit.*, p. 263

48. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

49 Simmel, 1978, *op. cit.*, p. 457

50. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 129.

53. Max Weber, 'Developmental Tendencies in the Situation of East Elbian Rural Labourers,' *Economy and Society*, 1979 [1894], 8, p 180.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 190

55. The dark side of Weber's understanding of the future of western civilization is ignored by those who see the ultimate triumph of reason. See Benjamin Nelson, 'Dialogs Across the Centuries: Weber, Marx, Hegel, Luther,' in Weiss, *The Origins of Modern Consciousness*, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1965, p. 160.

56. *Op. cit.*

57. Jeffrey Alexander, 'Formal and Substantive Voluntarism in the Work of Talcott Parsons: A Theoretical and Ideological Reinterpretation,' *American Sociological Review*, 1978, 43, p. 182, argues that Parsons' reliance on Weber was pivotal in developing a voluntaristic theory of action.

> symbolic action always occurs within a conditional environment of material facts which produces pressure for the pursuit of efficient means. The key intellectual figure in this final element of Parsons' theoretical synthesis is Weber, who outlined a method for carrying forward Marx's materialist concerns without the latter's exclusive emphasis on instrumentalism.

58. Donald N. Levine, Ellwood B. Carter and Eleanor Miller Gorman, 'Simmel's Influence on American Sociology,' 2 parts, *American Journal of Sociology*, 1976, 81, p. 820.

59. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1951.

Richard Breen and Christopher T. Whelan

Vertical mobility and class inheritance in the British Isles

ABSTRACT

This paper compares vertical mobility in Dublin and England and Wales as displayed in mobility tables using the seven class categories developed by Goldthorpe (1980). A model is developed which demonstrates the pattern of vertical mobility in each country and also allows us to measure the extent of class inheritance as distinct from class self-recruitment. The data are used to test the FJH thesis, and some differences between Dublin and England and Wales – in their degree of 'openness' and in the relative standings of the different classes – are examined. Patterns of relative mobility are found to differ quite strongly between the two with Dublin being considerably less open than England and Wales.

In recent years two main approaches have been taken in testing the modification of the Lipset-Zetterberg thesis advanced by Featherman, Lancaster-Jones and Hauser.[1] The original Lipset-Zetterberg thesis stated that 'the overall pattern of social mobility appears to be much the same in the industrial societies of various western countries'[2] while the revision of Featherman, Lancaster-Jones and Hauser, which we term the FJH thesis (following Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero),[3] claims that relative mobility chances are distributed in a cross-nationally similar fashion, while allowing for the existence of cross-national differences in absolute mobility flows. In other words, the FJH thesis allows for cross-population variation in the marginal distribution of fathers' and sons' occupations (origins and destinations) but hypothesizes broadly similar patterns of association between origins and destinations.

The two approaches commonly taken in examining the FJH thesis are, firstly, the comparative analysis of a large number of relatively small tables;[4] and, secondly, the examination of a smaller number of somewhat larger tables, permitting more detailed investigation of mobility patterns.[5] This paper presents an example of the latter kind

of analysis in which we compare vertical mobility in England and Wales, using data from Goldthorpe,[6] with that found in Dublin, the capital city of the Irish Republic, using data originally collected by Hutchinson in 1968 and 1972 and reanalysed by Whelan and Whelan[7] who recoded it according to the Hope-Goldthorpe[8] scale.

In addition to testing the FJH thesis, we shall seek to answer two further but related questions: (i) is Dublin more or less open – in the sense of displaying greater intergenerational equality in access to class positions – than England? and (ii) given directly comparable class categories in the two tables under consideration are there substantial differences in the relative positions of the classes in regard to the patterns of mobility into and out of them?

Comparisons between English and Irish mobility patterns are likely to prove particularly interesting because of the history of economic and political dependence of Ireland on Britain.[9] As a consequence of this dependence and, in particular, the inheritance of British traditions of craft and professional organization, detailed cross-national comparisons are greatly facilitated. Thus, it is possible to compare mobility using the sevenfold class schema employed in Goldthorpe's[10] original analysis of the data for England and Wales which is set out below:

I Upper Service class
II Lower Service class
III Routine non-manual
IV Petty Bourgeoisie
V Lower grade technicians and supervisors of manual workers
VI Skilled manual
VII Semi-skilled and unskilled manual

In previous cross-national comparisons involving England, France and Sweden[11] it was not possible to effect the division between skilled manual workers on the one hand, and lower-level technicians on the other. Furthermore, due to differences which, in part, appeared to arise from the definitions of the groupings involved but also, it was suspected, from real differences in the structure of the professional, administrative and managerial bureaucracies, it was not possible to maintain the distinction between Class I and Class II in the comparative analysis of relative mobility.[12]

Despite the similarities in occupational organization in Dublin and England and Wales the differences between the societies in their levels and patterns of industrialization are undoubtedly greater than those between any pair of the western societies included in recent comparative mobility studies. Thus, the comparison should provide a useful test case for generalizations relating to the significance of international differences in absolute and relative mobility patterns. The fact that a substantial transformation of the Irish class structure

took place between 1950 and 1970[13] suggests that the source of differences in absolute mobility between Dublin and England and Wales is likely to be found in variability in the effects of origins rather than destinations. In our subsequent analysis we will provide estimates of the relative importance of international variations in origins and destinations.

VERTICAL AND NON-VERTICAL MOBILITY AND THE GOLDTHORPE CLASS SCHEMA

The sevenfold class schema described by Goldthorpe[14] was arrived at by collapsing the 36 category version of the Hope-Goldthorpe occupation scale. Goldthorpe emphasizes that a distinctive feature of these categories is that they provide a relatively high degree of differentiation in terms of both occupational function *and* work situation. Consequently, it was possible to bring together within class categories occupations whose incumbents share broadly similar market and work situations. The aggregation of categories of the H-G scale was conducted without reference to their order in the scale. Goldthorpe points out that the class schema should not be viewed as having a consistently hierarchical form. In fact, he suggests that we should speak of vertical mobility only in the case of movement into and out of Classes I and II.

Goldthorpe[15] contrasts a class approach to mobility with analysis in terms of synthetic scales which, while capable of displaying particular hierarchical effects in considerable detail are, he claims, likely to obscure distinctions between the self-employed and employees, and between manual and white-collar workers. As a consequence of such failures, difficulties are created in treating issues connected with structural changes in the economy.

While we would accept the main thrust of Goldthorpe's critique of reliance on synthetic scales, the analysis of vertical mobility cannot be equated with the use of such scales. Furthermore, the limits which he suggests be placed on the use of the terms 'upward' and 'downward' appear *a priori* to be unduly restrictive. Certainly it would appear desirable to pursue empirically the questions of whether:

(i) the classes can be hierarchically ordered;
(ii) the ordering of origins and destinations differ within a country;
(iii) the ordering of origins and destinations vary cross-nationally.

The ranking of classes which we present in this paper should be understood as following directly from the theoretical rationale underlying the development of the class schema. Thus, the origins may form a hierarchy in terms of economic, cultural and social

resources while the destinations may be ranked in terms of their relative desirability and the relative barriers that are faced in seeking access to them. As with other analyses of vertical mobility in mobility tables, it will be necessary to treat the question of immobility separately from mobility by including terms for the cells on the main diagonal (the diagonal cells) in our model.

The present paper, then, is the first to draw international comparisons of vertical mobility specifically on the basis of the original seven class categories used by Goldthorpe. Furthermore, the paper provides the results of the first substantive application of the framework for the comparative analysis of mobility described in an earlier paper[16] and also presents the first application to relatively detailed mobility tables of log-multiplicative models which incorporate equality constraints applied to the diagonal cells,[17] thus going some way towards meeting Duncan's[18] request for a model that handles the diagonal cells of the mobility table in a 'less ad hoc fashion' than in previous treatments.

In the following sections of the paper we discuss the data used and the model fitted to the Dublin and England and Wales data. We then deal with the testing of the FJH thesis and finally we discuss differences in the openness of the two societies as these are revealed by patterns of inter-generational mobility and in the relative standings of the origin and destination classes.

MODELS OF VERTICAL MOBILITY

The model which we use to compare vertical mobility in Dublin and England and Wales is known as the Row and Column Effects model II (RC2 for short), which is one of the set of models for the analysis of association (ANOAS) in contingency tables introduced by Goodman.[19] These models are particularly useful in the study of vertical mobility because they presume an ordering of the rows and/or columns of the mobility table and they also give, in a direct way, expressions for the odds ratios, θ_{ij}.

It is well known that, in all log-linear models, the odds ratios can be expressed as functions of the interaction parameters. In the study of mobility, odds ratios are particularly important in so far as they provide simple measures of relative mobility chances. Erikson *et al.*[20] have pointed out that an odds ratio can be interpreted as the chances of men of origin class i being found in destination class j rather than j′, relative to the chances of men of a different origin class being found in j rather than j′. Thus, the greater the deviation of this ratio of odds from unity, the stronger the association between origins and destinations and the less equal is the competition (to adopt Goldthorpe's[21] term) between men of different origins for particular

destination classes. The model of mobility specified for the Dublin and England and Wales data is introduced below (equation (3)). It is an elaboration of Goodman's RC2 model, and before progressing further we shall discuss the RC2 model and its interpretation in some detail.

RC2, is log-multiplicative rather than log-linear, and takes the form

$$\log F_{ij} = \lambda + \lambda_i^O + \lambda_j^D + \phi u_i v_j \qquad (1)$$

where F_{ij} is the estimated frequency in the ij^{th} cell, λ is a scale parameter, and λ^O and λ^D are the origin and destination marginal effects, with normalization

$$\lambda^O{}_1 = \lambda^D{}_1 = 0$$

ϕ is an origin/destination interaction parameter, while u_i and v_j are scores assigned to the origin and destination categories respectively. These scores maximize the origin/destination association, subject to that association being described by a model of linear by linear interaction. An iterative method is needed to find the scores that maximize the association and thus to estimate the model[22] and in this case it was accomplished using GLIM and the approach outlined by Breen.[23] Under this model, odds ratios, or relative mobility chances, are given by

$$\begin{aligned}\theta_{ij} &= (F_{ij}/F_{i,j+1}) \,/\, (F_{i+1,j}/F_{i+1,j+1}) \\ &= \exp\{\phi\,(u_i - u_{i+1})\,(v_j - v_{j+1})\} \qquad (2)\end{aligned}$$

(2) shows that competition between men of different origin classes for one of a pair of destination categories will be less equal the further apart (in terms of the scores u_i and v_j) are both the origin and destination classes in question. In other words, the greater the distance between two origin classes the less equal is competition between men of those categories for a particular destination class. Likewise, the greater the distance between destination classes the more differentiated are those classes in terms of the origins of men entering them.

The location and scale of the u_i and v_j are immaterial: only the ratios of distances between classes are important. In this case we score the u_i and v_j from unity for the highest class (by which we mean, in terms of origins, the most advantaged in access to higher rather than lower destinations and, in terms of destination classes, the most 'exclusive' in drawing its recruitment from higher rather than lower origins) to zero for the lowest. This scoring has the advantage not only of simplicity but also provides, in cases where the association parameters are the only interaction terms fitted in the model, a clear interpretation of the ϕ coefficient. Taking the odds ratio formed from the extreme classes under our scoring we arrive at:

$$(F_{11}/F_{17}) \;/\; (F_{71}/F_{77}) =$$
$$\exp\{\phi\,(1-0)\,(1-0)\} = \exp(\phi)$$

Thus, under this scoring, ϕ records the advantage in competition for the top destination class rather than the bottom accruing to men of the top rather than the bottom origin class. It thus has a plausible claim to be, in comparative analyses, a measure of overall inequality in intergenerational mobility.

In fitting RC2, then, we are testing the hypothesis that vertical mobility along an unspecified hierarchy accounts for the pattern of movement in the table, and in the process of testing this hypothesis we are also identifying that hierarchy (in the form of the u_i and v_j). In substantive sociological terms these origin and destination scores may be viewed as reflecting differences in resources between particular class origins, differences in the desirability of particular destination classes, and barriers to movement between particular origin and destination classes.[24]

In addition to fitting the RC2 model to account for vertical movement, we also introduce specific parameters applied to the diagonal cells of the table to model the degree of class inheritance that exists over and above the level of class self-recruitment that would be implied by the prevailing pattern of vertical mobility. With this objective in mind we specified four diagonal parameters, applied as follows:

Parameters	Classes
1	I
2	II, III
3	IV
4	V, VI, VII

Specific parameters are applied to the petty bourgeoisie (IV) and the upper service class (I) because of the contribution which the transmission of property can make to immobility in both these classes. The other parameters distinguish between the white-collar non-elite workers (II and III) and all manual workers (V, VI, VII). Rather similar levels of immobility are observed within each of these groups, with the manual classes generally showing higher levels of immobility.

In summary then we have a model which contains three important sets of parameters. First is the ϕ coefficient, that, we claim, provides a measure of overall inequality in the processes of intergenerational vertical mobility (but not of specific inheritance effects). Second are the origin and destination scores which reflect the different relative positions of origin and destination classes in terms of access to resources, desirability and barriers to movement. Finally we have the diagonal parameters that express the level of class inheritance that

prevails over and above that implied by the overall pattern of vertical mobility.

DATA FOR DUBLIN

The data on which the analysis for Dublin is based were derived from surveys conducted in Dublin in 1968 and 1972 employing random sampling procedures. Full details of the samples and the statistical evidence justifying the merging of the samples can be found in Whelan and Whelan.[25] The merged sample is made up of 2,134 respondents from 1968 and 1,660 respondents from 1972.

Since the samples were restricted to Dublin less than 0.5 per cent of the respondents were in farming at the time they were interviewed. However, 8.2 per cent of their fathers had been farmers which compares with a figure of 2.1 per cent for England and Wales. There is considerable evidence of the existence of sharp differences in market situation among Irish farmers by size of farm.[26] Given this evidence, the size of the group, and our concern with vertical mobility, it was decided to depart from the Goldthorpe schema and allocate farmers to three categories. Farmers with 100 acres or more were allocated to Class I, those with 50–99 acres to Class IV and those with less than 30 acres to Class VII. This allocation was influenced by our desire to maintain the distinctions between class categories in terms of work situation. Thus large farmers are included with the bourgeoisie, medium size farmers with the petty bourgeoisie and marginal farmers with the lower working class.

TESTING THE FJH THESIS

Applied to each of our two tables separately, the RC2 model with four diagonal parameters has 21 degrees of freedom (critical value at $p = .05$ is 32.7). It fits both England and Wales ($L^2 = 32.6$) and Dublin ($L^2 = 32.2$), and this fit could be improved upon by introducing additional constraints, as we shall see when we come to examine the parameter estimates. Before doing that, however, we want to address the question of how different are the patterns of mobility in Dublin and England and Wales and the extent to which this comparison lends support to the FJH thesis. To do this we follow a framework set out elsewhere.[27]

The RC2 model with four diagonal parameters, and applied to each table separately, can be re-written as

$$\log F_{ijk} = \lambda_k^K + \lambda_{ik}^{OK} + \lambda_{jk}^{DK} + \phi_k u_{ik} v_{jk} + D^{LK}_{ik} \qquad (3)$$

where K (=1,2) suffixes the two populations and D_l (l=1 . . . 4) are the diagonal prameters. Taking this as the true model of vertical mobility for the two countries, then the baseline model for the study of how different the two are would replace all the heterogeous (using Clogg's terminology[28]) terms of (3) with homogeneous effects, thus

$$\log F_{ijk} = \lambda_k^K + \lambda_i^O + \lambda_j^D + \phi u_i v_j + D_l^L \quad (4)$$

Under such a model the fitted values for the Dublin and England and Wales tables are identical (except for a scale factor) and thus (4) is a 'no mobility difference' model. It can be seen in Table I that whereas, (3) has L^2 of 64.9 with 42 d.f., (4) is a much poorer fit (L^2 of 650.2 on 69 d.f.), showing that there are major differences between the two populations in their pattern of vertical mobility. If we assume that these differences inhere in only absolute mobility patterns and not in relative mobility chances, then the model

$$\log F_{ijk} = \lambda_k^K + \lambda_{ik}^{OK} + \lambda_{jk}^{DK} + \phi u_i v_j + D_l^L \quad (5)$$

should fit the data. (5) allows for heterogeneity in the origin and destination marginals of the tables, and is equivalent to Erikson *et al.*'s[29] model of 'constant social fluidity'. Such a model attributes differences in mobility solely to differences in the marginal distributions of the tables, which, following Hope[30] we may identify as reflecting the distribution of origins and of available occupations.

In fact, as Table I shows, this model also fails to fit the data, though it does reduce the L^2 by a large amount over model (4). If we define a total mobility variance as the difference in the L^2 values under models (4) and (3), then model (5), postulating differences in absolute but not in relative mobility patterns, accounts for 80 per cent of this 'mobility difference variance'. Since the difference between models (5) and (3) lies in the heterogeneity of the association and class inheritance parameters in the latter, it follows that the remaining 20 per cent of the variance is due to differences in the pattern of relative mobility chances between Dublin and England and Wales.

This is a somewhat surprising finding in that those comparative studies referred to earlier which have used detailed class or occupational categorizations have all found that relative mobility differences contribute much less to overall cross-national differences in mobility. As a corollary, these previous studies have provided much stronger confirmation of the FJH thesis (that national differences are due to different marginal distributions) than does the present result.

Since the English pattern of relative mobility has already been shown to be like that of other European countries[31] (albeit using a different class categorization) it follows that Dublin must be distinctively different in its pattern of relativities in inter-generational mobility, and we shall discuss this issue more fully later. At present,

TABLE I. *Models applied to Dublin and England/Wales data to test FJH thesis*

Model	*Equation in text*	L^2	d.f.
(1) True mobility model	3	64.9	42
(2) No mobility difference model	4	650.2	69
(3) Absolute mobility differences only	5	183 3	57
(4) Row marginal differences only	—	356.0	63
(5) Column marginal differences only	—	460.7	63

Mobility difference variance.

		L^2	d.f.	%
Total $L^2(2)-L^2(1)$		585.3	27	100.0
Absolute mobility (marginal) differences		466.9	12	79.8
[Row differences only		229.3	6	50.3]
[Column differences only		124.6	6	32.4]
Relative mobility differences		118.4	15	20.2
	Total	585.3	27	100.0
	Error	64.9	42	
		650.2	69	

however, we want to turn our attention to the 80 per cent of mobility difference variance that arises from differences in the marginal distributions in the two tables.

It is clear that models intermediate to (4) and (5) above could allow for heterogeneity in either the origin or destination marginal effects rather than both. Given what we have said earlier about the late industrialization of the Irish Republic we should anticipate that, of the two margins, differences between Dublin and England and Wales in their origin distributions would be a more important source of cross-population differences than would differences in their destination distributions, since the latter should reflect a recent rapid convergence in occupational structures. Some evidence for this is found in lines 4 and 5 of Table I. Allowing the origin distribution only to vary reduces L^2 by 294 or half of the total mobility difference variance, whereas allowing for heterogeneity in destination distributions leads to a smaller decline in L^2 of 190, or roughly a third of mobility difference variance.

These results show that a model allowing for differences between Dublin and England in outflow patterns (but with common patterns of relative mobility) fits rather better than a model allowing for differences only in inflow patterns, though clearly, any model which does not permit cross-populations variance in the distribution of

relative mobility chances will fail to provide an accurate depiction of the differences in mobility in Dublin and England and Wales.

PARAMETER ESTIMATES

In Table II we show the parameter values for the two populations derived from the application to each of the RC2 model with four diagonal parameters. Two things are immediately evident: first, the association parameter, ϕ, is 2.85 times larger in the Dublin data than the English (exp (4.28–3.23) = 2.85) and thus the level of inequality existing between men of class one and class seven origins in access to destination class one rather than seven, net of the specific inheritance effects pertaining to these classes, is almost three times greater in Dublin than in England. Thus Dublin appears to be less open than England and Wales and competition between men of different class origins for particular destinations shows greater inequality.

Second, the estimated scores for the origins and destinations are quite distinctively different in the two populations. Inspection of these scores suggests that, overall, there is more dissimilarity in the origin than in the destination scorings. This can be confirmed by looking at the fit of some simpler log-linear association models (with the diagonal deleted in this case) shown in Table III. Here we see that,

TABLE II *Estimates of origin and destination scores, diagonal parameters and overall association (ϕ) parameter under model RC2, Dublin and England and Wales (standard errors in parentheses)*

	Dublin		England and Wales	
Class	*Origin score*	*Destination score*	*Origin score*	*Destination score*
I	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
II	0.76	0 61	0.76	0.75
III	0.32	0.48	0 45	0.56
IV	0.48	0 52	0 31	0 49
V	0 16	0.25	0.32	0.23
VI	0.02	0.01	0 05	0.04
VII	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ϕ	4.28 (0 23)		3.23 (0.13)	

			Diagonal parameters	
1 (Class I)	0 19*	(15)	0 18*	(10)
2 (Classes II and III)	0.44	(.10)	0.17	(.08)
3 (Class IV)	1.18	(.13)	1.29	(.08)
4 (Classes V, VI, VII)	0 64	(.05)	0.27	(.03)

* not significant, p > 05

allowing heterogeneity in the row effects brings about a much greater decrease in L^2 over the equivalent homogeneous model than does heterogeneity in the column effects. This is particularly striking if we consider the homogeneous Row and Column Effects Model I (RC1). Allowing heterogeneity in the columns of this model reduces L^2 by only 14.4 and uses six degrees of freedom, whereas allowing heterogeneity in the rows reduces L^2 by 42.9 with the same loss of degrees of freedom. Again, adding heterogeneity of the columns to an RC1 model with heterogeneous row and homogeneous column effects (for which $L^2 = 64.9$ with 41 d.f.) only reduces L^2 by 3.6 with a loss of five degrees of freedom. In other words, once heterogeneity in origins is allowed for, heterogeneity in destinations becomes non-significant. Again, such a finding accords with our earlier discussion of recent convergence between Dublin and England and Wales in their occupational structure. These results show that while origins have very different effects on relative mobility chances across the two tables, the pattern of relativities in class recruitment shows much less cross-population variance.

The scores of the origin and destination effects shown in Table II reveal that in Dublin there is no differentiation between men of the skilled manual (class six) and semi-skilled or unskilled class (class seven) in their patterns of mobility whereas there are such distinctions in England and Wales. In addition, the hierarchy of classes is not the same in the two tables. In England and Wales the scoring of destinations follows the anticipated ordering of classes while in origins the petty bourgeoisie (class IV) and technicians (class V) must be interchanged. In Dublin, in both origins and destinations, classes III (routine non-manual) and IV (petty bourgeoisie) must be interchanged, though these classes are closer in their destination than in their origin scoring, where the petty bourgeoisie appear to enjoy a considerable

TABLE III· *Association models applied to Dublin and England/Wales data*

	L^2	*d.f.*
Row effects model		
Homogeneous	127.1	52
Heterogeneous	86.6	46
Column effects model		
Homogeneous	161.4	52
Heterogeneous	145.0	46
Row and column effects I		
Homogeneous rows and columns	107.8	47
Heterogeneous rows	64 9	41
Heterogeneous columns	93.4	41
Heterogeneous rows and columns	60.3	36

advantage over class III members in access to higher class destinations.

This interchanging of position arising from the u_i and v_j scores indicates that the petty bourgeoisie are in a much more favourable position in Dublin (where they are better placed than members of the routine non-manual class) than in England and Wales (where, in origins at least, they are more poorly placed than technicians). One possible explanation for such differences in the relative position of the petty bourgeoisie concerns the presence of farmers' sons in this origin category and in the highly selective nature of migration to Dublin. Those with origins outside Dublin are much more likely to have experienced social mobility. While only 21 per cent of the working class in Dublin have non-Dublin origins the corresponding figure for the service class is 39 per cent. This pattern is directly related to the Irish experience of emigration. About one fifth of the persons born since the foundation of the State and living in Ireland in 1951 had emigrated by 1961. Emigration was highly selective by social class. The bulk of the emigrants were from agricultural backgrounds – farm labourers, children of small farmers and owners of small farms. The possibility arises, therefore, that the very favourable position of those of petty bourgeoisie origins in the Dublin data is a reflection of the presence in this class of a number of migrant men of non-Dublin origins. In order to pursue this possibility, the RC2 model, with the same four diagonal parameters, was applied to the non-agricultural sample for England and to those Dublin respondents who had been born in Dublin or who had come to Dublin before the age of sixteen. The results of this analysis are shown in Table IV. For respondents with Dublin origins, while the ordering of the petty bourgeoisie and routine non-manual classes does not change, the distance between these origins is reduced from a difference of .16 to .06. Thus, to a considerable degree (but not entirely) the advantageous position of those with petty-bourgeoisie origins is due to the presence in this class of men who are immigrants to Dublin and who enjoyed very high levels of upward mobility. For England and Wales the exclusion of farmers produces a reversal in the positions of the petty bourgeoisie and supervisors of manual workers and technicians (class V). This arises through the increase in the origin score for the petty bourgeoisie from .31 to .40. In other words, excluding those of agricultural origins improves the relative position of the petty bourgeoisie in England and Wales. Since inheritance effects are dealt with separately in the model we employ (through the diagonal parameters) this result suggests that non-inheriting sons of farmers in England and Wales are disproportionately likely, when compared with other men of class IV origins, to experience downward mobility or, at a minimum, are less likely to be upwardly mobile.

The fact that the manual classes (VI and VII) are more sharply distinguished from each other in England and Wales than in Dublin

TABLE IV: *Parameter estimates for the application of the RC2 model to the Dublin origins and English and Welsh non-agricultural samples*

	Dublin origins		English non-agricultural	
Class	*Origins*	*Destinations*	*Origins*	*Destinations*
I	1.00	1.00	1 00	1.00
II	0 77	0.59	0.79	0.78
III	0.39	0 49	0.46	0.58
IV	0.45	0.51	0.40	0.50
V	0.21	0.26	0.32	0.26
VI	0.09	0.13	0.03	0.04
VII	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	ϕ	4.71 (.30)	3.06 (.12)	
			Diagonal parameters	
1 (Class I)		0.45 (.20)		0.33 (.10)
2 (Classes II and III)		0.38 (.22)		0.12 (.08)
3 (Class IV)		1.35 (.16)		1.16 (.09)
4 (Classes V, VI, VII)		0.62 (.06)		0.23 (.03)

can be explained by international differences in the composition of the classes arising from rather different experiences of industrialization. Thus, while in England and Wales almost one quarter of the current members of Class VI are higher grade skilled manual workers this is true of only one fifth of the Dublin sample. In Class VII the differences are even more striking; in England and Wales less than 14 per cent of the men currently in this class are unskilled manual workers while in Dublin the corresponding figure is 39 per cent.

One important finding, for both Dublin and England and Wales, regarding the scoring of origins and destinations, lies in the relationship of Class I – higher professional and managerial – to the other classes. In both countries Class I is the most distinct in the advantages it confers on those originating in that class and in terms of its differentiation in inflow (and this is so even when we fit a specific parameter to allow for Class I inheritance) as can be seen by its being the most distant of all classes from its adjacent class. Class I is at its most distant from Class II in the scoring for destinations, indicating that its inflow is very highly differentiated from that of the other destination classes. In other words, the odds that a member of any destination class has been drawn from the higher of a pair of origin classes is much greater for Class I than for any other class. The corollary of the distinctiveness of Class I in both origins and destinations is that we should expect to find a high level of self recruitment into this class arising out of the prevailing pattern of vertical mobility, regardless of the strength of the specific class inheritance factors captured by the first of our diagonal parameters.

IMMOBILITY AND 'INHERITANCE'

In the association models we have employed immobility and 'inheritance' are clearly distinguished. The diagonal parameters measure the degree to which class immobility exists over and above the level of class self-recruitment implied by the prevailing pattern of vertical mobility. From this perspective 'inheritance' is seen to arise from social processes other than the differences in resources, barriers and desirability captured in the hierarchical ordering of origins and destinations. While Goldthorpe[32] recognizes that immobility is influenced by hierarchical features of the seven class schema *and* by the transmission of property or on-going businesses and other advantages which must be conceptualized in a non-vertical fashion, the density levels models that he employs do not allow for the operationalization of such distinctions. This in turn leads to certain difficulties of interpretation when he attempts to go beyond statements about immobility *per se* to reach conclusions relating to 'inheritance'.

Goldthorpe emphasizes the variability in densities of immobility. The fact that such densities are considerably lower in Classes III, V, VI and VII than in Classes I, II and IV is seen primarily to reflect the fact

> that a crucial factor affecting the extent of the 'inheritance' of class positions is the possibility of this being achieved via the intergenerational transmission of economic resources, and in particular via inheritance in the strict sense, that is, of property and 'going concerns'.[33]

The best fitting density levels model for Dublin showed less variability in the densities of immobility suggesting, following Goldthorpe, a more even operation of 'inheritance' factors across classes.[34] However, when we turn to our models of vertical mobility a comparison of the diagonal parameters (shown in Table II) indicates that the differences between the Dublin and English data are relatively minor. In both cases the parameter for inheritance in Class I is non-significant. Thus, the observed frequency in cell 1,1 is due less to specific processes of class inheritance as such than to the prevailing pattern of vertical mobility. This can be further illustrated if we compute the expected frequencies for this cell omitting the diagonal parameter from our calculations (i.e. to give the expected frequency under the prevailing pattern of vertical mobility). In the English and Welsh case this is 259 (out of 311 observed in cell 1,1) and for Dublin 108 (out of 131): in both cases vertical mobility accounts for almost 80 per cent of same class recruitment in the higher professional and managerial classes.

By saying that vertical mobility processes largely account for the observed frequencies in cell 1,1 we are saying that the overall pattern of outflow from and inflow to Class I is the chief factor giving rise to

the observed level of immobility here (which is high in both cases: in Dublin, 44 per cent of men of class one origins remain in class one, while for England and Wales the comparable figure is 45 per cent) rather than any specific inheritance factors.[35]

For the remaining six classes it is necessary to allow for only two levels of class inheritance. In both tables, inheritance is constant in classes II, III, V, VI and VII (i.e. diagonal parameters 2 and 4 shown in Table II do not differ significantly from each other), though the strength of this inheritance factor is greater in Dublin than in England and Wales. It is for the petty bourgeoisie, however, that it becomes necessary to posit the operation of inheritance on a substantial scale, as we should expect. In Dublin and England and Wales – but especially in the latter – inheritance factors here are considerably stronger than in the other classes.

The substantive significance of these findings relates not to the extent of the differences in mobility patterns between classes but to the nature of the social processes underlying such differences. Our analysis indicates that in explaining immobility in Class I of the original Goldthorpe seven class schema the direct transmission of property or 'going concerns' is not a sufficiently important factor to require inclusion in the model. In contrast it is particularly important that allowance be made for the petty bourgeoisie 'inheritance' factor. Inheritance in Classes II, III, V, VI and VII reflects the operation of a variety of factors such as class differences in the value placed on white-collar *vis-a-vis* manual work and the effect of 'social resources, that is, involvement in social networks and also possibilities for less structured contracts, which can serve as channels of both information and influence'.[36] The somewhat greater magnitude of the relevant parameters in Dublin points to the particular salience of the manual/non-manual division in Irish society.[37]

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have compared mobility patterns in Dublin and England and Wales using a log-multiplicative model that allows for vertical mobility as well as for specific inheritance effects. This comparison was facilitated by our being able to categorize the Dublin data according to the class categories developed by Goldthorpe in his study of mobility in Britain, and by the fact that the two data sets are virtually contemporaneous.

We found that this particular comparative analysis gave little support to the FJH thesis, in so far as there appear to be very significant differences in the patterns of relative mobility chances in Dublin and England and Wales. Our analysis showed the association between origins and destinations to be much greater in Dublin than in

England and Wales: Dublin may thus be considered the less 'open' of the two societies. For example, net of inheritance effects we showed that the odds ratio:

$$\frac{F_{11}/F_{17}}{F_{71}/F_{77}}$$

is nearly three times larger in Dublin than in England and Wales: taking inheritance effects into account increases the difference between the two to a factor of over four.

The hierarchy of origin and destination classes also showed differences indicating that the relative positions of the classes in terms, particularly, of the advantages conferred by specific origin classes, but also in terms of the relative composition of the destination classes, was not the same in the two countries.[38] The clearest example of this was found in the position of the petty bourgeoisie (Class IV). In Dublin the petty bourgeoisie are much more favourably placed in terms of competition for desirable destinations than they are in England and Wales. Likewise, competition for entry into the petty bourgoisie in Dublin is much more likely to favour men of higher rather than lower origins to a greater extent than in England and Wales. We are able to show that the favourable position of the petty bourgeoisie in Dublin is due in large part – though not entirely – to the presence in this class of migrants into the capital (who are predominantly of farm origins) who were very likely to be upwardly mobile.

Finally, we examined the processes of class inheritance (which we were able to distinguish from class immobility) and found them to be strongest among the petty bourgeoisie. This is as we should expect, given that the characteristic of men of Class IV is their ownership of the means of production. Perhaps most surprising was the finding that specific inheritance processes were relatively unimportnt in Class I. Rather, our analysis showed that the high level of self recruitment here, in both countries, is due to the prevailing pattern of vertical mobility within which men of Class I origins are far and away the best placed.

We believe that we have demonstrated the existence of interesting and important differences in vertical mobility and class inheritance between Dublin and England and Wales. In so doing we have sought not only to describe the vertical mobility patterns of Dublin but also to add to the findings of Goldthorpe concerning mobility in Britain.

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NOTES

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21. Goldthorpe, op. cit., p. 77.

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27. Breen, 'A Framework', op cit.

28. Clogg, 'Some Models', op. cit.

29. Erikson *et al.*, 'Social Fluidity', pp. 11–12

30. K. Hope 'Vertical Mobility in Britain: A Structured Analysis', *Sociology* vol 15, no. 1, February 1981, pp. 19–55.

31. Erikson *et al.*, op. cit., Hope 'Vertical and Non-Vertical'.

32. Goldthorpe, op. cit , p. 109.

33. Ibid., p. 112.

34. Whelan and Whelan, op. cit., ch. 4.

35. Were it possible to differentiate within Class I between employers, the self-employed and employees it would almost certainly be necessary to modify this conclusion.

36. Goldthorpe, op. cit., p. 99.

37. One qualification which should be made to our conclusion regarding immobility relates to the somewhat different results which emerge from the analysis of men with Dublin origins and the non-agricultural sample for England and Wales. In both cases, as can be seen from Table IV, the diagonal parameter for Class I is statistically significant. The differences from the overall samples arise for rather different reasons in each country The increase in magnitude is easily explained for those with Dublin origins by the exclusion of large farmers among whom, given the coverage of the sample, it was not possible to observe 'inheritance'. For England and Wales the increase in the diagonal parameter is consistent with the fact that for both origins and destinations the distance between Class I and the other classes declines despite the fact that immobility in Class I is just as high in the non-agricultural sample as in the overall sample. However, in both cases the major contrast remains between the petty bourgeoisie and all other classes. Restricting the samples in the foregoing manner strengthens the evidence for international differences in relative mobility. The value of ϕ is substantially greater for men with Dublin origins than for the sample as a whole and is five times greater than for the non-agricultural men in England and Wales.

38. The greater heterogeneity of origin rather than destination effects is shown by the models in Table III. The equivalent RC2 model with four diagonal parameters allowing for heterogeneity in origin but not in destination effects is

$$\log F_{ijk} = \lambda^{K} + \lambda_{ik}^{OK} + \lambda_{jk}^{DK} + \phi_k u_{ik} v_j + D_{ik}^{LK}$$

This gives L^2 of 70 4 on 41 df: thus it is not a significantly poorer fit than our hypothesized true model of mobility (equation 3), supporting our belief that origin effects are a far more important source of cross population variance than are destination effects.

Kieran Flanagan

Liturgy, ambiguity and silence: the ritual management of real absence*

ABSTRACT

This paper is a preliminary exploration of a neglected area in sociology of religion. It aims to interpret and to characterize the distinctive performative basis of Christian liturgy. Ambiguities in liturgical enactment can be routinely handled as long as they relate to the nuministic content of the rite and not to its social form. Silence is a distinctive non-reducible phenomenon of rite that can be related to the regulation of ceremonial form through tactful management of the implicit. Liturgies work on the basis of an *apophatic* characteristic that makes them distinctive as religious rituals.

INTRODUCTION

Studies of religious rituals in primitive societies have had a considerable impact on contemporary sociological theory. Yet liturgies, the public ceremonial forms of worship of the main Christian Churches, seem to have received little systematic attention in sociology of religion.[1] Only a handful of entries can be found on the subject in *Sociological Abstracts*.

These rites, such as the mass or Eucharist, or evensong, repeated weekly or daily to large numbers of worshippers, and the existence of such successful rituals, seem to have become obscured by an excessive concentration of sociology of religion on areas of failure of Christianity, such as secularization and sects that reflect disenchantment with its beliefs. Such a neglect illustrates Hamnett's remarks of a bias towards error in sociology of religion, an anti-religious trait that emphasizes unbelief.[2] Any sociological account of liturgy, however, has to cope with the issue of a belief in its efficacy, which forms the basis of the capacity of the rite to repeat credibly and successfully for the adherents. Accepting this, however, generates recognition of a theological dimension to rite. Liturgies embody theological propositions,

such as transubstantiation and sacrifice. These assumptions shape the order and sequence of rite and so determine what becomes available for sociological description and interpretation. A purely sociological account of Christian liturgies, devoid of theological qualification, would be a reductionist exercise. The basis of the action would be mistranslated, a distortion that would hardly be acceptable in accounts of magic and ritual in non-literate societies.

Increasingly, sociological accounts of ritual defer to the beliefs and pre-suppositions of the actors, and their relationship to the action to be described. In approaching a sociology of liturgy one would follow Winch's argument regarding an internal relationship between ideas and their context.[3] Runciman has placed certain stipulations on sociological explanations that have a bearing on interpretations of liturgy. He has argued for 'representative' accounts of actions and has suggested that descriptions must not be pre-emptive and misleading, but must be in some way authentic. Thus, he has argued that descriptions 'are not merely reinterpretations *to* "them"; they are also reinterpretations *for* "us"'.[4]

A shift in sociological fashions has admitted a dimension of relativism to interpretations of action that would allow liturgies to be examined in their own terms without prescriptive assumptions about what they ought to do. Yet these Christian rituals, operating in advanced industrialized societies, present practices that are equally bizarre to those found in the rites of non-literate societies. Liturgical rituals proclaim the incredible routinely in such notions as a 'Real Presence', prayer, anthems, robes, and colours all making up a very distinctive ceremonial texture in an action whose ultimate aim is to speak internally to its adherents. The theological basis of a liturgical action has no tangible effect. Indeed the routines of rite follow a predictable ordered sequence in which nothing extraordinary appears to happen that would invite a sociological curiosity. Yet clearly, something is believed to happen, and sociology has to confront this and to find some means to characterize it without distorting the ritual basis of the belief for the actors. Too often, theoretical discussions of action, meaning and structure have a heuristic cast in which issues of time and space are 'discovered' as problematic in accounts of social reality. But the aridness of these theoretical perspectives often distorts the texture of the social phenomenon being assessed, by removing the content of belief that gives the action a meaningful shape to the actor. Whatever theoretical impurities liturgy raises, the sociological question of rite has to be placed in a context where the frame of interpretation of the actor has to be matched to its phenomenological outcome.

Geertz, Turner and Bellah have formulated approaches to ritual in terms of a social construction of meaning that constitutes and effects religious belief. Liturgies are orders of belief in which the sacred is handled and realized in a knowable manner, hence an emphasis on an

inductive approach. Liturgies cannot rely on belief alone as this has to be given some cultural mode of expression. Berger has recently indicated that religions require 'plausability structures' to service sacred orders, to domesticate the supernatural, and to routinely utter the unutterable.[5] Yet these rites have to be kept in good repair lest they become incredible to the believers. If liturgies were purely about the social, they would become eventually disposable parodies of rival civic rituals.

Our argument is that if properly used, the social becomes a resource for believers in managing the distinctive functions of liturgy of rendering the actors available to contacts with the transcendent. Liturgical orders petition through word, symbol and action and any aspects of the social in rite have to be made manifest to be regulated out, for rites are literally *not* about the social alone, but about a routine task of coping with its limits. A sociological description of a liturgy, the colours, the vestments, the sequences of actions, the management of space and place, and roles would add little to what a believer knows already, or could find in guides to contemporary rites such as in *Anglican Worship Today*.[6]

Our approach to liturgy follows an emphasis on what Rappaport has termed the 'obvious aspects' of ritual. These are the indentifiable events that are apparent and that can be termed instances of ritual. These are social facets of rite that effect its theological characteristics, that have to be regulated and observed so that they function for the maintenance of a credible performance for the believers.[7] Liturgies have to manage the resolution of potential contradictions, unnecessary ambiguities and possibilities of lies that might impair their performance. Liturgical 'mistakes' reveal breaches of ritual assumptions, but also the tacit basis of rite. They draw out profane implications and potential charges of deception a particular form of rite seeks to escape from, such as a high mass with baroque music fearing its shape invites comparison with a concert.[8] Since liturgies operate to render the ordinary (bread, clothing, objects) extraordinary, they are extremely vulnerable to social impurities that might render the rite literal, and that also might draw the form back from the theological content it wishes to attract. Liturgies strive to get past their form to yield properties of experience of a content in which there is a sense of the ceremony being transcended or being acted upon outside its own efforts. This points to Otto's notion of the numinous, which can be defined as a specific creature feeling, a sense of awe, fear, terror or of abject dependence. The numinous takes on an objective sense of dominating feelings, and is all the more mysterious for the indeterminate nature of its entry into religious rituals.[9] Liturgical forms strive to reach past their social limits to a content that can be characterized as numinous, but in so doing they encounter peculiar hazards of performance. Their ceremonial orders are ambiguous ventures, laden

with risk of being misunderstood, but also of failing to convey a sense that the rite has 'worked' – that the numinous has responded to a particular ritual petition.

Our paper is in three parts. First, we examine the methodological difficulties liturgies pose for sociological understanding, and the potential misunderstandings that need to be avoided. Our concern is with the accurate characterization of liturgy in a sociological language. Having discussed the terms of interpretation of liturgy, the second part examines the nature of ambiguity and its particular application to the understanding of liturgical performance. We wish to argue that liturgies resolve their ambiguities of social form in performance through a tacit management of pious actions that seeks to avoid undesirable implications being spelt out. Ambiguities in rite are given a provisional objective cast in the operation of the form that allows them to be left unresolved and indeterminate as openings to the distinctive quality liturgy as ritual seeks to petition-the numinous. Silence is a facet of the numinous, is polyvalent, and points to a distinctive non-reducible facet of liturgy that requires some form of management. In the final part of the paper, we examine the nature of the relationship of silence to social form and the distinctive problems of 'tact' and regulation its management requires. This allows a sociological access to the basis of liturgical movements, that emphasizes their implicit nature. Adjustment to these signals of transcendence, exemplified in the regulation of social form to silence, suggests an *apophatic* basis to liturgical actions. In theological terms, the *apophatic* is defined as a negative means of the knowing of God; in liturgical terms we use it as a means of seeing how what is incomplete in the form of the action is rendered complete in its contact with silence. This affirms the limit of the social in rite. In the end, as Grimes has observed 'liturgy . . . must always fail as a form of action. It aspires to more than it has power to produce.'[10]

PROBLEMS OF THE SOCIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF LITURGY

Adherents of a Christian liturgy would describe their activities as gatherings of goodly fellowship aspiring to convert the prosaic into the pious, as seeking a vision of the extraordinary in the mundane, as rendering worth to God, and petitioning for grace and favour. Yet despite such holy hopes, they would admit that the leaps of the social in rite into the spiritual are fraught with irresolvable wagers and ambiguities not least of which is knowing with certainty whether a liturgy 'works'. The attempt to connect the social to the metaphysical relates to Ricoeur's approach to symbols. These are seen as 'expressions of double meaning, wherein a primary meaning refers beyond itself to a second meaning which is never given directly'.[11]

Because the second meaning is indeterminate (an unprovable presupposition for the actor) a sociological account of liturgy has to assume that the ceremonial form *can* connect to this second order, for this is the basis of the ritual to be described. The liturgy has to be believed in order for it to become true for the actors. As Polanyi has suggested, symbols have to be surrendered to, so that actors can become carried away in a manner that realizes their meanings.[12] Belief in a rite 'fuses' the intentions of the actor with what the liturgy operates to effect, and if he is to avoid a gross mistranslation, the sociologist has to take this into account even though he might doubt these premises. There is a relationship between the believer and the enactment of the rite that cannot be pre-emptively separated, however indeterminate the outcome of the liturgy might be and however untenable and ambiguous the belief system it embodies also might be. Ricoeur's point regarding the subject and object of sociological inquiry being mutually implicated applies especially to the 'fused' type of relationship between the believer and the performance of the rite and the anticipatory and reflective demands it makes for the actor.[13]

There is a more general recognition in sociological theory of the dangers of misplaced pre-emptive expectations of rational intelligibility in approaches to social action. In the case of liturgy, the actor is confronting and routinely handling an indeterminate phenomenon, which he argues by its nature is mysterious and incomprehensible. Any claim for a translation of this interpretation into a frame of explanation that emphasizes the rational intelligibility of its meaning would be a mistranslation of the basis of the liturgical action to be described. Such an argument reflects a point made by Simmel, who felt that much western thought since the seventeenth century had committed

> the fallacy of misplaced clarity and precision. Categories which are fundamentally and ineradicably obscure are analyzed as if their import were clear. Distinctions which are inherently vague or ambiguous are analyzed as if they were precise.[14]

Indeed, one can argue that the pursuit of intelligibility can effect a mistranslation of a concept and its unwitting importation into an arena of meaning where it re-emerges to stand for something quite opposite. This arises in interpretations of the social basis of innocence, and its incompatibility with experience and guile. These latter qualities move the concept from an expression of simplicity and an absence of knowing, that give it such evocative powers, to a position of being known, and of having to utilize these qualities to respond, thus destroying the innocent. Experience effects a mistranslation of the initial query put to the innocent.[15]

Emphasis on the indeterminate nature of some forms of action has clear implications for handling issues of liturgical practice. We want

to suggest that liturgical forms have a necessarily tensive quality and that they are best seen as handling an opening to that which is believed to validate the ritual action. This relates to Wheelwright's term 'tensive language' and allows us to suggest that liturgies routinely strive for an adequacy they can never attain, in their attempts to cope with a complex sacred reality, whose implications the participants can never grasp, that are also by theological definition mysterious.[16] This fits in with his notion that symbols serve to sustain a sense of archetypal qualities and embody also fluid half-paradoxical elements of the transcendent.[17] A similar form of interpretation of ritual has been made by Gilbert Lewis, in an area somewhat removed from liturgical practices: the rite of penis bleeding of Gnau boys in New Guinea.

Explanation of the practice, as being a male imitation of menstruation, was denied by the Gnau, forcing Lewis to interpret the ritual from another perspective. The participants in the rite believed its practice affirmed the indeterminate strengthening powers of blood-letting. Lewis's comments on their attitude to the functions of the ritual reflect also our approach to understanding liturgical practices. He writes

> Ritual is not exactly like language; it is not exactly like communication by means of a code nor can it be decoded like one. The complexity and uncertainty about a ritual's meaning is not to be seen just as a defect – a code too obscure, too hard to decipher, too easily garbled. It can also be a source of that strength, evocative power, resilience and mutability which may sometimes sustain and preserve ritual performance.[18]

So, by accepting the indeterminate qualities of a ritual, one can gain access to what the actor thinks he is doing. For it must be remembered that the actor who beholds the rite

> is also active in the sense that he interprets the performance. The value of ritual lies partly in this ambiguity of the active and passive for creator, performer, and beholder.[19]

By accepting the basis of what the actor wants to become in the rite, one understands his relationship to its performance, and the ambiguities he elects to pass through to fulfil its basis.

Arguments about the 'tensive' indeterminate qualities of rituals, acceptable in non-literate society, can also be applied to the understanding of Christian liturgies coping with exactly the same dilemmas in performance. We would follow Barnes and Bloor in their argument that there is no rational privileged bridgehead that will give access to arbitration and translation between competing belief systems (in which sociology is one as well). They suggest sociology contains an insurmountable relativism in its explanations so that all

belief systems should be treated in terms of an equivalence of their truths, for the purpose of sociological enquiry. The task of sociology is to search out the social means by which these belief systems are given a local credibility, and how they are transacted in a way that allows them to be believed in, and accepted by the actors.[20] The advantage of such an approach is that it allows one to look at the Azande's approach to magic and also at Christian approaches to liturgies in terms of a management of effect and the means through which they are made routinely plausible. In each case, the issue of presuppositions is not allowed to impede attempts to understand that which of its metaphysical nature cannot be 'proved' to be true. Following, Polanyi, therefore, we are concerned with how rituals cope with their own definitions of incompatibilities as related to the belief systems they manifest. Liturgies, however, have to cope with these difficulties in a way that does not render the form socially incredible.[21]

Warnings to sociologists not to misdescribe or to misunderstand the shape of Eucharistic rites, assume there is some theological consensus they might breach. Not only are rites indeterminate in effect, but their variety of shape points to widespread theological disagreement over what the rite effects. To some, a Eucharist is a simple commemoration of the Last Supper, an act of remembrance; to others it is a meal to be shared, though others would add to this an element of sacrifice; whilst others would see it as an act of making Christ present under the guise of material objects of bread and wine. These theological suppositions embody conflicting denominational affiliations, but also differing levels of emphasis within the same Communion, as in the case of Anglicans. Words, gestures and symbols make up a textured whole, in these differing forms of rite. Liturgical forms compete not only for the attention of non-believers, but also believers.

The shape of a liturgy marks out a preparation and a petition that effects also its theological basis. Unfortunately, the quality of the liturgical performance available for sociological description is *not* an adequate criterion of the theological efficacy and validity of the rite. Certain minimi are necessary for its validity, such as the words of consecration being said accurately; and the celebrant intending to institute a Real Presence, an intention his vestments objectively mark out. But complexity or simplicity of form of rite do not control the quality or supply of grace the liturgy secures for the actors, as the issue of efficacy lies outside the discernable rite. The social quality of a rite, such as the reverence of its performance, is an aid, an outward manifestation of its credibility. The social marks out, makes manifest and enables belief to be realised, and made plausible. But it is often an ambiguous resource rendered partly accountable to liturgical rules and rubrics.

These rules order the sequence of the rite, its readings, and prayers, what is to be worn, who is to walk on the sanctuary and who is not,

who is to speak and who is to be silent. These rules have an archaic cast reflecting a mixture of local custom, cultural circumstances, historical accident, and revelation.[22] The shape of the rite is presented as a mosaic set in a social form with many possibilities. The elementary actions of an Eucharist – offering, petitioning, breaking and distributing – have a bewildering variety of settings in time, space and light. They range from a solemn sung mass in Freiburg Cathedral to an informal end-of-term student celebration. These rites often betray theological emphases, such as charismatic, traditional or progressive, that greatly qualify any sociological descriptions of a liturgy. Furthermore, the text used, whether Book of Common Prayer or the Alternative Service Book will also govern the formal or informal shape of the rite, and the loyalties it engenders in the congregation. Use of space reflects rules of access to the sanctuary and the roles of actors performing there govern relationships to the congregation. All these point to theological assumptions, which nevertheless have social implications of use. For instance it might be believed that placing the choir at the west of a Church will improve the quality of congregational singing. But equally having the choir robed in the sanctuary also might be believed to integrate their performance of the music more authentically into the central actions of the rite. Architectural factors effect and affect the movement of the rite, whether a simple table in a bare room, or a Gothic altar in a medieval Cathedral.

Because rites reflect a sanctification and realization of a sacred order of time, liturgical settings at Easter and Christmas, Festivals and memorials give differing textures to the order of rite, and accordingly proclaim contrasting expectations of sorrow or joy. Masses for the dead, or weddings, again point up the variety of emotions and ritual functions liturgies service. Clearly, there is little difficulty in showing the diversity of rite, even in musical settings. The Agnus Dei in a Haydn Mass seems different to its setting in a Byrd Four Part Mass. The diversity of rites, all fulfilling an elementary shape, demand something more than a descriptive classification of shapes, sizes, colours and sounds. Some connecting basis of interpretation to all these forms is required that makes allowance for the diversity of their settings. Yet, observing and describing liturgical actions pose particular pitfalls. Trivialities and detail in the ritual mosaic can be irrelevant, but they can also threaten the basis of the rite. Trivialities in rite are ambiguous, having a potential either for doctrinal significance, or irrelevance.

The *General Instruction of the Roman Missal*, 1969, gives rules that render trivialities and detail accountable in the liturgical action. The parts of the mass in contemporary practice can be followed up for explanations of their sequence and basis.[23] Yet details cannot be covered completely by a book of liturgical rules, for implications arise over what is worn in the ritual that can influence the interpretation of

attitudes to the rite by those present. A priest wearing a biretta at a folk mass would display a badge of hostility and a means of distancing himself from the informal basis of the rite; a deaconess appearing in surplice and stole might be proclaiming her right to orders she is precluded from, and the detail marks off her effort to naturalize this claim. A choir processing into Evensong shrouded in long white surplices covering scarlet cassocks might be asserting a religious right to override the civic intrusions of the Lord Chamberlain and the Clerk of the Closet that only those attached to Royal Foundations can display such colours in service.[24] Such details appear trivial, and can be regarded as so, but they point to a peculiar facet of liturgical actions. Meanings, whether intentional or given off unintentionally, cannot be negotiated and reconciled while the ritual is in performance. Because the detail forms part of a wider whole whose symbolic basis is indeterminate, a possibility of magnification and distortion tends to arise.[25] As Weber has indicated, the greatest conflicts can be tolerated between purely dogmatic views within rational religions more easily than innovations in symbols which somehow threaten the magical efficacy of the action.[26]

Thus, trivialities seem to have an almost random capacity for promotion out of the mosaic of the rite into impediments that unexpectedly seem to impair its basis and indeed its authenticity. Martin has noted the role of rote in rite in generating webs of identity and affiliation. Trivial elements can become biographical cues that reflect a private agenda of the actor for transforming a public repetition of liturgy into a cumulative insight into some theological belief.[27] Detail and triviality form an uneasy mixture, a hidden agenda of accommodation of the actor to an habitual contact with the shape of the liturgy. Repetition, detail and triviality all point to potentials for estrangement through boredom, or of getting the minutiae out of sociological and spiritual proportion. The ordering of detail into scales of significance points to the difficulties of finding an authentic criterion for sociological interpretations of liturgy. Rites are domesticated arrangements shaped for dealing with the sacred, and the furnishings used take on a 'use' significance that generates profound disturbances for the actors if changes occur, for they often fail to distinguish between the major theological elements in the rite, and its minor ceremonial details of enactment.[28]

Complexity of rite routinely generates the risk of the social being misunderstood and being overemphasized. As Weber has noted, devotional religions run the risk of losing their redemptory quality and generating instead a bare formal routinized ritualism.[29] The management of potential ambiguities and the procedures for avoiding a misplaced emphasis on trivialities are clearly of sociological interest. They are also facets of rite most open to sociological interpretations. But rubrics that regulate the social can be also considered by liturgists

to be impediments to 'good' liturgy. Thus, Dix, an Anglican liturgist, noted that in rich complex medieval rites, the layman became a mere spectator estranged by ritual detail and left spiritually isolated.[30] Liturgies can be compared to secular rituals, in the way they avoid misunderstandings in the action as in Turner's comparison of the ceremonial rules of the Tridentine rite with those for the Ndembu.[31] But this approach has limitations. Liturgies, whether simple or complex, are all believed to spiritually work, if ordered under the same denominational authority and doctrine. Detail or its absence can be theologically overridden. Yet, there is great uncertainty, however, amongst liturgists as to why a particular shape of rite 'works' better than another.

Sociologists are likely to be biased towards complex formal rites, because these entail rules of procedure that are explicit and controlled by the actors whose presuppositions inform what can be described. But simple, informal rites seem to work on a theological basis somehow exempt from a logic accessible to sociological descriptions. Belief can override sociological accounts of failures of liturgy as ritual. Detail that could undermine the basis of one form of rite, a concern with the shape of a chalice, could be regarded as trivial in another liturgical context such as at an informal Eucharist in a flat.

Liturgies are in a continual state of revision and purification of their social forms. They operate in hermeneutic circles, in which text, symbol and action are merged to reflect theological charters. These rites are enacted in an archaic fashion that somehow has to be related to a contemporary context of belief and interpretation. Rites generate a curiosity by the antique cast of their social forms, so necessary for their theological validity, but they have to achieve also some sort of balance with the need to generate a contemporary response. As Polanyi has observed, 'solemnities differ from works of art . . . in being essentially unoriginal.'[32] The paradox is that if they become too original in their form they become theologically incredible. Yet their lack of originality can make them irrelevant to a contemporary culture.

All liturgical forms face inherent risks of being misunderstood, accidentally or intentionally by actors and rival observers alike. A solemn choral mass could be misdescribed as a concert for aesthetic non-believers. Informal liturgies could be seen as self-indulgent encounter groups that function to resolve the psychological needs of doubting radicals. Elsewhere, we have discussed how these competing forms resolve these potentially damaging charges of self-deception.[33] Liturgical deceptions in form pose spiritual threats that have to be confronted. Three examples can be suggested.

The first type relates to the theological danger of confusing means with the end. In his *Confessions*, St. Augustine reflects on the use of singing in Church 'that so by the delight of the ears, the weaker minds

may rise to the feeling of devotion'. Yet he notes that when 'it befalls me to be more moved with the voice than the words sung, I confess to have sinned penally, and then had rather not hear music.'[34] A second problem relates to abuses arising in the performance of sacred music. A Vatican decree of 1856 stated that all

> music intended for execution in churches must differ from profane and theatrical music. Too lively or exciting movements are forbidden. If the words be joyous, it should be expressed by the sweetness of religious mirth, and not by the unbridled liveliness of the dance.[35]

The third example of ambiguities generating possible deceptions in performance of rite relates to a point of Hamnett. He notes that liturgies face twin dangers of idolatry or Docetism in their practice. Pelagianism is the characteristic vice of Catholicism, whereby symbols and actions are given a dimension of self help, an idolatrous status, to produce their own theological effects independently of God. Docetism arises in high Calvinism over the fear of doing anything with the social lest it be presumptuous, and its use might lead to idolatry.[36] The social contains properties of the incarnation and the transcendent that are ambiguously ordered in liturgy.

Clearly the potential range of detail (some trivial, some objectively important) that can be elevated almost randomly, into ritual impairments, is vast, and is not really capable of sociological resolution. Since liturgies are uncertain of the spiritual efficacy of their social forms, detail often drifts out of context. Indices of ritual efficacy vary greatly. Emotions of security or insecurity, dispositions of the self to the numinous, the competence or incompetence of the liturgical performance and the mood of religious experiences they generate, all influence degrees of tolerance towards disruptive details and response to them in enactment. Some issues can continually nag: the continued failure of the priest to use the famous seventeenth-century pulpit for Sunday sermons; the choirboys wearing their ruffs askew; the noise of the collection being taken up; and the quality of the bidding prayers. All these potential distractions pose risks for the actors on and off the altar, of having the 'flow' of the rite interrupted, the literal being made manifest, and the trivial causing attention to wander. Because liturgical actions, symbols and language form a whole, a ritual dance in which nothing empirical happens, and all is built on the implicit, the 'use' value of the detail is indeterminate, but also ambiguous to all the actors. They all risk giving a misplaced emphasis to the social in their movements, and their acts of worship, precisely because the liturgical form cannot stipulate exact responses to that which it petitions for, nor can it self-regulate its basis of success in theological terms, nor can it guarantee its subjective effects in advance in a

manner that would permit planned regulation of the form to match its nuministic content.

AMBIGUITIES IN THE PERFORMANCE OF LITURGY

Liturgies are prone to generate misunderstandings, and failures in enactment either to animate or to communicate. They have to cope also with anomalies arising from their settings, especially when the form is made to speak 'relevance' such as in the staging of an informal folk mass in the sanctuary of a Gothic Cathedral ordered for the enactment of a Sarum rite. Yet despite all these difficulties, an incompetent awkwardly staged rite, full of distracting details can work, and can convey the peace and fellowship the actors petitioned for in their actions. Spiritual resources can override the social, but that is not the same as saying the latter has a random characteristic. Some forms and aspects of the social are more efficacious than others, are more easily endowed with sacramental qualities, and can be ordered to petition more effectively. Even if the agenda of the social is theologically unclear, it does serve two distinct and necessary functions in liturgy: first to interpret, to secure attention, and to drive home the significance of what is proclaimed in the ceremony; and second, to make manifest that which it is believed the rite effects.[37] An example of this, would be Casel's reflection on the Eucharistic mystery as meaning

> a sacred ritual action in which a saving deed is made present through the rite; the congregation, by performing the rite, take part in the saving act, and thereby win salvation.[38]

Whether a sociologist accepts this to be true or not is irrelevant. The believers use such a statement as a pre-supposition of intention that allows them to tolerate and to override imperfections in the enactment of rite. Liturgy is believed to proceed on this basis. The sociological issue is how is this to be interpreted? If the effect is interior, the belief at best can only be awarded an equivalence status, and the action is 'fused' to a proposition whose efficacy is a function of this merger, what can a sociologist say?

Sociological reflections on liturgical experiments are rare. Accounts of comparisons between different liturgical forms often lead to emphasis on elements of the ritual apparatus that are best ignored. Health diaries as a way of monitoring responses to decision making over visits to the doctor fall into the same trap. Elements of the body that were previously ignored, take on a threatening significance.[39] Thus, Manly, writing on adjustments in the shape of liturgy to 'fit' the needs of a particular congregation, increasingly discloses a concern with informality, group cohesion, and communal identity, as central

elements in the form of rite. Seating and access to readings, are adjusted to meet liturgical needs, whose criteria become increasingly social and intrusive.[40] Such an approach to liturgical rules can be compared to those forming the basis of regulation of the Sarum rite, a medieval form of liturgy of considerable significance in England.[41] The cultural style of reflection on guidelines and their basis for ritual enactment often show markedly different criteria and pre-suppositions of procedure, even though the essential elements of the liturgy are the same. Informal contemporary experimentations and Sarum rites represent two ideal-type liturgies that have elements of each other mixed up, especially in Modern Anglican liturgies. Each type confronts different performative problems and procedures for the regulation of unacceptable ambiguities.

But it should be remembered that Durkheim noted that *all* religious rituals have a functional ambiguity. Because rites are polyvalent and indeterminate in their purposes, they cannot be seen solely in terms of particular and definite effects. They have to strive to make the particular generally available. He argued also that rituals run continual risks of being interpreted for contradictory purposes.[42] For instance, there was much controversy in England over the political and theological status of a commemoration service for the Falkland Dead in St. Paul's Cathedral, London. Liturgies generate ambiguities in performance, that can leave them open to dangers of parody. A procession of clergy and choir excessively concerned with exactitude of step and movement can seem to be like a military outing. These potential seeds of profanity point to liturgical discrepancies that can be contagious and can sabotage the holy in rite. Bidding prayers can develop into psycho-analytical dramas, and choral pieces can collapse into a sea of giggles leading to what Goffman had described as ceremonial profanations. As he suggests, 'every religious ceremony creates the possibility of a black mass'.[43] Liturgical ambiguities that impair enactment of form arise when an action speaks of an effect other than that which is intended or is believed to have been signified. Because liturgical effects are ultimately unspecifiable, the nature of any violation poses an equally unspecifiable sense of trespass that requires particular means of tactful avoidance, and resolution if it occurs. Some ambiguities are more efficacious and necessary than others.

By being let stand unresolved, ambiguities can fulfil particular functions. Thus, Hamnett has examined jokes and riddles as functioning to preserve a social arrangement whereby facets of action are left implicit and unresolved.[44] Wider reflections on the social use of ambiguity have been formulated by Dawe in an influential examination of discrepancies between action and system, and aspirations and their means of social realization. He has seen the issue in the context of agency and choice.[45] The distinctive functions of

ambiguity in realizing otherwise unrealizable effects have arisen in the issue of self-deception.

Fingarette has examined this in terms of locating an acceptable basis for *not* spelling out an implication or a conclusion that otherwise might seem sensible to render explicit. This is to enable a self that would otherwise be fractured to remain unified.[46] Haight has examined the issue of ambiguity in relation to self as a means of preserving some element of indeterminacy and paradox that allows access to a truth condition that could not otherwise be disclosed.[47] A similar theme has been taken up by Greenspan in her analysis of the management of conflicting emotions. She argues that a commitment to differing positions that are irreconcilable on a rational criterion, can motivate behaviour unlikely to arise from an emotional detachment. In other words, deference to the ambiguous state of an act allows particular qualities to be yielded that would otherwise be obscured if they were to be subject to a rational form of reductionism.[48] Such arguments can also be used to interpret liturgies.

In a religious ritual, ambiguity is acceptable and can be meaningfully contained as long as it is 'fused' to the theological content it effects and proclaims. It is unacceptable if the basis of the form is allowed to slide into its rival (aesthetic, psychological or otherwise). Profane implications that point to parody have to be tactfully avoided, or regulated out if they occur. They are seen as disabling properties that contaminate the sacred senses the rite tries to yield. Actions in liturgy have a defensive dimension that seeks to prevent imputations of the literal, the reductionist and the purely ceremonial being cast on to the form of the rite. As we have suggested elsewhere, mistakes in liturgy are less about indexical assumptions (in Garfinkel's term) of impression management of the holy, and more about the way actors distance themselves and the form they enact from the literal, from profane disclosures of self-interest, self-performance, and self-doubt. Rites routinely try to disguise the literal, all too easy to spell out, in a form of action so indeterminate in effect. Liturgies have to be defended from implications being spelt out from the purely discernable and the social, precisely because this is *not* the basis of the rite, whose basis of efficacy lies in a theological realm. All forms of rite claim a theologically privileged competence in handling their social arrangements for dealing with the holy and tuning their ritual orders to signals of the transcendent. They would all deny that their forms can be reduced to nothing more than the ideological, the literal and the aesthetic. As mentioned above, informal rites do pose sociological problems of interpretation, for ritual imperfections tend to be resolved by theological fiat rather than through describable rules and procedures. This makes the accountability of some forms of rite to sociological scrutiny ambiguous, for a sociologist has no means of assessing such theological claims. All rites face an endemic, and

admitted problem that the numinous might not come, and this is an ambiguity they have to live with. Ambiguities take on a more specific character in ritual performance.

Durkheim has noted that it is easy to assume that every gesture has a precise object, task or definite reason for existence.[49] An excess of detail can obscure a fault within a rite, such as waiting for an actor to come to the altar; bows can be over elaborate to allow the preacher to think up qualifications to his sermon; and a choir may process in very slowly, not for reasons of piety, but because they know the organist has not reached the loft. These are details that cover potential mistakes. Actions can also be exaggerated to shore up an insecure belief. Such an emphasis can lead to charges of obsessive neurosis, which as Freud has indicated are difficult to distinguish from the detail necessary to accomplish the action.[50] Clearly, some of these ambiguities and hostages to misunderstanding can be covered by liturgical rules. These can serve to reduce misunderstandings – not genuflecting before the altar on Good Friday.[51]

Because liturgies by their social nature are frail and easily misunderstood (where the incredible can be mis-attributed to the performance rather than to the content it seeks to produce) some form of tacit management of presentation of cues to potential meanings is required. Symbols can be detached from their referents, and because the order they point to is ambiguous, there is an acute danger of the 'wrong' feelings being animated. Some cue to the appropriate response has to be set out, and some control has to be kept over the performance lest there be grave violations of the basis of the rite. A charismatic gathering would be gratified by spiritual disclosures that underlay a conversion experience, but would have to set up a competitive witness, if psycho-ananlytical discourse took over and profane memories leaked in to the order of service. But such performing nicities should not obscure the metaphysical basis of what the rite attempts to portray.

Religious rituals not only handle signals of transcendence for Berger, but also the terrors of the margin of life, as in the case of funerals and confession, where death is contained and guilt is resolved.[52] Actors come to rites with varying levels of stress and expectation that have an elective affinity to what the liturgies might or might not produce. Rituals require a degree of investment for their metaphysical truths to be disclosed. Rituals try to surmount a paradox of performance: they seek to transcend their social form to reach for an existential order, but at the same time they have to objectify in some plausible manner that order which cannot be totally encapsulated. Thus as Eliade observed, rituals have to defend what they constitute. They desire to move the individual into the life of the sacred, but at the same time they have to produce some objectifiable reality that renders the form immune to the fracturing effect of

subjective relativizations.[53] This paradox is at the centre of sociological interpretations of liturgical management, and the margins the social form routinely handles.

Following Turner, one can see ritual as a bundle of 'thick' symbols that opens out root metaphors of existence in a creative form. At one level symbols invite a self giving and self yielding as Polanyi indicated. But these actions relate also to objects that are intrinsically uninteresting.[54] Liturgical orders are routine and intrinsically uninteresting activities if their condensed qualities are not unpacked and subject to interpretation. It is the potential of rite to appear as literal and boring that gives a defensive cast to the holy impression management of the actors. The symbols used in the rites are cues to a theological order, and following Ricoeur, their interpretation involves a task of deciphering the hidden in apparent and superficial meanings.[55] There is an element of uncertainty in the interpretation of liturgies, a hermeneutic dimension of coping with the surplus of meaning in the symbols and the ritual actions. Such a surplus carries an elective element for the actor who has to *allow* the rite to 'work' and to disclose its fuller meanings in the indirectly understood. This relates to an observation of Van Leeuwen that 'the ordinary referential power of discourse is suspended in order to allow a "second-reference" to come into force'.[56]

Liturgies are dealing with a future as yet undisclosed, and in their actions, one has to take account of a point made by Ricoeur that symbols 'manifest the dependence of the self on an absolute source of existence and meanings, on an eschaton, an ultimate end toward which all the figures of the spirit point'.[57] The liturgical actor elects to enter a second order of meanings in his ritual actions, and to engage in petition and expectation in their sequence. Thus water poured on the priest's fingers at a Catholic mass, at the side of the altar, contains a prayer that is 'fused' to and effects the basis of the action: 'Lord, wash away my iniquity; cleanse me from my sin.'

Wearing a white surplice accomplishes a merger of image and aspirations of purity and innocence. The garment marks out a distinctive expectation for the performance of a liturgical role and its accomplishment. It is an important ingredient in the impression management of piety. Yet despite such a public pious image, the actor can have covert qualifications, as a choirboy at Gloucester Cathedral wrote recently

Cassock red, surplice white,
Mouths wide open, singing right.
Can you guess? Can you not?
We look like angels, but we're not![58]

Liturgies deal with the liminal, and face a distinctive task of never totally realising the belief the form of rite incarnates.

The more the social is manipulated the greater is the danger of the form of rite becoming theologically incredible. Liturgies serve a fundamental purpose of making the social appear incomplete and of marking boundaries to its limits. Durkheim has viewed rituals and their relationship to the sacred in terms of 'something added to and above the real'. The image he draws is of rituals engaged in a collective effervescence, that transforms the actors through their psychic activities. This is an image based on the activities of the actor, the success of the social and its power to transform. Our approach to liturgy as ritual works on the opposite principle: collective restraint in rite draws out the limits of the social, and the actions work towards a passive state of reflection, wherein the sacred is manifested under conditions outside human agency and discretion. We argue that the sacred as 'real' has an inexhaustible ambiguity as a phenomenon. The sacred is expressed as a sense of experience of being acted upon by some autonomous phenomenon arising apart from the literal and the profane, an aspect of which we wish to emphasize is silence.[59]

Such an approach is by no means theological, as Rappaport has shown in his assessment of ritual. His argument is purely sociological, and deals with the invariant qualities of ritual and their relationship to emergent numinous properties. By stressing the operative qualities of liturgy, he manages to relate public and private dispositions to the social regulation of ambiguity in rite.

His argument is somewhat complex. He is concerned with a performative theory of liturgical efficacy that rests on the social commitment of the believer to the accomplishment of what he privately wishes to have accepted in public. This theory is therefore a sociological account of the operative means whereby what the believer holds to have been realized is 'fused' to the public invariable nature of the rite. Rather than seeing the unutterable as a sociological liability, Rappaport turns it into an asset that allows ambiguities to be overridden. By proclaiming in public what he privately wants to be believed, the actor accomplishes and realizes the belief. To some extent this is a variation on W. I. Thomas's famous dictum that beliefs are real in their consequences. Thus Rappaport argues that

> *by performing a liturgical order the performer accepts, and indicates to himself and to others that he accepts, whatever is encoded in the canons of the liturgical order in which he is participating.*[60]

Acceptance, however, does not necessarily imply belief. Rappaport, is pointing to a social means by which the actor can transcend his own doubt by acting in defiance of it.[61] Public acceptance is morally and socially binding.

Equally central to Rappaport's thesis is the proposition that 'liturgy's acts may also speak more clearly than words'.[62] Thus, when an actor draws himself into a posture to which the canonical (that

which is enduring and invariable) gives the particular (the indexical) a symbolic value, the actor incarnates the symbol and gives to it a social substance as it gives to him form.[63] Rappaport's ultimate answer to the issue of relativism of belief is to put the onus for its resolution on to the actor. Sanctity is the quality of unquestionableness (neither falsifiable nor verifiable) accepted by the believer (and in turn imposed on the sociologist as providing the basis to the action to be explained that is a liturgical instance). This given coherence of form heals ambiguities through an invariance that allows the sacred to emerge. The paradoxical nature of the emergent property of rite leads Rappaport to assert: 'it is important, if a proposition is to be taken to be unquestionably true, that no one understand it, and it is not surprising that ultimate sacred postulates are often "mysterious".'[64] Far from being a liability, the social is converted to a liturgical asset that gives velocity to the delivery of the sacred. The social naturalizes the unquestionable, through invariance of form, and marks out what is to be known either in movement or its absence, for what is missing is as important as what is seen in the rite. Ambiguity is put into a social place in liturgy. The ambiguous is given an objectified quality that enables response. It is a means of moving private intention into the realm of public realization. Ambiguities do persist in ritual enactment, but these themselves are often ambiguous as assets or liabilities. Good intentions are insufficient in rite for as Rappaport has suggested, symbols can be transmitted in the absence of their referents, and this greatly increases the possibilities of sanctity and lies occurring. The 'wrong' elements can be mistakenly delivered, for as he observes 'lies are the bastard offspring of symbols'.[65] Liturgical manuals do give rules and regulations on the avoidance of undesirable ambiguities that can often be covered in the preparation and enactment of the rite, but our concern relates to those that arise undesirably within the performance that can sabotage a credible delivery of the sacred.

Rappaport's approach relates to a wider debate on the relationship between performative utterances and ritual actions.[66] Liturgies fit closely to Skorupski's term 'operative ceremonies' and like these, rites not only signal but also effect changes in the actors.[67] Rituals do have a particular formal character that places them beyond pre-emptive 'logical' strikes, for they are enactments that 'fuse' peculiar experiences to specific contexts of delivery. Bloch has argued that the imprecise language of religious rituals is an important ingredient that gives them social and emotional force. His conclusions relate to our approach to liturgy when he states 'an attempt to link the context of ritual to the world or society directly does not work because in secular terms religious rituals are mis-statements of reality'.[68]

Yet, if Christian liturgies are so ambiguous, so unprovable in their operations, and so paradoxical as to turn an efficacy based on

incompleteness into a performing asset, how are they to be made available to sociological scrutiny? There is a dangerous implication arising, that Christian liturgies are isolated from all other forms of ritual, and are peculiarly incapable of sociological study. If, however, we eliminate objectivist and privileged assumptions, such as Bleicher argues for, this will allow us to see how actors manage to eliminate what they perceive as distortions that might impair the intersubjective transactions of liturgy. This suggests an element of collusion in preventing undesirable aspects of the rite being spelt out and points to a mechanism that shores up the impression management of a particular property in the action. Emphasis on the process of realization of a phenomenon reflects Bleicher's view of the sociologist as a *primus inter pares*, a Socratic midwife, seeing how meanings are delivered. This emphasis stresses the need to deal with acts of self-interpretation in liturgies as related to other actors in a context dealing with the implicit and taken-for-granted.[69] This aspect of self-regulation points to the problem of liturgical misunderstandings.

Liturgies require particular forms of 'tact' for the avoidance of 'mistakes'. As said above, in their actions they petition with the risk of not realizing the numinous. This effect cannot be manufactured or called up at will, for as Otto noted, one cannot explain how it comes

> not only in the forms of 'rational' religious worship, but in those queer 'sacramental' observances and rituals and procedures of communion in which the human being seeks to get the numen into his possession.[70]

Goffman's examination of demeanour as a ceremonial accomplishment relates to the regulation and avoidance of profanations in the performance of ritual. This means using ploys to disguise aspects of the rite deemed to be unworthy. His discussion of embarrassment complements this in emphasizing the price of a failure of demeanour that might generate possibilities of unfulfilled expectations where the actor could be found socially wanting.[71] In such cases, the audience is put in an ambiguous dilemma, wanting to avoid signifying the discrepancy lest it be magnified, or of noting it, lest they be charged with being critically unworthy of seeing the performance.

'Tact' is a form of ceremonial courtesy where failures in performance are not signified lest the frailty of the mechanism be made manifest. This would relate to a liturgical 'mistake' where the literal might appear in performance but is unsignified, and no response is given to it – the preacher falling out of pulpit would generate a holy, tactful silence. 'Mistakes' are seen as disruptive intervention that interrupt the ceremonial flow, draw out the literal, or what is literally undesirable – such as applause at the end of a 'concert mass'.[72] Collusion to effect the holy can also form the basis of service in more profane places. For instance cues and signals relate to the regulation

of boundaries between customers and waiters. Spaces and tables have to be managed in terms of atmosphere and the needs of the latter.[73]

SILENCE AS A MEANS OF LITURGICAL SELF-REGULATION

Silence is a fundamental dimension of the numinous that underpins the basis of liturgical form. It operates at many levels, and can be connected to social forms, yet it is polyvalent and indeterminate in effect. Silence underpins the 'pacing' of rite, and gives to intervals and spaces properties of meaning or its absence. It enables actors to feel that their private sensibilities have been invaded in public by a metaphysical issue. But more importantly for sociological interests, silence points to a basis of self-regulation of performance by pointing to what actors fear can be dispersed by trespass. Silence can be a space, an interval, where an unintentional effect can slip in to generate uncertainties and undesirable ambiguities.

Silence is a tactful means of allowing a ceremonial repair to be undertaken and the sacred tenor of the act to be restored. But because the audience is concerned with what the rite points to – as a carrier of a spiritual reality – the fragile sacred effect can also be ruptured in a contagious embarrassment uncontrollable by profane intervention. Because the congregation is trying to use the rite to realize the spiritual, without any empirical criterion of success, ceremonial embarrassments generate peculiar uncertainties. Errors in liturgy generate an ambiguity of choice: either to ignore what has happened and press on; or to stop and re-start in the hope of recapturing. But repeats in liturgy generate peculiar invalidating contradictions for instance in ceremonies for the dead a body can only be received into a Church once. The action cannot be repeated even if the family of the deceased arrive during or even after the reception. Because liturgical forms try to avoid being dead ceremonials they are always on guard against mistakes that violate the overall effect being built up. As Polanyi observes, 'a semantic integration is destroyed if we switch our attention . . . from the point of focal attention to the subsidaries which bear on that focus.'[74] Once a mistake exposes a discrepant detail, a spiritual anomie can descend that violates its relationship to other points of the trivial that make up the rite. Then, silence reflects an uneasy uncertainty that cannot be signified lest the frailty of the whole form becomes manifest. A warm inclusive sense of communal belonging in a liturgy can be turned rapidly into a frigid embarrassed individual discontent.

The violation of an aesthetic silence, the culmination of movements in a concert, can disrupt the cumulative effect of the 'pacing' that has gone before, destroying the build up of a continuity of implication of meaning within which the audience is increasingly being involved.

The audience is called back abruptly from an imaginative boundary just past the sound of music to the literal and the noisy. So silence requires 'tact', a respect for the cumulative effect of the implicit. As Simmel has observed 'if human sociation is *conditioned* by the capacity to speak, it is *shaped* by the capacity to be silent'.[75] Silence either holds back meaning or gives it velocity. The cessation of speech or activity completes a meaning, or can render it incomplete. An embarrassment can be either smothered or generated by silence. Because it operates in a social void, that partly embodies its nature, silence is interpreted by inference and seldom directly. It either generates a social space that has to be quickly filled or a void to be happily abided within. Silence is a distinctively ambiguous phenomenon in the management of liturgy. It is a resource laden with risk.

Because the Tridentine rites and those associated with the *Book of Common Prayer* proceeded on the basis of objectively cast ceremonial rubrics, where discretion was highly limited and recognition of subjective efficacy was discounted, the issue of silence was seldom raised in older liturgical manuals. It was, if anything an accidental effect of the social nature of the rite Even so mystical a writer as Underhill, whilst recognizing an ordered use of silence – in the congregational response to the priest's prayer – thought that it posed dangers, it being appropriate only to the 'spiritually mature'. She felt it provided so much spiritual appeal as to leave 'too much of our human nature behind'.[76]

Because the newer rites, since Vatican II, relate efficacy to quality of performance, and the regulation of its subjective sense, silence has emerged as a fundamental dimension of ritual enactment. What was previously the spiritual agenda of the desert and the monastery has now become embedded in the issue of liturgical efficacy, its staging and 'pacing'. Thus, an instruction on silence appears with regulations on actions and postures in the *General Instruction of the Roman Missal, 1969*. Silence, it is noted 'should be observed at designated times as part of the celebration. Its character will depend on the time it occurs in the particular celebration.'[77] Silence goes to the centre of what is spiritually *and* socially ambiguous in the enactment of rite. As Guardini has argued, Christian liturgy is a

> masterly instrument which has made it possible for us to express our inner life in all its fullness and depth, without divulging our secrets . . . we can pour out our hearts, and still feel that nothing has been dragged to light which should remain hidden.[78]

However the sociological attraction of the issue of silence lies not only in its polyvalence as a phenomenon and the range of forms to which it can be linked. Silence relates also to a metaphysical dilemma, pointing either to an aesthetic nihilism, or to belief in God, thus fulfilling an *apophatic* function. Silence opens up layers of metaphysical

and social possibility, but in whatever it appears as it is ambiguous. Even it's relationship to sound or action is ambiguous. Silence is about passing over a boundary 'a way of crossing the frontier which also acknowledges the frontier is there'.[79] But that threshold on which silence sits, recalls to the questioner the dilemma posed by its mere existence. Pricard, perhaps the most astute philospher of silence, observed that 'man does not put silence to the test; silence puts man to the test'.[80] Silence is 'fused' into the form of rite, both in its performance, and in what the ritual strives to render adequate at the level of meaning. It indicates why the form is necessarily 'tensive' and always characterized by some inadequacy. Silence enables the mysterious to be felt, but is also mysterious in what it effects. It discloses fundamental properties of the numinous, that require tactful management lest the utterable is forced to speak – and to flee. For the purposes of efficacios performance silence is the completion of liturgical form, a texture in rite that marks out a property whose tactful defence is desirable.

Silence has a potential to occupy a social space. It is a resource to be mobilized if meanings are to be best expressed as unuttered. It can mark the significance of a point just uttered, or it can be used as a threshold for one yet to be stated. 'Tact' relates to choice over meaning, when to speak or not to, and this can be an ambiguity actors use to put an onus on the audience to resolve. Because silence is the absence of speech or movement, it serves to invert these explicit elements and to point to their implicit opposites. Incompleteness can make speech or action necessary to fill up the space, lest it slides the whole activity into irretrievable embarrassment. Silence is related to the social in terms of setting a frame of expectations or cues for response, that carry meanings forward or back. These 'pacings' or 'gaps' carry implications that are culturally constituted. A silence at an English funeral would be out of place at an Irish wake and indeed, at such an event, could generate grief. Yet silence requires completion in the social, but paradoxically has also the power to render it incomplete or wanting. Silence conveys a social sense – benignity, warmth, gentleness, sympathy, hostile exclusion, moral inclusion.

It has an adjectival quality, a phenomenon that requires a tag. It is used to convey and to enforce moral premises. Equally, silence is also about power and discretion, and the capacity to generate deference and dependence. It was in this sense Simmel used the term to serve as a means of defence of a secret, whereby novices to a society are socialized into the unstatable nature of its wisdom.[81] But silence can also convey ignorance – the Victorian expectation of the silent woman, discreet and hidden. Yet again, its ambiguous nature shows in the relationship of silence to the credibility of wisdom. As Carlyle noted

> silence is the element in which great things fashion themselves together; that at length they may emerge, full-formed and majestic into the daylight of Life, which they are thenceforth to rule.[82]

So silence fulfils many functions, all of which are expressed in terms of a belief that a meaning to be disclosed is all the more powerful for being issued unuttered. There is no guarantee that silence will 'work' for its relationship to a cultural landscape is often unsecured and jumpy. Nervous giggles disturb silence in school assemblies, even in acts of remembrance for the unknown dead. But the texture and thickness of silence is changed if the same ritual is observed for a pupil who has just died. Then meaning is mobilized, in the expectation that silence will give some sort of cradle to grief. Inactivity can be filled with a sense of silence, or can be emptied in a way that ritual cannot directly control. That is the essence of the liturgical risk. Clearly, there is a subjective resonance, some intangible presence in the phenomenon of silence that cannot be 'proved' to the spiritually deaf. Despite its indeterminate origins, silence transcends and shapes the familiar in a way that changes markedly what has gone before. A rural graveyard in the summer light suggests a different dimension to silence to the brooding feeling in the same place at dusk in the autumn.

Silence is more than a passing ephemeral sense. It is also a phenomenon embedded in institutional arrangements. It can fulfil their domain assumptions and values, but again in contrasting senses according to the goals of the institution. In nineteenth century prisons, silence was used as a disciplinary device to fracture solidarity amongst the inmates, to break their spirit, to demean their place in the institution and to render them dependent on the institutional arrangements made by officials who could impose the terror of absolute solitude.[83] But a regime of institutional silence can also service an opposite end, one of spiritual liberation, as in the case of a monastery. In his account of the Rule of St Benedict, Wathen sees silence as a fundamental resource in maintaining the health of a monastic community. It allows the self to develop and a privacy to be accomplished in an institution whose public routines place great demands on the individual. Silence frees the individual for spiritual growth and contemplation, and allows him to grow whole in virtue. The cultivation of silence also allows the individual to be free to listen to the transcendent. As a moral basis, and as a way of creating an availability to the transcendent, silence also protects the individual against gossip. Yet even here, it is an ambiguous resource. It might well enable virtue to be cultivated but it also generates a risk of pride in spiritual accomplishments, and the generation of what might be termed a 'silent sulkiness'.[84] Silence, therefore, always imposes choice

for it is an ambiguous phenomenon that generates ambiguity in the social and the taken for granted.

There is however a fragile dispensable quality to silence an unexploitable dimension that makes it a form of 'holy uselessness'.[85] It imposes an ambiguity on the listener all the more puzzling for its intangible autonomous and sometimes unresolvable nature. It is both slight and dangerous with a capacity to point to a metaphysical and theological void. In the Old Testament, silence pointed often to an unholy obliteration (1 Samuel 2:9 and Isaiah 47:5). The fear was that silence would have no echo, would suggest no reflecting surface, and would lead to an extinction in an emptiness.

The attempt to utilize silence, to transcend literary forms of expression, can lead to a realization of the emptiness of existence.[86] This pursuit of artistic perfection relates to a point of Ganguly, that 'we long for a rule-free zone and silence comes to our rescue'.[87] Perhaps the best discussion of the aesthetic use of silence and its pursuit of a means of eliminating the limitations of form comes from Sontag. For her, silence is a form of liberation from the constraints of language and patronage. It is produced out of a dialogue with speech to yield its own fuller properties. Silence can be used as a means of purifying vision, and as a form of '"reticence" stepped up to the nth degree'.[88] Unfortunately, that 'reticence' might not yield a purifying effect. In Endo's *Silence*, a novel set in seventeenth century Japan, there is the terror of an unresponsive void expressed in the metaphor of a sea.[89]

It is important to remember that silence represents a possible triumph over the failure of speech and action, but contrasted to this is the belief that 'silence is the redemption of action'.[90] Language has a frontier, as Steiner indicated, similar to other modes of statement – light, music and silence – 'that gives proof of a transcendent presence in the fabric of the world. What lies beyond man's word is eloquent of God'.[91] This affirmation of the possibility of a contact with God emerging in the failure of language, complements the same notion of a boundary to form in liturgy. It strives in its actions to get past the boundary to yield the numinous. But it might also encounter a mechanical emptying ceremonial routine that precludes the sacred and bores the laity. Even Quaker gatherings, where silence plays a central role in worship, can lapse into petrified assemblies that sit rigid in *dead* silence.[92]

Crumbine expresses well the theological nature of the silence that relates aptly to what liturgies endeavour to touch and to be tactful about in their performance. She sees silence as opening out a way of life of its own, a 'revelation of a concealment, the "saying" of mystery. It is a bearing witness to what of the world cannot be taught.'[93] It is this dimension of incompleteness that liturgical forms routinely encounter.

Kierkegaard's concern with the silence of Abraham, at the possible sacrifice of Isaac, points to 'the paradox that silence can reveal more than speech [which] is indeed the paradox of faith'.[94] It is this paradox, of coping in faith with a risk of experience never coming, and if it does, possibly being misunderstood, that gives liturgical form its curiosity, its basis of movement out of the archaic into the immediate. Silence is an ambiguous surplus of meaning in ritual enactment that also gives its structure motion. For some it heals and is believed to contain meaningfully the paradoxes of liturgical ambiguities that litter any sociological accounts of its form. Emerging from a language half or wholly unintelligible, it embodies a phenomenon a sociologist has no means of making intelligible, without a massive misunderstanding and failure of description. This silence generates a belief in a reciprocity of action in liturgy between social form and a holy content. As Crumbine indicates 'the medium (or form) and the subject matter mutually disclose each other in equal depth and mystery' in a reciprocity that reveals 'the meaning of autonomous silence'.[95]

Picard's point that silence cannot be exploited raises peculiar problems for a liturgical management of its presence. Silence seems to be almost randomly linked to liturgical form. Certainly it is not possible to relate depths of silence to simplicity or to complexities of form of rite. But it can be related to the tensions within the form, a tightness of enactment so that when a gap in ritual performance occurs it is not filled with a social doubt but with an expectation that something numinous might emerge. For instance, if in conducting a choir, the choirmaster loses his place, the embarrassed silence that occurs would not be the same as that produced by the music's completion. As Picard, following Otto, noted, 'silence is never more audible than when the last sound of music has died away'.[96] The oblivion into which the musical echo retreats takes on a meaningful layer and produces, a phenomenon that shrouds the weakening sound in a sense of unutterable language and presence. The weakening of the sound is 'received' into a deepening silence. It is this sense of a phenomenon responding that supplies an *apophatic* dimension to rite, wherein one is taken by surprise by a corresponding rhythm in an apparent absence that seems real to the participants in the rite. This sense of silence gives to the actors an *apophatic* basis upon which to gauge the efficacy of the movement of rite, and a fragile indication of what the social form is cautiously moving to experientially incarnate. Silence provides a basis to the liturgical movement, giving it an unutterable complementary basis for the regulation of its ritual form. The form becomes a parody of a numinous movement, and silence is the fulfilled image the ritual process works to, in a tactful management, of the social.

Many instances of ritual could be used to illustrate this sense of liturgical form becoming 'fused' to an unutterable content, where

silence takes on a texture. The moment of consecration at a mass, or the period after communion are obvious times when silence can be meaningfully secured. But a better example where voice 'paces' a way into silence to produce an *apophatic* effect that transcends many, is the well known Service of Lessons and Carols, broadcast on Christmas Eve from King's College, Chapel, Cambridge. In the opening when the choir is assembled at the end of a crowded nave, a silence settles in anticipation of the beginning. A choirboy, emerging out what Picard has called 'a little hill of silence' sings out the opening verse of a carol 'Once in David's Royal City'. This 'still small voice' proclaims the beginning event of Christianity, and renews its telling in a way that seems to some to incarnate what is believed to be the timeless wonder. The treble voice makes its nervous movements in a fragile sounding narration of an improbable event. The 'tensive' slight utterance seems to 'pace' its way into a proclamation somehow secured against interruption. It is an action reflecting one of Picard's observations that

> language receives innocence, simplicity and originality from the silence whence it came, but its short duration, its fragility, and the fact that language never entirely corresponds to the things it is describing, come from the second silence, from death.[97]

This capacity to turn the actions of form into the premonitions of the *apophatic* gives it shape and the means of coping with and transcending some of the layers of ambiguity, resolvable, irrelevant, intrusive and destructive, or otherwise. These layers envelope liturgical impression management. A peculiar form of 'tact' is required to defend the implicit basis of such a 'thick' silence. Daunhauer suggests, a 'pacing' in a liturgy that allows an implication to cumulate, and silence comes as a motivated cut interrupting some already constituted determinate experience.[98] 'Tact' is a fundamental means of the preservation of silence. Following Gadamer, 'tact' is a means of preserving the intimate sphere of the person, where silence resonates most.[99] 'Tact' prevents the dispersal of pools of silence through profane ruptures in the enactment of rite. It underseals the covert disinterested basis of the liturgical action, and prevents movements occurring that are intrusive, attention catching, and disruptive. It generates a discipline, an awareness amongst the actors of what to regulate. But 'tact' cannot directly pick out what needs to be defended in silence for the location of offence is often ambiguous. This *apophatic* element can be fragile or strong in an indeterminate manner. A door could bang in a Church and not affect a 'thick' silence, whereas with the same intrusion a fragile stillness could dissolve leaving the congregation to fidget. Silence, as Crumbine sees it, gives priority to background 'allowing one to remember and to

foresee, allowing one a glimpse or intuition of the hidden and concealed'.[100]

The rupture of this background by noise, or abrupt and ambiguous movements, points to the meaning people were attempting to cope with before the interruption. Noise at a secular concert draws people back from an aesthetic experience to an irritation with the failure of management to maintain the building or to secure a 'correct' type of audience. Equally, noise at a liturgy, carelessly unloosed, violates what people are struggling to discern in rite. They are seeking a meaning that encompasses and surpasses the potentially trivializing ambiguities into which the form of liturgy *can* lurch that could render it an empty ceremonial. It is what the actors seek to wrest from the social that counts in sociological approaches to an understanding of what they seek to accomplish in liturgies. This accomplishment forms the basis of their self-understanding and the regulation of what they seek to have interpreted.

The hermeneutic circle has been seen too often in terms of the distorting effect of a question on an answer, and the degree to which the former is changed by this response found in the latter. Most especially, this has been applied to textual understanding, the act of translation that forms the basis of interpretation between contexts of disclosure and the writer's intentions, and the alien stances of inquiry of the reader who seeks to appropriate and to enclose a particular meaning. This act of interpretation has been expressed in terms of an act of becoming, a fusion of horizons, as Gadamer has seen it. But the being that is reflected in the act of understanding stands before a text, facing an infinity of the unsaid and finds in new interpretations a growing 'circle of the unexpressed'.[101] This opening relationship of self to text has been seen by Ricoeur as a metaphor for social action.[102] This has not been sufficiently explored in sociological theory. Liturgy offers an arena for hermeneutic issues. As a ritual it combines action, text and symbol in a distinctive formation that is characterized by a repeating effort to become, but never actually arriving at its point of ambition. As Dalmais has noted, liturgical objects, words or actions are symbols 'only in so far as they can be immediately recognised as bearers of a significance surpassing their own reality, or, more precisely, as being in some way something different from and greater than they seem to be'.[103] The rest is silence.

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AUTHOR'S NOTE

Apophatic theology emphasizes the unknowable nature of God who can be known only as a paradox, a 'dazzling darkness' beyond conception This tradition

of early Eastern Christianity, represented in the writings of Denys (Pseudo-Dionysius) and the English mystical thirteenth century work, *The Cloud of Unknowing*, has gained increasing significance in the recently translated volumes of Von Balthasar. His use of the *apophatic* in the context of a theological aesthetics is likely to have crucial implications in assessments of the relationships between culture and liturgical forms. The chapter on Denys in the second volume of his writings forms a theological backcloth to the sociological approach of this essay See Hans Urs Von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord. A Theological Aesthetics*, vols. 1 and 2, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1982 and 1984.

NOTES

* An earlier draft of this paper was read at the BSA Sociology of Religion Study Group Conference, University of Bristol, 1982. I owe a large intellectual debt to my colleague Ian Hamnett, for his comments on earlier versions of the paper, and for suggesting the notion of the *apophatic* as a basis for a sociology of liturgy Also I wish to thank Denys Turner, Department of Theology, University of Bristol for his restraint in coping with the unorthodoxies of my approach to liturgy. The actors on the sanctuary at Clifton Cathedral, Bristol, greatly affected my thinking on avoiding liturgical mistakes as an altar server My thanks are due to the anonymous referee of the *BJS* for his helpful report. Finally, my gratitude to Mrs Pauline Tilley, who wearily, if not cheerfully, typed a second final draft.

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23. See *The Roman Missal*, Goodliffe Neale, 1974. For an Anglican equivalent see Michael Perham, *Liturgy Pastoral and Parochial*, SPCK, 1984

24. See report in *Church Times*, 16 July 1982. The issue attracted considerable mass media interest.

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Adam Kuper

Durkheim's theory of primitive kinship

SUMMARY

Durkheim was preoccupied with problems of 'primitive kinship' throughout his career. He followed contemporary anthropological writings, and tried to order ethnological materials in terms of a Spencerian model of segmentary societies. In 1895 he was inspired by the work of the Scottish school on 'totemism', and he began to develop a theory which could account at once for the history of the family and the history of religion. His ultimate goal was to establish a scientific morality, which, unlike traditional moralities, would not need to appeal to religion or to the values of the family, and consequently he tried to establish the artificiality and plasticity of kinship.

I

In 1907, in a letter to the editor of a scholarly journal, Durkheim described a major crisis in his intellectual development:

> it was only in 1895 that I clearly recognized the crucial role played by religion in social life . . . for the first time I found the means to tackle the study of religion sociologically. It was a revelation to me. The course of 1895 marks a line of demarcation in the development of my thought, to the point that all my previous researches had to be started afresh in order to harmonize them with these new opinions. This was due entirely to the studies of the history of religion which I had recently undertaken, and notably to reading the works of Robertson Smith and his school.[1]

The reference would have been obvious to contemporaries. Durkheim was talking about the theory of totemism. Totemism, as Frazer's biographer had pointed out,

> like radar, whisky and marmalade, was a Scottish discovery or invention, for it was first defined by the Edinburgh lawyer John

Ferguson McLennan, and Frazer, Robertson Smith and Andrew Lang were among the first to discuss it.[2]

Durkheim contributed to the study of totemism for nearly two decades after 1895, and his final masterpiece, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, published in 1912, five years before his death, was the most interesting book published by a generation of ethnologists and sociologists obsessed with the chimera of 'totemism'.

It would be foolish to question the importance of these 'études d'histoire religieuse' for Durkheim's intellectual development; and yet the precise nature of their impact, in 1895, is not easy to establish. To begin with, Durkheim had already been familiar with the work of the Scottish school for nearly a decade. Marcel Mauss recorded that Lucien Herr, the librarian of the École Normale Supérieure, 'signala des 1886 à Durkheim l'article "Totemism" de M. Frazer'.[3] (Mauss also remarked that in the same year Herr converted Jaurès to socialism![4]) Robertson Smith's *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* (1885), which applied McLennan's theory of totemism to the ancient Arabs, was cited by Durkheim in *The Division of Labour in Society*, published in 1893. Nevertheless, Durkheim apparently returned to the literature with a fresh purposefulness in 1895, when he came to prepare a lecture course on religion. Evidently he then discovered something which came as a revelation, and obliged him to revise all his previous ideas. But what did he find?

Unfortunately, there are no copies of the lectures on religion delivered by Durkheim in 1895–6, so one must try to trace the impact of the Scottish school by indirect means. Stephen Lukes, the outstanding modern author on Durkheim, suggests that the impact was a complex one.[5] His strongest claim is that Durkheim took over Smith's sociological view of religion, his belief (to cite a classic formulation of Smith) 'that gods and men, or rather the god and his own proper worshippers, make up a single community, and that the place of the god in the community is interpreted on the analogy of human relationships'.[6] I am not convinced. Fustel de Coulanges, Durkheim's teacher at the École Normale, had developed a theory which was as sociological as Smith's, if more idealist; and there were others who propagated comparable views including, for example, Guyau, whose *L'irréligion de l'avenir, étude de sociologie* Durkheim had reviewed enthusiastically in 1887, commending especially Guyau's notion that religion was 'une explication sociologique universelle à forme mythique'.[7]

It is more obvious that (as Lukes points out) Durkheim adopted Smith's distinction between communal religion and individual magic. He also welcomed Smith's idea that rites were prior to beliefs. However, the vital element of Robertson Smith's theory, from Durkheim's point of view, was his substantive historical hypothesis.

Robertson Smith's sociological approach to religion was no doubt sympathetic, but what much have been really new to Durkheim was the idea that the original form of religion was clan totemism, and that this was directly linked, in an evolutionary fashion, with ancient Semitic religions and ultimately with the Christian communion and the Christian theory of Christ's sacrifice.

Lukes does, of course, mention this substantive aspect of Smith's theory, but he does not seem to take it very seriously. It is, after all, difficult for a modern sociologist to give due weight to this sort of exotic speculation. Nevertheless, I believe that the substantive theory of totemism was the source of Durkheim's intellectual crisis of 1895. From this time on, Durkheim's general theory of religion developed and became increasingly subtle and nuanced, as Lukes has so effectively shown. But more concretely, he remained faithful from now on to a new theory of religious history. This theory permitted him to recast some of his fundamental ideas, notably his ideas about the family.

II

Durkheim's theory of religion dominates all accounts of his sociology. This seems reasonable, on the face of it. After the early works – notably *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893), *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), and *Suicide* (1897) – Durkheim devoted himself largely to problems of religious sociology, and his next (and last) major study, the *Elementary Forms*, published 15 years after *Suicide*, is generally regarded as his masterpiece. However, Durkheim did not himself expect his study of religion to represent the crowning achievement of his career. Marcel Mauss reported that on his deathbed

> During a break in his illness, at a moment when he was preparing without conviction, through sheer will-power, for work and for living, he made a supreme act of faith and began to write his *Morale*, the goal of his existence, the foundation of his spirit.[8]

Durkheim also left another, perhaps equally important, part of his work unfinished. Mauss reported that

> As much as his *Morale*, Durkheim's *Famille* was his dearest project. He was aware of its value. He talked of shortening his *Morale*, reducing it to an 'Introduction', in order to be able to devote himself to his *Famille*. The manuscript was still that of the old course he had given at Bordeaux (from 1890 to 1892), but it was so rich in facts and ideas and so precious that Durkheim himself treated these pages with respect, and for a number of years he did not part with it even while travelling. He cherished the hope of

> beginning again, of recasting and rounding off this work. He had wished to consecrate his last days to this comparative natural history of the family and marriage until our days.[9]

The centrality of this theory of the family has been neglected somewhat by commentators on Durkheim, although when the *Année Sociologique* first appeared, under his editorship, in 1898, Durkheim took personal responsibility for the sections on the family and marriage. Part of the reason is that the ethnological aspect of Durkheim's work has been systematically played down.[10] One can see why. His ethnographic analysis has been discredited, while his abstract theoretical ideas remain powerful. Yet the ethnography was far from incidental. Karady, who has done more than anyone to reassert the importance of Durkheim's ethnographic commitment, has demonstrated the tactical value to the Durkheimians of colonizing and exploiting this unclaimed field of scholarship.[11] He has also pointed out that the theoretical justification for this interest is to be found in Durkheim's evolutionism.

Karady's analysis helps to explain the neglect of this aspect of Durkheim's work. For if Durkheim's ethnography has been of little intrinsic interest to later sociologists, his evolutionism has repelled them. Some have taken comfort from the belief that it was not entirely consistent,[12] or that it was a minor relic of an old way of thinking which Durkheim had otherwise transcended. But Durkheim's evolutionism was both fundamental and unambiguous: though it was certainly far from Comte's simplicities.

Durkheim's evolutionism was taken from Herbert Spencer.[13] Spencer believed that evolution was an inevitable movement towards increasing complexity and order and, at the same time, towards greater and greater diversity. 'Like other kinds of progress, social progress is not linear but divergent and re-divergent', Spencer wrote, 'Each differentiated product gives origin to a new set of differentiated products'.[14] But although evolution meant diversification, all societies shared a common point of origin. Moreover, the original institutional forms were never lost, but were simply recombined in various more complex new forms. This was a form of social Lamarckianism, and Spencer was himself a believer in the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

Durkheim shared the Lamarckian assumptions, which were common currency in France at the time. He even believed that acquired traits were never completely lost.[15] Therefore, though evolution resulted in divergence, Durkheim insisted that sociologists must reconstitute the original condition of social institutions. There was also the pragmatic consideration that institutions could be most easily understood in their simlest, original form, where their relations with other institutions would be most readily apparent.

This form of evolutionism was remote from Comte's. Durkheim was also anti-Darwinian, like virtually the whole French intellectual establishment of his day.[16] In his critique of Westermarck, he commented dismissively: 'D'abord, faire reposer la sociologie sur le darwinism, c'est assevir la science sur une hypothese'.[17] Yet while he was anti-Darwinian, and although he dismissed the unilinear evolutionism of Comte, Durkheim was a thoroughly consistent and, for his day, orthodox evolutionist. In his work on religion and on the family, he therefore hoped to reconstitute an original state of affairs as the baseline for his analysis.

III

Durkheim's initial university appointment was as *chargé de cours* of social sciences and pedagogy at the Faculty of Letters at Bordeaux, in 1887. In his opening course, on social solidarity, he set out the ideas which were to be developed in his first major study, *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893). His second course, delivered in 1888–9, was entitled 'La famille, origines, types principaux'.[18] Taken together with some early reviews and the relevant passages in *De la division du travail social*, it provides the basis for a reconstruction of Durkheim's early ideas on the family.

In his course at Bordeaux, Durkheim insisted that one must begin by studying the origins of the family, and he argued that Fustel de Coulanges and Maine had been wrong to ignore the descriptions which were available of the primitive family – though he agreed that ethnographic information was often unreliable and needed careful handling. He cited Lubbock, McLennan, Morgan and Giraud Teulon, who had interpreted Bachofen's ideas for the French public, and he showed a familiarity with the pioneering Australian ethnography, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, by Fison and Howitt. (This appeared in 1888, the year of his course.)

By the late 1880s an anthropological orthodoxy had crystallized on the evolution of the family, based especially upon the work of Bachofen, McLennan and Morgan. Durkheim accepted the orthodoxy as a starting-point. Originally, men had lived in undifferentiated hordes without any form of marriage or kinship. A uterine clan system had then developed. The conjugal family was a modern innovation.

Durkheim situated this conventional model in a new, more sociological context, taken from Herbert Spencer. The ethnologists had been primarily concerned with the form of the family itself. Durkheim's main interest was in the society formed by such family units. His fundamental thesis was that the form taken by family life corresponded to specific types of social structure.[19] The original society must have been unicellular, as it were, and internally

undifferentiated, giving rise by segmentation to more complex social forms. An original 'horde' would have split into two groups to yield a dual 'clan' system – which, Durkheim suggested, corresponded to the Australian system described by Fison and Howitt. Morgan had described the Iroquois as having eight clan units, and so clearly they were a yet more advanced system, having segmented not once but three times. The terminology for these segments was borrowed from the anthropologists, but the terminology for the structure which they formed was Spencer's. 'We give the name *clan* to the horde which has ceased to be independent by becoming an element in a more extensive group, and that of *segmental societies with a clan-base* to peoples who are constituted through an association of clans.'[20]

Durkheim contrasted two main types of social organization. The first was a segmentary, clan-based system. This was made up of repetitive, internally undifferentiated units bound together by what he called 'mechanical solidarity'. The second type was based on the division of labour. Specialized social units were intricately related to each other in a complex system which yielded 'organic solidarity', based on mutual dependence. In this more evolved type of social system, the family was no longer a property-owning corporation, and most of its erstwhile functions had been taken over by new, specialized institutions. Accordingly the family became smaller, feebler, and more internally differentiated. The old ties of descent, which had regulated communal property relationships, were now less important than the individual conjugal bond.

True to his Lamarckian views, Durkheim believed that the earlier family forms survived on the margins of the more evolved institutions. Thus the kindred, for example, surrounds the modern nuclear family, recalling the extended patriarchal family of an earlier period. 'The modern family contain within it, as if in miniature, the whole historical development of the family'.[21]

The crux of Durkheim's argument was that the form of family organization was derived from the broader structure of the society. The clans, for example, were units of a segmentary structure. It was a matter of comparative indifference whether or not the clans were organized internally on the basis of consanguinity. 'The organization with a clan-base is really only a species of a larger genus, the segmental organization. The distribution of society into similar compartments corresponds to persisting necessities, even in new societies where social life is being established, but which produce their effects in another form.'[22]

This sociological determinism implied a certain sociological formalism. The inchoate processes of social life became significant only when they were explicitly shaped to the requirements of the broader social structure. For example, Durkheim accepted Westermarck's view that in any community mating would tend to be concentrated between

stable partners. However, he denied that such *de facto* arrangements could constitute marriage. Marriage was an institution, it could therefore exist only when rules were formulated, generally recognized, and applied. Matriliny, similarly, was not a consequence of *de facto* unimportance of the husband. Rather, it marked his jural weakness.[23]

If family organization was generated by other, more significant, overarching forms of social organization, then clearly one could not sensibly talk about the abstract advantages of one or other kind of family institution. Nostalgia for 'traditional' family forms was irrational. 'The family of today is not more or less perfect than that of old: it is different, because the circumstances are different. It is more complex, because the environment in which it exists is more complex: that is all'.[24]

In *The Division of Labour in Society* Durkheim had argued that the family was withering away, and that its moral, disciplinary and organizational functions would be taken over by corporations which were grounded on economic specialization, that is, by professional associations. Durkheim insisted that the new organic society and its institutions were no less moral or natural than the old clan-based systems, although, inevitably, more evolved, more complex, more differentiated. Criticizing Tönnies for example, he wrote

> I believe that the life of the great social agglomerations is just as natural as that of the small communities. It is neither less organic nor less internalized (*interne*).[25]

There was, however, an obvious difficulty with this formulation. For was there not something *natural* about family organization? Le Play, for example, believed that the family was in some sense prior to, and independent of society, and that it was, moreover, a crucial source of moral values. The French ethnologist Letourneau insisted in his *L'evolution du mariage et de la famille* (published in 1888, the year of Durkheim's course on the family), that the primitive family forms were more natural then, and morally preferable to, our own. Westermarck, in his *History of Human Marriage*, argued even that the basic family institutions were derived from our primate ancestors. If arguments of this type were correct, then the value of the family was not contextual at all. The family would be a natural and permanent institution, independent of other social institutions.

The issue was vital to Durkheim's whole attempt to formulate a scientifically based morality. If certain institutions, notably the family, were 'natural' to man, then although they might 'evolve' they could not be jettissoned, or greatly weakened, without serious danger. If they were, however, conventional, artifacts of social necessity, then they could, when the time came, be replaced by more adaptive institutions.

A similar problem faced him with respect to religion. His

conservative opponents believed that morality rested on the twin pillars of the 'natural' family and the 'revealed' religion. Even the primitives, they argued, had some belief in divine beings, some glimmering of spiritual insight, just as they had crude family forms, for these were the natural and god-given bases of the social order, established for all time.

My argument is that Durkheim realized in 1895 how Robertson Smith's theory of totemism might resolve two of his most fundamental theoretical problems. The original totemic society demonstrated the fundamental variability of 'family' institutions and religious faith. The way was now open for sociological relativism and scientific morality. Durkheim began to elaborate the implications of this theory in an essay which linked the totemic theory of religion with a revolutionary theory of the family. This long essay was given pride of place in the first volume of the *Anée Sociologique*, which appeared in 1898. It is entitled 'La prohibition de l'inceste et ses origines'.

IV

McLennan's initial essay had defined 'totemism' as a form of 'animism' in which exogamous 'clans' worshipped natural species or phenomena.[26] His ideas were applied by Robertson Smith, and developed, illustrated and refined by Frazer. Frazer defined 'clan totemism' in these terms

> The clan totem is reverenced by a body of men and women who call themselves by the name of the totem, believe themselves to be of one blood, descendants of a common ancestor, and are bound together by common obligations to each other and by a common faith in the totem. Totemism is thus both a religious and a social system.[27]

Moreover, 'Persons of the same totem may not marry or have sexual intercourse with each other'.[28] As the evidence accumulated Frazer began to have his doubts, but until the end of the nineteenth century it was widely believed that totemism, clan organization and exogamy were necessarily linked to each other in very early or primitive human societies. There was, however, no generally accepted explanation for this complex, and in Durkheim's generation this question exercised a number of outstanding thinkers, perhaps most notably Frazer, Wundt, Freud, and Durkheim himself.

Durkheim began his essay by restating the orthodox view that exogamy was fundamental to clan organization, and that clan members believed themselves to share a common substance of some kind with their clan totem.[29] He also accepted the view that the original clans were uterine, arguing – on the basis of the Australian

ethnography – that exogamous patrilineal clans were a later development. These were patrilocal groups which had adopted the exogamous rules of the uterine clans by way of analogy. The Australian 'marriage-classes' resulted from the combination of exogamous uterine clans and exogamous patrilineal local units. Later even more complex family forms developed, but always the rules of exogamy were taken over and adapted.

Durkheim rejected the various explanations of exogamy which were available to him. One group of theories, he wrote, rested on the notion that exogamy was essentially a general prohibition on marriage with consanguines. Durkheim countered that the rules might cover non-relatives, that intra-tribal marriages were universally favoured, and that 'exogamy permits marriage between close relatives',[30] including, for example, mother's brother's children in a uterine system. He also rejected the view that there was a universal horror of sexual contact with consanguines.

Durkheim's alternative explanation derived exogamy not directly from consanguinity and the clan system, but rather from totemic beliefs. This was to make exogamy the consequence of religious ideas.

> Since the totem is a god and totemism a cult, should the cause of exogamy not be sought first in the religious beliefs of primitive societies? And indeed we shall demonstrate that it is simply a special case of much more general religious institution, which one finds at the foundation of all primitive religions and even, in a sense, of all religions. This is a *taboo*.[31]

Durkheim later developed this ethnographic notion of *taboo* – familiar in the ethnology of his day – into a more generalized notion of the sacred. Certain things are set aside, avoided, prohibited, because they are thought to be pervaded by some supernatural force. The totem was taboo, for in general it could not be eaten by members of its clan. Similarly, women of the clan could said to be taboo for men of the clan, since the men could not have sexual intercourse with them. Was there a common basis for these various taboos?

Durkheim argued that women are typically subject to ritual segregation at puberty, menstruation and child-birth. This was because their blood was regarded as especially dangerous. These taboos on women were connected with the taboo on shedding the blood of a clansman. The key to the whole intellectual complex was the belief that the clansmen shared a common substance with the totem. 'In this fashion the totemic being is immanent in the clan; it is incarnated in each individual and it resides in the blood. It is itself the blood'.[32] The notional consanguinity of clansmen is therefore not the consequence of a theory of common descent. It has nothing to do with kinship. Rather it is a religious belief, a way of expressing the solidarity of the congregation and its god.

V

It is possible to read Durkheim's argument as a kind of ideological determinism. A religious belief – totemism – generates an idea of consanguinity and a rule of exogamy. This recalls Fustel de Coulanges' argument in *La Cité Antique*, in which he derived a series of forms of family organization from prior religious beliefs. Fustel had been a teacher of Durkheim's, and although Durkheim criticized Fustel's ideological determinism in an early book, his *Rules*, his later formulation may appear to be fairly similar. Lukes himself suggests that the later Durkheim moved rather close to Fustel's position.[33] I believe that this is an oversimplification.

Durkheim's thesis (further developed in his *Elementary Forms*) was that the structural type of a society determined the nature and function of the social units. The simplest forms of society were made up of undifferentiated and repetitive units, which he called clans. These units could be organized internally in various ways. They might be consanguineal or simply local groups. But in any case they shared one fundamental need: the need for an emblem. This was the origin of the totem. At first it was just a badge of clan identity. Rites and beliefs associated with the totem then developed. The religious features of totemism – the rituals, the prohibitions, the beliefs – followed from the identification of the social unit, the clan, with an emblem, the totem. When the group came together at certain seasons it did so under is common banner. The sentiments aroused by collective action were then projected onto the emblem itself. In short, the clan is structurally prior both to its appropriate religion, totemism, and to the ideology of common descent, which totemism evokes. Kinship systems were generated by the social order.

Putting it another way, the family was not 'about' real blood relationships. Religion was not necessarily 'about' God. The source of social institutions need not be sought outside the social order itself. The proof of these propositions was to be found in ethnology, and specifically in the theory of totemism. Durkheim linked them in the first pages of the *Elementary Forms*

> Primitive civilizations offer privileged cases, then, because they are simple cases. This is why, in all fields of human activity, the observations of ethnologists have frequently been veritable revelations, which have renewed the study of human institutions. For example, before the middle of the nineteenth century, everybody was convinced that the father was the essential element of the family; no one had dreamed that there could be a family organization of which the paternal authority was not the keystone. But the discovery of Bachofen came and upset this old conception. Up to very recent times it was regarded as evident that the moral

> and legal relations of kindred were only another aspect of the psychological relations which result from a common descent; Bachofen and his successors, MacLennan, Morgan and many others still laboured under this misunderstanding. But since we have become acquainted with the nature of the primitive clan, we know that, on the contrary, relationships cannot be explained by consanguinity. To return to religions, the study of only the most familiar ones had led men to believe for a long time that the idea of god was characteristic of everything that is religious. Now the religion which we are going to study presently is, in a large part, foreign to all idea of divinity; the forces to which the rites are there addressed are very different from those which occupy the leading place in our modern religions; yet they aid us in understanding these latter forms.[34]

VI

Durkheim's theory of kinship institutions was remarkable above all for his insistence on the artificial and derivative nature of the family, marriage and descent groups. This starting-point lent a radical and novel character to his detailed comments on contemporary ethnological theories of kinship. His critiques of Westermarck[35] and of Köhler,[36] in particular, remain interesting. His formalism and his emphasis upon corporate structures, for example, led him to suggest that Crow and Omaha systems were more economically defined with reference to descent rules than with respect to hypothetical secondary marriage preferences.[37] But it is fruitless to detach isolated hits – or misses – from the general context of Durkheim's kinship theory. It is essentially an *a priori* theory, which must be appreciated as a whole.

Durkheim's kinship theory is inextricably linked with the theory of totemism, and the totemic hypothesis was in tatters well before Durkheim's death. Robertson Smith's variant had been definitely criticized by Orientalists.[38] Spencer and Gillen's ethnography, which Durkheim welcomed as a proof of Robertson Smith's conjectures, was recognized by most scholars – including Frazer and Baldwin Spencer himself – to be a refutation.[39] In 1910 Goldenweiser had destroyed the idea of unified sets of totemic institutions, which necessary combined prohibitions on totems, clan organization and exogamy.[40]

When Durkheim reiterated the old assumption that totemism was primitively universal, and that the religion and social forms were inextricably intertwined, he won hardly any support among the anthropologists. In 1912 Goldenweiser wrote to the editor of *Anthropos*

> The appearance of Durkheim's brilliant but unconvincing treatise on religion brings home the fact that one of the phases of socio-

> religious thought, namely the problem of totemism, remains as replete with vagueness and mutual misunderstanding as ever.[41]

On his suggestion, *Anthropos* published a symposium on the subject, in which specialists from a number of countries expressed their measured disillusion with the old models.[42] Virtually all insisted on separating the social and religious models of totemism, though there was less agreement as to which model then offered the better prospects for research. Rivers, for example, wanted to restrict attention to totemism as a form of social structure, while his student Radcliffe-Brown suggested that the term be used only to connote a magico-religious system. And if Durkheim's formulation remained influential for rather longer in France, it was badly dented by Van Gennep's powerful polemic, *L'État actuel du problème totémique*, published in 1920, a French version of Frazer's and Goldenweiser's critique.

But although totemism and the classical evolutionary history of family institutions have been completely discredited, Durkheim's basic model has shown extraordinary resilience. Even today, most anthropological conceptions of so-called primitive social structure are variants of his model of 'sociétés segmentaires à base de clans'; clans which, moreover, remain putatively exogamous, just as Durkheim had conceived them to be. My own view is that this model of a segmentary structure based on unilineal descent groups is a sociological fantasy with no ethnographic foundation, but it would take a lengthy review of the development of social anthropology to explain why it has, nevertheless, persisted.[43]

However little survives of Durkheim's substantive ethnology, one must respectfully note the rich endowment which his sociology provided for later generations of social anthropologists. The achievements of Mauss, Radcliffe-Brown, J. P. B. de Josselin de Jong, even of Lévi-Strauss, recognizably derive from the Durkheimian paradigm. The apparently paradoxical fruitfulness of Durkheim's work, despite its substantive failure, is, I believe, due to the power of certain elements of his methodology; to the importance of some of the questions which he set on the agenda of the next generation; and, above all, to the sense which he communicated of the richness, complexity and sociological interest of ethnographic materials.

Nevertheless, precisely because Durkheim's work remains influential, we must remain frankly critical. The ideas of the great masters often exercise a diffuse and therefore insidious influence. We sometimes presume to praise them by saying how up-to-date they appear, when in fact we have indirectly absorbed their ideas and then rediscover – with surprise – our common assumptions expressed with great clarity and force in some classic text. But as Pierre Bourdieu recently remarked in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France:

'on fait de la science – et surtout de la sociologie – contre sa formation autant qu'avec so formation. Et seule l'histoire peut nous débarrasser de l'histoire'.[44]

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Trevor Noble

Inflation and earnings relativities in Britain after 1970

ABSTRACT

The view that high levels of inflation reflect an intense and evenly matched balance of power between competing interest groups is examined over a period of rising and falling inflation rates. The evidence reviewed sustains this interpretation to some extent when comparing earnings relativities within the labour market but provides less support for it in relation to capital and labour in general. The relationship between inflation and earnings relativities discovered by Routh is examined for the periods of rising and falling inflation rates in the 1970s and early 1980s using data from The New Earnings Surveys. Though the pattern of relative gains and losses among the various occupational classes is complex it broadly confirms Routh's view. Movements are more marked amongst women employees however. For men it is the rigidity of the pattern throughout the period which is the most striking finding.

INTRODUCTION

Economists tend to argue that a major factor in inflation is the pressure for higher wages. Recently however, Beckerman and Jenkinson have argued that the primary influence on inflation trends in the industrialized countries since 1963 has been the rise and fall in world commodity prices. Wage demands are a response to import determined price changes.[1] Cause or consequence however, the relationship between inflation and personal income, wages and salaries and other earnings is an intimate one. Guy Routh has pointed out how in periods of high inflation pay differentials tend to narrow, only to widen again when inflation falls.

> The common characteristic of the periods of narrowing differentials is their high rate of inflation. For the period 1914 to 1920, the average annual rise in the cost of living index was nearly 17 per

cent; for 1935 to 1942, 6.2 per cent; for 1950 to 1955, 5.1 per cent. In the periods 1944 to 1950 and 1956 to 1960 when dispersion was stable or widening, the rise in prices was more moderate: 3.7 per cent and 2.7 per cent per year respectively.[2]

The social implications of this relationship are that in periods of high or rising inflation there is a shift in the balance of power between different groups which is re-established when inflation rates fall.

The periods of greatest income convergence coincide, it will be noted, with the First and Second World Wars and the Korean War. The inflation in Britain following the economic crisis of 1973–4 was far greater than any of those and though by 1983 the annual rate had fallen below five per cent even that remains high by historical standards.

Now that the annual rate of inflation has fallen to the lowest level for sixteen years, however, it seems worthwhile reconsidering some of the accounts of the social determinants of the rising rates during the 1970s. While in Britain inflation has never reached the levels of Germany after the First World War or Hungary after the Second or even of Israel or a number of Latin American countries today, it has been continuous for the past half century and after the economic crisis of 1973–4 accelerated to a greater rate than in any of the other major industrial economies. The purchasing power of the pound has fallen continuously since 1933 but after the 1973–4 for the first time the inflation rate went into double figures reaching 24 per cent in 1975, falling to 8 per cent in 1978, rising again to 18 per cent in 1980 and falling steeply thereafter to 4.6 per cent in 1983, the lowest annual rate since 1967.[3]

In this paper my purpose is to examine the relative earnings of different groups. The distribution of incomes in general has been affected by a number of factors including both the increase in the numbers of pensioner households and the very large increase in unemployment and the associated growth in the numbers of people living as a consequence on welfare benefits and also the change in the distribution of employment whereby increasing proportions of men and women in employment have non-manual and generally better paid jobs while the numbers in less skilled manual, the less well-paid jobs have declined. While these structural effects have influenced the distribution of income and therefore over all average incomes, my purpose here is to explore the question of how far there has in recent years been any widening or narrowing of the gap between different occupational groups leaving on one side the question of the degree of redistribution to those primarily dependent on welfare benefits of one kind or another. Specifically I want to consider how far changes in the rate of inflation have affected earnings relativities.

Using NES data from 1970 to 1977 Ashenfelter and Layard

examined the impact of incomes policies on earnings and concluded that the general effect was to narrow the dispersion within groups rather than reduce between-groups differentials. They argued that the effect of inflation would be to increase inequality as different groups of employees settled wage or salary increases at different points in time and the maintenance of established relativities becomes more uncertain due to the changing real value of any given settlement.[4]

A number of writers have argued that inflation was not merely a technical problem of currency rates but needed to be understood in sociological as well as, or even rather than, purely in terms of economic theory. Maier argued that inflation should be understood 'as one of the major forms of distributive conflicts in contemporary society'.[5] Thus inflation is the outcome or a symptom of conflict over resources between interest groups. While the balance of power between competing interests is maintained, the more intense the struggle the greater the inflation will need to be in order to contain it. Goldthorpe's analysis is similar but more specific in attributing the rising levels of inflation in Britain during the 1970s primarily to the increasingly effective pressure of the manual working class.

> The current inflation, [he argued] derives ultimately from changes in the form of social stratification, giving rise to more intense and more equally-matched social conflict than hitherto.[6]

The severity of inflation in Britain in comparison with other industrial societies thus indicated a more intense and evenly matched social conflict here than elsewhere. He attributed this to three, possibly interdependent historical developments: the decay of the status order, the growth of citizenship and the development of a mature working class. The decay of the status order is a matter of cultural change, particularly the decline or virtual disappearance of traditional values of deference and the acceptance of the inevitability, even the justice of social inequalities. The working class, one might argue, have become less likely to accept that people in middle-class jobs ought to enjoy a higher standard of living than they do themselves. The issue however is a wider one than merely a matter of wage and salary levels but relates to the virtual disappearance of sharp and obvious differences in styles of life so that it is no longer as easy as it was to tell the classes apart by the way they dress, the things they say or spend their money on. The growth of citizenship is an idea propounded by T. H. Marshall to include not only the spread of civil rights, that is rights to equal treatment by the law and then equal political rights to representation in parliament and local government to all classes, but the development, mainly in the twentieth century, of welfare rights for the old, the sick, the unemployed, etc. so that in spite of the inequalities that remain there has been some growth in equality of the rights of all citizens.[7] The emergence of a 'mature' working class

reflects the increasing homogeneity of background of manual workers as declining recruitment from middle-class or rural social origins provides less exposure to the influence of alternative loyalties which might inhibit their pursuit of their own sectional working-class economic and political interests.

A more homogeneous working class, a class increasingly isolated from the cross pressures of values inherited from middle-class origins, less willing deferentially to acknowledge established social distinctions and inequalities, more confident in its equal rights as citizens, to that extent makes increasing demands for a larger share in the national wealth. These demands, however, naturally are resisted in the interests of the currently principal beneficiaries but in so far as they cannot be repressed are met by spurious increases in money rewards rather than an increase in the share of real earnings. On this view then inflation is the by-product of class struggle and only a realignment of class power is likely to lead to its diminution.

The sharp rise in the level of unemployment after 1979 while inflation rates have fallen lends some plausibility to this perspective, what I have set out to explore is how far it also tallies with the evidence on earnings relativities.

An evaluation of this persuasive account however encounters a number of problems. To begin with high inflation is attributed to increasingly intense *and* more equally balanced social conflict. Presumably without an increase in intensity there would be no inflationary pressure while with an unequally balanced conflict the real share of one party would simply increase at the expense of the other. A decrease in inflation could therefore indicate a lesser intensity of conflict. Given a situation of pre-existing inequality however, that, one might expect, would lead to greater divergence of incomes. Alternatively a decrease in inflation could reflect a greater imbalance in the conflict between the classes which as suggested would show by a change in the share of income according to which group was winning the struggle. Thus increasing inflation, on this view, and in contrast to Routh's observations, should be characterized by stable income relativities while declining levels of inflation should coincide either with diverging incomes or in the rare case of an imbalance of power in favour of the poorer classes, a convergence.

Michael Gilbert has developed a similar sociological model to Goldthorpe's in which there are four elements, two normative and two structural.

> The argument in brief is that to the extent that economistic values of calculative self-interested advantage are more widespread and strongly held; that any normative system which might restrain the pursuit of such goals is weaker or less pervasive; that power is more dispersed among different groups or individuals so that they are

> able to affect the prices of the goods and services (including labour power) that they sell or affect the pattern of government expenditure in their favour; and that the productive capacity of the system is low, then the more likely there is to be a high inflation. Conversely, low economism, high normative restraint, power limited to a few groups or possessed by buyers rather than sellers and high productive capacity are factors likely to facilitate stable prices.[8]

Assuming that these are polar cases and that Gilbert's four factors are independent and so might in principle vary independently, it remains unclear, at least to me, what the implications for income relativities of changes in the normative variables alone might be. On the other hand, given the common-sense assumption that any accumulation in power will in most cases be used to advance sectional self-interest, then we can infer that a more even balance of power should bring about a convergence of incomes even though it is the limitation on productive capacity within the economic system which renders that situation inflationary. An increase in inequality between groups in other respects would tend to be used to bring about a growing inequality of income regardless of the productive capacity of the system. So Gilbert's model fits Routh's observed relationship with income convergence tending to be inflationary and a declining rate of inflation associated with growing divergence. It remains to be seen how far the pattern has been maintained in the recent rise and fall in inflation rates.

To summarize these hypotheses, for the period of increasing inflation we can infer (a) from Goldthorpe that income relativities should remain stable; and (b) from Gilbert that income relativities should converge somewhat. In the period of declining rates of inflation which has since occurred we can infer (c) from Goldthorpe and similarly from Gilbert that incomes would diverge except in the situation where (d) the decline in inflation reflects transformation of the balance of power when again there should be signs of convergence.

EARNINGS RELATIVITIES

The first problem in estimating how class interests have prospered is to determine what we understand them to be. On the one hand (i) we may conceive of the conflicting interests as represented in general (and rather abstract) terms by the return to capital and labour respectively. Alternatively (ii) capital and labour may be identified as categories of individuals deriving their livelihood from these sources. Thirdly (iii) we may consider the relevant groups to be those in different and distinctive positions within the labour market and

address ourselves to the benefits accruing to identifiable socio-economic groups or occupational classes.

(i) *Capital and Labour* Evidence on the return to capital and labour can be drawn from the National Income and Expenditure Blue Books. Table I represents the share of Gross National Product received by capital and labour between 1970 and 1982.

The share of GNP going to employment rises with rising inflation rates and falls as inflation rates fall. So far so good. The share going to capital varies inversely for most of the period covered though much less consistently but in the years after 1979–80 as the inflation rate falls so too do profits and property income from abroad. Over the whole period from 1970 despite the prevailing historically high rates of inflation there has been little change with a slight decline in the share of GNP accounted for by income from employment. In relation to the hypotheses suggesting convergence in inflationary periods then this data provides some ambiguous confirmation. Over the short run in 1974–5 and in 1979–80 labour gained at the expense of capital in the years of increasing inflation rates and vice versa when inflation decreased. However since 1980 the relationship no longer seems to

TABLE I *Incomes from employment and capital as a percentage of GNP in the United Kingdom 1970–82*

	Percentages		
	Income from employment	Gross trading profits of companies (including financial institutions) *plus* net property income from abroad	Annual rate of inflation based on General Index of Retail Prices (all items)
1970	69.2	15.0	6.4
1971	67.0	14.8	9.4
1972	67.3	15.5	7.1
1973	66 2	17.5	9.1
1974	68 3	16.7	16 0
1975	71 4	13.1	24.2
1976	68 2	14.3	16.5
1977	67.3	15.8	15 9
1978	66.6	16.2	8.3
1979	67.5	18 2	13.4
1980	69.4	15.3	18.0
1981	68.1	15 0	11.9
1982	66.3	14.9	8.6

Sources Central Statistical Office *National Income and Expenditure for the United Kingdom*, see *Annual Abstracts of Statistics 117* Table 14 2 and *120* Table 14 1 and *Internal Purchasing Power of the Pound*, March 1984.

hold while over the longer run since 1970, despite historically high inflation rates throughout, there has been very little change.

(ii) *Capitalists and Workers* To regard the classes as groups of people, say capitalists and workers, rather than as the abstract confrontation of capital and labour directs our attention to the more appropriate measure of personal income. Recognizing that there will be considerable overlap as individuals derive their income from more than a single source, nevertheless we can compare the changing relationship of income from employment (excluding welfare benefits this time) and personal property income. Again the *National Income and Expenditure* Blue Books provide the relevant information.

As a proportion of total personal income, income from employment fell continuously from 1975 and the income of the self-employed continuously from 1973 to 1981 (see Table II). Movements in total personal property income largely reflect the rise in the imputed rent of owner-occupied dwellings and the receipts of life assurance and superannuation schemes as the spread of owner occupation and the rise in house prices and the provision of superannuation spread more widely. Other property income, which includes interest on savings, dividends on equities etc., fell as a proportion of total personal income to 1977–8 rose to a level somewhat below that of the early 1970s in 1980 and fell again after that. In brief this shows no apparent

TABLE II *Personal income from employment and from property as a percentage of total personal income: United Kingdom 1972–82*

		Percentages		
		Income from rents, dividends and interest		
	Total income from employment	Receipts of life assurance and superannuation schemes	Imputed rent of owner-occupied dwellings	Other receipts
1972	69.0	3.1	3.2	3.3
1973	68.7	3.1	3.3	3.2
1974	68.9	3.1	3.7	3 2
1975	70.8	2.8	3.6	2.9
1976	69.7	2.9	3.7	2.8
1977	69.2	3.2	3.7	2.3
1978	68.8	3.3	3.8	2.3
1979	67.8	3.8	3.9	3.0
1980	67.7	3.9	3.9	3.1
1981	66.7	4.0	4.0	2.5
1982	65.2	4 1	4 1	2.8

Source *Annual Abstract of Statistics 120*, 1984, Table 14 2.

relationship with fluctuations in the rate of inflation and over the long run of the series of figures the decline in the share of personal income going to employment is contrary to the expectation of class convergence in an era of continuing high levels of inflation. On the other hand the share of income from capital sources was less too in 1982 than ten years earlier.

(iii) *Occupational Classes* The most detailed source on occupational earnings before tax since 1970 is the annual New Earnings Survey which provides information on a one per cent sample of employees in Great Britain in April each year. In the published tables data is generally presented for all occupations represented by at least a hundred and in some cases fewer. Even in such a large sample this means that some smaller groups do not appear separately distinguished every year but the coverage has been fuller since 1979. This, as we shall see however, does make for some difficulties when making some comparisons over a period of time especially for women employees.[9]

To reduce the NES data to more manageable proportions and more important to provide some degree of historical continuity over a longer timespan, it seemed worthwhile to sort the material on the separate occupations into the occupational classes developed by Routh in his magisterial study of occupation and pay in Britain 1906 to 1979,[10] which is presented in his book and in his evidence to the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth. Apart from the advantage of allowing some continuity with that important account of historical trends, the re-classification of NES data, though laborious, permits us to make use of that valuable source right back to 1970 in spite of the change in the grouping of occupations which was introduced in the survey in 1973 and which has limited the timespan of some occupational analyses based on NES results.[11]

Unlike the material Routh assembled, however, the New Earnings Survey only includes employees. Where the two sets of evidence overlap for the years 1970 and 1978 we can make a direct comparison (see Table III). An analysis of the NES data and the figures Routh presented in his book and in his evidence to the Diamond Commission suggest that the principal discrepancy between the two appears to be the under-representation of some of the highest paid professionals and managers in the NES so that the overall range of gross weekly earnings for men is smaller in the NES than in Routh's account but the general direction of change is the same for all groups except foremen whose earnings according to the NES showed a slight loss in relation to the all class average compared with a slight gain according to Routh. Amongst men the only case where the percentage increase in annual earnings between 1970 and 1978 differs by more than ten percentage points is for managers who enjoyed a greater increase in earnings according to the NES.

TABLE III. *Comparison of Routh's estimates and New Earnings Survey data for average annual earnings of occupational classes 1970 and 1978*

	Routh			*New Earnings Survey*		
	1970 £	*1978* £	*Percentage increase* %	*1970* £	*1978* £	*Percentage increase* %
Men						
1A Higher professions	2928	8286	183	1992	5798	191
1B Lower professions	1885	5435	188	1810	5148	184
2B Managers	3400	8050	137	2194	6427	192
3 Clerical	1337	3701	177	1420	3936	177
4 Foremen	1669	4685	180	1690	4633	174
5 Skilled manual	1440	4354	202	1456	4311	196
6 Semi-skilled	1298	3827	197	1290	3838	198
7 Unskilled	1154	3390	194	1201	3432	186
All full-time men	1707	4786	180	1529	4519	196
Women						
1A Higher professions	2460	6712	173	—	4830	—
1B Lower professions	1224	3892	218	1154	3736	224
2B Managers	1870	5070	171	—	3768	—
3 Clerical	839	2730	225	842	2730	224
4 Forewomen	1014	3214	217	1014	3214	217
5 Skilled manual	677	2246	232	697	2246	222
6 Semi-skilled	645	2356	265	676	2356	249
7 Unskilled	610	2275	273	619	2275	265
All full-time women	824	2691	227	822	2881	250

Sources· *New Earnings Surveys* Part D 1970 and 1978, Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth *Report No 8, 5th Report on The Standing Reference*, HMSO, 1979, Table 6.8 p. 80

The less complete coverage of separately identifiable occupational titles in the earlier NES data for women, together with Routh's apparent reliance on this source for some groups of women in 1978 make comparison between the two sources difficult though the NES generally indicates a smaller increase in the earnings of women employed full-time in manual jobs but a greater average increase overall. For these reasons one should not simply abut NES-derived earnings averages on to Routh's earlier series even though the general direction of change and, when one ensures the internal compatibility of the NES groups over time, the ranking of occupational class earnings relativities remains consistent between the two sources.[12]

Movements in average earnings relativities for the several occupational classes can be gauged either discontinuously, that is simply by looking at their respective increases over the whole or parts of the period with which we are concerned, or continuously year by year. In the first case the inequalities of initial earnings means that proportional

changes over a long period may make it hard to see the relative standing of the various groups at the end. In the case of direct continuous comparison, it is necessary not only to allow for the changing value of money by relating the average for each occupational class to the average for all classes but obviously at the same time to take into account the changing relative size of the various classes which affects this average itself. In the following analysis this has been done by weighting the earnings of each occupational class by their relative numbers in 1970.

The reorganization of categories used by the NES from 1973 onwards does not present any severe problem in continuity since the separately distinguishable occupations can be consistently coded into Routh's occupational categories throughout. However the increased coverage from 1979 among some higher paid among the higher professions and the disappearance of entries for top managers affects comparisons between the two occupational classes concerned and unless these are taken into account spurious movements in income relativities between the two groups can appear which need to be allowed for. Although the more recent inclusive data is an improvement it is only possible to make comparisons over the period for which evidence is available by standardizing the composition of the occupational classes year on year. These structural changes, it would appear, have important effects on average earnings comparisons which are not always appreciated by some analysts. Comparison of earnings relativities over time is beset by many difficulties.

The shape of the occupational structure has changed so that overall average earnings have risen in part as the proportions in higher paid jobs have increased while the numbers in worse paid groups have declined. Among men classifiable in the New Earnings Surveys between 1970 and 1983 those in the professions increased from 11 per cent to 22 per cent and managers from 5 per cent to 9 per cent while 66 per cent of men in the 1970 survey were manual workers but only 52 per cent of the men in the 1983 survey were. Amongst women those in non-manual jobs increased from 63 per cent to 75 per cent of those in full-time employment while manual workers decreased from 37 per cent to 25 per cent in the same period.

Obviously money earnings have increased but it is also evident that for most groups in full-time employment real earnings increased throughout the period too. While prices increased between 1970 and 1983 by 359 per cent, the New Earnings Surveys show that gross average weekly earnings of full-time employees grew by 457 per cent for men and by 577 per cent for women, a real increase for full-time men of 27 per cent and for full-time women of 61 per cent. We need to examine the timing and distribution between occupational classes of these increases more closely however.

(a) *Percentage increases in average earnings* In the years since 1970 we can distinguish three periods. First, up to 1974 a time of relatively high inflation rates by the standards of British experience in the present century was followed by the 1974–79 period of exceptionally high rates after which we have the declining rates through to 1983. These conveniently coincide with the period of the Heath Conservative administration from June 1970 to February 1974, the Wilson-Callaghan Labour years to May 1979 and lastly the again Conservative Thatcher period and in turn approximately enough for our purposes with NES samples drawn in April each year.

Since 1970 all groups of employees have seen their earnings rise faster than the increase in the cost of living except for men in the lower professional group, mainly in teaching, between 1970 and 1974 and male managerial employees between 1974 and 1979, and male foremen and supervisors, semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers between 1979 and 1983 (see Table IV). Women's earnings increased more than men's in all groups except amongst the lower professions, mainly again teachers and nurses, between 1974 and 1979 and managerial workers between 1979 and 1983 where it is clear women employees tend to be concentrated in the lower paid positions. Amongst men the rank order of occupational classes in 1983 was the same as in 1970 and though in 1979 the average earnings of managers had sunk slightly below those in the high professions they regained their pre-eminence by 1983. Clerical and sales workers' average earnings remained between those of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers having made up lost ground especially after 1979 after increasing more slowly than manual workers' earnings in the early 1970s.

Women as noted tend not to be very well represented among the best paid managerial jobs and their highest average earnings were found amongst those in the professions followed, perhaps surprisingly, by forewomen and supervisors. In 1983 unskilled women were on average earning more than the semi-skilled though for most of the period too few were in skilled manual jobs to show up in the survey. Even more than with men, the greater increases in women's earnings between 1974 and 1979 were received by manual workers but this was reversed after 1979.

In terms of relative gains in earnings then there were some signs of convergence for men in full-time employment during both the Heath period and to a lesser extent the Labour years with manual workers gaining on the non-manual groups up to 1974 though the worse paid did less well than the better paid within each. Between 1974 and 1979 amongst male manual workers again the occupational classes with higher average earnings gained more than those with lower average earnings and, except for foremen, all saw smaller percentage increases

than non-manual occupational classes except for managers. It was the comparatively poor performance of managers' earnings, being the highest of all at the beginning of the period, which provides a degree of convergence in those years. From 1979 the general pattern for men is one of growing divergence between the earnings of occupational classes with managers making the greatest gains and, except for the foremen and supervisors, unskilled manual workers the least.

Amongst women employees the picture is less clear. With a couple of exceptions all groups saw their earnings increase faster than those of men in each of the three periods though they remained appreciably lower than men's in every occupational class. In the Heath period the greatest improvements occurred at the extremes, in the earnings of unskilled manual workers and of those in the professions, the least in clerical and sales workers' earnings. In the Labour years 1974–1979 the greatest gains were again made by manual workers but also by women in management while the lower professionals mainly in health, education and welfare, gained least, exceptionally even less than men also in those areas. In the Thatcher period from 1979, however, manual workers saw the smallest increase in earnings among women employees and the general pattern of change for women, as for men, looks divergent though not consistently so with managers doing less well than some other groups of women and notably less well than men in the same occupational class.

In terms of percentage increases then the expectation that in periods of high and rising inflation there would be some convergence of earnings while in a time of declining inflation rates they would diverge again is confirmed in broad terms though some movements within the manual and non-manual sectors run contrary to the overall pattern. Differential percentage gains across an unequal earnings distribution however may be misleading and we must look at the pattern of earnings relativities more directly in order to see what the final outcome was.

(b) *Occupational class earnings relativities*

(i) *Men* To the comparison of accelerating and decelerating gains it is necessary to add some estimate of their outcomes and how they have affected the relative positions of the occupational classes. Table V expresses average gross weekly earnings as a percentage of the all class average for men. The averages are weighted to allow for the changing occupational structure and the first set of figures for 1979 onwards standardizes class membership so as to exclude the wider and more detailed data available in the later series of surveys which are not otherwise strictly comparable with the earlier material. The second set of figures for 1979 onwards is based on the complete set of data from the New Earnings Survey and unweighted.

For men Table V indicates very little change in the relative

TABLE IV. *Average gross weekly earnings of full-time employees* by occupational class 1970–1983*

	Average Gross Weekly Earnings				Great Britain Percentage Increase			
	1970 £	*1974* £	*1979* £	*1983* £	*1970–4* %	*1974–9* %	*1979–83* %	*1970–83* %
Men								
1A Higher professions	38.3	59 1	123 9	211.4	54 3	109.6	70.6	452.0
1B Lower professions	34.8	50.6	108.9	175.8	45.4	115.2	61.4	405.2
2B Managers	42.2	64.0	120.9	218.0	51.7	88.9	80.3	416.6
3 Clerical	27.3	40.3	86.6	143.7	47 6	114.9	65.9	426.4
4 Foremen	32.5	49.0	104.6	155.1	50.8	113.5	48.3	377 2
5 Skilled manual	28.0	45.1	95.7	151.4	61.1	112.2	58 2	440 7
6 Semi-skilled manual	24.8	40.2	85.0	131 5	62.1	111.4	54.7	430.2
7 Unskilled	23.1	36.7	76.8	117.5	58.9	109.3	53.0	408.7
All f.t. men	29.4	46.5	98.8	163.8	58.2	112 5	65.8	457.1

Women								
1A Higher professions	—	43 5	93.8	162.5	—	115 6	73.2	—
1B Lower professions	22.2	38.3	78.2	139.0	72.5	104.2	77.7	526 1
2B Managers	—	30 1	70.1	121 2	—	132.9	72.9	—
3 Clerical	16.2	26.0	58.5	98.9	60.5	125.0	69.1	510.5
4 Forewomen	19.5	32.5	70.5	124.3	66 7	116.9	76.3	537.4
5 Skilled manual	13.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6 Semi-skilled manual	13.0	21.5	50.8	80.8	65.4	136 3	59.1	521.5
7 Unskilled manual	11.9	20.9	49.4	81.7	75 6	136 4	65.4	586.6
All f.t. women	15.4	26.6	61.8	99.0	66.5	135 0	73.0	576.6
Index of Retail Prices at April (Jan 1974 = 100)	72.5	106.1	214.2	332.5	46.3	101 9	55.2	358.6

* including those affected by absence
Source calculated from New Earnings Surveys

TABLE V: *Average gross weekly earnings of full-time employees in Great Britain 1970–1983 as a percentage of men's all-class average: men by occupational class and all women*

	Men aged 21 and over: Women aged 18 and over									
	Occupational Classes[1] (Standardized: 1970 Weights)									
	1A	1B	2B	3	4	5	6	7	All Men	All Women
1970	130	118	144	93	111	95	84	79	100	54
1971	135	119	146	95	113	98	87	81	100	55
1972	141	115	145	97	115	99	89	81	100	56
1973	134	116	161	87	129	100	88	79	100	55
1974	133	114	145	91	111	102	91	83	100	57
1975	134	123	132	90	111	103	90	82	100	62
1976	138	126	134	93	111	102	88	82	100	65
1977	137	122	141	93	111	101	90	81	100	65
1978	136	120	150	92	108	101	90	80	100	64
1979	131	116	128	92	111	101	90	81	100	63
1980	152	116	147	90	112	100	89	80	100	64
1981	138	131	136	95	113	100	88	82	100	65
1982	138	124	137	94	112	100	88	80	100	64
1983	143	119	147	97	105	102	89	79	100	65
	Unweighted									
1979	130	110	132	86	106	97	86	78	100	63
1980	148	111	140	86	106	95	84	76	100	64
1981	134	121	126	87	104	93	81	76	100	65
1982	135	115	127	87	104	93	81	74	100	64
1983	136	107	133	88	95	92	80	71	100	65

[1] occupational classes as in Tables III and IV
Source: calculated from *New Earnings Surveys*.

earnings of semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers since 1970. Skilled manual workers' relative earnings rose to reach the all class average by 1973 and fluctuated very slightly around that level thereafter. There was some rise in Foremen's earnings to 1973 too but then they returned to their 1970 relative position and, apart from 1983, remained within 3 percentage points of that level afterwards. Clerical workers' relative earnings at first rose but dropped back to about 90 per cent of the all class average close to the level of semi-skilled manual workers until 1980 but appear to have risen to approach more closely to those of skilled manual workers after 1980.[13] Managers have seen greater changes in their relative position with a peak in 1973 followed by a series of fluctuations to a position in 1983 a little above the 1970 level. Men in the Lower Professions lost ground in the earlier 1970s, were relatively better off in between 1975 and 1978, fell back again in 1979 and 80, gained substantially in 1981 but declined after that. Relative earnings in the higher professions rose in

the first three years of the 1970s and after several fluctuations generally remained at a slightly higher level in the early 1980s. The greater range evident in the unweighted and unstandardized figures at the foot of the table reflect both the more comprehensive coverage of later NES tables and the increase in average earnings resulting from compositional effects as the better paid occupational groups have grown while the less skilled manual classes have shrunk as proportions of employed men. Women's relative earnings, as Tzannatos and Zabalata have already noted rose in the years following the introduction of equal pay legislation and then stayed more or less steady at the new higher level.[14]

Figures for individual years may be affected by sampling error and not too much emphasis should be given to singular peaks or dips. In Figure I these have been smoothed out by taking a series of overlapping three-year averages to indicate the general picture. There the convergence of earnings of managers and higher professionals from the mid 1970s is clearly apparent as are the relative gains made by those in the lower professions and in clerical and related jobs from the late 1970s onwards. Apart from the loss of relative position by managers and foremen and the general improvement in women's relative earnings after the early 1970s there are no dramatic changes. The general picture is one of a very stable pattern of earnings relativities despite the rise and fall of inflation rates and the percentage gains made by some groups in the period of rapid inflation and others later as inflation rates fell.

(ii) *Women* Tzannatos and Zabalata's analysis of NES data on women's earnings between 1970 and 1980 showed that although the distribution of women's employment had changed, with a shift from lower paid to higher paid sectors, the increase in women's relative earnings in the 1970s took place across all industrial sectors and within all occupational groups and in the largest, clerical and related occupations, in particular. Comparing relative pay over the period 1973–80 they note 'What is striking is that whether one occupation expanded or contracted in terms of female employment, relative pay always increased'.[15]

This is apparent too for even of the broad occupational classes as Table VI makes clear. As we have seen for women's earnings in general most of the increase took place in the mid 1970s and this is also the case for each of the occupational classes. The remaining differential would appear to be the consequence of the different distribution of men and women within each occupational class with men more likely to be in more senior positions partly at least due to their greater likelihood of having an unbroken career, being more likely to possess post-entry qualifications and more able to be geographically mobile.[16] The greater discrepancies in management

FIGURE I. *Percentage of full-time men's all-class gross average weekly earnings.* (3 year average – standardized classes.)

GREAT BRITAIN 1970–83 Men aged 21 and over



from New Earnings Surveys.

and semi-skilled manual earnings would seem to be related to the greater degree of job segregation in private sector employment which predominate in these areas of employment. In the public sector where most of the professionals and the unskilled are employed, job segregation appears to be less. Women's relative earnings have been influenced only very slightly however by changes in their pattern of employment because a similar redistribution has been taking place in men's employment too.[17]

Although women's average earnings in each occupational class are less than those of men, the range of women's average earnings between the classes is substantially greater (see Table VII). The low

TABLE VI. *Average gross weekly earnings of women full-time employees as a percentage of average gross weekly earnings of men full-time employees' in Great Britain*

	1970–3	1980–3
1A Higher professions	—	71.1
1B Lower professions	65 3	74.1
2B Management	42.4	55.9
3 Clerical workers	61.1	68.9
4 Foremen and supervisors	59.7	73.3
5 Skilled manual workers	48.4	—
6 Semi-skilled manual workers	54.1	60.9
7 Unskilled manual workers	53.7	67.7
All full-time employees	55 0	64.7

1. Women aged 18 and over, men aged 21 and over
2. — indicates data not available
Source: calculated from *New Earnings Surveys*.

TABLE VII *Women's average gross weekly earnings by occupational class in Great Britain 1970–83*

	Occupational Classes[1] Women aged 18 and over. (1970 weights)								
	1A	1B	2B	3	4	5	6	7	All Women
1970	—	144	—	105	127	87	84	77	100
1971	—	143	—	103	127	86	85	79	100
1972	—	143	—	105	130	86	85	80	100
1973	—	149	132	108	131	—	96	83	100
1974	184	143	128	110	138	—	91	89	100
1975	173	159	117	104	141	—	90	92	100
1976	166	159	115	105	130	—	88	93	100
1977	159	141	111	101	118	—	85	86	100
1978	172	147	124	107	137	—	91	94	100
1979	173	144	129	108	130	—	94	91	100
1980	180	145	135	108	135	—	92	94	100
1981	172	157	129	107	131	—	88	90	100
1982	177	150	131	109	136	—	90	89	100
1983	178	152	133	108	136	—	89	90	100
Unweighted									
1979	152	127	113	95	114	—	82	80	100
1980	157	126	117	94	118	—	80	81	100
1981	148	135	111	92	113	—	76	78	100
1982	152	129	113	94	117	—	77	77	100
1983	158	135	118	96	121	—	79	80	100

[1] Occupational classes see tables III and IV above.
Source calculated from *New Earnings Surveys*.

level of earnings of women managers reflects their concentration within that occupational class in retail and catering trades where earnings are generally less than in the large organizations employing women clerical supervisors who constitute a large proportion of those in occupational class 4. Because of the small numbers in some occupational classes there is a greater year on year variability in the figures for women's earnings and again these have been smoothed out in the accompanying Figure II.

FIGURE II *Women's average gross weekly earnings as a percentage of women's all class average* (1970 WEIGHTS)

GREAT BRITAIN 1970–83 Women aged 18 and over

TABLES I–VII



from New Earnings Surveys

It is clear in the figure how professional and managerial workers lost ground in the later 1970s but made up their relative losses from 1979. Amongst women in manual work, unskilled workers gained on the semi-skilled through the early 1970s and thereafter the average earnings of the two occupational classes have remained similar so as to suggest either that our classification is less satisfactory when applied to women employees or that there is in effect a single job market for less skilled women workers without even the small but consistent degree of differentiation evident for men.

Again there is some sign of convergence in the period of higher levels of inflation with a restoration of relativities afterwards indeed much more markedly than in male earnings though this would appear to be the consequence of a fall followed by a rise in the relative earnings of women in the best paid occupational classes while there was little change in the earnings of women in clerical and manual jobs relatively to the all class average. Again, as with men, the rigidity of over all distribution would seem to be the most striking feature of the years since 1970. As Routh observed, 'the outstanding characteristic of the national pay structure is the rigidity of its relationships'.[18]

CONCLUSION

The relatively larger percentage gains of manual workers in periods of high inflation rates only seem to maintain their relative position in actual earnings while men in the professions and women in the lower professions have improved their position since the late 1970s, though the gross earnings advantages men in management enjoyed in the earlier 1970s would appear to have diminished. Nevertheless there would appear to be some confirmation of the relationship between earnings and inflation trends in the data on employees relativities though not in terms of the relationship between capital and labour or capitalists and workers in general. Thus, in terms of the social conflict models of inflation discussed earlier, this analysis would seem to indicate that the effects are confined to the relative strength of groups *within* the labour market rather than also applying to the classical conception of a struggle between capital and labour.

The effects of inflation are in any case complex. As Piachaud has remarked, 'inflation acts neither as Robin Hood nor as Robber Baron; neither the poor nor the rich are affected in a uniform way'.[19] It taxes wealth and transfers resources to consumption, from savers to borrowers, though the owners of small amounts appear to suffer more than the richer. The effect of inflation is to benefit debtors at the expense of creditors so that, for example house buyers have benefitted at the expense of savers, whilst most earners were able to maintain or improve real incomes. After 1979 however with falling rates of

inflation, saving has become more attractive for those in a position to do so though for the worst paid, let alone the increasing numbers without employment, real living standards fell.

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NOTES

1 Wilfred Beckerman and Tim Jenkinson, University of Oxford unpublished paper see *Sunday Times*, 2 September 1984, p. 54.

2 Guy Routh, *Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906–79*, Macmillan, 1980, pp. 200–1.

3. Central Statistical Office, *The Internal Purchasing Power of the Pound*, March 1984.

4 Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard, 'Incomes Policy and Wage Differentials', *Economica*, 1983, 50, pp. 127–43.

5 Charles S. Maier, 'The politics of inflation in the twentieth century' in Fred Hirsch and John H. Goldthorpe (eds), *The Political Economy of Inflation*, Martin Robertson, 1978, p. 41.

6 John H. Goldthorpe, 'The current inflation. towards a sociological account' in Hirsch and Goldthorpe (eds) *op. cit.*, 1978, p. 210.

7 See T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class*, Cambridge University Press, 1950, reprinted as Ch. IV of *Sociology at the Crossroads*, Heinemann, 1963

8. Michael Gilbert, 'A Sociological Model of Inflation', *Sociology*, 1981, 15, p. 194.

9. The change in the sampling frame from National Insurance cards to PAYE records in 1974 may have reduced the representation in the sample of some low paid workers but in the analysis presented here any such effect is not discernable and since only full-time adult employees (men 21 and over, women 18 and over) have been included, and generally only those in occupations sufficiently numerous to be separately identifiable for recording purposes, many of those whom the change in basis would have excluded after 1974, mainly part-time workers that is, would not have been included in this discussion anyway.

10. I am most grateful to Dr Routh for kindly providing further information about the allocation of particular occupational titles to occupational classes

11. See e.g. P. Z. Tzannatos and A. Zabalata, 'The Anatomy of the Rise of British Female Relative Wages in the 1970s: Evidence from the New Earnings Survey', *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 1984, XXII, p. 184.

12. I was nevertheless mistaken in my attempt to bring Routh's series as up to date as possible in my book when I added on his NES derived 1979 figures to the end of the earlier long series with the effect of suggesting a degree of convergences which was unwarranted See Trevor Noble, *Structure and Change in Modern Britain*, Batsford, 1981, Table 7.1 p. 232

13. Cf. Reward Regional Surveys report for August 1984 reported in *The Times*, 13 August 1984.

14 *Op. cit.*, 1984, p. 177.

15 Tzannatos and Zabalata, *op. cit*, 1984, p. 182.

16 See e g Rosemary Crompton and Gareth Jones, *White Collar Proletariat: deskilling and gender in clerical work*, Macmillan, 1984.

17. See p 247 above.

18. Routh, *op. cit.*, 1980, p 197.

19. David Piachaud, 'Inflation and income distribution', ch 4, in Hirsch and Goldthorpe (eds) *op cit* 1978, p. 115.

Gordon Marshall, David Rose, Carolyn Vogler and Howard Newby

Class, citizenship, and distributional conflict in modern Britain

ABSTRACT

The authors are at present researching the impact of economic recession on class processes in contemporary Britain. The first stage of their study involves a national sample survey of 2000 people between the ages of 16 and 64. This has been linked to an international project on class structure and class consciousness originating from the USA. Many of the results from the British survey will be directly comparable with those obtained for North America, the Scandinavian countries, Australasia, Japan, and (it is hoped) at least three additional states within the Common Market. This paper summarizes the reasoning of the British team in the course of constructing the questionnaire. Although data from the study have yet to be analysed systematically there is some evidence from other sources to suggest that the argument submitted here is sound in essentials.

I

It is widely acknowledged that the separate writings of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim do not offer a complete or unambiguous theory of social class. As a rule, however, subsequent discussion of class matters – at least among European sociologists – has been conducted within the parameters established by the early theorists.[1] Few have felt the need to treat the subject *ab ovo*. The authors of this paper provide no exception. We therefore take as our datum the impressive achievements of the triumvirate towards an understanding of social class relationships. Their respective shortcomings will emerge in due course.

In different ways each of the founding fathers discussed the correlates both of industrialization and market capitalism. The former refers to a threefold process embracing the development of technology

(technical division of labour), growth of manufacturing industry (sectoral division of labour), and changes in the organization of production (social division of labour). The three dimensions of the division of labour raise issues primarily of co-ordination and control as these emerge from the differentiation, allocation, and negotiation of roles and tasks. The development of market capitalism, on the other hand, describes the extension of market principles to social life in general and the consequences of this for the distribution of wealth in society. It pertains to issues arising out of the ownership and exchange of private property.

These two processes are in principle distinct and often, in practice, empirically discrete. If capitalism is defined as the private ownership of property and transaction of social relations through the market by way of a cash nexus then Rome during the last two centuries of the Republic and the first two of the Principate was no less capitalist than was England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indeed it could be argued that urban markets in the former were subject to fewer external constraints (enforced monopolies, prices, or trading practices) than were those of the English towns and cities. Nevertheless the development of machine technology and growth of large-scale production had reached levels in early-modern England that were unimagined and unimaginable in classical Rome.[2]

Of course it is a commonplace observation that Marx, Weber, and Durkheim each wrote extensively about the progressive commercialization of life in general and the social consequences of the development of machine technology in particular. An important consequence of this is that all three refer their analyses of social class to aspects of both processes. It is true that their discussions of class mechanisms are generally held to be quite dissimilar. Above all else, Marx's account of social class relationships is said to differ from those proferred by Weber and Durkheim in that Marxism postulates an explicit theory of the relationship between market capitalism and the division of labour whereas sociology takes the occupational structure as given, 'as the starting point for the analysis of social stratification, not as a phenomenon requiring explanation in its own right'.[3] We shall argue that this is, in fact, a misconception. Let us examine each of the three contributions in turn.

For most commentators Marx is the theorist *par excellance* of social class relationships. Almost everything he wrote is directly or indirectly concerned with social class and this renders concise summary of his position understandably difficult. (The significance of the infamous unwritten 52nd chapter of the third volume of *Capital* is not that Marx had yet to express himself fully upon the subject of 'Classes' but that, in addressing himself directly to this topic, he might have provided clarification of his already extensive expositions upon the theme.) Nevertheless it can reasonably be claimed that his

conception of social class relationships involves the three dimensions of ownership, production, and struggle.

In Marx's early writings relations of ownership and production are merged into a single dimension of exploitation. Thus, for example, the analysis of alienation that is offered in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* describes a proletariat that is simultaneously deprived both of property and of unified (and therefore meaningful) work. The accumulation of capital and division of labour conjointly impoverish the workers, polarize the classes, and destabilize capitalist society by generating a crisis of industrial overproduction. At this stage Marx offers no theory of the relationship between the two processes. He merely asserts that they are empirically inseparable. In *The German Ideology* he returns to this theme insisting that the social relations which are the fundamental determinants of class structure embrace private property and the division of labour as 'identical expressions'.[4]

However Marx cannot be said to have been consistent about this. Elsewhere in *The German Ideology* he seems to accord priority to the division of labour by deriving from its structure both the general forms of ownership and specific distribution of goods. Two years later he insists that the relationship be reversed, conceding only that the division of labour can produce diverse occupations within social classes, so bringing members of these classes into conflict (but not *class* conflict) with each other. This is probably the position Marx would have developed in *Capital III*. There too he insists that

> the owners merely of labour-power, owners of capital, and landowners whose respective sources of income are wages, profit and ground-rent, in other words, wage-labourers, capitalists and landowners, constitute then three big classes of modern society based upon the capitalist mode of production.

Within these social classes the social division of labour separates labourers, capitalists, and landowners into an 'infinite fragmentation of interest and rank'.[5]

In his later works, therefore, Marx maintained an analytical distinction between ownership (which separates social classes) and the social division of labour (which delineates strata or fragments within classes). Moreover, because his account of the capitalist mode of production rests upon the labour theory of value, he can offer a concise statement of the relationship between the two: the division of labour (in the specific form of machine-based large-scale factory production) is the instrument by which the capitalist class maintains the extraction of surplus value despite the inherent tendency of the rate of profit to fall.[6] In fact the relevant passages in Marx's texts are sufficiently ambiguous to have permitted the development of two such formulations and these are neatly reflected in contemporary literature

on the labour process. In Braverman's interpretation of the deskilling and labour displacing features of modern technology, subdivisions of the work process are an attempt to reduce skill levels, so cutting wage costs and protecting 'efficiency' (or in other words maintaining the rate of profit). Others, Stone and Edwards for example, have argued that the introduction of the factory system of manufacture, application of new technologies, subdivision and hierarchical organization of tasks are all attempts to control labour irrespective of the issue of profit. These theories can, of course, be rendered complementary since they differ only in the extent to which there is an explicit reliance on the labour theory of value in reconstructing the motives of capitalists and managers. It can reasonably be argued that the whole point about controlling labour is that this is a prerequisite to extracting a surplus from it.[7]

Finally, it must be recognized that Marx envisages class relations existing at political and ideological levels, quite independently of the relationships that inhere in the labour process. This is the Marx of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* and *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850*. It is sufficient for our purposes simply to note that the elements of economic, political, and ideological struggle separately and together pervade his account of class relations. Since Marx is irretrievably ambiguous, both about the respective parts played by economics, politics, and ideology in the determination of classes, and about the roles of people, surplus value, and the relations of production generally as the makers and bearers of history, we do not intend to pursue these questions here.[8] The metaphysics of relative autonomy appear simply to have translated the problem of the *an sich/für sich* transformation into another vocabulary without in any sense resolving them. Likewise the *problématique* of the subject remains, indeed, problematic. In short, Marx's own writings are sufficiently inconsistent to ensure that the different interpretations of Hindess and Hirst and Cohen, Althusser and Thompson, are inseparable if adjudication is attempted merely by appeal to original sources.[9]

But what of Weber? His theory of social class is usually contrasted with that of Marx since the two are held to be more or less diametrically opposed. In fact, for Weber as for Marx, social class relationships embrace the same three dimensions of ownership, production, and struggle. This is nowhere more apparent than in Weber's definition of class itself which employs the criteria of private ownership of property, possession of and control over marketable skills, and association of class members in class organizations.[10]

Like Marx, Weber makes a fundamental distinction between propertied and propertyless classes, and allows for a similar differentiation of individuals into social strata within these according to the different types of property, services, and skills that each person possesses or controls. It is at this point, however, that Marx and

Weber are commonly judged to have parted company. Central to Weber's conception of class is the market. It is commonable life-chances as distributed by the capitalist market that circumscribe social classes. Marx, guided by his interpretation of the labour theory of value, was unhappy with this formulation since, at least as it appears in classical economics, the implication is that the contract between capital and labour is in some sense an exchange of equivalents. But, for Marx, the proposition that the market is the basic driving force in capitalism mistakes the level of appearance for that of reality. Symmetrical exchanges in the market are an illusion behind which surplus value is extracted from labour-power in the process of production.[11]

While this commonly held perception of the difference between the two approaches is indeed accurate it also serves, at the same time, to undermine the claim that Weber offers no theory of the division of labour (and hence of the occupational structure). In fact, for Weber, the same mechanism stands behind the social division of labour as generates the distribution of property in the form of capital and land; namely, the capitalist market itself. It is the operation of the capitalist market that determines the sectoral and technical divisions of labour (whether or not new technologies will improve efficiency or profits), and indeed determines the social division of labour itself, since this is nothing more than the bargain struck by employer and employee in the unequal exchange of more or less scarce formal job opportunities against more or less scarce socially agreed skills. As Braverman's critics constantly remind us the social division of labour is *negotiated* between management and workers. It is 'a continual process of conflict, compromise and even co-operation between capitalists and workers, over the form and content of the components of technical change'.[12] It is structured, in short, by market exchanges of the same order as determine the distribution of property. Labour power, and the differing skills embraced by it, are simply forms of property which offer variable life-chances on the market.[13]

If the idea that private property and the division of labour interchangeably structure class relations through the medium of market exchanges seems familiar this is perhaps because we have earlier encountered this same proposition. Karl Marx offered precisely such an interpretation of class processes in the Paris Manuscripts and *The German Ideology*. In other words, as far as the ownership and production dimensions of social class relationships are concerned, the young Marx and mature Weber are indistinguishable. It is only in Marx's later texts, beginning with the *Grundrisse*, that his treatment of class can be said in any sense to diverge significantly from that of Weber. The principal distinguishing feature would seem to be the theory of surplus value.

Finally, in respect of Weber's treatment, it is worth noting that, like

Marx, he perceives class relations as existing at the political and ideological as well as economic levels, and insists that the relationships between these levels are a matter for empirical investigation in each case. Class position (commonable life-chances) provides no necessary basis for collective action. Whether or not members of a class recognize and act upon class interests as a class 'is linked to general cultural conditions . . . and is especially linked to the transparency of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the class situation'. In fact, since classes tend not to be groups or communities, it is more often the case that the social sources of shared identity and collective action are located in status groups, these being defined in terms of 'a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of *honour*', normally expressed in 'a specific *style of life*'. Weberian classes, like their Marxian counterparts, are autonomous at the political and ideological levels. The classes which emerge in the class struggle, the antagonistic social relations between people, have an indeterminate and empirically variable relationship to the classes that are defined in material life by relationships between people in the market.[14]

Before going on to spell out the implications of this for the Essex study of class, it is worth recalling Durkheim's conclusions about the division of labour in societies, since these raise directly the related issues of distributional conflict and justice. Like Marx his predecessor and Weber his contemporary, Durkheim addressed himself to the issues both of the division of labour itself, and the extension of market capitalism. Similarly, his discussion of social class involves both processes, for he too analyses class relationships in terms of the same three dimensions of ownership, production, and struggle.

The separation of labour and capital is, for Durkheim, merely a specific form of the division of labour. Class conflict is then a pathological instance of this. The rhetoric here is nigh indistinguishable from that of the Paris Manuscripts, however the causality is somewhat different. Durkheim specifically rejects the labour theory of value, and for commonly acknowledged reasons is not disposed to speculate about the motives of individuals in society, be they capitalists or otherwise. The origins of the division of labour are, instead, social origins: changes in the material and moral density of society. It is unnecessary to pursue the details of Durkheim's account here. Suffice it to say that we concur with the many critics who have challenged the logical and empirical basis of his incomplete and speculative theory about the role of population densities and urbanization in explaining changes in the division of labour.[15] Similarly, and irrespective of the plausibility of his account of the allegedly integrative functions of the social division of labour, the principal effects of abnormalities in the process – anomie, inequality, and inadequate organization – offer too narrow a conception of

conflict in industrial societies. Consequently, Durkheimian theory has most commonly been invoked in explanations of industrial unrest, the example referred to by Durkheim himself. The theory is unequivocably reductionist. All forms of conflict, including class struggles, are simply abnormal forms of the division of labour. Now it may be true that forced and anomic divisions of labour (that is, external inequalities in the conditions affecting contracting partners, and unregulated social relationships) help explain aspects of wage-bargaining, but Durkheim offers no systematic account of how these conflicts (far less social conflicts generally) are structured. How is it that dissatisfied individuals come to ally with each other in common pursuit of a wide variety of goals and programmes? Why are such groups sometimes based on class solidarity and at other times on, say, trades union, gender, religious, or ethnic solidarities? In other words, even if Durkheim expounds a plausible theory of the origins of certain distributional conflicts, he offers no theory of action to account for the specific forms taken by such conflicts.[16]

This is scarcely surprising since Durkheim's view of the social system is explicitly functionalist. Societies are seen to possess homeostatic mechanisms that operate independently of human agency. The ends of particular actors are of no interest to Durkheim since they introduce the spectre of subjectivity in the form of human purposes and motives. All that matters is the self-correcting harmony between socially recognized means and ends. This is why, although Durkheim acknowledged many of the same ills in capitalism as Marx and Weber (unequal exchanges, unregulated competition, meaningless labour), he paid little or no attention to the variety of conflicts engendered by these. They were all abnormal and therefore transient. Once the (temporary) lack of appropriate norms regulating work organization and markets had been rectified a 'normal' state of social order would be re-established. It is true that, in an ideal world, this order would be both more efficient and more just than was presently the case. But Durkheim's lack of realism in locating the principal agents of this new justice and morality in a centralized state bureaucracy, and *gemeinschaftlich*, non-egoistic, occupational associations or corporations, is indicative of his want of a theory of social solidarity as opposed to that of system integration.[17] For Durkheim there is simply order and disorder. The social basis of the latter is invariably located in a pathological form of the division of labour which can (and will) be remedied by the re-imposition of moral regulation. The unanswered question is, of course, 'Regulation according to which (or whose) morality?'

II

Why revisit the founding fathers as part of a project investigating class

processes in Britain in 1984? The answer is simply that this renders more easily defensible both the framework and substance of our argument in respect of the contemporary situation.[18]

The first issue raised by the Essex study is that of the framework of the class analysis itself. The Essex group are collaborators in an international study based on more or less similar survey instruments which replicate questions about work, home, and political life in a dozen or so national contexts. Many participating academics propose to analyse their results using the class schema devised by Erik Olin Wright. Wright's structuralist Marxist conception of class has been extensively criticized elsewhere. We concur with his critics. Wright's analysis (in common with those of most other structuralists) is static, mechanical, crudely deterministic, eliminates human agency, offends common sense and therefore, not surprisingly, offers *ad hoc* explanations for the nature of specific 'historical conjunctures'. For similar reasons we would reject all functional definitions of social class. They also founder on the *raison d'etre* of class analysis: it requires intellectual contortions (and a series of implausible assumptions about the behaviour of ordinary people) in order to link the analysis each generates to the explanation of solidarity, schism, and class action.[19]

In contrast we propose to adopt a broadly Weberian approach in analysing social class in Britain. Specific historical forms of the social division of labour generate a structure of positions such as that found in the UK today: employer, self-employed worker, domestic labourer, and employee, with the last of these in particular differentiated into a complex hierarchy according to varying conditions of employment. Of course certain positions within the structure – manager, supervisor, self-employed worker – typically accrue broadly similar returns in terms of job autonomy, control over various types of decision-making, income, and so forth. However a satisfactory class analysis must take seriously the issues of agency and hence class formation:

> For any such structure of positions, the empirical question can then be raised of how far classes have in fact formed within it, in the sense of specific social collectivities: that is, collectivities that are identifiable through the degree of continuity with which, in consequence of patterns of class mobility and immobility, their members have been associated with particular sets of positions over time; and, in turn, the further issue may be pursued of the degree of distinctiveness of members of identifiable classes in terms of their life-chances, their life-styles and patterns of association, and their socio-political orientations and modes of action.[20]

Social classes are then collectivities of families and individuals who share commonable life-chances over time. This conditional definition of class has the added virtue of recognizing the diverse forms of property – land, capital, skills, and credentials – brought to the

market by individuals and households. Of course for most people life-chances are directly determined by their participation in the labour market as employees – or indirectly determined by the participation of those with whom they form a household sharing communal resources. There would seem to be good grounds, therefore, on which to argue that occupation will be central to the classification of social classes. At this juncture we would say simply that each of the numerous classifications of occupation that are currently available have different strengths and weaknesses. These are matters of common knowledge though still some dispute.[21] Since we do not hold with essentialist definitions of class the most important question is, in our view, an empirical one. Which conception of social class best illuminates the nature of collective action, shared life-styles and beliefs, and patterns of association? Since it will be possible to fit out data to class schemata as diverse as those of Erik Wright, at one extreme, and the Registrar General at the other (embracing the Goldthorpe and Cambridge schemas *en route*), we will be able to provide a systematic comparison of the merits and demerits of these approaches, with reference to real-world processes rather than speculative theorizing.

The most commonly voiced objection to an approach such as our own is that it takes the division of labour (in its various dimensions) for granted. Marx is held to be more satisfactory than Weber in this respect. Clearly we do not share in this assessment. We have argued that, while Durkheim does tend to take the occupational structure for granted, Weber does not. The former's account of the division of labour pertains to general issues of system integration and in particular the processes of what nowadays might be termed structural differentiation. Not only is it empirically questionable but it is also entirely wanting in detail at the level of analysis of the technical, sectoral, and social divisions of labour. Weber, on the other hand, relates ownership to the division of labour in the same manner as did the young Marx. We do not think it necessary to plumb the murky depths of the labour theory of value, transformation problem, and laws of capital composition in order to explain the organization of work and nature of the labour process in capitalist societies. Weber's revised marginalist conception of the operation of the capitalist market is sufficient in itself to explain changes in the division of labour in its various dimensions.[22]

Even if our argument is sound however, and it is granted that in their studies of social class the founding fathers related market capitalism to industrialization in the manner suggested here, the claim might still be made that Marx's approach is *as* satisfactory as that of Weber in this respect and therefore no less valid. While this is true we would disqualify Marx on other grounds. The Marxian theory of class rests on a historicist teleology to which we cannot subscribe. It was a gamble with history which has not paid off. There is simply no

evidence to suggest that under advanced capitalism the working class (however this is defined) is necessarily the rising class. Attempts to find a revolutionary socialist functional equivalent to the proletariat are, if anything, even less convincing and are further testimony to wishful rather than critical thinking.[23] Moreover, and as a corollary of this, Marxism lacks a theory of action adequate to explain either the historical inevitability of the end-shift of the proletariat, from a class in itself to a revolutionary class for itself, or the current reluctance of the western working classes to initiate this. In fact, as David Lockwood has convincingly demonstrated, Marxists have 'theorized' the relationship between class structure and class conflict in ways which are either incompatible with their own first principles, or logically inconsistent, or empirically implausible – where, indeed, they have addressed this issue at all rather than simply resolving it by definitional fiat.[24]

For these reasons we would distance ourselves from those authorities who have argued that class analysis must now proceed via the integration of structuralist accounts of place or function with the insights into process and agency gleaned from recent *Marxisant* analyses of the labour process.[25] Weber seems to us to offer an alternative and more satisfactory explanation of the relationship between ownership and production – the operation of the capitalist market – and in so doing avoids the error of taking the division of labour for granted. Marxist and other proponents of radical theories of the labour market (Gordon, Piore, Reich) and labour process (Braverman, Marglin, Edwards) have simply rediscovered those components of class relationships that Weber discussed under the headings of market and work situations. They have added a new vocabularly but little in the way of original insights into class processes. Neither segmented labour markets nor the deskilling of labour were unknown to Weber.[26] Moreover, Weber's account of status groups, parties, and class organizations provides at least the basis for a theory of class conflict, though it is by no means complete. It can be and has been developed in ways which facilitate explanations of class action (or generally the absence of it) without recourse to dubious concepts such as 'false' consciousness and 'real' (as opposed to 'immediate') interests.[27]

This brings us squarely to the substance of our own interpretation of class processes and distributional conflict in present-day Britain since significant elements in the argument that follows are of clear Weberian genealogy. In particular we wish to argue that sociologists should address the issue of social status more directly than has been their practice during recent years. On what grounds have we reached this conclusion?

III

We begin from an observation about the class structure itself. As has been stated previously it is our view that the market is the primary mechanism determining class processes. Changes in market conditions necessitate the continuous reorganization of capital and labour as the former moves from less to more profitable sectors and technologies. The ownership and control of profits, plant, and investment have all taken new and generally more complex forms. Labour, too, is constantly reorganized as a result of international and sectoral movements of capital and the adoption of new technologies and forms of work organization. These changes in the national and international direction of investment and division of labour have had three important consequences from the point of view of the class structure. First, the ownership and control of capital has become more involved as pension funds, multinational corporations, horizontally and vertically integrated companies, cartels, and 'spheres of interest' have replaced local family proprietorship as the prevailing form of organization.[28] Second, sectoral shifts in the economy (industry shift effects) and in the reorganization and restructuring of labour itself (class composition shift effects) have, on balance, created a more diverse and sectorally uneven economic structure, and one in which the differences between workers in different economic sectors are tending to increase. This has been reinforced by changes in the sexual composition of the labour force and geographical restructuring of the division of labour.[29] Third, the shedding of 'surplus' labour during the current recession has reinforced labour market segmentation, in particular the boundary between those in relatively secure occupational or company careers and the unemployed or subemployed.[30]

The composite effect of these changes has been to render class structures and class processes increasingly opaque. Class is objectively opaque to the extent that forms of ownership and control are distant, more impersonal, and less concrete. The occupational structure has become progressively more complex as the numbers in traditional proletarian occupations are decreased and those in services increased.[31] This generates both theoretical and subjective opacity. In effect the conventional distinction between manual and non-manual labour becomes less salient sociologically and socially. By theoretical opacity we mean simply that the intricacies of modern class arrangements create problems for sociological analysis. This is evident in the plethora of recent attempts by Marxists and sociologists alike to come to terms with the class structures of contemporary societies both conceptually and empirically. These have yielded an *embarras du choix* among occupational classifications and boundary-mapping schemas; a choice, it must be said, in which one can as yet be guided by little beyond personal preference.[32] Similarly the very complexity of

contemporary class structures renders class processes ever more inscrutable to the population at large. This makes it less likely that individuals, especially those who are relatively disprivileged, will perceive a common class cause as informing their interests and action. We would argue, therefore, that the degree of ambiguity, ambivalence, and contradiction which emerges from the literature on, for example, working-class images of society is not merely the result of cognitive mystification.[33] It reflects many of the objective characteristics of the contemporary class structure.

This raises the issue of the extent to which social class has retained its coherence as a strong source of social identity. By definition sociology is less concerned with who a person thinks he or she is in a highly personal sense (Who am I?) than with who a person identifies with (Who are we?). Such social identities can be thought of as important intervening elements in the sociological equation of social structure, social consciousness, and social action. Social identity intercedes between structure on the one hand and consciousness and action on the other. One such identity is with class. Does this identity extend into any sense of what Mann has called totality, opposition, and alternative?[34] Do people see their interests as being in concert with those of others among their class and, moreover, as antagonistic to the interests of other classes?

The evidence suggests that class identity is still reasonably widespread but merely formal: in Bagehot's terms 'dignified' rather than 'efficient'. Class has become less relevant as a basis of social schism as the economic structure of Britain has become more diverse and uneven with increasing differences between workers in different economic sectors, labour markets, and geographical locations. Workers in the advanced multinational sector, for example, are now dependent on economic enterprises operating in quite different economic circumstances from those in declining national and state sectors. These differences have been reflected in changes in the nature and organization of collective action. Increasingly class conflicts have taken the form of sectional distributional struggles. These are as likely to embrace intra-class conflict as conflict between classes. During the last ten years, for example, centralized industry bargaining between national trades union leaders and nationally organized employers has been almost completely replaced by sectional, decentralized, single-employer bargaining on the basis of the market position of individual companies. This form of bargaining is particularly prevalent in the multinational sector comprising mainly high wage industries which tend to take the lead in pay bargaining. There have also been increasing regional and sub-regional disparities in employment and wages, since multi-employer bargaining tends to be concentrated in the declining regions, whereas company bargaining is more prevalent in the relatively buoyant south-east.[35]

Against this background of increasing heterogeneity and diversity among the workforce the class structure comes to be perceived as an opaque hierarchy based on distributional competition over scarce resources. In the distributional conflicts which characterize the market situation of the working population, the lesson which has been learned from the ubiquity of capitalist social relations is that moral restraints upon acquisitiveness have no part to play, and that one's market situation must be exploited to the full.[36] Under these circumstances particular groups are more likely to look after their own interests than consider their possible common cause with those in other sectors, industries, or companies who happen to share the same class position. Rather than a revolutionary political and economic consciousness the working population has developed institutions which reflect its pervasive absorption of capitalist economic values: individualism, egoism, and economic calculation. Instrumental collectivism, based on sectional self-interest, has become the order of the day.[37]

Evidence on instrumental collectivism is matched by that on orientations to work. It seems that a lengthy period of inflation *and* recession during the past twenty years has exacerbated rather than diminished the pecuniary attitude to work which, together with an instrumental orientation to class organizations, was regarded as the hallmark of the affluent workers of the 1960s. Indeed, when it is recalled that the impact of recession has been thrown principally onto the unemployed and unwaged and that many of those continuously in work will have experienced an increase in real living standards, then arguments about affluence and recession converge.[38] For example Brown and his colleagues, in their comparison of studies of work carried out in the period 1963–1972 with those undertaken since 1973, found 'no clear evidence that there have been general changes in orientations to paid work'. However their own recent studies in Tyneside provide

> some evidence . . . for orientations to work to become more narrowly preoccupied with pay and security and similar 'economistic' reasons . . . (which may) reflect the declining proportion of workers who have a sense of a distinctive 'occupational identity'.

In other words industry shift effects are reducing the numbers of workers in 'traditional proletarian' occupations which, in turn, 'could give rise to an increasing calculative involvement in work and attachment to the employing organization, and lower levels of satisfaction with work'.[39]

Of course people can still make celebratory comments about social class: it is part of the folk-memory of the British people. Nevertheless its outward manifestations have become less visible as a result of the general improvement in living standards during the post-war period.

True, there is still poverty in the UK,[40] but its connotations have changed because, however inadequate the system, social security has been established as a right of citizenship. Similarly, and perhaps most importantly to the majority of people, the National Health Service guarantees health care for all who require it and irrespective of the ability to pay. Or, to take another example, exploitation at work has fewer dimensions than hitherto. Labour may be meaningless and monotonous but workers are for the most part no longer casualized; they have a right to paid holidays; above all else trades unions offer at least a measure of protection against the power wielded by owner and manager.

None of this means that class has been abolished. But it does indicate some of the ways in which the harsher and most visible inequalities of a capitalist order have been ameliorated, so that nowadays the majority of working people can share in the material benefits of such a society, at least to the extent of owning their own cars, consumer durables, and perhaps most significantly their own homes. These represent real advances compared with previous generations – notwithstanding the fact that they may not be very securely based for many people. The difference between comfort and relative poverty for most may still be the next wage-packet. However, providing that the wage comes in, people retain their sense of being full participants in the consumer society. As long as the economy has been able to sustain the necessary level of activity, the fact that the gap between rich and poor has hardly altered seems not to be noticed; or, if observed, not to be seen as something which needs to be altered in any progressive way.

Or perhaps the gap between rich and poor is seen as something which cannot be affected by human action? The predominant mood among British workers would seem to be one of instrumentalism but also stoicism. Compared with their counterparts in other advanced industrial societies, British workers seem not only to be motivated mainly by the achievement of material success, but also characterized by a very high rate of failure to achieve their (limited) aspirations for personal autonomy at work. Finding their jobs boring, most people do not seek fulfilment through paid labour, but elsewhere. Moreover there is considerable evidence to suggest that the element of fatalism which informs resignation to the cash nexus in the workplace extends also to the economy as a whole. The apparent intractability of Britain's economic problems has led to increasing fatalism about their solution. The economic well-being of the country is seen as being dependent on market forces, or the equally impersonal activities of largely uncontrollable agencies elsewhere (the Japanese, the Common Market), so that even the British government is powerless to rearrange matters (if indeed it is inclined to do so). This results not in a politics of protest but of quiet disillusion and cynicism, of which lack

of partisanship, indifference to organized party politics, and a marked decline in support for altruistic social policies are the common features. It is not that people are unaware of inequalities. They simply judge them to be unassailable. The economy and, in broad outline, the class structure are, like the weather, beyond human volition.[41]

Increasing sectionalism and perceptions of the public world as being intractable are undoubtedly related to a further process which we believe has come to characterize social relationships. This is the process of privatization, by which we mean rather more than the end result of affluence and geographical mobility, as discussed in the sociological literature of the 1960s.

In so far as people have any sense of control over their own destinies this is more likely to be experienced in the private than in the public domain. The private domain may therefore be as crucial for the formation of social identities as the more public milieux of work and production. We have already indicated the crucial mediating role which we believe collective social identities play in any analysis of the relationship between social structure and social action. Structural locations create arrays of potential interests, but interests depend for their realization in action upon people's perceptions of their social identity. Sociologists have tended to assume what is undoubtedly often true: that social identities arise primarily from the spheres of production. However this is not always true, nor does it have uniform consequences. Sectional as well as class identities can arise from particular work experiences but they need not be durable or permanent. They may be acted upon in particular situations, say in the context of an industrial dispute or when a plant is threatened with closure, but may at other times remain latent. At such times non-work areas of life are more likely to be most salient for active social identities. Indeed for some individuals such identities may generally override other potential identities. In this sense, sectionally-based social identities may simply be an extension of a more basic social identity which is derived from the private, non-work sphere. Even the various forms of militant collective action may only be so many collective means to individual ends; that is, the improvement of the position of separate individuals, rather than of the class as a whole.

Again we would relate these remarks to the increasing diffuseness of the capitalist economic system. This system involves, of course, not just a sphere of production but also spheres of civil society and consumption. Moreover the sphere of civil society has expanded and a consumer society has emerged. Both developments have affected people's experience of the sphere of production. For example, not only do people spend fewer hours at work and have paid holidays, as well as legislation specifically to protect them as workers (Factory Acts and so forth), but the economic returns from work in combination with the social wage also guarantee for most people a full sense of

participating in society as citizens and consumers. Other changes, such as those in the nature of local communities, tend to reinforce the trend towards increasingly privatized life-styles and individualized home or family-centred social identities based on them. While we would not wish to take this argument too far, nevertheless we believe that for many people, privatized social identities may be more significant in mediating political interests than the public social identities deriving from the sphere of production. Changes in non-work life may, therefore, be contributing towards a decline in the experience of class identity and solidarity outside work and in the community, so that even the effects of recession do not result in the emergence of widespread class struggle or politics, but in further disillusion and fatalism towards class politics and a retreat into the privatized world within home and family.[42]

These changes have also been reinforced during the post-war period by changes in consumption which have affected social identities and thus conceptions of political interest in a similar manner. As Moorehouse has argued, rising living standards have come to integrate people into the capitalist market economy as individual consumers, thus reducing the coherence of their experience of society as fundamentally class-divided.[43] One particularly important feature of changes in consumption patterns which is of crucial importance in the formation of social identities is home ownership. As Westergaard points out, recent growth in home ownership is particularly noticeable among the skilled working class. By 1981 more than half of all households headed by skilled manual or junior non-manual workers owned or were buying their homes, as were more than one third of all semi-skilled households and about one quarter of all unskilled households. The broad effect, he argues, has been to produce a new dividing line between home owners and others which is now affecting voting patterns. Fifty-nine per cent of former Labour voters who bought their council houses switched to the Conservatives at the 1983 General Election.[44]

This link between changing patterns of consumption (especially home ownership) and politics also emerges clearly in a number of recent studies which show that the working class is now politically fragmented by what we may refer to, following Dunleavy, as 'sectoral consumption cleavages'. The evidence suggests that private market-based consumption of housing and transport have now come to divide the working class, so undermining the strength and extent of working-class support for the Labour Party's traditional policies of increasing state provision in these spheres. Both party alignment and variation in support for Labour's traditional policy of increasing state spending are now more affected by how people consume housing and transport (that is their consumption location) than they are by their location in the sphere of production. As expected those most dependent on state

provision are most supportive of state spending. The Labour Party thus appears to be representing a shrinking minority rather than a clear majority of the working class. Post-war patterns of consumption have thus served to integrate workers into capitalism as individuals, and in a directly economic (rather than simply ideological) way, so providing them with a stake in the system of financial and property markets which in turn undermines their sense of class identity and hence their participation in class politics. This helps explain the ambivalence in working-class attitudes both to the welfare state and to the traditional policies of the Labour Party.[45] The fact is that the British Labour Party has been relatively unsuccessful (compared with the Swedish Social Democrats for example) in constituting and mobilizing class interests, by presenting issues in class terms, and reinforcing the formation of collectivities with shared class identities.[46] Labour's housing policy, for example, fragments rather than unifies the working class. Neither it nor the trades unions have had much success in mobilizing members behind centrally organized initiatives on incomes policies. Pushed onto the defensive by the internationalization of capital, by mass unemployment, an intransigent government, and their own inability to direct from the centre, the unions have increasingly translated class issues into sectional struggles based on narrow self-interest. In the absence of an agreed concrete morality for rendering distributive issues principled, fatalistic beliefs about the economy as a whole combine with the pursuit of self-interest to generate sectional distributional struggles, as opportunities to exploit one's market position present themselves. The material basis of the capitalist society is thus reflected in its moral order – or, more accurately, the lack of it.

In summary, then, we would argue that sociologists have exaggerated the extent to which the sphere of production generally, and paid labour in particular, now provides individuals with a clear sense of collective social identity which could form the basis for class action. For many people, work is now part of a world which is not regarded as amenable to either personal or collective control, and thus approached instrumentally and fatalistically. Such empirical findings as are available point to a combination of increasing sectionalism and fatalism in the sphere of production. As Daniel argues these may well be causally related: the British economy is seen as unalterable precisely because of the high degree of sectionalism and lack of common identity and purpose between different groups of workers in different companies and sectors of the economy.[47] Similarly, in the sphere of consumption, post-war changes in patterns of working-class culture and community are tending towards a relative privatization of individual households or families, which is in turn reinforced by patterns of private consumption, particularly in housing. In both the spheres of production and consumption, groups of workers are coming

to occupy increasingly diverse social positions (in terms of their potential interests), which traditional working-class organizations such as the Labour Party and the trades unions have failed to articulate or constitute in terms of collective class identities. These diverse potential interests have thus come to be mediated through non-class sectional identities (in the sphere of production), and privatized home or family-centred interests (in the sphere of consumption), both of which are associated with increasing fatalism and instrumentalism in relation to the structure of the wider economy and society.

IV

It is important to recognize the difference between our conception of privatization and earlier versions which appeared in the sociological literature about work and family in the 1950s and 1960s. Previous studies identified geographical mobility and affluence as responsible for increasing privatization and the consequent undermining of the communal sociability of working-class occupational communities. However we would relate the process of privatization to the broader economic shift effects discussed above. These have undermined the economic basis for communal solidarities as the shape of the occupational structure has changed.

Moreover privatization, in the sense of a separation between a private domestic sphere and a public sphere outside it, emerges historically as part of the push for greater political and other citizenship rights. So, for example, the breakdown of high levels of social integration at the local level is associated not simply with the emergence of relatively socially isolated private households, but also with a process of their cultural, political, and economic integration into the nation state, especially with the gaining and exercise of rights of citizenship. Not only have wider economic shift effects been overlooked in previous analyses of privatization, but so also have successful political struggles, initially for citizenship and then for the welfare state. Although citizenship rights may be partial in coverage nevertheless much of the need for self-help, which lay at the basis of communal solidarity, has been obviated. As long as workers were exposed to the precariousness of life governed wholly by market forces, local communities provided a measure of defence by acting as units of self-help, and in the process generated a sense of collective identity which helped sustain the emergence of workers' organizations. However the irony of citizenship, achieved by collective organization and struggle, is that it erodes the basis of communal solidarity and results in individualism. As Marshall observed thirty years ago, the legal, political, and social rights of citizenship are all pre-eminently

concerned with the rights of the individual. To the sovereignty of the consumer, noted earlier, is added the sovereignty of the citizen.[48] This suggests that sociologists should perhaps devote as much attention to status orders as they have hitherto accorded class structures.

Like class the concept of social status pertains to differences in power and advantage. However class is concerned with inequalities rooted in the economic order and in particular with the distribution of property and possession of marketable skills. Hence an individual's class position will depend greatly upon his or her market situation. Status, on the other hand, is concerned with how people are placed in what one might call the moral order of society. Status is evaluative. It has a symbolic basis and in its conventional aspects is generally associated with life-style: with what different groups consume and how they consume. Because the capitalist market has no moral dimension sociologists have often seen the importance of the status order as that of giving a legitimation to the structure of power and advantage created and expressed by market exchanges in the sphere of production. In other words status has been seen in modern societies as an emergent property of the class structure. It is a kind of surrogate relationship possessing, as a consequence, diminishing analytical utility.[49]

We would take exception to such a view. It seems to us that certain patterns of consumption and styles of life which were hitherto the prerogative of the few have now become relatively commonplace. This lends a kind of equality to status in its conventional aspect. Underpinning such patterns of consumption for most people is the modern version of social status in terms of social prerogative – the legal right to something – namely citizenship. To quote Lockwood:

> Citizenship is no less a part of the status order because it has to do with the equality of civil, political, and social status. On the contrary it is the foundation of the modern status order, on which are superimposed what Weber refers to as 'conventional' status inequalities.[50]

Citizenship, too, is about equality and it reinforces the appearance of a more equal status order in terms of life-styles and patterns of consumption. Just as the status order of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries served to legitimate social inequalities which arose in the market place so in the late-twentieth century it serves to lend an appearance of equality to what remains an unequal (but now modified) system of market exchanges. But the modern status order also has real consequences for the class structure itself. It can change it and in fact has done so. Citizenship hinders the strict application of market principles: for example a citizen has a right to health care regardless of his or her ability to pay. In such areas of life not only are we *apparently* now all more equal; we *are* certainly more equal than

would otherwise be the case if health care were distributed solely according to market criteria. By the same token the fact that the majority of people now routinely consume what a generation ago was limited to the wealthy (houses and the range of consumer durables on offer) takes the sharpest edges off other of the most visible aspects of inequality in the market place. The status order has come to emphasize not what is regarded as socially superior or inferior but what is commonly valued as everyone's right by virtue of being citizen and consumer.

Both citizenship and the conventional status inequalities of consumption offer important and alternative sources of social identity to that of social class. They may therefore bring some much needed clarification to the question of the relationship between structure, consciousness, identity, and collective action. Sociologists can, of course, demonstrate at the macro or objective level the existence of a relatively rigid structure of inequalities, and the consequences of this for the life-chances of individuals differentially located in that structure, but they have been far less successful at relating that structure of positions to social consciousness and action among its populace. We know we cannot read off consciousness and action from structure and we know also that the structure has real consequences for the lives of the individuals who comprise it. However, this gives us no warrant to suppose that any necessary consequences must follow in terms of how those individuals view society, think and act politically, and so on. People live out their lives in a micro-world and 'generalise their view of the life they lead from face-to-face relations and experiences, not from the impersonal activities of the major institutions of society'.[51] It may be that part of the object of that micro-world is to shut out the macro-world for most purposes beyond the troublesome process of making a living. None of this need lead us, however, to abandon our sociological faith by rejecting the possibility of making any sensible link between social structure and social action. On the contrary we need to investigate in much greater detail the processes which mediate between the two. It is one thing to recognize that structure does not determine action but it would be wholly wrong to believe it does not condition action. We have already suggested that one important mediating process is the development, maintenance, and disruption of collective identities and the way in which these can be manipulated by political parties.

This brings us full circle to Weber who saw class as a less likely basis for communal action precisely because of the existence of status groups. The historical importance of the status order is that it has the power to contain the forces of the market so that 'the market is restricted, and the power of naked property *per se*, which gives its stamp to class formation, is pushed into the background'.[52] This is also its contemporary significance, especially where citizenship is

concerned. Casual observation suggests and voting studies confirm that the Thatcher government has been extremely successful at manipulating collective identities to the extent that it has made the policies of the Labour Party appear irrelevant to Britain's problems. The 1983 General Election did not so much confirm the popularity of the government as the unpopularity of the Labour Party. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Britain's economic decline has been exacerbated by the particular policies pursued by the present government, and that, sociologically, these policies can be seen as the reversal of the post-war relationship between citizenship and social class. That is, whereas previous governments of both parties pursued policies *via* a mixed economy which emphasized citizenship and social status over social class (interventionism rather than the rule of market forces), the Thatcher government is attempting to reverse that process by re-asserting the market and, therefore, social class over citizenship. In this sense citizenship, whether in terms of the rights of the trades unions or the continued expansion of the welfare state, is seen as the enemy of economic policy in the form of a cost which a de-industrializing economy can no longer afford.

Of course such policies as the present government is pursuing could always rebound on it. If the equalities which we discussed in relation to the status order have become part of people's expectations, then the more the government eats into them, the greater the chance of eventual popular reaction against it. By our argument previously, of course, this will ultimately depend on the importance of citizenship to social identity. In the words of Goldthorpe,

> the implications of the growth of citizenship for the legitimation of class inequalities are, as Marshall recognized, double-edged. While the possibility is created of legitimation in terms of meritocracy, the threat also arises that with the realization of citizenship, the contrast between the principled equality of rights that it bestows and the unprincipled inequalities thrown up by the market will be highlighted, and that the latter will thus be increasingly called into question.[53]

So far the government has carried the day, but if our analysis is correct, one of the main reasons it has done so is because for most people the benefits of citizenship and the maintenance of at least basic living standards still outweigh the extent to which market forces, and therefore class based inequalities, have been reimposed. Consequently the future, as always, is open and Marshall's war between citizenship and social class continues.[54]

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NOTES

1 See, for example, Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*, London, Hutchinson, 1973; Peter Calvert, *The Concept of Class*, London, Hutchinson, 1982; and on the rather different traditions of North American sociology Charles H. Page, *Class and American Sociology*, New York, Schocken, 1969.

2. Compare W. G. Runciman, 'Capitalism without classes', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 34, 1983, pp. 157–81, and J. U. Nef, 'The Progress of Technology and the Growth of Large Scale Industry in Great Britain, 1540–1640', *Economic History Review*, first series, vol. 5, 1934, pp. 3–24. Of course the capitalist market neither extended across nor integrated the political territories and social structures of the Roman Empire or seventeenth-century England. Rightly, therefore, these societies are not conventionally described as capitalist, whereas this label can aptly be applied to industrialized west European states, in which the market mechanism acts as the primary means of system integration (see Karl Polanyi, *The Livelihood of Man*, New York, Academic Press, 1977, and *The Great Transformation*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1957). This is not to deny that market economies tend to exert a destabilizing influence on the societies within which they operate. 'System integration' via the capitalist market is rarely associated with 'social integration' in the sense of social or value consensus (see David Lockwood, 'Social Integration and System Integration' in G K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch, *Explorations in Social Change*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964, pp. 244–57).

3. Elizabeth Garnsey, 'The Rediscovery of the Division of Labour', *Theory and Society*, vol 10, 1981, p. 348. See also Simon Clarke, *Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology*, London, Macmillan, 1982, for a detailed exposition of this argument.

4. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1973, pp. 67–8; Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1970, pp. 52–3.

5. Compare Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 43; Karl Marx, 'Die moralisierende Kritik und die kritisierende Moral. Beitrag zur Deutschen Kulturgeschichte. Gegen Carl Heinzen' in T. B Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, p 208; and Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1972, pp. 885–6.

6. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party' in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1970. pp. 38–42; Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1970, pp. 312–507. On this point see also Garnsey op. cit., p. 348, and Ali Rattansi, 'Marx and the abolition of the division of labour' in A. Giddens and G. Mackenzie, *Social Class and the Division of Labour*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp 12–28.

7. Compare Harry Braverman, *Labour and Monopoly Capital*, London, Monthly Review Press, 1974; K. Stone, 'The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry', *Review of Radical Political Economy*, vol. 6, 1974, pp. 113–73; Richard Edwards, *Contested Terrain*, London, Heinemann, 1979; Stephen A. Marglin, 'What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production', *Review of Radical Political Economy*, vol. 6, 1974, pp. 60–112; and Andrew L Friedman, *Industry and Labour*, London, Macmillan, 1977.

8. Compare, for example, Karl Marx, 'Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*' in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, pp. 181–2; Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, pp 170–1; Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, pp. 791–2, 818–19; and Karl Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach' in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, p 28. See also Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963, p. 86, and W. Wesolowski, *Classes, Strata and Power*, London,

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. 18–29.

9. Compare Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, *Mode of Production and Social Formation*, London, Macmillan, 1977 and G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978; Louis Althusser, 'Marxism and Humanism' in *For Marx*, London, New Left Books, 1977, pp. 219–47 and E. P. Thompson, 'The Poverty of Theory: or an Orrery of Errors' in *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays*, London, Merlin Press, 1978, pp. 193–397.

10. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, New York, Bedminster Press, 1968, p. 302. Weber's account of social classes, like that of Marx, is both ambiguous and unsystematic. In particular there are a number of possible inconsistencies between his earlier and later treatments of the subject (compare *Economy and Society*, pp. 926–39, 302–7). What follows is one interpretation of these texts rather than close scrutiny of their nuances. For further details and an alternative reading see Jack M. Barbalet, 'Principles of Stratification in Max Weber: an interpretation and critique', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 31, 1980, pp. 401–18.

11. Compare Weber, *Economy and Society*, pp. 927–8 and Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, pp. 175–6. See also, for example, Rosemary Crompton and Jon Gubbay, *Economy and Class Structure*, London, Macmillan, 1977, p. 16.

12 William Lazonick, 'Industrial relations and technical change: the case of the self-acting mule', *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, vol. 3, 1979, p. 257. See also Jill Rubery, 'Structured Labour Markets, Worker Organization, and Low Pay', *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, vol. 2, 1978, pp. 17–36; Tony Elger, 'Braverman, capital accumulation and deskilling' in S. Wood, *The Degradation of Work?*, London, Hutchinson, 1982, pp. 23–53; and C. R. Littler and G. Salaman, 'Bravermania and Beyond. Recent Theories of the Labour Process', *Sociology*, vol. 16, 1982, pp 251–69.

13. Garnsey is therefore correct when she claims that Weber's account of the division of labour 'is an account of the social relations which it engenders and does not provide the basis for a theory of economic and social development. In this he differs from the classical political economists and Marx' ('The Rediscovery of the Division of Labour', p. 347.) Weber did not subscribe to a theory of history – far less an economistic and deterministic one. However, she is wrong to imply (pp. 346, 348) that Weber merely followed the marginalists in taking the organization of work (hence the occupational structure) as given, as the outcome of 'the prevailing state of technology'. Indeed he explicitly denies this. Although he does not develop a systematic theory of the technical division of labour ('It is out of the question here to undertake to develop even the most modest outline of a theory of the evolution of the technology and economics of tools and machinery', *Economy and Society*, p. 121), Weber is quite unambiguous in attributing a significant role to market forces in capitalist societies, by way of explaining both the application of changed technology and the social organization of labour. Neither are simple residual categories in the manner of marginalist economics. Moreover, neither technology itself nor the division of labour are neutral, since both are *socially* constructed and negotiated. They are not the outcome of mere 'economic' calculations (see *Economy and Society*, pp 67, 129, 44–6, 128, 141).

14 Weber, *Economy and Society*, pp 928–32.

15 See Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, New York, Free Press, 1969, pp. 369–73, 354–6, 382–4, 256–82, and the discussion in Steven Lukes, *Durkheim*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, pp. 167–72.

16. Compare Durkheim, op. cit., pp 49–69, 353–95.

17. See Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, pp. 387–8, 'Preface to the Second Edition', and *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957, pp. 1–41, 76–109. For more detailed criticism see Anthony Giddens, *Durkheim*, London, Fontana, 1978, pp. 108–12, and for a general assessment Tom Campbell, *Seven Theories of Human Society*, Oxford, Clarendon Press,

1981, pp 139–68.

18. Of course we are not suggesting that nothing of value has been written about the study of social class since the turn of the century. Patently this would be absurd. Rather, in adopting this strategy, we are attempting merely to locate our own approach within the context of the broad frameworks which, it is generally agreed, have guided class analysis up to the present day. Tracing the development of each perspective in the interim, and detailed assessment of the present state of class analysis, are tasks for another occasion

19. Compare Erik Olin Wright, 'The Class Structure of Advanced Capitalist Societies' in *Class, Crisis and the State*, London, Verso, 1979, pp. 30–110, and Frank Parkin, *Marxism and Class Theory*, London, Tavistock, 1979.

20 John H Goldthorpe, 'Women and Class Analysis: In Defence of the Conventional View', *Sociology*, vol. 17, 1983, p. 467 Whether or not demographic maturity is a precondition for class action is, of course, an empirical issue and not a matter of faith.

21. Compare John H. Goldthorpe, *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980; Rosemary Crompton, 'Class Mobility in Modern Britain', *Sociology*, vol 14, 1980, pp 117–19; Roger Penn, 'The Nuffield Class Categorization', *Sociology*, vol. 15, 1981, pp. 265–71; A Stewart *et al.*, *Social Stratification and Occupations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980; and Catherine Hakim, *Secondary Analysis in Social Research*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982. In this controversial matter we tend to follow Anthony Heath (*Social Mobility*, London, Fontana, 1981, pp. 50–1)·

> The classification of occupations exhibits more disarray than almost any other issue in professional sociology and provides endless ground for argument and confusion How a sociologist decides to categorize occupations will reflect his own beliefs about the nature of the social world, his theoretical preference and objectives, and his own moral or political attitudes and values (and all these will themselves be interrelated). We cannot say that one categorization is 'wrong' and another 'right'. There is no neutral, objective yardstick for deciding on the correct way to classify social reality. Even if we can show that, say, functionalism involves certain empirical assumptions that are unwarranted – for example, the claim that occupations' prestige and social honour vary according to their importance for the society – we still cannot say that it is 'wrong' to scale occupations according to their prestige. We may say it is uninteresting, or unfruitful, or even perhaps that the measurement has been badly done, but these adjectives do not really mean the same thing as 'wrong'

22. Weber may only have 'revised' marginalist economics but his revision was nevertheless profound; namely, to recognize that both the division of labour and the market itself are social constructs, and generate outcomes that are socially negotiated. Of the former, for example he writes:

> The distribution of occupations in a market economy consists to a large extent of technically irrational specification of functions, rather than of rational specialization of functions, because such an economy is oriented to the market situation and hence to the interests of purchasers and consumers. This orientation determines (the uses to which) the entire bundle of labour services offered by a given productive unit will be put in a manner often different from the specialization of functions (of the given labour force), thus making necessary modes of combinations of functions which are technically irrational (*Economy and Society*, p. 141).

But market exchanges themselves are not explicable in terms solely of the relative marginal utilities of goods and services For example, markets may be 'regulated'

> Regulation of the market may be determined (1) traditionally, by the actors' becoming accustomed to tra-

ditionally accepted limitations on exchange or to traditional conditions; (2) by convention, through social disapproval of treating certain utilities as marketable or of subjecting certain objects of exchange to free competition and free price determination, in general or when undertaken by certain groups of persons; (3) by law, through legal restrictions on exchange or on the freedom of competition, in general or for particular groups of persons or for particular objects of exchange . . . (4) By voluntary action arising from the structure of interests' (ibid., pp. 82–3. See also pp. 75, 99–100.)

Thus, to take an example often used by Weber himself, skilled craftworkers are often able, by restricting access to apprenticeships, to enforce closed shop agreements, gain a measure of job protection, resist new technology and work practices, and thus enhance the market situation (life-chances) of those possessing such skills (ibid., pp. 125, 128–9). It seems to us, therefore, that class analysis does not need to address the impenetrable issues of how new values are created in production since conflict over control of the conditions of production and distributional struggles about the allocation of rewards are both explicable in market (that is Weberian) terms

23. For more detailed criticisms see John H. Goldthorpe, *Intellectuals and the Working Class in Modern Britain*, University of Essex, Fuller Bequest Lecture, 1979, and Zygmunt Bauman, *Memories of Class*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982.

24. David Lockwood, 'The Weakest Link in the Chain? Some Comments on the Marxist Theory of Action', *Research in the Sociology of Work*, vol. 1, 1981, pp 435–81.

25. See, for example, Garnsey op. cit., and Gavin Mackenzie, 'Class Boundaries and the Labour Process' in Giddens and Mackenzie, op. cit., pp. 63–86.

26. Weber, *Economy and Society*, pp. 141–2, 137–8, 128–9.

27. Notably by T. H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class' in *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development*, Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1973, pp. 65–122, and David Lockwood, *The Blackcoated Worker*, London, Unwin, 1958

28 John Scott, *Corporations, Classes and Capitalism*, London, Hutchinson, 1979.

29. Guy Routh, *Occupation and Pay in Great Britain, 1906–1979*, London, Macmillan, 1980; Elizabeth Garnsey, 'Women's Work and Theories of Class Stratification', *Sociology*, vol. 12, 1978, pp. 223–43; A. R. Thatcher, 'Labour Supply and Employment Trends' in F. Blackaby, *Deindustrialisation*, London, Heinemann, 1979, pp. 26–48, S. Amin, *Unequal Development*, London, Monthly Review Press, 1973; Stephen Fothergill and Graham Gudgin, *Unequal Growth: Urban and Regional Employment Change in the U.K* , London, Heinemann, 1982.

30. Adrian Sinfield, *What Unemployment Means*, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1981; Reinhard Kreckel, 'Unequal Opportunity Structure and Labour Market Segmentation', *Sociology*, vol. 14, 1980, pp. 525–50; R. M. Blackburn and Michael Mann, *The Working Class in the Labour Market*, London, Macmillan, 1979.

31. For a concise statement of the relevant statistics, and comparison of the situation in Britain with that in other advanced industrial societies, see David Rose *et al.*, 'Economic Restructuring: the British Experience', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September 1984, pp. 137–57.

32. See Erik Olin Wright, 'Varieties of Marxist Conceptions of Class Structure', *Politics and Society*, vol. 9, 1980, pp. 323–70, and Nicholas Abercrombie and John Urry, *Capital, Labour and the Middle Classes*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1983.

33 For a review of this literature see Gordon Marshall, 'Some Remarks on the Study of Working-Class Consciousness', *Politics and Society*, vol 12, 1983, pp. 263–301.

34. Michael Mann, *Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class*, London, Macmillan, 1973.

35. Fothergill and Gudgin, op. cit , W. W. Daniel and Neil Millward, *Workplace Industrial Relations in Britain*, London, Heinemann, 1983; W. Brown, *The Changing Contours of British Industrial Relations*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1981; J. R. Mellor,

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54. The authors acknowledge the support of the Economic and Social Research Council. Preliminary results from the national survey of Britain will be available in 1985.

BOOK REVIEWS

Nations Not Obsessed with Crime
Freda Adler 1983 Fred B. Rothman & Co. 204pp n.p.

Comparative criminology was first recognized by American sociologists as something other than the simple extension of theoretical chauvinism abroad with the publication, in 1973, of Clinard and Abbott's *Crime in Developing Countries*. In the decade since it has become a minor boom industry, spawning a considerable number of empirical studies, and even venturing to raise some of the elemental questions of epistemological and ethical protocol implicit in cross-cultural analysis. But comparative criminology is still a relatively uncharted territory with several key issues as yet inadequately explored. One such issue is the cross-cultural identification of the sociological characteristics of countries with low crime rates. What causes low crime rates? What, if anything, do countries with low crime rates have in common?

It is to these two important questions that Freda Adler's highly-touted *Nations Not Obsessed with Crime* is directed. To begin with, she isolates five diverse 'regions' (European capitalist, European socialist, Latin America, Islam and Asia) and selects from each a pair of countries (respectively: Switzerland/Eire; Bulgaria/G.D.R.; Costa Rica/Peru; Algeria/Saudi Arabia; and Japan/Nepal) with the lowest, or among the lowest, crime rates in its region. Adler's strategy is then twofold. In the first chapter, and two appendices, she tries to determine for each of these countries the statistical correlations that exist between their arrest rates per 100,000 population and 47 socio-economic variables. These latter include age and occupational structures, national income, education and patterns of consumer expenditure. No uniform configuration emerged, and even the most obvious profile (predominantly rural and underdeveloped) faces exceptions in Japan, the G.D.R. and Switzerland. However, one wonders about Adler's choice of variables. Why did she not use indicators such as police/population ratios, crime report rates and criminal justice expenditures?

Adler's second strategy she terms 'qualitative', and involves an analysis of the formal and informal mechanisms of social control in each of the ten countries. At this level she discerns one relatively common factor, namely, popular acceptance of and participation in the criminal justice system This finding she supplements with the suggestion that countries with low crime rates tend to have, irrespective of political and economic differences, stable family systems and at least one other strong system, such as religion, or support institutions such as the Swiss *Gemeinde*. This 'in-depth' analysis of each of the ten countries constitutes the bulk of the text and is, quite frankly, very weak. What are the mechanisms that generate acceptance and participation? How is discipline induced? Is obedience voluntary? Each country is described in approximately eight pages; these pages include observations on demography, history, law, economy, family and polity. The result is a text that reads as a compromise between ten research proposals, an elementary geography book and a travel brochure. Nowhere does Adler admit to the linguistic difficulties of working with, and within, so many languages. Nowhere does she inform her audience of her criteria for selecting the secondary literature that she uses to describe each country.

One is forced to conclude that Adler's discourse is very largely based on the

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'information' with which she was provided by the various national governments and criminal justice officials.

The book concludes with a chapter that covers thirty years of the American-dominated literature on social control, crime and cultural strain in exactly twenty-three pages. Adler's assessment of this history leads her to the simplistic conclusion that if anomie is the cause of 'high' or 'increasing' crime rates (these two notions are throughout treated interchangeably) then the opposite of anomie must be the cause of low crime rates. This *deus ex machina* she terms 'synnomie', namely, 'a convergence of norms to the point of harmonious accommodation' (p. 158) But is Adler's synnomie a cause or an effect, and if so, of what? Like the book as a whole, the concluding argument is ambitious but dreadfully disappointing From the author of *Sisters in Crime* and *The Criminology of Deviant Women*, this reviewer expected better fare.

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War, State and Society *M. Shaw* (ed) Macmillan Press 1984 266pp £20.00 (£6.95 paper)
The State and Nuclear Power. Conflict and Control in the Western World *J A. Camillen* Harvester Press 1984 347pp £22.50

Reading these texts reminds one that despite the resurgence of sociological interest in the state during recent years, it is remarkable that war and the preparation for war – central activities of the modern state – have not become central problems in social theory but have been left largely to specialist historians and military sociologists. Even the latter have until recently too often been concerned with military organization from the point of view of problems relating to organization theory, bureaucracy and professionalization, rather than with the larger scale issues of power violence and the modern nation-state.

The significance of these texts is that they acknowledge the relevance of some neo-Machievellian ideas for an adequate account of state behaviour and in so doing expose the inadequacies of Marxist theory. This is despite the fact that, overall, both books attempt a restatement of its validity.

War, State and Society comprises a collection of conference papers organized in terms of a discussion of the theoretical question of the relationship between capitalism and militarism on the one hand, and issues relating to the 'Cold War' and western defence policy on the other. Shaw posits the 'need to recognize theoretically the existence of a world system of states as an artificially separable level within an understanding of world society as a whole' (p. 64). The external relations of states – geo-political and prestige factors – preceded and are not reducible to the competition of capitals How this line of argument can be sustained within any Marxist problematic worth the name must remain in question, particularly as Hall's analysis of Aron's 'Sociology of States' and Mann's excellent paper pursues it with the latter concluding that

> the greatest contribution to militarism is the multi-state system in which warfare has been a normal and often rational element throughout recorded history . . [N]either the capitalism of the west nor the state socialism of the Soviet Union are the key enemies of those who desire peace and survival today The enemies are rather the common geo-political pretensions of the super powers – the *same* pretensions as Greece and Persia, Rome and Carthage possessed (p. 45).

It is disappointing to note that the contributions in the second half of the book largely present Marxist accounts of issues relating to the Cold War and Defence Policy which do not take into account the above objections For example, Miliband lays the responsibility for the current arms race and the 'drive to nuclear war' on the USA – the greatest and most aggressive (because most capitalist) global power – with most to lose should the revolutionary nationalist and 'anti-imperialist' movements developing in the Third World since the 1950s be successful

The Soviet Union is viewed historically as a defensive, pragmatic power, intent on holding on to its existing possessions, while intervening elsewhere only when provoked into a concern for its own security Miliband concludes with a dogmatic argument for nuclear pacificism – echoing the pacifist sentiments of Young's paper – both of which underestimate the theoretical significance of national, geopolitical divisions. Arguments similar to those of the Alternative Defense Commission and of the current Labour defence policy are presented assertively with scant attention paid to the possible objections that have been made to them.

Smith's paper concludes that the forces shaping current British defense policy are 'pushing it and the rest of us towards deepening economic ruin, political repression and nuclear war . . . [T]here could hardly be a stronger case for the imperative of sustaining the disarmament movements' He advocates NATO's reduction of its nuclear forces, which by lessening the threat to the Soviet Union would probably elicit reciprocal moves. Throughout these discussions lies the hidden assumption that (pace Marxist theory), the Soviet Union, although an oppressive regime, is less aggressive than the USA because it is not capitalist but is a (poor) approximation of socialism. The related, liberal, functionalist assumption that national, geo-political rivalries are abnormal in respect of the maturity of industrialism also plays a supporting role.

Cox's otherwise interesting paper continues in a similar vein. It refuses to consider possible continuities between Russian imperialism and the current Soviet empire and regards any extension of Soviet power as 'defensive'. It views the origins of the 'Cold War' after 1947 largely in terms of attempts by the USA to use the 'fiction' of the 'Soviet threat' to institutionalize its hegemony in western Europe and through the world (although the rise and fall of Detente from the point of view of geo-political issues is often acutely observed – see 169) Arguments that the Soviet Union has constituted a genuine threat to western capitalism, e.g., in respect of Stalin's failed attempts to become the power broker in Europe during the 1930's in expectation of an exhausting war between the capitalist powers are not considered seriously. He concludes that a diminution of east-west divisions, at least in Europe rests on a socialist renewal of internationalist working class struggle and unity – an echo of the continuous thesis that somehow socialism and militarism are negatively related.

Camilleri's text is concerned with applying Marxist theory – apparently Miliband's account of the state – to a comparative analysis of the economic, power political and prestige factors relating to the role of the advanced capitalist state in the establishment, maintenance, and promotion of the nuclear power industry. At first, this project is confusing as the argument draws freely on ideas developed by Offe, Habermas and others concerning the role of the modern state in *directing* rather than facilitating the process of capital accumulation. In so doing, the interest of the state in capital accumuation is not simply to serve the collective interests of capital but to produce a legitimate political consensus and economic growth which may injure particular sections of 'capital' These strategies provide a fiscal basis for the state and for the pursuit of its perceived geo-political interests – quite a welcome departure from the view of the state as an executive committee of the bourgeoisie in the first or last instance. Unfortunately, important theoretical issues are dealt with in asides or by referring to other works particularly the contention that the modern industrial state pursues a 'technocratic design' (p. 278) and in so doing mobilizes the resources of capitalism – a convincing argument perhaps but a major departure, I suggest from Marxism. However, some very interesting arguments are developed. The military origins and significance of nuclear power provided a context of state security and lack of public accountability for the development of the civil uses of nuclear energy The USA's atomic programme involved an extension of the 'military-industrial' complex through the self-interested collaboration of the armed forces, private industry and finance,

legislative, executive and intelligence branches of the state as well as the emerging nuclear bureaucracy itself. However, it should be noted Camilleri stresses that it was the state which, being overly impressed with what it regarded as the long term potential of nuclear power for high economic growth and technological progress, persuaded sections of industry with very favourable financial incentives to invest in nucelar power. Once initiated, a large market for the goods of the industry was required to make it economically viable. However, given the fragmented system of nation-states and national rivalries, American efforts to preserve and strengthen its nuclear monopoly could not but fan the flames of nuclear proliferation, despite simultaneous and not particularly successful attempts to develop integrative mechanisms of regulation to offset the consequent political insecurities.

The state-sponsored development of nuclear power was legitimated in terms of its supposed economic benefits whilst attempts were made to obscure its military origins and significance However, the association of nuclear power with the technical and political co-ordination provided by the 'security' state, its failure as an economic success story, together with the waning in some quarters of enthusiasm for the principles of modern technology and economic growth as reflected in the 'green' and ecological movements, have produced major legitimation problems for the state. At the same time the spiralling costs of state subsidy reinforce the state's fiscal problems. Quite apart from the military dangers of nuclear proliferation, Camilleri raises the issue of whether in years to come nuclear power will be seen as a 'white elephant' in respect of an economically and politically viable basis for a modern energy policy. As with the Shaw book, the reader is left with the impression that there are no easy panaceas for the problems resulting from a world of competing nation-states

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Racial Exclusionism and the City: The Urban Support of the National Front *Christopher T. Husbands* George Allen & Unwin 1983 191pp £18.00

This book reports the results of a survey in thirteen areas of England where the National Front (NF) had previously gained significant levels of electoral support. Husbands's main aims are to identify the characteristics of those who had voted for or who were sympathetic to the NF and to offer an explanation for the pattern of support thereby revealed. His analysis reflects his previous contributions to the debate over the nature of NF electoral support, stressing in particular the geographical specificity of this support. Electoral support for the NF was never a fully British phenomenon but, rather, was concentrated in certain areas of particular English cities and towns and so Husbands combines the aggregate survey data with an examination of the social and political histories of the thirteen areas. He anticipates that there were certain traditions in these areas which favoured the development of support for the NF.

Husbands shows that all the thirteen areas sampled had undergone a process of economic and cultural degeneration, into which New Commonwealth migrants had been inserted at a time of labour shortage. His survey data reveals that NF voters and sympathizers were more likely than others to be concerned about what they identified as the deterioration of their local neighbourhood and to explain this as being a consequence of the West Indian and/or Asian presence. Thus, Husbands's main conclusion is that there are certain areas of largely working-class residence which contain a proportion of people who support the NF for racist reasons. These urban areas are characterized by economic and cultural decline which, Husbands argues, when interpreted through the localism that is an important component of working-class culture, encourages support for fascist politics

One can query certain aspects of

Husbands's survey design and, more importantly, his failure to offer any detailed analysis of the constituent elements and origins of working-class racism. Nevertheless, this is an important book because it offers some firm evidence of exactly who was voting for the NF in the 1970s and why they were doing so. The fact that the explanation is to be found in a process of material decline which continues suggests that racism has not gone away, even it it is currently not being expressed in electoral support for the NF.

Robert Miles
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Capitalism and Class in the Middle East: Theories of Social Change and Economic Development *Bryan S. Turner* Heinemann Educational Books London 1984 229pp £17.50

Professor Turner is already well known in this field, above all for his important study of what Max Weber did say and would have said about Islam, had he but had the time to deal with it in full. The present volume does not really constitute a unity, consisting as it does of a series of essays and papers written in diverse contexts. These are essays dealing with specific topics, such as the Iranian revolution or Israeli nationalism. The book is interesting and stimulating, but it is also disappointing. We really have the right to expect something better of a man of Professor Turner's ability and erudition.

Any theoretician, of course, is bound to be interested not only in the empirical material of his domain, but also in the earlier theories in this field. My own feeling is that the reason for Professor Turner's disappointing performance is that the balance between the two has, in this work, become excessively and disastrously tilted in favour of a preoccupation with Marxist theology, to the sad detriment of interest in concrete societies His reference group seems to be the Federation of Marxist *ulama*. The fact that the Marxism he pursues is one which does not yet altogether exist – one knows that it is true, that it will be purged of the sins of something called 'Orientalism', but otherwise it remains in the main a kind of blank X – is liable to make him go round in circles.

For instance, in Chapter 4 he repudiates explanations of the failure of endogenous capitalism in the Middle East in terms of either political oppression or ideological inhibition. Yet he also goes on to affirm (p 59) 'there are no historical grounds by which it can be claimed that the Middle East does not possess a characteristic which was decisive in European capitalist development. On the contrary . . .' Given, however, that capitalism *did* endogenously develop in the west, and *failed* to do so in the Middle East, where does that leave us? It is no use saying, as he then does, that the prior emergence of industrialism elsewhere completely changed the terms on which it could develop in the Muslim world. That is not in dispute, but constitutes no answer whatever to the initial question.

If the standard accounts of western development are all wrong, and if it is a terrible sin to project the west on the Middle East, then, I should have thought, these two considerations would cancel out. Not altogether, it appears; on page 58 Turner sternly tells us '. . . it is impossible to identify social classes without a prior identification of modes of production – classes are determined by their function within modes of production'. The authority of this axiom about what classes ought to be must of course paralyze our attempts to understand the Middle East, if we have not yet succeeded in identifying its 'mode of production'. That seems to be so, unless cocktail explanations are allowed on page 106, we are told that prior to capitalism it exemplified no fewer than five such modes (primitive, slave, pastoral-nomadic, feudal and Asiatic), as opposed to pre-capitalist Europe blessed with 'a relatively homogenous feudalism'. If this is so, then the Middle East was blessed with everything under the sun bar capitalism itself. The number of classes (and non-classes) engendered by that kaleidoscopic patchwork of modes makes my head spin. Yet at the same time (p 162/3) Turner appears to endorse the rejection of the

notion of an Asiatic Mode of Production, on the ground that it does not allow one 'to give an account of the state as a product of class struggle' (No property, *ergo* no economically defined classes, *ergo* no conflict between them, *ergo* no state) Once again, an axiom determines what facts may be allowed to exist Turner also rebukes those who merely echo Ibn Khaldun (but what if he got it right?), without mentioning that Engels himself also did so in his old age

One must be grateful for the stimulus and collection of information brought by this volume, but one must also hope that Professor Turner will one day abandon the pursuit of the Holy Grail of an *orientalismusfreier Marxismus*, and for a change indulge an interest in the Middle East *an sich*.

Ernest Gellner

No Future: Youth and Society *E Ellis Cashmore* Heinemann Educational Books 1984 111pp £12 95 (£3.95 paper)

What future does 'no future' entail for working-class youth? What happens when a generation of school leavers begins not to fight against the prospect of unemployment but to accept it as inevitable, perhaps even preferable to the 'slave labour' provided by the Youth Opportunities Programme, and to adapt to the status of 'dole technicians'?

No Future maps the developments of working-class youth culture. Although the actual numbers who have become teds, mods, rockers, punks, Rastafarians, skinheads or heavy metal kids are probably relatively small, groups such as these ought, the author argues, to be recognized as exaggerated representatives of far larger sections of the young population, which has, as a whole, had a sense of a shared position in society since the 1950s. Dr Cashmore traces their various attitudes as these are expressed in, and reflected by, such things as their music, their dress, their racial prejudices and their consumer power He ends by summing up some of the consequences of prolonged unemployment on working-class youth. a generation has emerged with consumer, rather than producer status – individuals define themselves and others by what they buy, rather than what they produce – but it is a generation which no longer has the wherewithal to purchase the goods it has been taught to desire. Education has lost its credibility as a stepping stone to future rewards; alternative means may be considered (the risks of crime might appear to be worth taking), glue-sniffing might be a way of escaping the hopelessness and helplessness, or one can merely resign oneself with the expectation of little or no future

Of course, the 'problem of youth' is enormously complex, and many differing explanations and suggestions have been offered on the subject *No Future* does not provide all the answers, but it is suggestive; while it embraces a clearly defined structural analysis, the 'real people' are never lost – indeed, they come vividly to life under Dr Cashmore's pen. This is a short book which is well worth the time it takes to read it.

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The State in Socialist Society *Neil Harding* (ed) Macmillan 1984 316pp £20 (£7.95 paper)
The State in Capitalist Europe: A Casebook *Stephen Bornstein, David Held and Joel Krieger* (eds) Allen & Unwin and The Centre for European Studies, Harvard University 1984 175pp £25 (£9.95 paper)

The titles of these two books might encourage more general expectations of enlightenment Could we put the two together and pronounce on modern states in general? But not so· the contributors to these two collections of original essays work firmly within the horizons of their area specialisms, raising legitimate and interesting, but none the less limited, issues traditional there.

Harding's 'State. . .' is the Soviet State. Half the contributors contribute to the 'labelling debate' traditional to Sovietologists Archie Brown discusses 'totalitarian', 'pluralist' and 'corporatist'

theories common among westerners as well as Soviet theories. He rejects them all, modestly backs away from producing a rival grand label, but says he looks relatively favourably on 'imperfect monism' or 'diversity within monism'. Ronald J. Hill concentrates on Soviet views, principally the 'All-Peoples' State' whose life has been prolonged for the indefinite future by further delays in the arrival of 'Developed Socialism'. He gloomily concludes that the reality of this state represents the worst of all worlds since it has neither the freedom nor the expertise to challenge the despotism of the Party. The editor, Neil Harding, develops his own label, the 'organic labour state' in two stimulating, pithy essays. This state has monopolistic control of the organization of labour within its territories, and its main characteristics (ten are listed on pp. 308–10) flow from this. Harding's thesis is supported by John Hoffman who attacks pre-occupation among scholars with 'coercion or consent' as the basis of regime stability. It is neither, he says, but rather the achievement of adequate material subsistence through centralized planning of production by the Party As there is no possibility of achieving subsistence outside of this centralized structure of 'mobilized participation', coercion or consent, though both exist, are not fundamental.

The other essays are more empirically specific but fit into the editorial mould. Interesting essays by Peter Rutland and Mary McAuley discuss the nationality problem, given recent prominence in western media. They conclude that it is not a major problem for the regime. With the exception of the Baltic Republics, the association of ethnicity with desired separate statehood is historically absent in the USSR. The regime has usually been ideologically and pragmatically committed to a 'federal' conception of community, Soviet patriotism above ethnic particularisms Its preference for the Russian language has been an occasional disturbing flashpoint, but as it is the language of science, technology and modernization in general, linguistic issues actually divide the intelligentsia who might otherwise constitute potential ethnic dissident elites. Both writers reject, perhaps too forcefully, suggestions that Islam might now be bringing more serious nationality problems for the regime in its Central Asian Republics.

The three remaining essays look at other socialist countries principally to highlight Soviet regime characteristics Paul Lewis shows in recent Poland what happens when such a regime breaks down. David Goodman argues that recent events in China are restoring a Soviet-style party. Sharon Zukin discusses Yugoslavia as the only deviant socialist country how much state power remains when the state consciously abandons control over production?

As a non-specialist, I was informed and enlightened by the essays. Their bias (apart from the nationality essays) is economistic, but within those limits they have much to say. They also constitute a coherent book, integrated by the editor's two contributions.

The title of the other book indicates that this Europe is capitalist and only capitalist. Capitalism alone is theorized Where other social structural forces enter – and several authors are sensitive to them – they are empirical complications to an overall capitalist essence 'The State' indicates a methodology which, first, distils its capitalist essence and, second, uses the real world states of which Europe is actually composed only as analogous and independent units in a comparative analysis of variation around that essence. The theory underlying the book is Marxian. Only Dennis Smith's, short but useful, essay on education policy is written outside of Marxian debates. The terrain is laid out explicitly by David Held and Joel Kreiger's introduction 'Theories of the State'. It is lucid and sensible (especially when extending Offe's ideas on state autonomy) but constantly back-tracks to only a cautious, negative conclusion Their concluding statement is 'the state is not an unambiguous agent of capitalist reproduction', somewhat disappointing and hardly news. The strength of the essays is to show this empirically over many European countries and several policy areas. Capitalism and its class conflict are seen

as extremely important but not always decisive The weakness is that they leave it there, even when their analysis cries out for more theoretical development. On regional policy, James Lewis makes many good points about capitalist influence. He even mentions the reason why there are regional policies at all: the state's role of maintaining *territorial integrity* i e. nothing to do with capitalism. So why didn't he marshal his excellent arguments of detail around the central social contradiction in this sphere of state policy: territorial integrity, backed by electoral systems, produces regional policy but which is then necessarily implemented by capitalist agents with conflicting preoccupations?

The two central essays also show caution. Peter A. Hall centres his analysis of economic policy on relations between industrial and finance capital and the state in Britain; France and Germany. Stephen Bornstein's analysis of labour relations distinguishes neo-corporatist from neo-liberal or 'conflict based' national strategies. Austria, Norway and Sweden are exponents of the former; Britain, France and Italy of the second (West Germany is a mixed case). Both authors deal systematically and well with the various national forms of organization and their domestic causes. But international relations are mentioned only sporadically. Yet these countries differ systematically, both in the international economy and in their relations with the hegemonic western nation-state, the USA Why are these social-structural patterns not theorized? Only because they lie outside of this tradition of state theory.

One essay is weak, Rosemary Taylor's on health care policy, which she argues is conditioned by a struggle between class interests. She identifies recent calls for preventive rather than curative treatment as promoted by capital (to cut rising medical costs) and resisted and redefined by Labour This leaves out a decisive power actor, the medical profession, whose curative, medical model of health remains dominant in all countries Only Thatcherite Britain has had any success at all in cutting back the escalating finances of medical practice.

With this exception the essays are good in what they deal with Each is followed by a short collection of relevant documents which makes the collection doubly useful for teaching. But I think we are entitled in a book so generally titled to expect more of the reality of what states do, of their territorial concerns, of geo-politics and geo-economics, and of militarism. It is a reflection on the academic parochialism of both these books that (with the exception of remarks by Rutland and McAuley on Soviet patriotism) they have nothing to say about the possible Armageddon resulting from the clash between exactly these states (plus the USA).

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Jewish Commitment: A Study in London *Julius Gould* Institute of Jewish Affairs London 1984 113pp £6

This small (and expensive) volume reports the London side of an ambitious, but in the event, unsuccessful attempt to study Jewish identity, by comparing London Jews with those from an American metropolitan area. The data are based on questionnaires and interviews gathered in 1969–70 from a sample of 217 persons (119 men, 26 women). As might be expected from so experienced an author, the analyses of the data are thorough and meticulous Five indices of Jewish commitment are presented attitudes to Jewish education, ritual observances, attitudes to intermarriage, attitudes to Israel and circles of friends. More than half the book is taken up with ten case studies, which report on interviews 'in depth'. Gould considers that 'the most striking finding is that just below 40% . . . gave top place for Jewishness to their *mothers* [his italics]' (p 21) (32 per cent to fathers), but does not comment on information from respondents of whom 65 per cent claimed to read classical Hebrew fluently or quite well, 11 per cent claimed to speak modern Hebrew fluently or quite well and 34 per cent spoke Yiddish fluently or quite well.

This suggests either that, in spite of the care devoted to the sampling process (Appendix 1) there was an unexplained bias in the sample, or that respondents' ideas of fluency were exaggerated. Perhaps it was the fact that it proved to be impossible to bring the data up to date by re-interviewing respondents which constrained the author from commenting at greater length on the important issues raised by the study, and from discussing his findings in the context of other studies, such as those of Simon Herman, for example. The indices which have been established suggest a valuable basis for further research.

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The Making of a Moonie: Brainwashing or Choice? *Eileen Barker* Blackwell 1984 305pp £12.00

By any standards, this book must count as one of the most thorough and impressive sociological enquiries ever undertaken into a religious movement We have nothing quite comparable to it, whether for the Methodists, the Roman Catholics, or the Church of England, or, indeed, for any of the small sects that have attracted the attention of sociologists. The author conducted an extensive questionnaire of a large sample of Moonies, and of those who, although attending Moonie 'workshops' did not become Moonies, and with a matched control group to provide the basis for rigorous comparison. She reinforced this approach by a series of extensive interviews with members, and by prolonged participant observation. Her deep and detailed penetration of the movement is evident at every point, but she is never overwhelmed by the abundance of her unusually rich material. The basic questions are kept well in mind, and the material is always cogently marshalled in the presentation of her argument. The book is thus not only an important study of the Unification Church, but also, and perhaps this is of even greater significance, it is a study of the process of recruitment and conversion which – Unificationism apart – is a most valuable contribution to sociological literature and, one would hope, to the public understanding of such matters.

The focus of enquiry is whether the movement might in any sense be properly accused of brainwashing its contacts. Barker examines those contacts, the points at which encounter occurs, the social background of those contacted, their pre-existing dispositions, and their past experiences She provides us with a breakdown which makes possible predictions of just what types of people are most 'at risk' of becoming Moonies, and what constitutes the background of their motivation. Despite the wealth of questionnaire material on which this study draws, the text is not encumbered with statistical tables. Those with strictly methodological concerns may consider that publishing exigencies have relegated perhaps too much of the technical apparatus The result, however, is an immediately readable and accessible account, enlivened by first-hand description and well-caught impressions of atmosphere. There is no jargon – not even where it might have been justifiable and even helpful

In a short review, there is no call to recount the work's principal findings. These generally make apparent the influence of social factors in recruitment; effectively dispel reductionist arguments; make clear that Moonies are not disposed, to any greater degree than a matched sample of the general population, to mental illness; that what is ineptly called 'brainwashing' by the media (and by the judiciary) is so ineffective that only a minuscule proportion of contacts actually join, and that the majority of those who do join decide, sooner or later, to leave – all of which are indications of the sociological common sense which informs this work. These findings are rooted in a scrupulous objectivity and exposed by penetrating analysis. The author's detachment and impartiality in handling the sort of delicate and controversial subject matter in which some other social scientists have lost their sense of academic propriety is not the least item to be commended in this study

B. R. Wilson
All Souls College

The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements *Manual Castells* Edward Arnold 1963 450pp £35

For twenty years Manual Castells has been one of the foremost students of cities and social change, the subject of this impressive treatise. Over a decade ago he marshalled his studies and theory in *The Urban Question*. Whilst that book was enormously influential it was subject to a series of penetrating criticisms. Amongst the most important were: Castells's use of evidence as merely illustrative of theoretical categories, the restriction of those categories to a formalistic Marxist structuralism, Castells's lack of historical sense coupled with the mechanical determinism of his claims, and his naive optimism on the role of urban social movements in advancing the class struggle. On each of these points *The City and the Grassroots* represents an about-turn, of which Castells is frankly self-conscious and clear. The book thus represents a major re-thinking of his theory of urban movements, cities, and the role of both in social change, a re-thinking which has produced an immensely stimulating and greatly improved approach to these important matters.

Instead of slotting empirical cases into abstract boxes Castells now works 'from the grassroots' The bulk of this book presents the results of major research efforts on housing movements in Paris, neighbourhood and gay movements in San Fransisco, squatting communities in Latin America and the Citizen Movement in Madrid Each of these amounts to a monograph in itself and is marked by the careful presentation and analysis of evidence and the cautious advancement of empirically supported theory Castells's theoretical resources are eclectic and catholic (see the discussion in Chapter 28), he still draws inspiration from what he at one point calls 'the glorious ruins of the Marxist tradition' (p 301) but he no longer remains within that tradition, particularly its Althussarian structuralist variant. Instead of elaborate formal systems of elements Castells now conveys a continuous preoccupation with the historical specificity of the people, processes and movements of cities. Furthermore, people and their movements, not 'contradictions determining their bearers', are the agents on the historical stage.

Yet whilst the 'new' Castells is empirically grounded, conceptually liberal, historically sensitive and voluntaristic he still maintains the objective of generating a theory of urban movements, their significance in shaping the form, culture and politics of cities, and the role of cities in major social change It is to this he turns in the final section of the book Castells begins by situating cities in a world context of the internationalization of capital, the sophistication of information technology and the increasingly centralized and bureaucratic state. These major forces generate, as their *alter egos*, the major preoccupations of urban movements across different cultures. at the grassroots people are concerned with space as a use value not exchange value, with living in community rather than being passive, atomized receivers of information, with managing their own lives rather than being pawns of the system. Castells claims that only when these three goals are self-consciously articulated will an urban social movement form which can influence the meaning of the city But this also requires linkages with the wider society through utilizing the media, professional knowledge and political parties. Yet an urban social movement must maintain its independence, in particular, to become incorporated into the political system is its kiss of death

Having stated the structural conditions of urban social movements Castells considers their role in cities and social change. He is well aware that the major determinants of both lie outside the parochial world of such movements which can only be 'reactive Utopias' working against the grain. Yet, precisely because the labour movement, liberal rationalism and the democratic ideal seem increasingly incorporated and debased by capital, technology and the state, urban movements in which people 'organize themselves on their local turf' (p 330) become

modest but crucial expressions of human values.

My brief synopsis of Castells's theory does little justice to its subtlety, depth and insight He has re-affirmed his status as a major theorist of urban life, one hopes that a paperback edition of this book becomes quickly available so as to make his new ideas as familiar as the old. They are a great improvement.

Ian Procter
University of Warwick

Forever Feminine: Women's Magazines and the Cult of Femininity *Marjorie Ferguson* Heinemann 1983 243pp n.p.

This book is a serious treatment of a neglected and trivialized subject: the potential social influence of women's magazines. The newspaper and the magazine as developed in the nineteenth and through the twentieth centuries provide 'prototypes' for how culture is now manufactured in industrial countries and how it has become a means for both repression and liberation. Magazines have been studied least and yet may be more important than the daily press because from their inception, they have not been targeted to the masses but to specialized segments of the population.

Although Marjorie Ferguson provides some information about other women's magazines, her study focuses basically on a few most widely read weeklies in Britain directed especially to women who adhere to 'traditional' values and lifestyles. She examined the magazines' histories, their contents and the contexts in which they were produced. The content analyses are in two parts· the first, examining the dominant themes in the popular weeklies for the period 1949–74, and the second, a follow-up for the years 1979 and 1980. The context of production is also examined in two ways first a look at the role of editors, and then a comparison of two major publishing organizations Data for these parts of the study came from interviews with editors, journalists, and managers both in Britain and the USA.

According to Ferguson, the ideology promulgated by these magazines is the 'cult of feminity'. To adhere to the rules and to be identified as a member of the cult, the women readers must actively pursue the goals of the cult or 'religion' Chapter 3 presents the most widely read messages provided by the magazines. Women of all classes were told that their primary goal in life as members of the cult was to 'get a man' and after that to 'keep him'. The messages were inherently contradictory because women were told to *actively* participate in becoming dependent. The world presented in these magazines was also internal, not external, a world where problems of unemployment, international issues involving peace and war, and other political and economic concerns did not exist or were of no consequence to women. The emphasis was on the centrality of family life for women. The message could not have been more clear. Satisfaction was to be derived solely from wifehood and motherhood The idealized role models were not career women, scholars, politicians, or even volunteers in community service, but homemakers, making themselves, their houses and their families beautiful and healthy

Ferguson shows that while the actual roles of women were changing, the magazines did not reflect those changes. Chapter 4 presents the second follow-up content analysis. By 1979 and 1980, a new woman emerged from the pages of the magazines, no longer just interested in getting and keeping a man. Women in the stories and articles were portrayed as moving from the roles of female dependency to the broader opportunities of female autonomy. However, although there was a change in ideology, the female world presented in women's magazines still remained internalized and focused on the individual, on self-improvement and wider individual choices, rather than on more worldly political and social concerns.

The book is more than a content analysis – it also provides a valuable analysis of how such messages are shaped and how they change There is a section on 'where ideas come from' and how decisions are made about what to print

Ferguson's experience as a journalist before becoming a sociologist provide realistic insights into the work world of editors and journalists. As might be surmized, this chapter and the next one on the impact the organization has on both the role of the editors and the content itself are the most intriguing. Here the contradictions and dilemmas involved in studying the production of culture come to the fore. Do the editors impose their own values on the readers? How does one account for the fundamental changes in the message? How could the editors (work-oriented, independent women) present a world view prior to 1974 so different from their own way of life, represented by their actual behaviour?

The data available cannot answer these questions, but Ferguson does make a convincing case that the magazines are both cultural productions and economic commodities. Editors and, of course, publishers will use those messages that they think will sell magazines. This overriding concern brings up the basic problem, as yet only partially solved, concerning the ultimate power that readers have over the content. Do readers get what they want or do they eventually want what they get? How do editors know what readers want? A careful reading of this book shows that although not definitely answered, reader 'demand' appears powerful as an influence.

Majorie Ferguson takes women's culture seriously by showing how commercialism and ideology intersect. Women, in spite of the messages they were given from one of the primary journalistic sources, did change in directions that the editors (high priestesses of the cult) and publishers would never have thought possible This is a serious work on the role of ideas and ideology in women's lives It also provides a model for future research as well as a solid base of data for other scholars to build on.

Muriel G Cantor
The American University

The Origins of Trade Union Power
Henry Phelps Brown Clarendon Press 1983
320pp £15.00

Henry Phelps Brown has long been outstanding among economists for his willingness to treat social, historical and psychological variables as at least equally important as the usual economic factors in accounting for the behaviour of labour. In this new work he brings these insights to bear on an analysis of the increasingly problematic place of trade unions in British society. In particular, rather than simply observing events and actions from outside, he tries to adopt the perspectives of those actively engaged. Such an approach is familiar to sociologists, but this remains a remarkable example of such writing for its ability to display, and let rest without hasty resolution, empathy for rival positions. Thus, strikes that threaten vital services can reasonably be seen as threats to order, as major exercises of potentially unconstitutional power. At the same time they are usually also simple attempts by workers to improve or safeguard standards of living that, even if the attempt succeeds, remain modest.

Such an approach leads to frequent clashes with conventional wisdom. Workers, as Phelps Brown sees them, experience the market as a source of constraint and menacing insecurity: 'Working life has been made tolerable in practice only because there have been few labour markets in which competition has been really free. . . . (p. 30)' The market threatens the capacity of individual workers to keep control over their lives. Workers' recourse to combination is therefore an assertion of, not a challenge to, individualism.

For all that, it is clear that in general he considers that British industrial relations have developed in an excessively unregulated way that now renders a normless and undisciplined trade-union power a political and economic problem, working against its own best interests as well as those of the country. The book's most important contribution is its demonstration that possibilities for various kinds of order have at times been available: detailed legal establishment and regulation of union rights, as in the USA; strong, centralized organizations of both capital and labour, as in Sweden; com-

pulsory arbitration, as in Australia. All these, and others, were possible choices for Britain at certain moments; but for reasons entirely explicable at the time, they were all rejected by government, employers or unions, or by all of them.

The ground traversed in this work is familiar. However, not least because of its great ability sympathetically to explore rival points of view, it contains things that readers of all dispositions and disciplines will find challenging, requiring them to re-examine their prejudices.

My own main quarrel with the account is methodological. International differences, as well as changes over time, says Phelps Brown, 'can only be ascribed in the last resort to differences in the attitudes of the protagonists' (p. 300). But if attitudes are the last explanatory resort, they are seen as essentially exogenous, not themselves capable of explanation within the general framework of history, sociology and economics. Surely this is not so. Austrians and Australians, British and Americans approach their industrial relations with different attitudes because the logic of the situations they confront and the accumulated experiences of the past have suggested to them that some attitudes are a sure guide to their best interests than others. These attitudes may be mistaken; but they are not the last link in the social scientist's chain of explanation.

Colin Crouch
London School of Economics and Political Science

Politics in the Ancient World *Sir Moses Finley* Cambridge University Press 1983 152pp £15.00 (paper £5.95)

The title indicates precisely the contents. 'Political' means pertaining to the *polis*, in which binding public decisions are made after open discussion followed by a vote in an assembly. The subject-matter is that extraordinary phenomenon of 'direct democracy' in classical Greece and Republican Rome, rarely seen before or since. From this definition Finley launches spirited polemics against classical scholars who see ancient politics through the lens of subsequent ages. Forget electoral politics, he says. Though there were sometimes elections, they were less important than assigning office by lot. In Athens this device gave the fullest political rights to citizens over the age of thirty every three or four years (by serving on the Council of the Assembly). 'Free speech' was also different from ours: it was active, the right and duty to speak out in assemblies. Politics meant far more active participation, though by small numbers of citizens in a world of subordinate slaves, foreigners and women; politics also co-existed with exploitation of poor by rich citizens.

Finley is very good on these matters (except for women, whom he does not discuss). In Rome, as the number of citizens increased, and as they failed to encroach on the rights of the Senatorial aristocracy, new informal arrangements surfaced, especially what we might call 'collective bargaining by riot'. In a political system of assemblies, a citizen-body of many thousands strong demonstrated, rioted, injured or forced the exile of opponents (but rarely killed them) and withheld military service (the first strikes of recorded history). This worked intermittently for centuries, keeping the material interests of the poor (land-hunger and restraints on debt) on the political agenda – as they were also in Greece with smaller numbers of citizens. The co-existence of politics and class is his narrative theme. We hear little of status (preferred to class in earlier work), religion is played down, the kinship of 'tribes' is fictitious. Instead we learn of how class and the *polis* combined to foster colonial settlements and military conquests, and of how in Rome this eventually destroyed the *polis* itself. It is a cautionary tale, told with Finley's customary style, authority and sociological imagination. Sociology is general parochial, ignoring these well-documented, complex, class-riven yet democratic societies Yet they have much to tell us. This little book is one of the best places to start the remedy.

Michael Mann
London School of Economics

Hare Krishna, Hare Krishna *Steven J. Gelberg* (ed.) Grove Press 1983 276pp £6.95 (paper)

The International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) has grown from a small band of hippies who learned how to chant 'Hare Krishna' from an elderly Indian who arrived in the west without any money or contacts in the mid 1960s, into an international organization with thousands of western devotees who have become steeped in the ancient philosophies and devotions of Vaishnavism.

This book is a transcription of five interviews conducted by a Krishna devotee. The scholars who are interviewed are: the Harvard theologian Harvey Cox; Larry Shinn, who has just completed a sociological study of ISKCON; Thomas Hopkins, an expert on Asian religious traditions who has specialized in Hindu devotional movements; the historian A. L. Basham; and Shrivatsa Goswami, a student of Hindu philosophy and culture who himself belongs to the religious tradition from which ISKCON was born

The interviews certainly do not comprise an in-depth sociological analysis, but there is much of interest, not only for the religionist, but also for those who are interested in cultural dynamics. Particularly fascinating are the discussions relating to the changes that have taken place since ISKCON's inception, especially the way in which the movement has become increasingly punctilious with regard to traditional devotions – unlike most other imports from the east which have tended to become diluted for western consumption.

Eileen Barker
London School of Economics

Industrial Relations and Management Strategy *Keith Thurley and Stephen Wood* (eds) Cambridge University Press 1983 242pp £22 50 (£8.95 paper)

This collection of articles, the product of a seminar series under SSRC auspices, examines the role of management in industrial relations. It stems from current concerns about management having been 'left out' of industrial relations research – which has focused on the institutional context and trade unions – and a pressing need to integrate the various theoretical approaches to management in order to allow practitioners to benefit from academic research. To these ends Thurley and Wood bring together an impressive array of contributors from industrial relations and personnel management, business policy and organization theory. The unifying concept is that of *strategy* – the notion that 'managerial actions' shape industrial relations, albeit within a complex of constraints and inputs from other actors.

The editors' aim is at once ambitious and modest: ambitious in the sense of pointing to a new direction for the study of industrial relations, and modest in that they confine themselves to setting out a framework of analysis for future research.

Factors which directly affect the managerial function as regards industrial relations are dealt with in the first section of papers. These include the implications of sectionalism within management for industrial relations policy, the fact that managers themselves may be unionized, how far union authority rivals or supports management's, and environmental constraints on managerial attitudes towards workers' participation. The second part of the book covers the broader context of managerial decision-making. Papers here are concerned with the historical and comparative background to employment relations, the differences between public and private sphere companies, and the specific context of the culture and history of organizations.

This is a stimulating book containing important insights into the links between management as an occupational group and the decision-making function A strong interdisciplinary approach is its great virtue; but at the same time I doubt if the problem of the integration of subjects has been sufficiently anticipated by the editors, particularly the clash between sociological methodologies and the prescriptive method of business studies

It would seem a pity, for example, if recent critical and sociological advances in industrial relations theory and organization theory were ignored – certainly the dangers of a lapse into 'managerialism' were evident despite the editors' claim that managerial strategy implies no necessary commitment to managerial control (p. 4). The editors also acknowledge that the industrial relations crisis caused by the recession must be a vital topic of future research. However, some of the contributions make one wonder exactly how this would be approached. Purcell's paper, in particular, restates the familiar ideal-typical model of primary sector industrial relations, whereby firms exist in relative harmony with trade unions, and simply asserts that the recession will not tempt 'large corporation management' to jeopardize long-term stability (p 61).

There are real conflicts of purpose between the reform of industrial relations, its academic study and business performance which are not really acknowledged here. And it seems to me that closer attention will need to be paid to providing the concept of strategy with a coherent methodology if it is to give the broad impetus in industrial relations that the editors clearly hope for.

Robin Fincham
Napier College

Equality and Inequality: Theory and Practice *André Beteille* Oxford University Press 1983 302pp £12.50

This book is an attempt to bring scholarly debates on inequality in Indian society to a wider audience. The five main papers cover legal, economic, sociological, educational and political aspects of inequality. A central theme of this collection is the attempt to achieve greater equality in Indian society through constitutional and legal reforms, which has been almost totally thwarted by economic and social structures Beteille's introduction is a rather uncritical summary of the papers, and an outline of his own basically Weberian position

The first four papers fit together surprisingly well considering the various disciplines of the authors. B. Sivaramayya covers the legal aspects of equality and inequality from early Hindu customs to modern constitutional issues and legal reforms based on western social democratic ideals. For the lay reader this is a clear and concise introduction. Moving to economics Suresh D. Tendulkar deals with some conceptual issues in economics and relates these to data on economic inequality in India. Anand Chakravarti looks at inequality in rutal India in a sociological approach examining the inter-relationships of class, caste and political power. Malavika Karlekar covers education and inequality looking in detail at sex and caste inequalities in education, and disparities between primary and higher education sectors.

Manoranjan Mohanty's contribution on political theories of inequality is the most disappointing in the whole book. It doesn't fit in with the main themes of the earlier papers, and in such a small space it is difficult to treat the theories of Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, Weber, Lenin, Rawls and Macpherson adequately for the lay reader. He concludes rather lamely that any new political theory of inequality must go beyond Marx, but he gives us no indication as to how we might proceed.

As might be expected in a book of this kind there are no great original insights, but the four main chapters on legal, economic, sociological and educational aspects of inequality could be useful for new students of Indian society. However it is unfortunate that neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment and the recent contributions of feminism are not covered in relation to the Indian context.

Paul Bagguley
University of Sussex

The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain *Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies* Hutchinson 1982 324pp £5.95 (paper)

I approached this book with a good deal of enthusiasm. Its title is slick and rather appealing and I have a good deal of

respect for much of the work that has come from the Centre of Contemporary Cultural Studies over the years. Those who have worked at the Centre have tried to interpret the significance of cultural change in our society and in my view that is a very important enterprise – one which generally has been much neglected in sociology and related social sciences in recent years. However, having waded through the three hundred pages I set the volume aside with feelings of frustration and despair. It is at least a third longer than need be, thanks largely to the esoteric Althusserian language in which most of it is cast. The style is not justified on the grounds that the authors are treating concepts of conspicuous complexity: all that it can do is deny their arguments the wide circulation they deserve.

The major purpose of the book is to explore the ways in which racism has developed in Britain, to show how it is rooted in our imperialist history, how it is re-worked in the conditions of our economic and political decline and woven into the fabric of our current institutions and culture. The first chapter sets the agenda and indicates the authors' belief that this ambitious project can be accomplished only through the development of a materialist framework, a political economy which distances itself from academic sociology.

> Racism as it exists and functions today cannot be treated simply from a sociological perspective. It has to be located historically and in terms of the wider structures and relations of British society. (p. 11.)

The first chapter also introduces a second theme that is to run throughout the book: the argument that the forms of racism we can observe today are in large part reactions to the struggles of black people and their *resistance* to oppression. There can be no doubt that this theme really does deserve attention for, at least to my knowledge, there are precious few books and articles which deal seriously or extensively with it. The racism that pervades our culture serves all too frequently to obscure the fact that there has always been resistance – whether in colonial territories or here in the factories and communities of Britain. Even if we acknowledge it, we rarely study it.

Two of the best sections are contributed by Paul Gilroy, in the first of which – 'Police and Thieves' – he explores in a subtle way not only how racist assumptions inform police conceptions of criminality but also how a writer on the left, like E. P. Thompson, is curiously silent about the civil rights of blacks or a critical criminologist, Jock Young, fails to explore the racial connotations of a crime described as 'mugging'. In the final chapter Gilroy discusses, among other things, a feature of cultural resistance which will surely repay further examination. He draws our attention to the fact that those who have experienced colonialism bring with them to Britain a conception of their struggle, and of their relations with whites which is distinctive. Kept alive in their neighbourhoods and communal organizations in Britain this understanding and its recollected practices informs their responses here. It would be good if these radical traditions could be looked at in more detail.

Almost a third of the volume is taken up by two chapters by Errol Lawrence: one on the roots of racism and 'common-sense' racist ideologies, the other on sociology and black pathology. The first seems not to add much that is new to our understanding of racism; the second does make some good points about the often-ignored cultural creativity of Afro-Caribbean and Asian people and their efforts at resisting white colonial rule. However, a major part of this chapter presents the author's criticisms of sociologists (Rex, Khan, Cashmore, Troyna and others) alleging that those involved in the study of ethnicity or race relations have failed to unmask any but the most obvious forms of common-sense racism and, worse, that they have created distorted and inadequate representations of black people and black cultures. The latter, it is claimed, help shape public policies at all levels and feed the racist aspects of them. The trouble with this section is that its tone and manner of argument makes it difficult to take seri-

ously. The condemnation is so sweeping, the quotes so selective that the plausibility of the criticism is undermined Again, that is a great shame, for a more careful and incisive examination of the recent studies would genuinely advance our understanding.

In several passages in the book the authors force to our attention the fact that the role of black women is given short shrift or is ludicrously caricatured in sociological work. Certainly there is substance to that charge and the part played by women in movements or episodes of black resistance has received little commentary. Pratibha Parmar in a chapter on 'Gender, race and class: Asian women in resistance', does something to rectify that. She demonstrates very well the fact that Asian women are not the passive, subjugated creatures they are made to appear in much popular writing and some academic work. Both in their countries of origin and in Britain, Asian women have played a much more active role economically and politically than is commonly allowed. Parmar produces good arguments and good evidence on this. Her piece is persuasive. I cannot say the same for the chapter by Hazel Carby entitled 'White women listen! Black feminism and the boundaries of sisterhood'. I find it hard to believe that this essay will do much to induce an essentially white feminist movement 'to take account of the lives, herstories [sic] and experiences of black women', (p. 232) desirable though that would be

The Empire Strikes Back addresses a number of very important issues, it attempts some timely criticism of received wisdoms in branches of sociology and it contains some genuinely novel and insightful passages. To find the gems though, you will need to dig through several polysyllabic layers.

Brian Elliott
University of Edinburgh

The Microfoundations of Macrosociology *Michael Hechter* (ed.) Temple University Press 1983 289pp $29.95

Hechter's edited collection of nine essays is an attempt to promote rational choice theories in sociology. Hechter argues for the need to rediscover theories of individual action, which rational choice theories encapsulate, against the background of the founding fathers' dismissals of social theories based solely on individualistic explanations. It is not entirely clear, however, whether we are being asked to regard rational choice theories as merely complementary to structural or normative social theories (p. 8), or stand-alone and 'better explanations of key macrosociological problems' (p. 10). Hechter waivers between these two positions and stops a long way short of views like those of Chicago economist Gary Becker. Becker claims that the method of economics, by which he means the assumption that individuals make rational choices, explains any and every aspect of social and economic behaviour, and eliminates the need for other theories therefore.

The subject matter of these separate essays which illustrate the value of rational choice theory is wide-ranging. The authors are all North Americans but their essays consider American, European and Japanese societies. The topics include theories of group solidarity and cohesion with cross-cultural comparisons, religious specialization in academia and the protestant ethic, French political regionalism, why workers strike, institutional change and Polanyi's social theory. They are a mixture of empirical and theoretical pieces, approximately half of which have been published previously as journal articles. It is an interesting collection and includes a perhaps surprising argument that rational choice and Marxian theories are compatible (see Brustein paper).

A central question remains unanswered by this collection as to whether rational choice theories are explanations of behaviour *given* certain constraints, or whether they are sufficient explanations of both the constraints, norms and structures, *and* the behaviour.

Shirley Dex
University of Keele

Achievement and Inequality in Education *June Purvis and Margaret Hales* (eds) Routledge & Kegan Paul in association with the Open University 1983 276pp £3.50 (paper)
The Sociology of Education: A Systematic Analysis *Jeanne H. Ballantine* Prentice-Hall 1983 398pp £21.55

In the context of a study of the problem of inequality in education, four major and inter-related aspects of inequality are important, viz., inequality in educational opportunity, inequality in educational attainment, inequality in occupational attainments, and inequality in economic achievements or inequality in returns to education. While the last one has been the concern of economists of education, the other three received serious attention of the sociologists The *Reader*, prepared by the Open University, under review is concerned with all the four aspects but concerned more with the second aspect, i.e., why and how inequalities in educational attainments are created?

The book is a collection of a dozen papers, and like many other publications of the Open University, all the papers in the volume had been published earlier in journals and similarly edited volumes. The book is indeed meant for a course on 'Conflict and Change in Education: A Sociological Introduction' at the Open University. What happens in the classrooms and how do the teachers view it? How do the students view the whole teaching learning process? After all, students' views could no longer be dismissed as 'a product of unintelligence'. The first two parts of the volume present respectively the teachers' perspectives, the pupils' perspectives on the inequalities in the teaching-learning process. The third part is devoted to a discussion on inequalities in educational opportunities written from a feminist perspective. Interestingly, in a paper, Katherine Clarricoates describes the evils of gender-blind conceptualization within the field of sociology of education, which in a sense grants approval to the subordination of women in the literature. The third part also contains an excellent historical analysis of the problems of women's education in the nineteenth century Britain by June Purvis. The fourth part titled 'Education and Qualifications' consists of two papers. The one by Anthony Heath and John Ridge examines the three aspects of inequality in education, viz., educational opportunities, educational achievement and occupational attainments. The volume on the whole adds substantially to a critical understanding of the problem

June Purvis rightly argues that we can understand inequalities in education only if we study them in relation to 'wider economic, social, cultural and ideological factors outside the education field' (p. 153) So does Andy Hargreaves. What happens within the boundaries of the schools is clearly related to the nature of the socio-economic and political structure of the wider society and the functions, which the educational system performs for that structure. Almost all the contributors noted this. However, there are a few exceptions For instance, David Jary should have related his discussion on liberal art education to technological changes resulting in less number of hours of work and more hours of leisure, producing more demand for art education, etc.

Jeanne Ballantine, the author of the other book under review, also clearly recognizes the importance of social, economic and political factors in education. For the same reason, he covers a variety of issues in the book· education, economy, society, environment etc., and their symbiotic relationship, besides the school system, the pedagogy, the curriculum, comparative education and so on Ballantine rightly views education as a part of the whole inter-dependent society, as against those sociologists of education who deal only with specific institutions of education

Ballantine's book is a very good textbook on sociology of education. Even though sociology of education is a fairly recent field of inquiry, the contributions of the late nineteenth and twentieth century sociologists, particularly Emile Durkheim and Max Weber have been quite significant to the students of soci-

ology of education. The 'new' sociology of education drew its intellectual stimulation from a variety of sources including Karl Marx, G. H. Mead, Alfred Schutz, P. L. Berger, Herbert Blumer, H. Becker, etc. As June Purvis and Margaret Hales observed in the introduction to the earlier book under review

> Whereas the structural functionalist perspective had stressed the relationship between education and the wider social structure of society, and had seen men and women as rather passive beings who were largely 'determined' by the social system, the perspectives comprising the 'new' sociology of education stressed that people were active individuals, continually constructing their own reality as they made sense of the world. In particular, studies of the class-room within the 'new' sociology of education stressed that teachers and pupils were actors negotiating and interpreting meanings rather than puppets operated by the social system. (p. 3)

When this is new sociology of education, the text book by Ballantine regrettably falls within the boundaries of the traditional perspective of the sociology of education

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New Delhi

School Leavers and their Prospects: Youth and the Labour Market in the 1980s *Kenneth Roberts* Open University Press 1984 133pp £5.95 (paper)

Ken Roberts will be well-known to many readers as the author of a number of undergraduate texts on social class and several important studies of youth, the careers service and the transition from school to work. The present work is a meeting of these waters inasmuch as it is a teaching text concerned with youth and the labour market. In addition, however, the author offers a distinctive analysis of the topic, which he presents forcefully throughout the book: youth unemployment and underemployment – which are not in themselves particularly novel phenomena – are primarily problems of the labour market, manifestations of the decline in the availability of certain kinds of jobs. As such, they have little to do with the putative undermining of educational standards, nor do they reflect a change for the worse in the 'youth of today'.

In the course of making this point Roberts covers a lot of useful ground: the pre-war situation, the relationship between education and the labour market, the post-war youth labour market, the return of youth unemployment and the rise of state intervention and the Manpower Services Commission. This is a comprehensive coverage and makes the book the most useful teaching text currently available on this highly topical subject. Although, as is the way with these things, we will all be able to find something to disagree with within its covers, with this book Roberts has performed a service for all teachers and students concerned with youth studies, education or the labour market.

Richard Jenkins
University College of Swansea

Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change *D Levy and G. Székeley* Westview Press 1983 287pp £11.25

This is a book written by political scientists for a North American undergraduate audience. As a textbook on the Mexican political system it is competent, though somewhat dull, and can be recommended as a reliable introduction. For a sociologist, there is a disappointing lack of coverage of key aspects of the social structure and how these might impinge on politics The focus tends heavily toward a discussion of policy issues and of the policy-making process This is the best part of the book and the authors are careful, when focusing on policy issues affecting both the USA and Mexico, to give a balanced presentation, devoting space to elaborating the arguments put forward in both countries.

The 'paradoxes' of stability and change

identified by the authors turn out to be paradoxes only in a superficial sense, the reason why Mexico has managed to combine political stability with development is that the dominant party has been flexible enough to respond to possible challenges while at the same time thoroughly repressing any movement aimed at overthrowing the existing system. It is a system in which power is concentrated in the hands of an elite which is astute enough to pay attention to at least some of the dissatisfactions of other actors.

In this aspect, at least, Mexico is very different from other Latin American political systems. Levy and Székeley have written a useful introduction which explains why this should be so.

Ian Roxborough
London School of Economics

Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge *David Bloor* Macmillan 1984 213pp £15.00 (£5.96 paper)

Wittgenstein's work constitutes a 'determined assault' on certain fundamental assumptions of common sense and established philosophical traditions and in challenging these assumptions Wittgenstein, argues Bloor, offers an approach which is inherently sociological, placing men and women 'back in the centre of the picture' and also naturalistic in treating their beliefs, language and rationality as part of their natural history Seeking to demonstrate the sociological orientation of Wittgenstein's later work, Bloor also considers the ways in which his ideas may be further developed by drawing from anthropological sources. He analyses logic and mathematics from the standpoint of Wittgenstein's social theory of knowledge, pointing out that if the theory can be established in these, the most difficult cases, then 'there is no need to make concessions elsewhere.' In his *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Wittgenstein shows that logical inferences refer to moves within the language-game which are not questioned and, as Bloor emphasizes, should be seen as customs or traditions While this is often interpreted as a conventionalist position, Bloor insists that Wittgenstein's focus is on ways of acting as the source of validity. Logical necessity is treated as a 'moral and social relation' rather than as resting on a sequence of decisions.

Where Bloor goes beyond Wittgenstein is in his construction of a typology of language-games If we want to understand how language-games develop and change, Wittgenstein's own work is inconclusive. Although he refers to the role of needs and interests, he does not develop these ideas. Moreover, while advising his readers to 'look and see' what happens in ordinary life, Wittgenstein, as Bloor rightly notes, does not follow his own advice but relies on imaginary rather than historical examples. According to Bloor this can be remedied by making use of empirical investigations and he draws from the work of Mary Douglas on responses to strangers in working out a typology of language-games. Arguing that there are only a limited number of responses to strangers or anomalies, namely indifference, exclusion, opportunism and accommodation, Bloor illustrates this with examples drawn from the natural science. Pointing to the patterns of socially-sustained boundaries within and between groups, and to their shifting goals and interests, he claims that all subjects of cognition may be analysed in terms of these social processes.

Given Bloor's strong interest in the dynamics of change, it is curious that his study contains only one reference to Wittgenstein's remarks on grammar. For Wittgenstein the limits to change are determined neither by arbitrary decisions nor by natural objects but by the relation between them which he elucidates with the notions of grammar and grammatical propositions. While grammatical propositions are characterized by their rigidity within particular language-games, none the less they can be modified. When this occurs the movement may be attributed to changes in social and material conditions In *On Certainty*, for example, Wittgenstein uses the analogy of the river-bank which 'consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another

gets washed away, or deposited' to capture the fluidity and strength of grammatical propositions as part of the framework of our understanding. Although he acknowledges the importance of the notion of grammar for empirical research, Bloor interprets it as the rules of a language-game rather than its meaning and in doing so, arguably loses its significance for an understanding of social change. However, he is correct to distinguish Wittgenstein's approach from pure conventionalism: for Wittgenstin we cannot simply decide to act differently, new ways of acting can arise only within the context of our existing practices.

But while placing considerable emphasis on Wittgenstein's reliance on ways of acting as a source of agreement, Bloor makes no reference to the notable similarities between Wittgenstein and Marx here. Overlooking their common concern to ground knowledge in social action, he in fact treats Wittgenstein's interest in ordinary life as evidence of conservatism. Against Bloor it could be argued that in tying change to socially constructed rather than natural limits, Wittgenstein is moving closer to humanist Marxism than to conservatism. Wittgenstein shares Marx's confidence that the mysteries of philosophy – including the problem of nature and convention – may be resolved by a return to practice. What is of considerable value in Bloor's analysis, however, is his use of ethnographic material to develop Wittgenstein's ideas and by this means he facilitates the re-entry of sociologists into the philosophical arena

Susan M. Easton
University of Sussex

Corporatism and the Welfare State *M. L. Harrison* (ed.) Gower 1984 157pp £13.50

'Corporatism' proves something of a will-o'-the-wisp in this collection, which stands on its strongest ground as a series of creative and interesting experiments with various theoretical tools for analysing the welfare state and related institutions. Sometimes, for example in David Coates's otherwise admirably clear-headed and well ordered critique of the theoretical literature, the concept slips to mean nothing more than incorporation. Much the same is true of Kirk Mann's interesting application of Parkin's idea of 'closure' to divisions within the working class, where corporatism stands either for incorporation or even mere sectionalism. Eric Reade's original critique of town and country planning practice, with its thought-provoking contrast between 'professions' and 'experts', does not need to speak of corporatism where it means political deals

The concept is most effectively used by those authors studying a field genuinely rich in organizational intermediation· Craig and Harrison on the National House-Builders Registration Council and the Building Societies Association, and Steven Winyard on agriculture. And by the one author who argues for its relative irrelevance to his topic. Geof Mercer on the National Health Service.

Colin Crouch
LSE

Modern Social Theory: From Parsons to Habermas *Ian Craib* Wheatsheaf Books 1984 230pp £18.95

I wanted very much to like this book. Its aims seem admirable and it is written in an accessible, amiable and commonsense style. In this it is a vast improvement on the introductory theory texts of the 1960s on which I was reared. But there are more good basic theory works now than there were then and I'm neither sure that Ian Craib's book does any more than them, nor any better.

There were several minor irritations such as idiosyncratic spellings – 'relevent' and 'hermaneutics', the occasional patronizing phrase and some disparaging comments about the unnecessary complexity of certain theories which seem intended to cajole the student novice into the validity of the theoretical enterprise

A more productive technique is his use of catchwords and phrases which pinpoint common 'theoretical traps' and no one could doubt the aptness of the jungle

metaphor to modern social theory. But as I followed Craib's path through the jungle, I couldn't help feeling that I would have been better off with my own machete The route and rate at which we proceeded left theorists and theories lying about in the creepers and the inexperienced reader rather lost and uninformed. His attempts to justify his own emphases lead to obscure and confusing references to 'things which have to be left out' Sometimes the omissions are serious – Merton is ignored in the chapter on functionalism and Foucault only merits a bibliographic reference in the section on post-structuralism. The early chapters are far too superficial in the exposition of theories and too brief in criticism. On phenomenological sociology, however, he expresses himself with superb clarity and he clearly knows his stuff on structuralist and post-structuralist Marxism These latter chapters being written lucidly for the most part with an engaging enthusiasm which one would have hoped for throughout.

On the whole it is difficult to balance a metatheoretical endeavour with a substantive theoretical exegesis in an introductory text. So much depends on valid and clearly stated criteria by which theories are to be rigorously assessed and compared. Here the main criteria are rather crude notions of causality which are not sustained throughout and an inadequately stated but crucial idea that most theories of social structure fall apart in their failure to account for human agency

His central suggestion ' . . that theory is necessarily fragmented in that we need different types of theory to explain different things' could have been put and illustrated much more succinctly. Craib has tried to do too much for a novice audience in too short a space. There is a real need for an entire introductory text dealing with neo-Marxist theory and structuralist influences on it. Craib could have written it. It is a pity he chose to produce this book instead.

Ron Iphofen
Coleg Harlech

The War Over the Family: Capturing the Middle Ground *Brigitte and Peter Berger* Penguin Books 1984 270pp £2.95 (paper)

The War Over the Family is not a book about 'the family'. Rather, this book is a defence of the bourgeois family – a term used by the authors but never defined by them, leaving it safe to surmise that what they defend is the white middle-class American form of family. The authors, in their own words, 'believe in the basic legitimacy of the bourgeois family, historically as well as today, both in terms of morality and in terms of the requirements of a free polity' (p 7). Their defence lies upon three 'facts' about the family in contemporary society: (1) the family remains a popular institution, despite accusations to the contrary; (2) historically, the bourgeois family is the only stable institution of primary interpersonal relations – especially between parents and children – so that there are no viable alternatives to this nuclear, heterosexual arrangement; and (3) this institution is the only one which can instil democratic values. Thus the key to their defence remains a conviction (not convincingly argued) that 'the family, and specifically the bourgeois family, is the necessary social context for the emergence of autonomous individuals who are the empirical foundation of political democracy' (p. 186). In attempting to argue this case, a number of assumptions which others may not share become apparent. First, the American parliamentary two-party system as the epitome of democracy is never doubted. Second, the exercise of choice – for example by a system of vouchers – is seen as resulting in autonomy which would furthermore contribute to the elimination of social inequalities. Third, society is portrayed as held together by moral consensus, the chief values of which include 'reliability, honesty, industriousness, respect and concern for others, willingness to take on responsibility' (p. 198). Despite the authors' insistence that individual mean-

ing and experience are paramount, critiques of the family, especially those by the counterculture and by feminists, do not inform the Bergers that perhaps the bourgeois family does not mean the same thing to all people, and that the reality for some is oppressive. Rather, these arguments are dismissed as extreme elements which accompany 'hyper-modernity'.

In summary, *The War Over the Family* suffers from four fundamental and fatal flaws. It is atheoretical, as illustrated by the authors' use of the catchall phrase 'modernity' to describe the spread of bourgeois institutions and value systems and which gives rise to confusing concepts such as 'de-modernization' and 'hyper-modernity'. It is unanalytical, in that it does not investigate the empirical basis for 'complaints' that have been raised against the family but reduces them to part of an ideological battle. It is tautological in its arguments about the importance and the role of the family in socialization. Finally, it is uninformed or misinformed of certain intellectual developments, such as feminist debates. Thus the Bergers may be surprised to learn that many others, including some feminists, support the notion of 'family' and the humanizing values it engenders, and criticize the bourgeois family on precisely those grounds That is to say that while 'the family', as many experience it, may very well help to reproduce bourgeois democracy characteristic of advanced capitalist society, it may for the very same reason frustrate genuine human needs.

Dawn Currie
London School of Economics

Karl Mannheim *David Kettler, Volker Meja and Nico Stehr* Ellis Horwood and Tavistock 1984 169pp £3.25 (paper)

Anyone familiar with the authors' previous work would have been looking forward to the publication of this study of Mannheim. However, despite many illuminating passages the text is rather disappointing. Mannheim's thought is seen as being formed in a liberal context and its development is traced through his subsequent emigrations. Much weight is placed upon Mannheim's sense of possessing a mission in life and his formulations in the sociology of knowledge are discussed in this light. The book contains an original and well written chapter on Mannheim's move to England and his subsequent disagreements with British sociologists as well as a discussion of his involvement in the 'Moot'.

Much of this analysis is interesting and explains many aspects of Mannheim's work. However, there are two main critical points that should be made. First, the placing of Mannheim in a liberal *milieu* is based on a rather broad definition of liberalism and is consistently undercut throughout the book, where the conservative slant of much of Mannheim's work is noted. Second, while Mannheim's importance is often stressed, the reasons given for this are not always very convincing and more attention might have been paid to Mannheim's role in the foundation of a detailed sociology of knowledge, which can form the basis of an analysis of contempoary culture.

Brian Longhurst
University of Lancaster

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Edited by Alice S. Rossi

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Hardback DM 122,–; approx. £40.65 ISBN 0 202 30311 X
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Papers presented to the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in Detroit, 1983. An American Sociological Association Presidential Volume.
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Third edition

1985 14 8 x 22.8 cm. XIV, 520 pages
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Edited by Glenn Hausfater and Sarah Blaffer Hrdy

1984 15 x 23 cm. XXX, 598 pages.
Hardback DM 122,–, approx. £35.70 ISBN 0 202 02022 3
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Papers resulting from the 1982 Wenner-Gren Foundation conference on „Infanticide in Animals and Man" held at Cornell University. Over the past decade, the intellectual pendulum in behavioral biology and related disciplines has swung from an earlier view that infanticide – the killing of unweaned or otherwise maternally dependent offspring – could not possibly represent anything other than abnormal and maladaptive behavior to the current view that in many populations infanticide is a normal and individually adaptive activity

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1984. 15 x 23 cm XVI, 942 pages
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This anthology is a comprehensive integrated, and stimulating collection of major Western writings on the most important elements of contemporary Soviet politics and society The book is designed to portray the policy-making and administrative processes and the substance of national policies, the economic and social contexts within which political power is exercised, and the ways in which the Soviet polity influences and is influenced by socio-economic and scientific-technical developments at home and abroad The contributors are distinguished journalists, government officials and scholars specializing in politics, economics, sociology and history All are Westerners or former Soviet citizens currently living in the West

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Classic and Contemporary Perspectives
Edited by Deane H. Shapiro, Jr. and Roger N. Walsh

1984. 18 x 22 5 cm XXII, 722 pages
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Ernst G. Beier and David Young

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Erratum

In the March 1985 issue of the journal, line 13 of Ray Pawson's review of *Social Research in Developing Countries* by Martin Bulmer and Donald P. Warwick should read: '. . that custom breeds competence'. The journal regrets any misunderstanding this mistake may have caused.

Bryan R. Wilson

Morality in the evolution of the modern social system

HOBHOUSE MEMORIAL LECTURE

The early sociologists, at least until the First World War, and perhaps even until the Second, confidently assumed that the course of social evolution had an analogue in the process of biological evolution. Such an idea, already anticipated by Auguste Comte, is central to the work of Herbert Spencer and can be easily identified in the optimistic early Durkheim, but it had perhaps its fullest expression, and acquired its special application to moral evolution, in the work of the early English sociologists. Almost simultaneously, L. T. Hobhouse produced his two volume work *Morals in Evolution*, and his eventual successor as Martin White Professor, Edward Westermarck, published his two volumes on *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*. Today, those works stand as neglected monuments of a past age of sociological thought; but I seek neither to compare them nor to speculate on the sort of intellectual debate that might have occurred when two dominant figures each set to work on a common theme. Rather, I seek only to add a tentative footnote, albeit a somewhat lengthy one, to the task which, in *Morals in Evolution*, Hobhouse set himself. That task, Morris Ginsberg later told us, was 'to trace the growth of morals' and, if my assumptions differ somewhat from those of Hobhouse and, if I find myself unenthused by the optimism that permeates his pages I speak, none the less, in honour of that pioneer sociologist whose memory and whose work we are here today to commemorate.

Hobhouse assumed that one might properly speak of 'moral progress'. He wrote,

> Moral progress (to assume provisionally that it is a reality) does not proceed continuously in a straight line — it does not affect all branches of the moral law simultaneously, nor does it advance step by step with the growth of civilization. Even if it be true — and it has yet to be proved — that the highest civilization possesses the highest ethical code, it is certainly not true . . . of every intervening stage in the growth of civilization that it witnesses a corresponding

> moral advance. The study of moral advancement . . . is not tracing out of a single straight line, but rather the following of a very winding curve.[1]

Perhaps I am following only one of Hobhouse's winding curves; but to me moral progress appears a much more problematic concept than Hobhouse seems to have assumed. The speed of change has accelerated dramatically in society: who now would say, as Hobhouse said, echoing the 2nd Epistle of Peter, 'In Social Development be it remembered, a hundred years are but as yesterday'.[2] Rather, we might say that the effect of change that once took a hundred years, may now be wrought in but a fraction of that time. Morality now appears to be a much less durable commodity; for society has changed in some very fundamental ways. Whereas, until recently, society was rooted in its own past, we have now become future-oriented. Less impressed by what our forebears did, less bound by tradition, we put our faith not in timeless truths but in new research, technical innovation, and in planning — investments, our cities, even our families — for the future. Morals in evolution become, today, morals in revolution, the social revolution going on around us. The pace of social change is now so great, that we must be prepared to see moral changes occurring in our own lifetimes; to see, possibly, morality as a different phenomenon from the morality known in the past, with perhaps a different social function.

It was a sociological orthodoxy in the days after evolutionism had passed the peak of fashionability, to regard social cohesion as vested in shared values, sentiments, and mores, common within and throughout a society.[3] Society, it was supposed, was 'held together' by the commitment of individuals to a shared pattern of norms and moral dispositions that determined the character of social action and social relationships. The supporting evidence for this thesis came initially from pre-literate societies, often no more than a few hundred strong, and different in virtually every respect from the large-scale, complex, stable systems of the industrial world to which the thesis was applied. For small communities, the normative structure was indeed the framework of order, regulating behaviour, forming boundaries, giving shape to social life, and creating certainties where otherwise chaos might have prevailed. There were, of course, historical continuities between small communities and the collectivities organized into modern social systems, and early modern industrial nations were, as I hope to show, moralized societies. But our question is whether the nature of social integration in these large-scale societies can rest on those same devices that provided cohesion for tribal groups. Hobhouse saw the problem long before the structural functionalists sought to generalize and universalize their theories of social cohesion. He wrote:

> Social solidarity is one thing in a group of a couple of dozen men, women and children, and another when it is predicable of a nation of forty millions.[4]

And he briefly touched on the issue that I wish to address when, a little later, he commented,

> As society becomes larger and more complex, many of its obligations become more remote and impersonal. Losing their direct application to our neighbour whom we see, our charity and our sense of justice are diluted and lose their strength. Our sympathies cease where our imagination fails to reach, and the great fabric of government is apt to become an inhuman machine advancing blindly over the living flesh and blood that happens to come in its way.[5]

This was a moment of Weberian doubt in a mainly sanguine analysis, for Hobhouse at once continued,

> Yet the vaster the social organism, the greater the triumph, when justice, kindled to new life, has again sent purified blood through its arteries.[6]

Hobhouse, despite his cautions against supposing the tribal group and the nation-state to be of the same species, steps back into the easy Spencerian analogy of treating each and any society as if it were necessarily an organic entity — with blood coursing 'through its arteries'. I doubt the identification of all societies as the same species, and even more the dubious analogy of society to a biological organism.

Permit me, for the sake of brevity, to collapse the long process of social evolution, into a crude and simple model useful for my argument. Let me postulate three broad phases, overlapping but loosely associated with patterns of socio-economic organization. The first phase coincides with communal organization, mainly a thing of the past, in which society's primary functions were negotiated by face-to-face groups. This phase embraces tribalism, feudalism, and such communal organization as persisted in to the early phases of industrialism (and perhaps beyond). In most such communities men were either wholly or mainly illiterate; communication was restricted; techniques depended mainly on hand labour.

Second, there is the period of industrialization, with intensified division of labour, new techniques, and sources of power. The third phase has emerged in very recent times, in post-industrial society largely based on the communications revolution, advanced production techniques, and electronic systems.

In the first two phases (and remnants of them may still persist), morality functioned to provide social cohesion. These were largely moralized societies — not in the sense that all men were moral — obviously not, but in the sense that there was a shared acknowledgement of moral obligation, a prevailing, generally operative moral code, an effective (or relatively effective) normative system. There were, however, differences between societies in these two phases, to which I shall come shortly, and which mainly related to the way in which morality was diffused, sustained, and sanctioned. Hobhouse tells us that morality among simpler peoples rested on what he called 'public hygiene'.[7] Many offences to which opprobrium attached were sacral offences — offences against the gods, and hence, (following Durkheim) we may say offences against the community itself. Such acts were dangerous: and the community needed to purge itself from those who exposed it to such danger. Many rules of sacrality were virtually arbitrary, of no intrinsic consequence: their value reposed in their symbolic meaning. They were the boundary markers of the group, symbols of its shared norms which differed from those of other communities. To cite Hobhouse's contemporary, Westermarck, such was the case with Israelite strictures against male homosexuality.[8] Since homosexuality was widely practised — perhaps for religious reasons — among other peoples in Canaan, the recently arrived Israelites sought to preserve collective identity as a group by severe injunctions against it. Thus, although homosexuality is intrinsically unharmful to others, and poses no direct threat to the community — is, indeed, the archetypical 'crime without a victim' — it aroused among Israelites, and in all those societies culturally descended from them, intense moral feeling. The function of this type of taboo was to mark the boundaries between a self-proclaimed chosen people and men of lesser breeds. Moral strictures may not have defined the social group, but they reinforced its definition.[9]

Under the impress of the great religions, a more extensive common value-system was canvassed, which transcended local and particularistic concerns. Even so, the context of shared morality remained essentially local, and the effective normative order, the sanctions, and the agencies of control were overwhelmingly local in their operation. All communities were moralized, this was the behavioural language of their operation. Even when elements of a more general morality were prescribed — by the Church primarily — the rhetoric of community, kinship, and neighbourliness, continued to be invoked as part of the vocabulary of morals. Since moral demands imply not only naked duty and sheer obligation, but also affective concern, they employ language that kindles positive sentiments of warmth and love. Such sentiments appeared to be virtually an extension of the natural order. They appeared both external and constraining, as Durkheim would have put it; moral demands were represented as 'human nature',

while immoral acts were readily indicted, as people still sometimes say, as acts 'against nature'.

The first phase is one in which, although socialization of children clearly played its part, morality was effected largely through social control — the feelings of the group, the community, the neighbours. Such control is effective where there is a low degree of individuation, in which a separate private life is scarcely known, and where men can watch how others behave. These tendencies persist in some measure into the second phase, the main features of which emerge in the social order that is being industrialized, in which the social system is becoming role-articulated, and its functions more rationally organized. The new dependence on innumerably sub-divided skills make such a social system too complex for the effective maintenance of old-style social control through communal surveillance. The new work order demands a new moral texture in society. Dependence shifts from diffuse social control to more intense individual socialization. Work tasks are now widely differentiated and skills are diversified in more specific tasks. The best guarantee of a man's being a good worker is the assurance that he is also a 'good man'. A man now distinguished himself and marked himself out as a candidate for social mobility by being a moral man. It became quite common, in late nineteenth century Britain, for any workman of the humbler sort, to rely not merely, and perhaps not mainly, on any certification of his technical skills (that day was still to come) but on an evidence of his moral worth. He often had, sometimes literally in an envelope in his breast pocket, what he called 'my character' — a testimonial from some employer which affirmed that he was the possessor of those prized moral virtues: honesty, willingness, industry, conscientiousness, a sense of responsibility, punctuality and sobriety.

The expansion of industrial organization in nineteenth century Britain and America was accompanied by large-scale attempts at the re-moralization of the new classes being drawn into the role-articulated social system. The model for the diffusion of a work ethic already existed in the seventeenth-century Puritanism of a rising bourgeoisie. In Methodism, sectarianism, interdenominational revivalism, and general evangelical religion, and in the new discipline and sense of order being imposed in services and church life, there was disseminated a new morality, embracing the work ethic, but by no means confined to the narrow sphere of work. Society was to be a society of good men — good not because they were under surveillance, but because they had internalized an ethic, had been socialized to moral performances. The model for comportment was, however, still based on assumptions of direct relationship between known persons, on the interaction of face-to-face groups, and on the sense of personal responsibility to a visible and known community. And, for a time, the work order remained predominantly of this kind.

Work was being moralized. It had become a separated and well-defined sphere of activity, no longer embedded for the mass of men in home, kinship and local community, in the life *tout court* of mediaeval man. Once it transcended brute, manual labour, work could become the anvil on which character was forged. New virtues arose for the individual. Honesty was no longer the old community honesty dependent on surveillance and lack of opportunity for theft. Punctuality — never needed before — became a test of responsibility, and self-control. Since work was for others, it now became a contracted responsibility, and alongside the sometimes coercive, and necessarily remunerative sanctions, there grew increased awareness that good work depended on willingness, sobriety, trust, and commitment, and the moral undertaking to give of one's best.[10] And these qualities were not only the subjects of Wesleyan sermons, but came to belong to the individual's own sense of moral rectitude. Diligence, once a matter merely of self-interested necessity, now became a normatively-prescribed moral quality. Pride in one's work was the slogan of this new morality. So it was, that, for the social order, more intensive socialization came to take much of the weight from social control, and necessarily so, because of the higher degree of self-regulation, hence of self-control, demanded of the worker in his role.

The third phase of my model is that of the de-moralization both of work and of the wider reaches of the social order. I use the word guardedly, but it would be ill-becoming and indeed indefensible to have raised my eyebrows at Hobhouse's phrase 'moral progress' were I so soon even to appear to talk of 'moral regress'. I do not want in any evaluative sense to talk about 'moral decline', but only to discuss, as neutrally as I can, what I take to be the factual phenomenon of de-moralization: of a work order, and in part of a social system, which proceeds without recourse, or with decreasing recourse, to morality.

The third phase is one in which work becomes impersonalized. The role now transcends the person. Workers come to be described in more abstract terms and larger agglomerations: 'hired hands'; 'labour units'; 'shifts'; 'the work force'; 'the working class'. Work becomes more explicitly part of the rational, economic calculus. The new technology, bureaucracy, and accountancy result in new patterns of relationship in which pragmatism, expediency, and rational and impersonal calculation put work into a new context. The old dicta of classical economic theory can now be applied with reinforced rigour, less and less mediated by the inefficiencies, and those lingering moral, non-rational residues — such as personal commitment, community welfare, loyalty, and obligation. The moralized work force depended on moralized management — a management which recognized and invoked the moral dimension of work. The demands of improved economic efficiency, however, and the need for calculability require that the compliance of workers be elicited by remuneration and as

little as possible by moral and normative obligation. The concern for heightened economic efficiency thus becomes an agency which demoralizes work.

The new work order gradually ceased to be dependent on the general morality inculcated in earlier industrialization. As work tasks became rationalized, new technical equipment came, in many jobs, to impose its own rhythms, and its own imperatives on those who used it. Once conveyer-belts, electronic controls, automation, and computers came into wider use, it became less necessary to depend for performance on the moral commitment of the worker. Control could become more specific: there was less need for the blanket effect of total socialization and moralization. The good worker need not now be the 'good man'; indeed, his moral quality as a man could now be regarded, industrially and commercially, as a matter of indifference. It follows that the modern worker does not need to have been socialized for a predominantly moral role. Now, moral socialization, and the cultivation of moral sensibilities, is an arduous task. It is demanding not only of children themselves, but also of the adults who undertake it. Modern society leaves less time for such a process, which, economically, at least, is less needed in a social system that operates more narrowly and more precisely by automation, and time-and-motion procedures, and which relies less and less on personal dispositions and discretion. Functionally, for the rational and technological economic system, widespread and intensive moral socialization of children has become cost inefficient. The economy can get from workers the performance it requires without imposing on parents the burden and rigours that were attendant on the long, slow, and intensive personal socialization process of the past.

Parents, then, have been in part liberated, and because moral behaviour is no longer an important criterion of employment, a changed ideology about the upbringing of children has become possible. I do not pretend to know the causal relationship between demoralization of the work order and changes in the ideology of child-rearing, any more than I know the causes of the coincidence of the rise of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Protestant work ethic, on the one hand, and Calvinist attitudes to the socialization of the child, on the other. But attitudes to children have changed. We have moved from the Victorian precept that the child might be seen but must not be heard, to the modern assumption that, even without socialization, the child is *ab initio* a moral being; from a stage of calculated repression to one of exhorted expression. Child-rearing ideologies today assume that, with freedom, man will come forth at his best — in stark contrast to traditional moral ideas, guided by Christianity, that men were born sinners from whom good behaviour could be elicited only by severe training, threats of hell and the prospect of heaven, and the exercise of parental and communal restraint. But the burden of

socialization has receded, only as the new forms of specific social control have evolved.

Let me, however, interrupt my argument to make clear that the sequence of relations that I have been tracing in industrialization — from an enhanced dependence on socialization to a period, following the development of advanced technology, of renewed dependence on devices of social control — is not in itself a necessary course of economic and social change. The relation of morality to economy is subtle and must vary with divergent factors of culture and history. The modernization of Japan, for example, has clearly involved quite different patterns of moral change and social regulation. There, apparently, a moral system persists, at least as yet, which still draws considerably on local sentiment (in the firm or in the new religious movement, if not now so much on the neighbourhood or the lineal descent group). The homogeneous ethnic basis of Japanese society — less racially and culturally mixed than any other in the world — perhaps facilitates the maintenance of a moralized social order that has not yet been abandoned in spite of the expansion of technological procedures and controls. The process of moral change that I have depicted appears most strikingly in those western societies that were industrialized relatively early.

The agency through which the specific requirements of social control is mediated in all societies is the role. Roles predicate rules and, in simple societies, role performances are dictated by a variety of moral obligations. Diffuse roles, which predominate in simple societies, might be performed in a wide variety of ways, or, were not moral rules attached to them, might suffer from dereliction of duty. Industrial advance leads to increased specificity of role, to more precise demands for technical performance, and to the demoralization of the role. Normally, de-moralization is contingent upon the adoption of new work techniques, but even in the more diffuse work roles of advanced society we may see de-moralization exemplified. The roles of teacher and clergyman were, until recently, defined primarily or largely in moral terms: their tasks were socializing tasks, but what is demanded of these role players has changed. The moral dimension diminishes: witness the decline of concern for pastoral care in schools and in universities; and the developing moral permissiveness, and, at times, the moral abandon, of the clergy. Instead of being engaged to communicate 'right' attitudes and to inculcate well-understood 'virtue', the teacher and clergyman are increasingly asked only to provide technically adequate performances: the emphasis is on professionalism and technical skills. Even trainees for the 'caring professions' — for social work — are emphatically told of the need to cultivate attitudes that are truly professional: that is to say, not to care too much.

Specific roles themselves become contexts for the exercise of social

control. The role is a harness, and the role player is required to lay aside all attributes and skills (including, today, moral competences as well as incidental technical abilities) that are irrelevant to his role performance. Others, whose role performances impinge upon that of the individual role player, entertain expectations that impose upon him, and which exact from him, his own role performance. The intermeshing of roles provides a complex, subtly-mediated, refined, but increasingly technical, form of control. A society in which a high proportion of the population is involved in work roles necessarily becomes a society in which, through the public domain, social control is powerfully maintained. Although the public domain is pre-eminently the sphere of work, as modern institutions are increasingly differentiated, rationalized, and societally-organized, that domain encompasses wider areas of the social system. Thus, the whole of public life becomes characterized by ever more specific role performances.

The distinction of public and private domains of life is not in itself of very great antiquity, and the growth of civility and morality was simultaneously relevant to both, initially with little discrimination. Family privacy developed, in England, only in the seventeenth century when, in the houses of the nobility, there came into being private quarters into which those who were not family members or servants could not go. Only then did a different pattern of social control for private and public life emerge. In the very long run, this change was not to have the effect of enhancing specifically moral regulation in either, but in our second phase, the emerging public domain depended on the consequences of moral socialization affected in private family life. Public reputation depended on private moral training. Today, however, the formal roles of public life become less dependent on moral regulation as they are increasingly controlled by external rules of a technical and legal kind and, increasingly, all public comportment bears diminishing evidence of moral socialization. Witness only our popular newspapers, the news in which is often predominantly about the sexual lives — and what was once called 'immorality' — of public figures, from pop stars and footballers to parliamentarians. Moral probity is less demanded either for specific public roles or for general participation in public activity.

Less and less serviced, because less and less needed for public role performances, moral socialization has withered even in the private sphere: moral character is no longer perceived, in any immediate way, to be necessary, either for 'the public good', or for the economic benefit of the individual. The economic order appears well-enough controlled by the complex tissue of well-articulated expectations and inter-related operations that fix every role-player in his appointed tasks. To the wider, civic arena, little further thought has been given. Civic roles are less easily refined, but during the period of

industrialization, adequate behaviour for the civic sphere was elicited on the strength of moral attitudes inculcated in the community, since the large society still relied on the moral consensus of that older form of social organization. Eventually, however, technical evolution disrupted the old moral consensus and the strength of local community. The massification of publics; the new impersonality; the scale of social mobility, and of geographic mobility in its temporal and spatial incidence — produced anonymity for each individual, and this became a cloak protecting him from the operation of all but the most overt forms of social control. There emerged the anonymous individual — less powerfully socialized for moral response, and inhabiting new social contexts in which the old moral and personal prescriptions failed to apply, and liberated in considerable measure from self-control of the old kind. In the civic arena, virtue has become a private predilection, and in a work order which depends less on moral socialization, many partially de-moralized individuals inhabit public space. The question is whether their self-restraint is sufficient for the smooth operation of the social system, or whether that operation may not need the introduction of new, and because external, perhaps oppressive, means of social control.

The social system has come to depend less and less on private virtue, and more and more on rational procedures. In the society dictated by moral consensus — the society of our first and second phases — everything was a moral matter. Dress carried moral connotations, and those who dressed, not only in bizarre fashion, but even in slightly unusual style, risked ridicule. One remembers that Scriabin was pursued regularly by jeering small boys in pre-World War I Paris because he went out without a hat. Speech was a moral matter, with obligations of honorific usage, courtesy, and style, accommodated to the varying claims of those who were addressed — as it is still today in Java and Japan. Demeanour was a moral matter, and civility of manner was one of the things on which people were judged. The public domain was a moralized order. This is not to say that everyone was moral, but only that moral order was normative, supplying the criteria for judgment. With the displacement by rational, technical, and legal requirements, of the demand for moral virtue, all of these distinctions were done away. In the old order, a young man, claiming less public regard, was expected to defer to an older person, or to any person to whom society attached greater social honour: politeness was morally informed. No such subtleties inform the operation of our traffic control systems, our elevators, or our computers. In consequence of the impress of these rational, egalitarian de-personalizing innovations, we no longer need to be so polite, nor so morally preoccupied, in our social intercourse. Morally-justified social distinctions are discounted, and we are free to behave even in our personal relationships, more and more according to rationally-

calculated self-interest, and with an impersonal indifferentism that conforms to the principle we designate as affective neutrality.

The decline of moral stricture has led to the idea that the private sphere is an area in which individual freedom should be unconstrained by any remaining residues of moral inhibition. A new libertarianism is encouraged which is juxtaposed (sometimes in a facile way) to the status-ridden, coercive society of the past. For some, moral constraint comes to be identified as reaction, or even as fascism, and it is easily represented as the shackling of the individual. The Hegelian model, canvassed in diverting fashion by the young Marx, of unconstrained man, unalienated, living a life that is entirely self-determined has, today, become, if not literally believed, then more readily taken as a credo, and for some as an ideological support for relinquishing moral responsibility and for abandoning the irksomeness of educating the emotions of the young, and of establishing moral discipline in private life.

Modern economy has shifted from emphasis on production to emphasis on consumption. The communicator in the service of consumption is advertising, which has now replaced church and school as the major disseminator of social values. The goal is to persuade people that they have the right to consume, have unbounded choices, extensive liberty of action, and the privilege, if not the obligation, to indulge themselves as fully as they wish or can. To this particular persuasion, the credit company tells men that they can begin such a course of self-indulgence without waiting. The individual need but choose, and choice is not a moral matter. Whereas the ethos of the producer society was asceticism — saving, austerity, deferred gratification, and effort — the ethic of the consumer society is hedonism: indulgence and gratification now. Asceticism lends itself to moral exhortation; hedonism only to *a*moral self-interested choice. The individual is given to understand on all sides that his right is choice — in the market, at the polls, in the box office, in religion, and in every aspect of his comportment. This right is regularly propounded as if it had no consequence for anyone but the individual himself, as if only self-interest need be consulted, and as if the summation of all private choices would produce, as in *laissez-faire* economics, the best for everyone. Of course, men face social reality: they know the limits of actual choice; but the arena in which choice appears least impeded is in private life, life-style, morals, and personal philosophy. Economically these items are costless, easily conceded by the system (no matter what cost might eventually accrue for the quality of life). There is no cost in affronted morals, since consensus has gone.

Yet, on the other hand, people increasingly believe that there issues from the public sphere new and persistent threats of coercion. Democratic societies are recurrently beset with expressions of concern about such matters as the conduct of the police, police-files; the

increase in telephone-tapping; coded and computerized passports; electronic eyes; protective legislation on secrecy; bugging devices; and data retrieval systems — the whole apparatus of the surveillance of the private citizen. Currently, a high court judge seeks to introduce a new bill of human rights to protect the individual. Alarms about the techniques of social control grow all the more intense because of the contradiction between them and the prevailing ideologies of freedom of choice.

The dissonance between the idea that individuals should be free from constraint, as in the private sphere, and the impression that they are subjected to increasingly sophisticated surveillance for unspecified purposes by state bureaucracies and even by multi-national concerns, leads to ever more vigorously stated alienation from the state and large-scale economic enterprise. The people comes to distrust the system. Public and private life become polarized, in a way analogous to the separation, in the minds of many modern workers, of 'work' and 'life'. Instead of the mediation of a morality which was forged in the private sphere and which informed the operation of the public domain, there is a sense that personal freedom, and the entitlement to it, are subverted and invaded by the machinations of those who operate the system. A persisting half-articulated conspiracy theory gains currency. *They* are against *us*. And who are 'they' or 'them' and 'us'? In large part 'they' are 'we', '(us)', but they are us, or at least a section of us, in our role performances. They are people in their official *a*moral roles, against 'us', private sentient people who still invoke our latent sense of moral rectitude and moral indignation to indict the system and the *a*moral 'them' who perform its roles. The state operates abrasively and, to many, legal codes appear to be arbitrary, hostile systems designed to curb freedom. We have returned to Hobhouse's 'inhuman machine advancing blindly over the living flesh and blood that happens to come in its way'. The old moral order cushioned relations between the public and private domains and ensured an element of continuity between the two: a tissue of custom and morality, which tempered legal demands, provided a sympathy between ideas of comportment in the private sphere and the need for moral and responsible behaviour in the public arena.

Such tempering of the abrasive operation of the law diminishes as the law itself becomes more technical and abandons areas that were traditionally of primarily moral concern. That the law does become more technical and less moral is evident even in the civil law. To give a non-contentious example, the widespread use of insurance affects the whole moral principle of fault liability. The insured individual does not himself now pay for the consequence of fault — why, then, pursue expensive litigation to decide who is morally to blame? Compensation for injury ceases to be regarded as a matter of

moral conduct but increasingly as merely a technical issue of economic efficiency. In the area of criminal law the effect is more immediate: local customs and informal rules by which people regulated their own — and their neighbour's — lives diminish as a source from which legislation stems. What, indeed, could local custom be with respect to such non-local activities as one's behaviour in using a motor vehicle: an activity sufficiently technical and impersonal to dissolve moral dispositions in otherwise quite moral men? No custom moderates the harshness of the law when motorists commit what they see as merely technical offences. And, I need hardly remind you, that when Hobhouse wrote *Morals in Evolution*, the motor car scarcely existed to challenge the prevailing assumptions about moral behaviour. The law changes to meet the more technical demands of rational order, abandoning traditional interdictions which, from the economic and rational perspective, have lost social relevance but which, in the past, were important symbols of the community's moral self-defence.

The traditional community's integrity was vested in knowing both what 'must not be done' and also what were a man's positive obligations. What 'must not be done' constituted sometimes quite arbitrary prohibitions, yet moral indignation was readily summoned by any infringement of the group's real or symbolic sanctity. Its taboos on sacrilege, blasphemy, and whatever acts were deemed to be immoral, comprised its cultural integrity: those acts — and I have mentioned the Israelite interdiction of homosexuality — were what modern man sees as 'crimes without victims'. What I am suggesting is that there was a victim: the victim was the whole community and its moral order. Thus, to eliminate those prohibitions is a conscious act of de-moralization — and we have seen many such changes: the legalization of abortion and homosexuality; the new openness about things once thought pornographic; the abandonment of suicide as a criminal offence; the scaling down of treachery into the more technical offence of revealing official secrets; the fall into virtual desuetude of laws against blasphemy and sacrilege. The old moral prohibitions are superseded: their latent function, as a community's moral defence, was to reinforce social cohesion: but that function is no longer fulfilled in the way in which once it was.

It is evident from such interdictions that the moral prejudices of a people are, in some sense, arbitrary — that is, they lack direct rational justification. The positive obligations of the group are clearly more manifestly functional, even though modern men might find them quaintly anachronistic. Community consensus was expressed in terms that are of dubious propriety to modern ears: 'tradition'; 'patriotism'; 'our way of life'; 'loyalty'; 'obligation'; 'duty'; 'self-esteem'; 'status'; 'gallantry'; 'deference'; 'honour'; and even 'moral integrity'. This language was a vocabulary of cultural morale as well as of morality. And these were the moral dispositions that were

diffused throughout the community. By asserting moral distinctiveness and, indeed, moral superiority, these dispositions predicated action that was needed to reinforce group identity.

Modern social systems have not entirely abandoned moral perspectives. There is an attempt, in disregard of any supposition that morality might exist only as the property of an identifiable group of limited size, to universalize certain principles, or at least to generalize them within a given polity. Such a process we might refer to as the politicization of morals. Conspicuous cases are the attempts to enforce racial and sexual equality and to legislate against the expression of any sentiments to the contrary. The contemporary state system cannot afford not to interfere with spontaneous expressions of public feelings that are discriminatory: it cannot afford to await for the processes of socialization to produce non-discriminatory sentiments and humane and gentle dispositions. The modern social system cannot trust its own public. The persisting moral dispositions of that public still stem from the communal past, invoking such ideas as loyalty, group identity, preference for one's own and for their way of life. In modern society, however, individuals must be treated equally — and equally may mean impersonally: there can be no toleration of the vestigial legacy of communal values and particularistic morality. Thus, the state, like the economy, must impose universalistic principles, and must do so not by the slow processes of socialization, education and cultivation, but by political edict: and this is so because, in the modern social system, there is no homogeneous or stable communal base from which cultural and moral consensus can spontaneously arise.

Paradoxically, then, this politicization of certain moral matters occurs simultaneously with the abandonment and de-criminalization of those other moral concerns to which reference is made above. Increased permissiveness in private life is accompanied by the legal regulation even of private sentiments and dispositions in the public domain. The public area is de-moralized because, in all those issues important to the maintenance of the social system, it depends decreasingly on moral, and increasingly on technical and legal constraint. The private area is de-moralized because the social system has apparently less need for, and less patience with, the process of socialization.

The fact that worthy causes are endorsed by individuals, on the one hand, and made the objects of political policy, on the other, does not, I believe, in itself indicate any strong counter-current to that process that I have called de-moralization. The institution of health insurance, unemployment benefit, or pensions for the elderly do not as such manifest direct and diffuse moral concern. Rather they indicate a shift from reliance on well-diffused moral dispositions to dependence on technical and legal provision. The political institutionalization of

moral goals may indeed even have the paradoxical consequence of absolving individuals from the need to cultivate any sense of personal moral responsibility. If the social system presents itself as an agency of care, then individuals may take leave to 'care less'. The family may say 'we cannot take care of our old or ailing or the morals of our children — the state and the school should do those things; that is why we pay taxes'. The political institutionalization of what can be represented as the noblest moral concerns may accompany increased moral insensitivity among the people at large.

The impetus for the institutionalization of what may still be called 'moral concerns' arises from the need of the social system to deal with men in the abstract, as equal units, interchangeable entities, as role-players, labour units, age cohorts, citizens, or voters. These categories are neutral and non-moral. The once salient distinctions of personal worth — age, sex, race, status, nationality, regional or local origin — are no longer significant criteria in respect of which approved and appropriate personal behaviour might be elicited. None will deny the importance of the social justice which such formal equality before the law ensures. But what disappears is the personal respect which attached to more particularistic attributes, since differential respect might hinder the system's requirement that roles be performed clinically with as little inter-personal differentiation as possible. Modern society, having embraced the affective neutrality of the new technical and bureaucratic order, has not, of course, entirely sloughed off the remnants of the positive affectivity of the moralized past. These are divergent value-orientations which confront each other, and many of our contemporary moral disputes respecting a wide range of social issues — from surrogate motherhood, to paedophilic sex; from the legal and social discrimination for or against new or immigrant religious movements, to the provision of secret contraceptive advice for adolescents — are fought out on this very frontier.

The traditional community engaged in moral commendation or condemnation of a wide variety of acts: the individual incurred praise or blame for his behaviour. In the affectively neutral social order, there is smaller place for merit or culpability: individuals are less required to answer for their deeds, morally they become people of diminished responsibility. This reduction in personal responsibility is implicit in the system's dependence on role performances: everyone may say, 'Don't blame me: I'm only doing my job'. Personal blame is further diminished by the ideological indemnification which modern society is increasingly disposed to endorse, for example, in explaining — and in explaining away — personal failings, along the lines suggested by contemporary psychoanalysis. The moral dimension gives place to the therapeutic; men are seen as suffering less from moral blemishes than from psychological deprivation.[11] Whereas the great religions made men in greater or lesser degree responsible for

their actions, the ideologies of modern society excuse him. Whereas in the communal and traditional past, men acknowledged their faults, confessed them, and repented, now fault is attributed to ailment; instead of confession men seek therapy, whether from religion, medicine, or human potential movements; instead of repentance they seek disability pay. Modern man escapes the burden of guilt — sometimes a crippling burden — borne in the past as an impost for the social good. But although personal blame is so much reduced, fault as a category has not disappeared. The hiatus between the realms of private and public life allow individuals to attribute blame for any personal failing or misdemeanour to the system. Such is the hostility against the public sphere, that the system is now indicted not only for its inefficiencies, but also for the private and public misadventures of individuals. Repeatedly, squatters, juvenile delinquents, rioters, arsonists, multiple murderers, or merely those who fail examinations are said to be 'victims of the system'. Moral indignation — perhaps the most vigorous vestige of the old morality — persists against 'the system', despite the fact that there is so much less moral responsibility to justify it.

There are questions which any reader of Hobhouse must raise in the light of my discourse — above all: Whatever happened to the rational ethic? Modern society certainly depends pre-eminently on rational procedures but, I have sought to suggest, it does so not solely, perhaps not even mainly, by recourse simply to reason. Its recourse is rather to abstract and institutionalized rationality, embraced not so much by the minds of sentient citizens as in the planned framework of organizational techniques. The application is not so much of reason to ethics but of rational procedure at the cost of community morality — of those arbitrary proscriptions and positive prescriptions (such as honour, loyalty, patriotism) that were rooted ultimately in locality, national, religious, or ethnic prejudice. That cost in itself might be adjudged not too great to pay for the benefit of abstract social justice — were there not a concealed supplementary charge. That supplement is the further loss of the latent function which moral consensus fulfilled — the maintenance of social cohesion. The application of reason to ethics is a noble philosophical ideal, but the application, not of reason, but of institutionalized rationality to morals is perhaps more of the sociological reality: and institutionalized rationality may be a solvent of many moral dispositions.

Hobhouse measured social development by applying four criteria to society: scale, efficiency, mutuality, and freedom.[12] Greater scale and more efficiency are desiderata of an intrinsically rational kind, and they appear attainable in the contemporary evolution of the social system: but since that system depends for its continued viability less on moral socialization and more on overt social control, may not the cost be reduced mutuality and diminished freedom? A common

morality may cease to function as an effective regulative agency for social agglomerates which pass beyond a certain limitation of size. The economies and efficiencies of scale may curb freedom and vitiate mutual trust. My preliminary answer to these Hobhousian questions is that rational organization has reduced the function of morality. The evolution to which we are witness is not so much a change *in* morality, or of the extent of its application, as a change *from* morality to an alternative underpinning of social order.

Modern society lacks social cohesion in the form in which it is said to have prevailed in traditional societies. There is no binding normative framework: indeed, there is continual dissent, dispute and conflict. Society is not cohesive, yet the system is indeed integrated, and the integration of the system, as distinct from the cohesion of the consciousness of the participants, depends on a framework of rational, technical, and legal order. In modern society, men are bound together not by shared sentiments, loyalties and symbolism, but by the multiform bonding of economic and political obligations; by the fiscal structures of the state; by tax-dues; insurances; mortgages; credit facilities, in a tissue of debt relationships which enmesh men inexorably in the social system. The pressures within the system demand constantly that irrational bonding — the bonds of morality — be replaced, wherever possible, by conscious, planned, contractual relationships. The system is self-consciously man-made, and it is assumed that by rational planning, there can be forged into an integrated whole all the necessary links among individuals and between individuals and the system.

My remarks have been addressed to Hobhousian questions, but they apply no less to a Durkheimian question. In his study of *Suicide*, Durkheim distinguished suicide by reference predominantly to two value-systems: the altruistic values of traditional societies and the egoistic value-system of nineteenth-century industrial societies. He asked whether there was not an intolerable contradiction in those industrializing societies in which the substantive value-system inculcated egoism and directed men to *self*-advancement as the approved *social* goal.[13] In so far as substantive values are still evident in societies in the post-industrial third phase, the internal contradiction has been pressed even further, for now self-interest is defined in increasingly hedonistic terms. That such values, so negative or at best neutral, towards society, are at all tolerable stems from the fact that hedonism is confined to the private sphere. Yet it has a corollary in the growing cynicism directed against the system as such. In its public, and most particularly its economic, operation, the system has, however, other devices for exacting the individual's contribution to its maintenance, whilst hedonism fulfils a function in stimulating consumption and economic demand for whatever range of gratification the system offers. The values by which the system itself is held

together are not substantive values at all — whether altruistic, egoistic, or hedonistic: they are purely procedural, the values of rational order. Ultimate ends are unconsidered and, in the meantime, procedural, instrumental arrangements prevail — but can the meantime be forever?

The questions remaining are whether a society which has lost its value consensus and relinquished common morality can be held together and whether there are alternative agencies of social integration. The short answer to these questions is that it can and that there are. But the short answers may also be short-term answers. The economic order may survive — may survive better — without a public that responds primarily to shared diffuse moral sentiments, and which can be mobilized rationally for economic roles. Social control in the role may suffice to elicit adequate performances. But beyond the economic order there is a wider civic arena in which men also act; and social control there presents a less acceptable face. Yet if that civic space is peopled by those whose emotions are uneducated, who are fed on hedonism and cynicism, and who are untrammelled by inner restraints, shall we escape new forms of oppressive social control to contain the latent hostilities between a people which does not trust the system and a system which cannot trust the people?

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NOTES

1. L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, London: Chapman & Hall, 1906. Repr. edn., 1951, p. 32.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 609.
3. This view found its apogee in the work of Talcott Parsons: see, in particular, *The Social System*, London: Tavistock Publications, 1952; see also, Marion J. Levy, *The Structure of Society*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952.
4. L. T. Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 631.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 636–7.
6. *Loc. cit.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
8. E. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, London: Macmillan, 1906–8. Ch. XLII.
9 On this subject, see Christie Davies, 'Sexual Taboos and Social Boundaries', *American Journal of Sociology*, 87, 5, 1982, pp. 1032–63.
10. On forms of compliance see Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961.
11. See R LaPierre, *The Freudian Ethic: Analysis of the Subversion of Western Character*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1959; for a much more subtle discussion, Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, London: Chatto & Windus, 1966.
12. L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Development*, 1924, reprinted, London: Unwin University Books, 1966.
13. See Emile Durkheim, *Le Suicide: étude de sociologie*, Paris: Alcan, 1897 (English translation by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952).

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The myth of cultural integration*

ABSTRACT

What culture is and what culture does are the subjects of conceptual confusion throughout social theory. This state of affairs is attributed to a pervasive Myth of Cultural Integration which wrongly conflates Cultural System integration (a logical property characterizing relations between ideas) with Socio-Cultural integration (a causal property pertaining to relations between people). A reconceptualization of culture in terms of analytical dualism is proposed, for it is suggested that an examination of the interplay between Cultural System integration and Socio-Cultural integration will give a better explanatory purchase on cultural dynamics and also allow culture to be examined in the same generic manner as structure.

The conceptualization of culture is extraordinary in two respects. It has displayed the weakest analytical development of any key concept in sociology and it has played the most wildly vacillating role within sociological theory.

(i) At the *descriptive* level, the notion of 'culture' remains inordinately vague despite little dispute that it is indeed a core concept. In every way 'culture' is the poor relation of 'structure'. Definition of the former has not undergone an elaboration equivalent to that of the latter. Consequently there is no ready fund of analytical terms for designating the components of the cultural realm corresponding to those which delineate parts of the structural domain (roles, organizations, institutions, systems, etc.). Methodologically such is the poverty of conceptualization that there are as yet no 'units' for describing culture: essentially cultures are still 'grasped' in contrast to structures which are now 'analysed'. Basically the notion of cultures *being* structured is uncommonly rare outside

of structuralism: instead of different 'cultural structures' there are endless 'cultural differences'.

(ii) At the *explanatory* level the status of culture oscillates between that of a supremely independent variable, the superordinate power in society and, with a large sweep of the pendulum, a position of supine dependence on other social institutions. Hence in various sociological theories, culture swings from being the prime mover (credited with engulfing and orchestrating the entire social structure) to the opposite extreme where it is reduced to a mere epiphenomenon (charged only with providing an ideational representation of structure).

Together this descriptive vagueness and these theoretical vagaries mean that culture occupies no clear place in sociological analysis. What culture is and what culture does are issues bogged down in a conceptual morass. From this no adequate sociology of culture has been able to emerge. Obviously such a state of affairs begs for explanation and I believe that the reason for it is embedded in the generic assumptions of an all-pervasive 'myth of cultural integration'. This myth embodies 'one of the most deep-seated fallacies in social science . . . the . . . assumption of a high degree of consistency in the interpretations produced by societal units.'[1] Yet it projected an image of culture which proved so powerful that it scored the retina, leaving a perpetual after-image, which distorted subsequent perception.

Originating at the descriptive level, the myth created an archetype of culture(s) as the perfectly woven and all-enmeshing web, whose intricate construction only added to its strength. Today, instead of analogy, one would simply say that the myth portrayed culture as the perfectly integrated system, where every element was interdependent with every other — the ultimate exemplar of compact and coherent organization.

Held in thraldom by this archetype, theorists of various persuasions concerned themselves only with *how* to accommodate it in their theories: there was no questioning of whether it should be given house-room. Their problem was to find a place *for* the Myth since the Myth itself was not problematic. In turn the Myth derived power and durability precisely because it was endorsed by schools of sociological thought which were otherwise hostile to one another if not antipathetic.

That the same theorists who were in bitter dispute over the extent of structural integration (institutional complementarity or contradiction) could simultaneously agree on the subject of *cultural* integration, only buttressed this mythology. Moreover the fact that they produced differing versions of the myth helped to insulate its core premise from scrutiny: the *existence* of cultural integration could never be at issue in a debate on the rival mechanisms held to be responsible for it. Thus

profound differences over *how* cultural unity was achieved only served to reinforce a fundamentalist accord upon the generic nature of cultural coherence.

The most proximate and powerful origins of the myth are undoubtedly the heritage of anthropology. Despite definitional wrangling over the term 'culture' there was substantial concord amongst anthropologists about its main property — strong and coherent patterning. This central notion of culture as an integrated whole,[2] grounded in German historicism (historismus), echoes down the decades. Malinowski's conceptualization of 'an individual culture as a coherent whole'[3] reverberates through Ruth Benedict's 'cultural patterns',[4] Meyer Shapiro's 'cultural style'[5] and Kroeber's 'ethos of total culture patterns',[6] to resurface in Mary Douglas's notion of 'one single, symbolically consistent universe'.[7] Two features of this heritage should be underlined. On the one hand its strong aesthetic rather than analytical orientation, which led to an endorsement of '"artistic" hermeneutics as the method for grasping the inner sense of cultural wholes'.[8] On the other hand this approach, based on the intuitive understanding of cultural configurations, entailed a crucial prejudgment, namely an insistence that coherence was there to be found, i.e. a mental closure against the discovery of cultural inconsistencies.[9]

This *a priori* assumption that there always was a discoverable coherence in culture and this total reliance on inspirational grasp as the method for discovering it, spilt over to soak the most diverse varieties of sociological theory. The myth surfaced intact in functionalist thought, transmitted by Sorokin. His insistence on the internal logic of culture, which would be apprehended by sweeping up a mountain of cultural fragments whose inner coherence could then be intuitively deciphered, was finally enshrined in the Parsonian central value system — that *a prioristic* guarantor of further societal integration. If Parsons had taken on board and given pride of place to a notion of an overt and readily detectable cultural system (being somewhat more analytical in his attempt to grasp it through his 'pattern variables'), linguistic structuralism did the reverse. It accepted incoherence as being the surface characteristic of overt and seemingly unconnected cultural symbols, but then revealed their underlying structuration by a hidden code — again grasped intuitively, by some form of deciphering or interpolation, though always lacking any external context of justification. Finally, the myth received monumental reinforcement by its adoption into western humanistic Marxism. The notion of 'hegemonic culture' and its off-spring, the 'dominant ideology' thesis, embodied the same assumption about cultural coherence: certainly it was inspired by sectional interests, generally it distorted the nature of reality and, undoubtedly, the consensus it generated was the product of manipulation; but,

nevertheless, mystification and misguidedness did not deny it the basic property of coherence shared equally by the Parsonian normative system. Significantly the now familiar reliance on aesthetic grasp dominated Marxist methodology here, as evidenced by the growing pre-occupation of Euro-Marxists with literary criticism[10] — with laying bare the ideological impregnation of works of art, by a kind of 'class decoding' which had distinct affinities to the enterprise of linguistic structuralism.

Now the conventional anthropological approach to culture in fact contained two distinct strands within the concept:

(a) the notion of a *cultural pattern* with an underlying unity and a fundamental coherence;
(b) the notion of *uniform action*, identified with the above and stemming from it to produce social homogeneity.

In other words to view culture as 'a community of shared meanings' meant eliding the community with the meanings. In so doing a vital analytical distinction was obfuscated and this was to have far reaching consequences when the myth was transmitted to sociology. For the myth contains a basic analytical confusion between two elements which are both logically and sociologically distinct. Teasing them out involves separating the two strands (a) and (b) which were tautly intertwined in the anthropological image.

What remain inextricably confounded in the myth of cultural consistency are

(1) LOGICAL COHERENCE, that is the degree of internal compatibility between the components of culture (however these two terms are defined)
(2) CAUSAL CONSENSUS, that is the degree of social uniformity produced by the imposition of culture (again how ever these two terms are defined) by one set of people on another.

The former concerns *the consistency* of our attempts to impose ideational order on experiential chaos; the latter concerns *the success* of attempts to order other people. Logical Coherence is a property of the world of ideas: Causal Consensus is a property of people.

The main proposition advanced here is that the two are logically and empirically distinct, hence they can vary independently of one another. Thus it is perfectly conceivable that any social unit from a community to a civilization could be found whose principle ideational elements (knowledge, beliefs, norms, language, mythology, etc.) do indeed display considerable logical coherence — i.e. the components

are consistent not contradictory — yet the same social unit may be low on causal consensus. For example this may be especially true where the 'culture' in all its logical coherence is the perogative of an elite (priesthood, caste, intelligentsia, estate or ruling class). Because of this the non-elites will behave differently (absence of social uniformity) because shaped by non-identical, since more restricted, ideas.

Restricted access may give rise to defective or divergent syntheses of the cultural stock resulting in schism through the differential accentuation of the cultural elements received. Furthermore, such action is the joint-product of the notions inculcated and the response to enforced inculcation. Unlike the elite, these actors are not responding to the power of precept alone but also to preceptual power. Power relations are the causal element in cultural consensus building and, far from unproblematically guaranteeing behavioural conformity, they can provoke anything from ritualistic acceptance to outright rejection of the culture imposed.

It should be noted that these cases where high logical coherence is accompanied by low causally induced consensus do not depend upon the existence of cultural alternatives within the social unit in question. Although these are generally extremely important in amplifying the lack of social uniformity, their presence is not a necessary pre-condition for the independent variation of logical coherence and causal consensus in the cultural realm. In brief, this distinction can be sustained *even if* we uncritically accept the existence of a single unified central value system or cultural scheme.

Equally, the opposite situation can be found in society: causal consensus may be high whilst logical coherence is low. Again there is nothing inconceivable about a social unit whose members display considerable cultural accord in their basic values, interpretations and language yet where the cultural system itself is riven with inconsistencies. Successful imposition does not require high coherence of the cultural package imposed. Partly this is because humankind does not necessarily notice inconsistency or unexceptionally find it intolerable (individually we all give house-room to incompatible mental furnishings through intellectual idleness, patches of ignorance, nostalgia or closing the emotional shutters). More important empirically, are again the power relations implicated in imposition. Whether we are talking about parental socialization or political indoctrination, the success achieved may reflect coercion rather than conviction. As in the glaring case of German fascism, considerable behavioural uniformity can co-exist with *both* substantial doctrinal inconsistencies and significant mental reservations in the population.

Thus my basic proposition is that it is essential to distinguish LOGICAL COHERENCE from CAUSAL COHESION in order to gain an analytical grip on the cultural components and upon socio-

cultural dynamics. This distinction would closely parallel that between system integration and social integration,[11] made by Lockwood, in the structural domain. Indeed much of the following argument seeks not merely to bring the analysis of culture on a par with that of structure but also to suggest that the two can be analysed in very similar generic terms. In line with this conviction, what has so far been discussed as the LOGICAL COHERENCE of culture will henceforth be referred to as CULTURAL SYSTEM INTEGRATION. Similarly CAUSAL COHESION will now be termed SOCIO-CULTURAL INTEGRATION. As in the structural field, so here, the point of this distinction is to improve our explanatory purchase upon cultural statics and dynamics.

Lockwood rightly argued that neither element alone provided the sufficient conditions of structural change. On the one hand, system integration could be low but unless its contradictions were actualized and amplified by sectional social groups, they could be contained and stasis would persist because of this high social integration. Alternatively group antagonism could be profound (low social integration) without leading to significant change in society, unless it was linked to systemic contradictions. Obviously the cultural parallels require a detailed specification which will follow later, but for the moment the key point is that in both structural and cultural fields the analysis of stability and change depends upon making such analytical distinctions.

The error underlying the Myth of Cultural Integration was that it elided this crucial distinction: the basic deficiency of the anthropological heritage *as appropriated in sociology* was that it resisted making any analytical distinctions at all. The net effect of this insistence upon cultural compactness was that it precluded any theory of cultural development springing from internal dynamics. Logically the component parts of any complex have to be accorded some autonomy if they are to interact and to change (or actively to maintain) one another, or the state of the whole. Yet this is precisely what the image of a coherent pattern, a uniform style or an all-pervading ethos effectively denied. Consequently *internal* dynamics were surrendered to external ones — the forces for development were located anywhere other than within the cultural system itself. At their most sociological they were pictured as diffusing inwards from the exterior; at their least, as giant mirrors of individual psychology[12] whose traits were independent of their cultural context.

However the interest of this myth for sociology does not concern its genesis, maintenance and vitality in the history of thought, but instead relates to its analytical premises and consequences. Its evergreen quality is mainly of significance in protecting and protracting these. Thus I now want to link three things together over time, but the linkage to be accentuated between them concerns conceptual continuity. Obviously this is mirrored in the history of ideas but it is

not their chronology which will be traced here:

(i) the genesis of the myth of cultural integration in anthropology;
(ii) sociological support for the myth;
(iii) the weak analytical development of a sociology of culture.

My main argument is that the current theoretical deficiencies in the sociological analysis of culture are directly attributable to the conflation of *cultural system integration* with *socio-cultural integration* — a confusion of the two which could be found within the anthropological heritage but which was intensified by the myth of cultural integration in all its subsequent sociological manifestations. Consequently the premises and implications enshrined in the myth must be disentangled and demolished before culture can assume a proper place in sociological analysis.

THE ORIGINS OF THE MYTH

1. The image of cultural coherence is grounded in traditional society. It is most persuasive where traditionalism prevails largely because the enduring enruttedness of primitive society can immediately be taken as exemplifying the force of cultural consistency. (This logical leap is far too precipitous and requires close re-inspection.) Almost automatically, however, the durability of routine was attributed to its enmeshment in an all-pervasive perfectly integrated cultural system which had imposed itself as the printed circuit of the primitive mind. Thus in the classic statement about compact coherence among the Azande we should note that Evans-Pritchard in fact elides the cultural, structural and personality systems: 'In this web of belief every strand depends upon every other strand, and a Zande cannot get out of its meshes because it is the only world he knows. The web is not an external structure in which he is enclosed. It is the texture of his thought and he cannot think that his thought is wrong.'[13]

Not only was this taken as the epitome of the primitive cultural system by many social theorists, but certain anthropologists also sponsored the extension of such imagery beyond traditional society. Thus it percolated up the centuries or the 'stages' of social development — a seepage undoubtedly encouraged by a neglect of the 'interregnum', that vast tract representing the majority of human history which fell between the increasingly popular dichotomies of primitive and modern, undeveloped and developed, traditional and scientific societies. Thus in 1924 we find Edward Sapir generalizing the myth from one side of the gap to the other: both sides displayed

cultural coherence and so, by extension, did the phases and forms in between:

> A genuine culture is perfectly conceivable in any type or stage of civilization . . . It is merely inherently harmonious, balanced, self-satisfactory . . . It is a culture in which nothing is spiritually meaningless, in which no important part of the general functioning brings with it a sense of frustration, of misdirected or unsympathetic effort.[14]

Hence the 'anthropological image', with its co-insistence upon a complete interdependence (every strand depending upon every other) and an inherent harmony of the whole cultural system (balanced, self-satisfactory) passed into sociology. And this despite the existence of at least one school of thought which had consistently repudiated the association of interdependence with harmony — the Marxist tradition accentuating contradictions between interdependent parts and their disruptive social potential.[15]

2. But before moving on to the sociological inheritance it is important to enter certain severe objections to the conception of cultural integration where it originated — in relation to primitive society. First, it is a strange tribute to the influence of German historicism and romanticism that something like Zande culture, which Evans-Pritchard himself called 'a thing of shreds and patches',[16] should have become the supreme exemplar of coherent integration. As Gellner comments it

> is ironical that this culture of shreds and patches, incorporating at least 20 culturally alien groups and speaking at least 8 diverse languages in what is but part of its total territory, should have come to have been systematically invoked, by philosophers making facile and superficial use of anthropology, as an illustration of the quite erroneous view that cultures are islands unto themselves, *whose supposedly coherent internal norms of what is real and what is not real may not be challenged.*[17] (my italics)

The irony is compounded if it is recalled that the famous passage about the tightly interwoven cultural strands which completely enmesh the Zande population is immediately qualified in the text. This reads on,

> Nevertheless [a caveat perhaps so large as to swamp the initial proposition] Zande 'beliefs are not absolutely set but are variable and fluctuating to allow for different situations and to permit empirical observations and even doubts'.[18]

Evans-Pritchard himself attempts to save his argument from this obvious objection by introducing the notion of a kind of moving cultural equilibrium whereby the Azande 'adapt themselves without undue difficulty to new conditions of life',[19] adaptation preserving coherence. This theme of course echoes down the corridors of later functionalist thought. But given that he has acceded to the presence of doubts and to the importing or implanting of external influences, why should we assume that these are unproblematically reintegrated into a new form of cultural coherence?

The assumption has not in fact been acceded to universally. The work of certain later anthropologists has questioned this view of *cultural system integration* as generic to primitive societies. There is, for example, Edmund Leach's record of Burmese tribesmen alternating between two quite incompatible visions of their society.[20] There are the frequent instances of frontier dwellers who literally and linguistically bestride two different (thus potentially inconsistent) cultures, and there is the well documented effect of exogamy in marriage rules which enforces exposure to and incorporation of cultural differences to varying degrees. These are simply a few examples of the occurrence of cultural pluralism and the accompanying incursion of inconsistencies. Usually, however, these have been deprived of cultural significance through an easy acceptance of adaptive reintegration; but, as Gellner argues, the implications of this view are unacceptably unrealistic. It presumes that

> there can be no syncretism, no doctrinal pluralism, no deep treason, no dramatic conversion or doctrinal oscillation, no holding of alternative belief systems up one's sleeve, ready for the opportune moment of betrayal.[21]

It denies the readiness of opportunistic gurus, ambitious younger sons or disgruntled minorities to capitalize upon cultural ambiguities and discontinuities which would advance their ambitions. If the standard view does not give us the noble savage it leaves us with the primitive cultural dope, unable to exploit the intricacies of his own *Lebenswelt*.

3. Yet if it is indeed the case that pluralism is common, inconsistency is pervasive and syncretism in general practice, why has the image of *high cultural system integration* possessed such staying power? Why too has there been the complementary and stubborn resistance to assigning cultural inconsistencies any importance in mainstream social theory? Two reasons are usually given to account for this situation by those who, like me, see perversity and prejudice in its perpetuation. Both reasons are rooted in the debate about the nature of the so-called primitive mind. Although they themselves are mutually opposed, they jointly repulse the notion of cultural inconsistencies and their social importance.

On the one hand the long lasting school of thought which has endorsed some concept of a 'savage mind' has enshrined a mentality which is constituted entirely differently from our own. No amount of information or instruction would alter its basic difference in constitution, its (romanticized or regrettable) fusion with nature which, in turn, repudiates clear distinctions between the mundane and the spiritual, the animate and the inanimate, the self and others or other things. What is crucial in this generic concept of a 'savage mind' is that it is one where the rules of identity and contradiction do not operate. For from this perspective these are not 'the' rules, they are 'our' rules, part of a wholly different mentality. Consequently the reactions which *we* might expect towards inconsistency and incoherence are predicated upon *our* own mental constitution. Hence cultural discontinuities are theoretically discounted from this point of view which holds them unimportant because the 'savage mind' discountenances them. It cannot act upon what it does not sense. For us to accord theoretical significance to unsensed contradictions would be an unwarranted act of cultural importation, to proponents of this kind of theory.

I have no interest here in debating the demerits of this 'booming buzzing confusion' portrayal of primitive mentality except on one point. Since a substantial amount of evidence indicates that the perceptual discrimination of primitive people in every-day and experimental settings is just as acute as that of their investigators, and that their linguistic capacities for differentiation in various areas (snow, cattle, kin) may well exceed that of the anthropologist, there are no grounds on which to *presume* that the cultural inconsistencies we perceive and could/would act upon, *must necessarily* remain inert to the 'savage mind' and therefore *will be of no significance* in primitive society. What I am more concerned to stress is the odd affinity in this connection shared by those holding a diametrically opposed view of primitive mentality.

Ironically, the harshest opponents of the 'pre-logical mind' notion seek to make their case by a demonstration of the total coherence of primitive thought. Intense hermeneutic ingenuity is deployed to defend seemingly contradictory statements/beliefs from the charge of incoherence: extensive interpretative schemes are erected to decode superficially inconsistent elements by revealing their underlying compatibility. Once again the effect is systematically to deprive cultural inconsistency of any social or theoretical significance — not by arguing that such contradictions are unsensed but by contending that they are 'merely' sensed, that is they are apparent rather than real. But, as Gellner argues, the 'trouble with such all-embracing logical charity is . . . that it is unwittingly quite *a priori*: it may delude anthropologists into thinking that they have *found* that no society

upholds absurd or self-contradictory beliefs, whilst in fact the principle employed has ensured in advance of any inquiry that nothing may count as pre-logical, inconsistent or categorically absurd though it may be. And this, apart from anything else, would blind one to at least one socially significant phenomenon: the social role of absurdity'.[22]

4. However, without diminishing the significance of these two views for founding and buttressing the myth of high cultural system integration — through their *a prioristic* denial of the existence or the significance of inconsistency — I believe that there is an even more pervasive reason for accounting for its longevity. This reason is more general since it also characterizes the work of many who remain completely agnostic about the constitution of primitive mentality. Basically it consists in attributing the massive uniformity of behaviour, displayed over time, in 'cold' societies, to the *binding logic of the cultural system.* In other words the predominance of routine, repetition and reproduction in the traditional society are interpreted as properties of high cultural system integration. Primitive peoples are seen as inexorably trapped in a coherent cultural code which generates the behavioural uniformities observed. Thus, to give a recent example, Giddens writes of 'societies confined implacably within the grip of tradition'[23] because of the 'ontological security' conferred by unquestioned codes of signification and forms of normative regulation. Now in all such cases there seems to be a fundamental confusion between the 'grip of tradition' (which I do not denigrate) and its source in the bindingness of the cultural logic. In brief, *high cultural system integration is consistently being confused with high socio-cultural integration.*

The uniform and lasting patterns of behaviour accredited to properties of the cultural system are never considered to be engendered and encouraged by contingencies of the traditional terrain.[24] In other words the force of tradition is seen as the force of the traditional belief system rather than of the traditional way of life. On the contrary I would argue that it is the latter which fosters uniformity and continuity in collective patterns of behaviour, whereas it is an illusion foisted on traditional life that its regularities are *orchestrated* by an overarching cultural system. Instead they are merely manifestations of high socio-cultural integration. That is to say that given a relatively stable environment, individuals could largely live inductively from past contexts to future ones *because* they were engaged in unchanging activities. But this was due to the stability of the structured context which promoted high socio-cultural integration since customary practices did continue to 'work', rather than to their constrained enmeshment by an integrated belief system. On the contrary it should be ventured that it was precisely this high level of day to day and generation to generation workability of practices

which created an optical illusion about the coherence of cultural systems and simultaneously discouraged the thorough exploitation or exploration of their contradictions.

Instead the two are elided, the effects of socio-cultural integration have generally been seen as the consequences of cultural system integration. Even a thinker like Bauman, who conceptualizes 'culture as praxis', gives more power to the systemic elbow. The *univers du discours*, from which meanings are derived, is seen as 'foisting itself, with the force of an external inevitability, on each particular member of the community and on each particular communication-event'.[25] What is much rarer to find in the literature is any full blooded assertion that the crucial element in traditionalism is the *social* integration aspect. Gellner provides this, but also recognizes the controversial nature of his following proposition: where

> relationships are fairly well-known (because the community is small, and because the types of relationship are small in number), shared culture is not a precondition of effective communication.

In support of this he cites Lévi-Strauss's example of a Red Indian band in the Brazilian jungle, made up of two smaller groups, neither of which understood the other's language. Here, given

> the smallness of the total group, and the simplicity of the problems and situations facing it, this absence of linguistic communication did not apparently prevent it forming an effective co-operating group.[26]

In fact I suspect that Gellner is deliberately over-accentuating his case in stating that given a highly structured society then culture is not indispensable, in order to put gunpowder under the myth of cultural system integration and integration through cultural systems. What I think he is really accentuating is the independent contribution of socio-cultural integration to traditionalism, dissociated from any orchestration by a binding cultural system. For the reasons why he holds that 'an affective co-operating group', or other kinds of repetitive relationship, can work are *not* without a cultural dimension: those involved

> have long ago sized each other up: each knows what the other wants, the tricks he may get up to, the defences and counter-measures which, in the given situation, are available, and so on.[27]

But this of course is at the socio-cultural level.

Even if I am guilty of misconstruing Gellner's intentions, such an interpretation of his position is at least of value in pointing-up the fact

that much of the uniformity which has been confused with and attributed to the bindingness of cultural belief systems, merely reflects a high degree of socio-cultural integration. Another, more contentious, way of putting this is *that traditionalistic practices are not necessarily shared because the cultural system is binding, but can be binding because they are shared at the socio-cultural level.* In fact I think that this is not an *a prioristic* matter, it is a view which strengthens but is not essential to the main argument — namely the necessity of distinguishing analytically between the two types of cultural integration, the systemic and the social. So far this necessity has been established negatively by reference to the errors arising from elision of the two elements; next I will seek to establish the positive advantages of this analytic distinction.

5. *Four Flaws in the Original Myth* So far I have tried to show *how* the myth of cultural integration originated in terms of its constitutive assumptions — the most basic one being the conflation of cultural system integration with socio-cultural integration. Now I want to disentangle certain sins of commission and omission perpetrated within the myth in relation to these two elements. For the crucial point here is that their combined effect serves to extinguish exactly those features whose combination could give explanatory purchase on cultural change. In teasing them out the object is of course complementary: it is to delineate those components whose interplay would form the kernel of a theory of cultural development.

(a) Where *cultural system integration* is concerned, the main sin of omission has been touched upon already — the refusal to recognize or attach any importance to the existence of inconsistencies at this level. Commitment in advance to cultural coherence

> blinds us to the possibility that social change may occur through the replacement of an inconsistent doctrine or ethic by a better one, or through a more consistent application of either. It equally blinds us to the possibility of, for instance, social control through the employment of absurd, ambiguous, inconsistent or unintelligible doctrines . . . even if they never occurred it would be wrong to employ a method which excludes their possibility *a priori*.[28]

What Gellner is pointing to here are certain far reaching social consequences which *may* result from systemic cultural contradictions. Whether these do occur depends, I will argue, on conditions in the socio-cultural realm. So far Gellner has touched on a necessary but insufficient condition for consequential cultural change, which is suppressed by the upholders of systemic consistency.

Simultaneously he has done something else of equivalent importance. This is to explode the assumption that the *interdependence* of cultural

elements automatically equals the *integration* of the cultural system (as exemplified in the image of each strand depending on every other and forming an escape-free web). Quite simply what he demonstrates is that when inconsistencies obtain between interdependent elements as in the case of the role expectations attaching to *igurramen* of the High Atlas (who must behave generously, appear unmaterialistic and yet remain prosperous), then *cultural manipulation* is inescapable (in the above case in order to balance the books). In other words far from a coherent cultural system being passively received, its active mediation is required if it is to be translated into a semblance of social coherence. Thus interpretative manipulation is involved, whether to sustain the cultural system or to change it.

In brief the theoretical incorporation of inconsistency at the systemic level does two things. It specifies certain necessary conditions for stability or change in the cultural system. Every contradiction, represents a potential for change. Whether it does lead to this rather than to active containment depends on the activities of groups and individuals at the socio-cultural level. Thus the second implication of giving due attention to the flaws in cultural system integration is the necessity of distinguishing this level analytically from socio-cultural integration — for the latter determines the fate of these discontinuities, that is whether they are amplified into recognisable changes or damped down to preserve the picture of social continuity.

(b) Still at the level of *cultural system integration* an equally important sin of commission is covertly committed in the process of conceptualization. The presence of a high degree of interdependence among cultural components is taken as a straightforward manifestation of high systemic integration. Already we have seen the fallacy of assuming that because the strands are tied together, they necessarily form a neat web. This erroneously presumes that interdependent elements must be compatible; and, empirically, we have seen that this is not always the case. However, the coherence of the cultural system may not derive from the harmonious integration of its parts as tends to be assumed (for we have seen that harmony and interdependence need not be synonymous). Instead the coherence presented, and any integrative force it exerts, may be due not to something the cultural system possesses (harmonious integration of parts) but to something it lacks, namely autonomous elements (relatively independent of the connected components). To use the traditional imagery, these would be 'loose ends' unknit with the main web. Empirically they might be things like pockets of deviant cultic practice, novel practices penetrating from frontier regions or ancient mythological survivals. If at all extensive such autonomous elements would constitute a fund of alternatives at the systemic level. The myth however is committed to the absence of such 'loose ends'.

The crucial point here is that cultural coherence may not stem from

the integration of the cultural system but from lack of alternatives to it. And this, itself, is a property of the system. Too frequently it has been presumed to be a property of the socio-cultural level. Primitive people, because of their low individuation, are held to lack a *sense* of alternatives (rather than alternatives being systemically unavailable). Thus Horton exemplifies this view when he writes that 'in traditional cultures there is no developed awareness of alternatives to the established body of theoretical tenets; whereas in scientifically oriented cultures, such an awareness is highly developed'.[29] But the (systemic) existence of options cannot be elided with people's sense of them. In modern societies a variety of options are known to be available but some people can also close their minds to this plurality: in traditional societies we cannot assume that everyone has a closed-mind until we know whether they have any option. Once again this point serves to bring home the need to distinguish between the two levels.

Equally this question of alternatives (like our discussion of inconsistencies) is linked to the conditions of cultural stability or change. The existence of alternatives at the systemic level, or the presence of *variety* as it is termed in information theory,[30] is essential for *adaptive systems*. This mathematical theory postulates some source which continuously generates variety (new signals, symbols, messages) and some receiver who can put this variety to use. Now I am not concerned here with the 'adaptive' aspect or with the notion of 'successful mapping' (through which the fund of variety is sorted into those modifications which most closely match the environment and those which do not) but simply with the question of change (which may turn out to be non-adaptive — always assuming that this term can be operationalized). However in the context of cultural change, information theory does contain two invaluable insights: (1) that alternatives (variety) must be available to be drawn upon at the systemic level; (2) that there must be receivers at the socio-cultural level who are willing and able to make use of them. (Yet again the distinction between the levels is indispensible.)

To put some meat on the bones of this abstract discussion let us briefly refer to Roger C. Owen's example of the interpenetration of certain independent Indian patrilocal bands of Northern Baja California.[31] Here the source of variety at the systemic level was the operation of the exogamy rule for marriage partners. This meant the continuous importation of females from other bands which were linguistically and culturally different. The local band was thus a hybrid residence unit, in terms of language and culture, where the children differed from either parent given their bi-lingual and bi-cultural characteristics. Here, in other words, the children constituted the group which could draw upon the pool of variety. To Owen, who pursued the notion of adaptation, this meant that 'contained in any

given population would be a diversified set of adaptive symbols derived from the females: to any situation of rigorous selective stress, there would be available a number of possible responses, thus giving to the culturally hybrid band a high survival potential'.[32] I would prefer to say more simply that this unit had a high systemic potential for change, requiring actualization by its bi-cultural agents.

(c) Turning now to *socio-cultural integration*, the main sin of omission here was a conventional unwillingness to concede that there was *ever* enough differentiation in the population to make interpretative innovations, to manipulate cultural loopholes, or to exploit inconsistencies. Now I would not for a moment deny that the relatively low levels of social differentiation in most traditional societies do act as a severe drag upon large-scale collective action for cultural and any other sort of change. But, at the same time, it seems to me that our modern notions of the kind of collectivity which introduces significant modifications, and also the kinds of modification which count as significant, have blocked an appreciation of smaller scale differences *and* the qualitative changes which they can introduce.

Now certainly in the Durkheimian tradition low social differentiation is closely associated with low personal individuation; and, in general terms, I do not contest this. However 'individuation' is a comparative social term, never meant by Durkheim, at least, to rob tribal man of any element of individual*ism*: indeed it was precisely his egotism, self-seeking and opportunism which required normative control. Yet all such character traits tended to be banished by the makers of the original myth. This was particularly true of the holistic anthropologists

> the individuals they so respect and exalt, jealously guarding them against subsumption under the typical or the general, are always *collective wholes* . . . Historicists may like individuality; yet as good holists, they feel no affection towards *individualism*.[33]

Homogenous individuals as standard bearers (in both senses) of shared cultural uniqueness were the humanoids of this type of theorizing. These were the oversocialized populaces which made for high socio-cultural integration. What is lacking here is the acceptance of a few individual personality differences — a bit of gumption, a sense of grudge or grievance, an eye to the main chance, a touch of adventurism. For these are all that need to be postulated as the initial mechanisms through which the contradictions of the cultural system begin to be exploited.

Unfortunately, and partly because of this dominant orientation in anthropology, what we lack is a 'high politics' of traditional society. There seems to be a glaring paucity of case studies dealing with individual machinations to gain power, to establish independence or to generate legitimacy, which would have been very revealing about

the cultural elaboration associated with these manoeuvres. There is another reason for this neglect which is just as powerful. Quite simply the manifestations of early cultural elaboration which I have in mind were often not recognized as such. Shifts in cosmologies, in doctrinal emphasis, in symbolic combinations, or in ritualistic practices have not been accorded much significance because they did not represent an obvious shift towards cultural modernity. Very likely they do not, but this does not mean that they are merely a kind of symbolic Brownian motion inside a sealed cultural vessel. Instead, by elaboration, accretion, syncretism, or re-interpretation, a winding path may lead away from the original cultural system. Though there is no reason to assume that this will either constitute or join the highway to modernity, this is *not* to deprive it of subsequent social significance.

(d) Finally to view socio-cultural integration as the product of the bindingness of the cultural system involves an equally serious error of commission. Namely the assumption that the shared beliefs, values and symbols will continue to integrate society whilst ever the cultural system remains intact. As far as change is concerned, it is presumed to be a one way relationship which works from the top down. I believe it is more realistically conceptualized as a two-way relationship, but once again this would depend upon utilizing analytical dualism for dealing with the interplay between the two levels. In support of the latter approach let us pursue the implications of the view that culture is *not* always shared because it is binding but may sometimes be *binding because shared.* The latter allows the socio-cultural level the possibility of pushing open the door to cultural change through actions which diminish integration-through-sharing and to do so independently of any co-terminus alteration in the cultural system.

Undoubtedly integration-through-sharing is a powerful binding force in traditional societies. By its very nature it discourages innovation. Where there is a high level of co-action this does serve to promote co-thought,[34] especially when we are dealing with subsistence living. As a generalization, it does seem to be the case that there is rough parity between the available variety and active variety of cultural elements in such societies and that they are pretty equally distributed. There is no significant vocabulary of concepts, meanings, beliefs or knowledge for some to draw upon, thus distinguishing themselves from others and fragmenting socio-cultural integration. Secondly, although this does not preclude individualistic innovation (primitive creativity should not be ruled out *a priori*), it is the individual who accumulates variety in the co-action system and who then confronts severe difficulties over its retention and transmission. In other words cultural poverty is like physical poverty, grinding. Primitive cultural accumulation is almost as difficult as primitive capital accumulation and is of course related to it. So far these may

look like further good reasons for not anticipating an independent contribution to cultural change from the socio-cultural level. They are *not*; they are simply reasons why this contribution will be slow and hard-won.

On the one hand the generalization about available variety and active variety being on a par is nothing more than that — it represents an 'average type' of traditional society not a universal characterization of traditional societies. For in many such social groupings small pools of variety do exist, in the form of surviving practices which can be activated and legitimated through a claim to represent the authentic 'tradition'. At any time this diversity may also be augmented by external contact, or more likely the latter sets up a tripartite, though rudimentary, pluralism between cultural recusants, conventionalists and converts. Then we have only to return to the postulate of elementary differences in personality and interests for the erosion of sharing to be set in train. The second argument about the difficulties of accumulation is basically that the train can never gather enough speed to leave the station. Undeniably there is strength in the assertion that without the written word, cultural variations and innovations will be condemned to protracted recapitulation and oral embroidery. But this it seems to me is a general characteristic of any form of cultural transmission in traditional societies: it is not particular to, or more difficult for, ideas outside the mainstream. This would only be the case if the individual alone accumulated them. But whilst he/she may be the first to originate or adopt them, we cannot universally assume that such people will be unsuccessful in transmitting them to their families, to a particular locality or to some subgroup with the same opportunism, or general outlook as themselves. Only by assuming complete homogeneity at the level of structure, geography and personality *as well as* culture, can lack of success be a foregone conclusion. Without this assumption there is no reason why slow cultural fissiparousness cannot undermine previous socio-cultural integration, by eating into the 'sharedness' which was its mainstay.

In sum four major criticisms have been made of the original myth, and are summarized below:

— refusal to recognize or attach importance to inconsistencies within the cultural system;
— inattention to the presence or absence of alternatives at the systemic level;
— unwillingness to concede any modicum of differentiation in the population;
— rejection of any condition capable of damaging socio-cultural integration.

When considered in conjunction these points totally preclude a theory

of cultural change because they eliminate precisely those elements essential to one. At each of the four points it has been seen that there is a common defect — the lack of any distinction between properties of the cultural system and the features of socio-cultural integration. In brief it is this central aspect of the myth which militates against examination of the interplay between the two levels and thus obstructs the investigation of cultural dynamics.

Yet the origin of the myth was grounded in primitive society which at least accounts for the playing down of inconsistency, alternatives, diversity and discontinuity, though it does not exculpate those who advanced theories which were predicated upon their total absence. Even if the 'discovery of incoherence were never more than a contributory rather than a sufficient cause, it still would not be legitimate for us to employ a method which inherently prevents any possible appreciation of this fact. When anthropologists were concerned primarily with stable societies (or societies held to be such), the mistake was perhaps excusable: but nowadays it is not'.[35] Instead the myth has gone from strength to strength. As at its origins it continues to draw its power from the elision of cultural system integration with socio-cultural integration.

In the first place its appeal was redoubled since it got buttressed from two different, and usually opposed schools of thought. However it is vital to be clear that the one reinforced it in an entirely different way from the other. In the first case (typical of normative functionalism) the myth was restated in terms of 'downwards' conflation. Here cultural system integration engulfs socio-cultural integration through processes of orchestration, regulation and internalization. In the opposite case (represented by neo-Marxism) the myth was reinstated in the form of 'upwards' conflation. Basically the socio-cultural level swallows up the cultural system as the effect of social domination and ideological manipulation. Finally, just as both of these versions were becoming rather frayed under the wear and tear of criticism, the myth was suddenly revitalized by a brand new exposition of it — this time taking the form of 'central' conflation (typified by the 'structuration' approach).[36] This was not merely a new shot in the arm: rather it extended an eternal life-support system to the myth by seeking to banish the analytical dualism, upon which the present critique depends, for good. To these theorists the myth did indeed elide the systemic and socio-cultural levels, *but* rightly so: since the two were mutually constitutive and consequently inseparable, it was therefore improper to analyse them dualistically. That this full-frontal defence of the inexorable duality of culture was even less capable of providing a theory of cultural change[37] than the two preceeding forms of conflation, is taken here to constitute the final condemnation of the whole conflationary procedure.

The common denominator of the various conflationists who

buttress the myth of cultural integration is that they elide logical relations with causal connections and then judge this ensemble to make a coherent whole. On the contrary, an approach based on analytical dualism challenges this judgment and the premisses upon which it is founded. Instead, by distinguishing logical relations (pertaining to the cultural system) from causal ones (pertaining to the socio-cultural level) and allowing of their independent variation, the interface between them becomes a problematic area for intensive exploration. The results of this would identify the *conditions* for integration in the cultural realm, without that state of affairs being taken as a foregone conclusion — any more than it can be in the structural domain. Cultural integration is demythologized by rendering it contingent upon the particular patterning of interconnections *at* the two different levels and *between* the two different levels.

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NOTES

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1. Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society*, Free Press, London, 1968, p. 146.

2. 'Culture' in the German romanticist tradition stemming from Herder, referred to a unique collective pattern of life, an integrated whole, pertaining to particular peoples. It was viewed as a 'meaningful' historical product, transmitted within the collectivity but not transferable beyond it. Herder's concept of culture as an integrated whole is closely akin to the notion of Gestalt.

3. B. Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1944, p. 38.

4. Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961. She in fact used the terms 'pattern' and 'style' interchangeably in this work: Coherence of a given culture is indicated by her usage of the 'broken cup' metaphor for cases where any mixing of cultures occurs.

5. Cf. 'Style', in Sol Tax (ed.), *Anthropology Today*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 278.

6. A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology; Culture, Patterns and Processes*, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1963. See sections 122 (integration) and 125 (ethos/eidos and values).

7. Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966, p. 69.

8. J. G. Merquior, *The Veil and the Mask*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979, p. 48.

9. Ernest Gellner, 'Concepts and Society', in Bryan R. Wilson (ed.), *Rationality*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1979, p. 36 f.

10. Perry Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism*, Verso, London, 1979, pp. 75–8.

11. David Lockwood, '*Social Integration and System Integration*' in G. K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds), *Explorations in Social Change*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1964.

12. 'Cultures are individual psychology thrown large upon the screen, given gigantic proportions and a long time span', Ruth Benedict, 'Configurations of culture in North America', *American Anthropologist*, vol. 34, 1932, p. 24.

13. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1937, p. 195.

14. Edward Sapir, *Culture, Language and Personality*, University of California Press, 1949, p. 90. What Sapir's views lacked in typicality was more than compensated by their congruence with functionalism and its universalistic pretensions. Later on they retained salience as they were to gel equally well with cultural projects based on linguistic relativism.

15. As Lockwood rightly argued Max Weber was equally aware of the potential for strains and conflicts developing between interdependent parts as is illustrated by the example of patrimonialism. See David Lockwood, 'Social Integration and System Integration', op. cit., pp. 253–5.

16. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Position of Women in Primitive Society and Other Essays in Social Anthropology*, London, 1965, p. 110.

17. Ernest Gellner, *Legitimation of Belief*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974, p. 143–4.

18. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande*, op. cit., p. 195.

19. Ibid. pp. 13.

20. Edmund Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma*, Bell & Sons, London, 1954.

21. Ernest Gellner, *Legitimation of Belief*, op. cit., p. 156.

22. Ernest Gellner, 'Concepts and Society', op. cit., p. 36.

23. Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, Macmillan, London, 1979, p. 219.

24. J. G. Merquior, *The Veil and the Mask*, op. cit., p. 51.

25. Zygmunt Bauman, *Culture as Praxis*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973, p. 5.

26. Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1964, p. 154.

27. Idem.

28. Ernest Gellner, 'Concepts and Society', op. cit., pp. 42–3.

29. Robin Horton, 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science', *Africa*, vol. XXXVII, no. 2, 1967, p. 154.

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Working-class differentiation and men's career mobility*

ABSTRACT

This paper reviews the usefulness of neo-Weberian ideas about social class for understanding patterns of men's career mobility. Special attention is devoted to the non-Marxist concepts of social class advocated by Giddens, Sorokin, and Parkin. Further insights are provided by an analysis of data for 20,000 men in the experienced American civilian labor force. The data are fit with a log linear model and then further analyzed with multidimensional scaling techniques. Very broadly, the findings support the social class literature by showing that its predictions are consistently upheld. The conceptual implications of these findings conclude the discussion.

A high priority on the agenda of modern stratification research is an assessment of the internal divisions among members of the working class — working-class differentiation.[1] Very little is known about these divisions because they have been obscured by numerous conceptual and methodological problems. However, understanding the heterogeneous fragments of working-class structure is important because it provides useful insights about the larger mosaic of modern capitalism. This inquiry will explore working-class differentiation from the perspective of discontinuities in career mobility.[2] These discontinuities allegedly result when class divisions block the free exchange of workers between occupational roles, thereby shaping patterns of career mobility.

There are numerous intellectual precedents which examine the limiting influence of class barriers on social mobility. The outlines of class structure exhibited in patterns of occupational shifts preoccupy this approach. As Weber observed, 'A "social class" makes up the totality of those class situations within which individual and generational mobility is easy and typical.'[3] Highlighting the relation between career mobility and working-class differentiation, the ensuing

discussion critically reviews previous explanations by addressing problematic issues in conceptualization and measurement. Next, the issues raised by this review are empirically evaluated in an analysis of career mobility. This analysis focuses on the problems of locating class boundaries and assessing the conditions responsible for their formation. Finally, the implications of these findings are outlined.

Restricting this research to career mobility and the class structure of workers is not meant to discount the importance of the owners of capital in modern class structures, but as it happens, such individuals are rare in surveys containing mobility data. Occupationally, they are usually classified as proprietors but disproportionately, most of the individuals in this category are small petit bourgeois entrepreneurs who do not exercise the kind of economic power ordinarily attributed to the capitalist class. As the data will show, these individuals frequently move in and out of self-employment. Career mobility is singled out because it closely resembles the collective experiences of workers in the labor market. From the time of market entry, this type of mobility reflects the movements of individuals from an earlier occupation to their current employment, within a group of currently active workers. Mobility between generations is not examined because it is more distantly related to labor market conditions.[4] Although important, the subjects of occupational and class inheritance across generations are outside the scope of this paper.

CLASS STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Conceptualization Since Sorokin's classic work,[5] Giddens's analysis is a notably extensive effort to develop a plausible theoretical link between the empirical phenomenon of social mobility and the concept of social class.[6] Giddens strives to explain the persistence and reproduction of class structure in advanced capitalist societies. Accomplishing this goal requires him to set forth a definition of social classes, the processes by which classes are formed, and an outline of the class structure endemic to advanced capitalism. A synthesis of Marxist and Weberian ideas serve as the foundation of this work.

Giddens begins with a vague description of class as a group of individuals, comprised of impersonally defined relationships, and nominally '"open" in form.'[7] This definition provides little insight into the structure of classes or mobility. However, his discussion of class formation and reproduction, i.e., structuration, is more helpful. Underpinning the class structure of capitalist societies are the market relations among and between workers and capitalists. Market relations in advanced capitalism are governed by a power structure based upon the relative bargaining strengths of market participants, viz. workers and capitalists. Bargaining strengths are acquired

through the possession of property and capital. Ownership of property and control of capital vests the capitalist class with a disproportionate amount of power in the market. However, Giddens does not accept the proposition that workers are powerless because they are propertyless. The 'property' which wage workers bring to the bargaining encounter is their labor power. For workers, the ability to freely alienate their labor or withhold it from capitalist production confers a 'market capacity' to influence bargaining outcomes. In this usage, 'market capacity' refers to '*all forms of relevant attributes which individuals may bring to the bargaining encounter.*'[8] Obviously, the market capacities of workers are contingent on the ability to collectively withhold labor or through the possession of skills which are scarce in the labor market. These capacities give workers the power to actively bargain with the owners of capital for wages and fringe benefits.

Market capacity should not be confused with social class. Market capacities are continuums of power in market relations and consequently, there is considerable variation in the extent to which power is possessed by workers and capitalists. For example, some groups of workers have substantial power to influence bargaining outcomes while other workers are relatively powerless. Equating market capacity with social class results in a large plurality of social groupings. This leads to a central problem in Giddens's analysis; namely, reconciling a continuum of market positions with the existence of a few discrete classes. While there are infinitely many different market capacities, there are only a small, finite number of social classes. In these circumstances, understanding the process of class formation requires an examination of 'the modes in which "economic" relationships [market relations] become translated into "noneconomic" social structures.'[9] This means that class formation is the process by which economic relations in the form of market capacities become transformed and crystallized to create a class structure. Giddens calls this process the 'structuration of class relationships.'

Structuration is a global term referring to the variety of conditions and processes which contribute to class formation. Giddens further elaborates this concept by positing two major types of structuration. *Proximate* structuration involves localized conditions which influence class formation. They are 'local' in the sense of being immediately situated in the social relations arising from the organization of production. These conditions include such considerations as the production technology and authority structure of the firm.

Proximate structuration is superceded by another, more global type which is the catalyst moulding social classes from market capacities. *Mediate structuration* links market conditions with class relationships, resulting in the rudimentary development of class structure. Conceptually, this force operates at the level of market relations where labor

is bargained and exchanged, viz. the labor market. An important distinction between mediate and proximate structuration follows from their location in the class formation process. Mediate structuration is aligned with conditions governing the labor market while proximate structuration corresponds to conditions at the production site respectively. The role of mediate structuration in the labor market is most clearly expressed in its relation to occupational mobility. In particular, mediate structuration is reflected by the mobility regime of a society. Giddens writes that

> the greater the degree of 'closure' of mobility chances . . . the more this facilitates the formation of identifiable classes . . . [class formation] is facilitated *to the degree to which mobility closure exists in relation to any specified form of market capacity.*[10]

Mobility closure defines class boundaries and the extent of closure determines their permeability.

Mediate structuration operates by limiting opportunities for mobility on the basis of differential market capacities among competing groups and individuals. Three specific types are centrally responsible for the closure of mobility chances and represent the kernels of social class. They are the ownership of property and/or capital, the possession of educational and/or technical qualifications, and the possession of manual labor power. Corresponding to these market capacities, three major groupings are prominent in capitalism's class structure: an upper class of property and/or capital owners, a middle class possessing technical and/or educational credentials, and a working class which relies on its labor. Giddens also notes that factors in proximate structuration, such as production technology, reinforces these tendencies by promoting a manual-nonmanual division of labor that creates a cleavage between the middle and working classes.

While Giddens' description of class structure in capitalist societies is articulate, it is hardly novel. As early as 1927, Sorokin set forth a virtually identical scheme. Sorokin argues that the class systems of modern societies develop around the stratification of occupational roles. Gradients of inequality among occupations lead to three principal strata. At the top are *entrepreneurs* who are, in Sorokin's words,

> economically independent . . . their own 'bosses' . . . and whose activity consists either exclusively, or at least partially, in an [sic] organization and control of their 'business' and their employees.[11]

Entrepreneurs own property and/or capital. Below this group are *higher employees* who do not own property but engage in professional,

technical, and nonmanagerial pursuits. The work of this group is limited to nonmanual activities. *Wage earners* are the third group. Compared with 'higher employees', they are also unpropertied but 'receive lower remuneration [and] are subordinate in function, being mainly manual workers.'[12] Each of these broad strata are internally differentiated with finer gradations corresponding to increasingly detailed specifications of occupational roles. More recently, Gagliani reviewed a large body of literature on working-class differentiation.[13] Agreeing with Sorokin and Giddens, he argues that class divisions among workers most consistently follow the manual-nonmanual distinction.

Unlike Giddens and Sorokin, Parkin does not present a set of divisions corresponding to class structure.[14] However, his discussion of social class provides several insights about the conditions responsible for class formation and reproduction. Parkin accepts the Weberian premise that classes exist by virtue of 'social closure'. Social closure is 'the process by which social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles.'[15] Structured inequality results from one group systematically excluding another from valued social resources. As a condition of class formation, Parkin argues that 'Strategies of exclusion are the predominant mode of closure in all stratified systems.'[16] Another type of closure follows exclusion when the excluded organize for the purpose of usurping resources from the dominant class. Consequently, the processes of exclusion and counter-exclusion (usurpation) are the primary forces in the development of class structure.

In this formulation, the scope of class analysis is defined by two analytic problems which are essential for comprehending the interplay of exclusionary processes. One problem is the process of group formation, and the other concerns the mechanism through which exclusion is achieved; especially the eligibility criteria which decide class membership. A thorough appraisal of class structure is incomplete without considering the criteria for class membership and the means by which they are applied. Regrettably, Parkin overlooks the relationship between occupational mobility and working-class differentiation. This is significant because exclusionary practices are very likely a leading cause of discontinuities in the exchange of personnel between occupations. Underscoring this point is the demonstrably obstructionist role of organizations such as unions and professional associations. These groups are directly involved in controlling occupational entries and competition among workers by enforcing eligibility criteria such as credential and training requirements.[17] The barriers imposed by occupational organizations and their limiting influence on occupational mobility are among the most palpable reflections of working-class differentiation.

Parkin does not overlook the significance of credentials and

credential enforcing organizations for class structure, despite his neglect of occupational mobility. Occupational organizations and their membership criteria are important devices for mobilizing and wielding power in the market. In general, 'Modes of closure [e.g. occupational organizations] can be thought of as different means of mobilizing power for the purpose of engaging in distributive struggle.'[18] Agreeing with Giddens, this statement suggests that classes form around collectivities in the market. Organized action by occupational groups seeking an advantaged position in the market is a central cause of closure in occupational mobility. Comparing Parkin with Giddens, power is used in one instance to exclude competing workers from opportunities to bargain their labor, and in the second, to influence bargaining outcomes with capitalists. Coalescing these authors, excluding potential competitors *is* a means for influencing the terms workers receive for their labor. This implies that market power is exercised multilaterally between workers and capitalists, and among workers themselves; the imagery is more of Hobbes than of Marx.

The scarcity of socially recognized credentials makes them a useful tool for influencing bargaining outcomes with employers and at the same time, they are an effective screening device for limiting entry into an occupation. Screening entrants further reinforces the scarcity and subsequent value of credentialed workers. Under these conditions, it is easy to envision a labor aristocracy which is well organized to bargain its labor; largely because exclusionary practices free it from widespread competition in the market. As a feature of working-class differentiation, a labor aristocracy shapes career mobility by carefully screening candidates, denying free movement, and contributing to occupational immobility. Therefore, immobility in highly credentialed occupations should be a prominent characteristic of working-class differentiation. Note that this reasoning does not pre-empt the manual-nonmanual division advocated by Giddens and Sorokin. Credentialing can be found in manual and nonmanual occupations alike; skilled crafts and professionals are examples of each.

Measurement A general view of class structure in advanced capitalism includes divisions between workers and owners of capital, and between manual and nonmanual workers. It also recognizes the importance of credentials in creating social divisions. Another point is that the exact location of class boundaries and the extent of their closure cannot be established by theory alone. Conceptually, social classes are amorphous and ill-defined structures with permeable boundaries. In this view, the task of empirical research is locating and assaying the observable qualities of class systems. Giddens explains the role of empirical research succinctly.[19]

> The problem of the existence of distinct class 'boundaries' is not one which can be settled *in abstracto*; one of the specific aims of class analysis in relation to empirical societies must necessarily be that of determining how strongly in any given case, the 'class principle' has become established as a mode of structuration.

The acknowledged need for empirical research has not led to a proliferation of research mapping class structure in the contours of mobility data. However, a small amount of information is available. Existing studies repeatedly uncover the manual-nonmanual division, but the limiting effects of credential are yet to be detected. The principle limitation of this research is that unless otherwise indicated, it deals only with intergenerational mobility. It is not absolutely certain that career mobility should follow these patterns.

An early contribution is the Blau and Duncan study of the American occupational structure.[20] Among the findings they report is a Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) of 12 × 12 mobility tables. Their findings consistently show that a major source of immobility is the division between manual and nonmanual occupations. That is, an important barrier to mobility exists between manual and nonmanual occupations. They also note that farmers exhibit distinctive patterns of mobility. The Blau and Duncan findings exhibit three major divisions in the occupational structure of workers: manual, nonmanual, and farm. In a later replication, Featherman and Hauser report similar findings,[21] as does McDonald in an analysis of British data.[22] Disputing these results, Vanneman reanalyzed the Blau-Duncan data and found that lower white-collar workers are becoming 'proletarianized.'[23] The mobility patterns of these workers closely resemble those of manual workers and blur the manual-nonmanual division.

More recently, Breiger criticized mobility research for the lack of theoretical justification guiding the construction of most occupational classifications.[24] Especially troubling are the myriad images of class structure implied but never developed by these taxonomic schemes. Using log linear models for a large disaggregated mobility table, Breiger proposes a test of several alternative hypotheses about class structure; these hypotheses are derived from published classifications. Each hypothesis specifies an alternative aggregation for a detailed set of occupational categories. The 'best' formulation of class structure produces an occupational aggregation which minimizes between, and maximizes within class mobility, respectively. It is also an aggregation which for a given model, most closely reproduces the observed data compared with other aggregations. Breiger reports an acceptable model of class structure that consists of eight major groupings. This work clarifies several issues but the empirical results are disappointing. Most unsatisfying is the lack of parsimony and his failure to delineate the dimension(s) responsible for the emergence of class

structure — in Giddens's words, a principle of structuration. For example, Breiger shows little interest in the manual-nonmanual division that appears in his chosen classification. Another problem is that the principle of parsimony is betrayed by an eight group description of class structure, and especially by a model requiring 220 parameters to fit the data, over three-fourths of the total degrees of freedom.

In a thorough review of the mobility literature, Goldthorpe identifies three major theses.[25] One is the 'closure' thesis which posits high levels of mobility between socially proximate occupations and at central locations of the occupational structure. The 'buffer zone' thesis concurs with Giddens by predicting a large gap between manual and nonmanual occupations. Mobility across this gap is limited to short distance moves, say from upper manual to lower nonmanual or vice versa. The 'counterbalance' thesis maintains that class inheritance and immobility are increasingly due to the rising use of educational credentials and inflated standards for occupational entry. These requirements counterbalance the mobility generated by greater equality in the distribution of educational resources.

Goldthorpe presents data showing limited support for the first two theses but concludes that occupational mobility is too complex to be reduced to simple metaphors. These results lend support to the manual-nonmanual dichotomy but regrettably, they also illustrate Breiger's critique of occupational classification in mobility research.[26] The class categories employed by Goldthorpe are presumed to reliably characterize class structure with very little theoretical or methodological justification offered for their usage. The validity of Goldthorpe's classification is unquestioned and the result is that his analysis reveals much about mobility patterns and very little about the outlines of class structure beneath these patterns.

METHODS AND DATA

In studies of social mobility, the analyst is confronted by two methodological problems. One is devising a set of occupational categories which are intellectually satisfying and methodologically tractable. Ideally, occupational classifications should contain enough detail so that potentially important mobility patterns are not obscured within a few overly broad categories. However, too many occupational categories can overwhelm an analyst with excessive details that make generalizations impossible.

Another important problem facing researchers is to devise a measure of mobility which is reliable and unbiased. Until recently, mobility research has been plagued with demonstrably biased measures which incorrectly reflect the true flows of personnel between

occupations. Critics point out that the widely used Glass-Rogoff index of pure mobility does not measure secular rates of mobility as it was originally intended. Instead, this measure is subject to a host of biasing inflences such as short term economic cycles, unique historical events, demographic processes, and other exogenous conditions which should be expunged from measures of net rates of mobility.

A complete review of the perils of occupational classification or of the development of mobility measures is far afield. There are excellent discussions of these subjects elsewhere and the interested reader should consult them.[27] This study uses a conventional seventeen category classification well known in mobility studies.[28] Seventeen categories retain a modest amount of detail but are not so numerous as to be unmanageable; it is also a conveniently available classification.

The mobility measures are based on methods devised by Leo Goodman for analyzing contingency tables. The procedures for generating these measures are considerably more complex than older techniques. However, they are most desirable because they are unbiased measures of pure mobility, net of short term fluctuations in demographic and economic conditions. In searching for the presumably enduring divisions of class structure, unbiased measures of stable, or pure mobility are essential, and applied to mobility tables, Goodman's techniques are especially promising. As Pullum writes,

> Goodman's multiplicative models permit us to quantify the 'inertia' of each occupational group and the 'barriers' between various groups. *Results could be used to locate important gulfs or boundaries between major occupational groups.*[29]

The implications of Pullum's comments should be readily apparent to students of social class. Following Goodman, the procedures for generating measures of occupational mobility used in this research were developed by Robert M. Hauser. The interested reader should consult the original discussions for additional details.[30]

Briefly, for a simple two dimensional mobility table of say, first by current occupation, a log linear model can be written to describe several types of effects present in observed mobility. To fully account for the observed mobility within cells of the table, the log linear model consists of an overall main effect parameter for sample size, parameters for the influences of row and column distributions (miscellaneous 'structural' effects), and parameters indexing the extent of 'pure' or 'circulation' mobility. The structural parameters of the model reflect demographic, economic, and technological trends, measurement error, and other unaccounted factors that tend to obscure true secular patterns of movement between occupations. In contrast, the parameters of the model corresponding to 'pure' mobility measure personnel flows net of structural influences.

The parameters measuring pure mobility are computed by grouping cells that share a common level of interaction, net of row and column effects, for pairs of occupations. For each level, a parameter is computed with standard methods for log linear models. The reader should note that the interaction levels into which table cells are grouped represent a third, latent dimension representing the magnitude of pure mobility between occupations. In other words, this approach to mobility table analysis takes an ordinary two-way table and transforms it into a three-way cross classification; the third dimension consists of levels of pure mobility that are not otherwise directly observable. The assignment of table cells to levels is obtained with exploratory procedures and is exhaustive and mutually exclusive for all cells in the mobility table.[31] When cells of the mobility table are incorrectly assigned to the wrong levels, conventional statistical tests will reveal a model that fits the data badly. Reassigning incorrectly placed cells will produce a better fitting model. The underlying mobility reflected by these parameters also gauge the similarity between pairs of occupations or obversely, the 'closeness' of occupations in social space. A high level of circulation mobility indicates that a given pair of occupations are similar or near one another.

Once the measures of pure mobility are obtained, these parameters can be further analyzed to identify the linkages and barriers between occupational classes. This task is accomplished with Guttman-Lingoes Smallest Space Analysis (SSA). Using the mobility between occupations as a measure of distance, SSA should uncover the location of major class divisions as indicated by discontinuities in movement.[32] The validity of this analysis is checked by a simple agglomerative clustering procedure (BMD-P2M). These techniques are used because they have relaxed assumptions about the general linear model and accept a variety of measures for distance or similarity. For additional details, the reader should peruse Lingoes[33] and BMDP. This step is necessary because log linear models for large mobility tables produce large numbers of parameters. Searching for the linkages and barriers that might signal class divisions requires sifting through a daunting number of parameters. Clustering procedures such as SSA are invaluable for organizing and simplifying large amounts of information.

The data are taken from the 1972 survey *Occupational Changes in a Generation* (*OCG-II*). The OCG-II data were collected as a replicate analysis of the benchmark Blau and Duncan study of mobility and achievement among US men. Details about the sample are available in Featherman and Hauser.[34] The OCG-II data are the product of a mail-out, mail-back questionnaire administered by the US Bureau of the Census. The sample consists of 33,613 civilian males, black, white and hispanic, ages 20 to 65. It is weighted to bring the sampling design into conformance with a simple random sample. When these

weights are applied, the total N is reduced to approximately 20,000. The value of this survey is due to its large size and the exceptional quality of its occupational data.[35]

This research does not use a mobility table in the strict sense of the term. Table I is a 17 × 17, two way job shift matrix in which first full-time occupation *and/or* occupation in 1962 (origins) is cross classified with current occupation (destination). It should not be viewed as an ordinary mobility table because it contains 34,685 *job shifts*, not individuals. The actual number of individuals represented in this table is the much smaller weighted sample size of the OCG-II data. This Table was constructed from a three way, 17 × 17 cross classification of first occupation by 1962 occupation by current occupation, which was subsequently collapsed over the 1962 dimension to create the analyzed table. Men who entered the labor force before 1962 represent two job shifts in Table I; one shift for mobility between first and current occupations, and another for mobility between 1962 and current occupations. Younger men who entered the labor force after 1962 are responsible for only a single job shift between their first (post-1962) and current occupations. Analyzing this table of job shifts instead of a more conventional mobility table was undertaken to lessen the serious problem of sparse cell counts in a table of this size, 289 cells. There are more observations in the job shift table than in a table of either first by current, or 1962 by current occupations. One potential problem is that the data in Table I somehow confound the mobility patterns of older and younger men. This possibility was rigorously investigated. The results showed that there are no significant differences in the mobility of men who entered the labor force before 1962 and the mobility of men who began their careers after 1962. it cannot be concluded that the job shift data in Table I unduly distort patterns of mobility characteristic of US men.

OUTLINES OF CLASS STRUCTURE

Table II is a simple cross-classification showing career mobility between first and current occupations in the OCG-II data. The row and column percentages reflect occupational outflows and inflows respectively, and the diagonal percentages indicate the degree of immobility, or occupational 'inertia' experienced by male workers. In view of existing theory and research, the results in Table II are not surprising. Mobility between manual and nonmanual occupations is relatively low compared to the proportions of workers who are not mobile between these broad categories. In terms of recruitment patterns, 67 per cent of nonmanual workers began their careers in nonmanual occupations while a larger proportion of currently employed manual workers started their careers in manual occupations.

TABLE I *Job shift matrix, origin to destination, origin: first full-time occupation or occupation in 1962; destination: current occupation; males aged 20 to 65 years, OCG-II data*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	Total
1. Professionals, self-employed	232	85	15	6	5	1	2	8	3	3	2	3	4	0	4	1	1	371
2. Professionals, salaried	207	2739	714	62	145	31	129	98	44	118	58	42	54	7	22	25	5	4500
3. Managers	11	181	1009	91	142	51	108	35	33	51	33	49	39	6	11	11	3	1864
4. Salesmen, other	7	14	91	154	28	20	17	10	20	20	18	21	21	3	6	6	1	457
5. Proprietors	9	64	318	62	427	44	38	29	15	32	37	33	26	4	15	6	2	1161
6. Clerks	6	78	261	102	106	155	92	66	32	77	88	58	56	9	25	15	3	1229
7. Salesmen, retail	29	343	637	81	191	77	814	186	69	154	223	169	132	33	85	17	5	3245
8. Craftsmen, manufacturing	2	119	140	51	38	15	73	874	75	136	249	66	60	29	33	12	2	1974
9. Craftsmen, other	1	40	111	80	13	10	32	91	705	148	82	89	52	11	78	9	8	1560
10. Craftsmen, construction	4	112	197	85	54	41	81	184	114	952	120	140	72	18	56	14	9	2253
11. Service	6	181	245	106	74	55	246	638	184	261	1588	350	234	149	163	37	10	4527
12. Operatives, other	8	116	229	138	74	56	156	197	217	360	385	959	170	71	171	47	35	3389
13. Operatives, manufacturing	3	73	108	47	31	27	95	68	43	83	152	119	663	29	76	11	12	1640
14. Laborers, manufacturing	1	33	48	21	15	13	55	128	71	91	264	104	59	145	75	15	10	1148
15 Laborers, other	4	47	152	68	35	30	119	143	244	189	270	271	148	48	393	28	23	2212
16. Farmers	5	19	37	32	16	14	22	34	44	59	78	69	50	15	48	517	57	1116
17. Farm laborers	2	47	77	52	16	26	52	117	145	164	285	240	116	74	150	241	235	2039
Total	537	4291	4389	1238	1410	666	2131	2902	2058	2898	3932	2782	1956	651	1411	1012	421	34685

TABLE II *Cross-tabulation of mobility between and within categories of manual and nonmanual occupations, OCG-II data, ECLF men, first by current occupation*

	Frequency Row % Column % Total %	*Current occupation* Nonmanual	Manual	
First occupation	Nonmanual	5527 78% 67% 29%	1581 22% 15% 8%	7108
	Manual	2768 23% 33% 15%	9098 77% 85% 48%	11866
		8295	10679	18974

However, about one-third of currently employed white-collar workers had first jobs in blue-collar work. A much smaller proportion, 15 per cent, moved from nonmanual to manual occupations. These findings suggest a modest shift toward white-collar employment, in spite of the high levels of occupational inertia. On the supply side, over three-fourths of workers who started working in manual or nonmanual occupations are still employed in these occupations, while slightly under one-fourth of their co-workers were occupationally mobile.

Although these findings are consistent with the literature, they reveal nothing about the internal patterns of mobility within manual and nonmanual occupations. Examining job shifts between detailed categories provides insights about mobility that are otherwise hidden in the highly aggregated categories of Table II. Detailed classifications are essential for identifying important subdivisions within broad occupational categories because the finer detail is less likely to obscure significant divisions in personnel flows. Detailed classifications also can show which, if any, occupations are specifically responsible for mobility between broad occupational classes. For example, mobility between some combinations of blue-collar and white-collar occupations may be more common than between other pairs of manual and nonmanual jobs. Mobility between white-collar clerks and blue-collar factory operatives is almost certain to be greater than mobility between farm labor and professional occupations. This kind of detailed information is available in the 17 category classification of Table I. However, making generalizations about pure mobility from

the fine details of Table I requires the application of more sophisticated techniques.

Table III presents a design matrix for partitioning the 17 × 17 job shift table. This specification divides the interactions into 17 mutually exclusive groups. The numerical cell entries are subscripts for the parameters shown in Table IV. These parameters are the measures of pure mobility discussed above. For example, the level of pure mobility between salaried and self-employed professionals is the same as pure mobility between farmers and farm laborers, 2.427. In absolute terms, these parameters have little meaning but useful comparisons can be made with them and this will be illustrated shortly.

The lower panel of Table III shows that the model of simple independence between occupational origins and destinations, noted as (1)(2) in Table III, does not fit the data. The likelihood ratio Chi-square statistic, L^2, (similar to Pearson's Chi-square) is highly significant at 34,748.31 and 256 degrees of freedom (df).[36] The hypothesis that origins and destinations are unrelated must be rejected, and this is consistent with most other studies of occupational mobility. Partitioning the two-way table into a third dimension for pure mobility yields a much better fitting model. This model, labeled (1)(2)(3), states that origins are independent of destinations, conditional on the level of pure mobility between them. The model based on the design matrix partition fits the data with a likelihood ratio Chi-square statistic of 509.94, signifying that the relationship between origins and destinations apparent in the model of simple independence can be explained by the intensity, or level of pure mobility between them. This means that the marginal distributions for first and/or 1962 and current occupations would be unrelated except for the underlying flows of pure mobility between them.

In a strict sense, neither the model of independence nor the design provide an acceptable fit to the data by conventional statistical criteria. The errors of these models are highly significant. Nevertheless the degrees of freedom are large and tend to produce significant results. Another way of assessing the fit of the design matrix is to compare its Chi-square statistic with the Chi-square for the model of simple independence. The ratio of these two Chi-squares is approximately .01. This figure is analogous to R^2 in regression analysis and it means that 99 per cent of the error in the simple independence model is explained by the model based on the design matrix. The index of dissimilarity (Δ), a descriptive measure of error, also shows a sharp reduction between the two models.

Inspecting the design matrix, several observations about mobility are notable. For purposes of interpretation, entries in the matrix with higher numbers have less pure mobility and smaller parameters than entries with low numbers. Low numbers and large parameters indicate highly fluid movements between occupations. High numbers

TABLE III *Symmetric, seventeen level design matrix for a 17 × 17 table of first/1962 by current occupation first/1962*

First/1962	Current																
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. Professionals, self-employed	1	3	6	7	8	12	7	14	14	15	14	10	8	17	13	12	17
2. Professionals, salaried	3	3	5	16	9	13	8	13	17	14	12	14	11	17	17	8	15
3. Managers	6	5	2	6	4	5	4	11	12	9	8	7	7	15	12	14	11
4. Salesmen, other	7	16	6	5	9	8	12	16	14	15	13	11	9	17	16	14	16
5. Proprietors	8	9	4	9	3	6	7	14	17	14	11	10	10	17	14	15	15
6. Clerks	12	13	5	8	6	4	7	14	16	12	8	9	9	16	14	13	14
7 Salesmen, retail	7	8	4	12	7	7	3	10	15	11	6	7	6	12	9	14	13
8. Craftsmen, manufacturing	14	13	11	16	14	14	10	4	14	11	6	10	10	12	13	16	13
9. Craftsmen, other	14	17	12	14	17	16	15	14	5	13	11	9	11	15	9	15	11
10. Craftsmen, construction	15	14	9	15	14	12	11	11	13	5	9	8	10	14	12	14	11
11. Service	14	12	8	13	11	8	6	6	11	9	3	5	5	6	7	9	6
12. Operatives, other	10	14	7	11	10	9	7	10	9	8	5	3	6	8	6	8	6
13. Operatives, manufacturing	8	11	7	9	10	9	6	10	11	10	5	6	2	9	7	9	6
14. Laborers, manufacturing	17	17	15	17	17	16	12	12	15	14	6	8	9	5	10	14	8
15. Laborers, other	13	17	12	16	14	14	9	13	9	12	7	6	7	10	5	10	7
16. Farmers	12	8	14	14	15	13	14	16	15	14	9	8	9	14	10	2	3
17. Farm laborers	17	15	11	16	15	14	13	13	11	11	6	6	6	8	7	3	2

(1)(2) = 34,748.31 Δ = 36.65 df = 256 (1) First/1962
(1)(2)(3) = 509.94 Δ = 4.05 df = 240 L_H^2/L_T^2 = 01 (2) Current
(3) Design

and small parameters mean that for given pairs of occupations, movement between them is uncommon, if not unusual. The design shows that immobility is highest among self-employed professionals (level 1, category 1). This means, for example, that compared to any other group of wage and salary workers, self-employed physicians and attorneys are most likely to remain in their first chosen occupations throughout their careers. In contrast, proprietors, construction and other crafts, and laborers (level 5, categories 4, 9, 10, 14, 15) are least likely to be life-long careers because immobility is lowest for these occupations. Possibly, the high failure rate of small business means that tenure in the role of proprietor is short lived for all but the most well leveraged capitalists.

Another significant feature of the design matrix is that it is symmetric across the diagonal. This characteristic reflects a conscious decision to construct a model that disregards directional information about occupational mobility. Requiring the model to incorporate symmetric interactions foregoes special consideration of upward and downward mobility; rates of net upward movement are presumed identical to net rates of downward mobility. Modeling the interactions as symmetric does not create significant errors in the expected frequencies, although 202.12 of the 509.94 L^2 can be traced to random departures from symmetry.[37] However, this characteristic greatly simplifies later analyses because it implies that patterns of upward mobility are not substantially different from downward mobility, and that separate analyses for each are unnecessary.

The assignment of cells to levels in the design matrix represent pairwise groupings of occupations which share the same distances. By inspecting the cell composition within each of the design levels, one can begin to see patterns in the relative proximity of occupations. As noted, pairs of occupations which are near one another in social space will be located in levels which have large interaction parameters. In large tables, a complete inspection of all the design levels is unnecessary because a limited number of design levels are usually sufficient to summarize the most prominent patterns of movement. One rule for selecting design levels chooses those with parameter values greater than 1.0.

The rationale for this rule is that in multiplicative models, parameter values greater than 1.0 mean that occupational interactions are sufficiently intense to increase observed mobility beyond the contributions of row and column effects. Values greater than 1.0 indicate that circulation mobility has a positive impact on the observed movements between given pairs of occupations. Parameters hovering around unity indicate that pure mobility is weak or nonexistent. In this instance, observed mobility is mainly the product of conditions affecting the marginal distributions of origins and destinations. Parameters less than 1.0 mean that occupational

interactions are so small and weak as to produce a net decrement to observed mobility, after accounting for row and column effects. Parameters smaller than unity indicate unusual kinds of occupational mobility — for example, farm laborer to salaried professional. The first eight levels of the design matrix have parameters greater than 1.0, reflecting common types of occupational exchanges. Level 9 is about equal to unity, so these cells are chiefly the product of structural effects, largely unaffected by circulation mobility. Levels 10 through 17 are unusual types of occupational mobility. In the same fashion, cells in levels 1 through 8 represent pairs of occupations which are relatively near or similar to one another compared to combinations in the remaining levels. A complete listing of parameter values are provided in Table IV.

Table V shows the cells located in each of the first eight levels. Each cell represents an exchange between a pair of occupations. The first two levels of the design matrix are dominated by diagonal cells indexing immobility. For this reason, they are less interesting except to note the extreme immobility among self-employed professionals and that managers, service workers, farmers, and farm laborers are equally immobile. In the off-diagonal cells, especially remarkable is that most mobility occurs within manual or nonmanual occupations and there are few instances of exchanges between manual and nonmanual occupations in levels 3 through 8. Where occupational interactions are strong, circulation mobility reinforces the division between white-collar and blue-collar work. In level 3, mobility between salaried and self-employed professionals is the same as mobility between farmers and farm laborers. The mobility between these occupations matches the absence of movement among salaried professionals, nonretail sales, clerks and all operatives. This latter group of workers are about as likely to remain locked into their occupations as professionals (or farmers and farm laborers) are to switch between salaried and self-employed positions. Salaried professionals are as likely to remain in their salaried status as they are to switch to self-employment. Mobility within professional occupations and within farming positions are the most prevalent of all possible interoccupational shifts.

The next two levels, 4 and 5, are a mixture of mobile and immobile cells. In level 4, mobility between managers and clerks or other sales is equal to immobility among retail sales and manufacturing craftsmen. Managers are about as likely to become salaried professionals or retail salesmen (or vice versa) as craftsmen in construction and manufacturing are to remain in their positions. Equally prevalent mobility also exists between manufacturing operatives and service workers or operatives in non-manufacturing industries. Levels 6, 7 and 8 consist entirely of exchanges between occupational categories.

For example, they include shifts between managers and proprietors, retail sales and clerks, proprietors and retail sales.

A revealing example of a local 'buffer zone' between manual laborers and nonmanual clerks is situated in level 6. In this level, exchanges between service and operative occupations form a nucleus overlapping the division between manual and nonmanual occupations. On the manual side, personnel in laborer occupations are bonded to this nucleus by equally strong connections to service and operative positions. These linkages are matched on the nonmanual side by another three way exchange involving workers in service, operative, and clerk occupations. In other words, service and operative employment share personnel with each other, with laborers, and with clerks. Significantly however, clerks and laborers do not exchange personnel with the same intensity. For mobile laborers and clerks, the gap between manual and nonmanual occupations is bridged by an intermediate stopover in service or operative work. This pattern crudely resembles a career line by which the barriers created by skill requirements are circumvented. It also vitiates the possibility of long distance shifts across the manual-non-manual division, supporting buffer zone models.

Using the interaction parameters of the design matrix, Smallest Space Analysis graphically maps occupations into n-dimensional space by minimizing the Euclidean distances between occupations.

TABLE IV *Row, column and level parameters (log) from the conditional independence model. Seventeen level design*

Occupation or Level	Row	Column	Level
(1)	−1.70106	−2 82938	6.15303
(2)	1.01760	.66256	3.34138
(3)	.64658	−.87461	2.42724
(4)	.68614	− 82241	1.63944
(5)	.19894	− 44266	1.30008
(6)	− 47566	− 08226	.94571
(7)	.05863	.42091	.65059
(8)	.94961	.38741	.37624
(9)	.90545	.52521	08384
(10)	1.05658	66712	−.04576
(11)	.37282	.68015	−.22851
(12)	.12595	.50787	−.37591
(13)	.23592	− 41074	−.54372
(14)	−.48440	41441	−.77901
(15)	.03857	.74493	−1.02941
(16)	−1.0791	.03267	−1.11471
(17)	−2.14191	41883	−1.71085

Grand Mean = 3.82450 (log)

TABLE V *Composition and parameter estimates (log e) for levels 1–8 of design matrix*

Design level	Parameter	Cells	Occupations
1	6.15303	1,1	Professionals, self-employed
2	3.34138	3,3	Managers
	13,13	Service	
	16,16	Farmers	
	17,17	Farm laborers	
3	2.42724	1,2–1,2	Self-employed professionals, salaried professionals
		2,2	Salaried professionals
		5,5	Sales, other
		7,7	Clerks
		11,11	Operatives, mfg.
		12,12	Operatives, other
		16,17–17,16	Farmers Farm laborers
4	1 63944	3,5–5,3	Managers, sales, other
		3,7–7,3	Managers, clerks
		6,6	Sales, retail
		8,8	Craftsmen, mfg.
5	1.30008	3,2–2,3	Salaried professionals, managers
		6,3–3,6	Managers, sales, retail
		4,4	Proprietors
		9,9	Craftsmen, construction
		11,12–12,11	Operatives, mfg., operatives, other
		11,13–13,11	Operatives, mfg., service
		10,10	Craftsmen, other
		14,14	Laborers, mfg.
		15,15	Laborers, other
6	.94571	1,3–3,1	Self-employed professionals, managers
		3,4–4,3	Managers, proprietors
		6,5–5,6	Sales, other sales, retail
		7,11–11,7	Clerks, operatives, mfg.
		7,13–13,7	Clerks, service
		8,11–11,8	Craftsmen, mfg., operatives, mfg.
		17,11–11,17	Farm laborers, operatives, other
		12,17–17,12	Farm laborers, service
		11,14–14,11	Operatives, mfg., laborers, mfg.

Design level	Parameter	Cells	Occupations
		12,13–13,12	Service, operatives, other
		12,15–15,12	Laborers, other, operatives, other
7	.65059	1,4–4,1	Professionals, self-employed, proprietors
		1,7–7,1	Professionals, self-employed, clerks
		12,3–3,12	Managers, operatives, other
		13,3–3,13	Managers, service
		5,7–7,5	Sales, other clerks
		6,7–7,6	Sales, retail clerks
		7,12–12,7	Operatives, other, clerks
		11,15–15,11	Operative, mfg., laborers, other
		12,15–15,13	Service, laborers, other
		17,15–15,17	Farm laborers, laborers, other
8	.37624	1,5–5,1	Self-employed prfessionals, sales, other
		1,13–13,1	Self-employed professionals, service
		2,7–7,2	Salaried professionals, clerks
		2,16–16,2	Salaried professionals, farmers
		3,11–11,3	Managers, Operatives, mfg.
		4,6–6,4	Proprietors, sales, retail
		11,6–6,11	Operatives, mfg., sales, retail
		10,12–12,10	Craftsmen, other, operatives, other
		12,14–14,12	Laborers, mfg., operatives, other
		12,16–16,12	Farmers, operatives, other
		17,14–17–14	Farm laborers, laborers, other

Smallest Space analysis is a multidimensional scaling technique that is analogous to factor analysis. A problem that arises in SSA concerns the number of dimensions necessary to provide a satisfactory fit to the data. The coefficient of alienation (τ) measures the goodness-of-fit of SSA solutions with one or more dimensions. A rule of thumb accepts a solution after the coefficient of alienation reaches a value between .10 and .15. However, as Everitt and Dunn point out, substantive

meaning is preferable over the rigid application of a numerical index in selecting the appropriate dimensionality of an SSA solution.[38] The coefficient of alienation is best considered a general guideline. The results of the SSA suggest that the one dimensional solution is unsatisfactory, $\tau = .362$. The two dimensional solution is much better; the coefficient of alienation is roughly one-half that of the one dimensional solution, .182. The three dimensional solution, .132, yields a fit which is within the prescribed range but does not measurably improve the two dimensional fit. The three dimensional solution also is much less interpretable than the two dimensional solution.

In Figure I, plotting the coefficients in two dimensions illustrates the configuration of occupations in relation to one another. The first dimension, running from left to right of Figure I, visibly separates white-collar from blue-collar occupations. The left side of the figure is dominated by nonmanual occupations while manual occupations are located on the right. Among the nonmanual occupations, the professionals are located in the upper left quadrant while all others are situated in the lower left. On the right, craftsmen are clustered at the bottom while operatives, laborers and service are near the middle. Farmers are outlying in the upper right quadrant. The cell composition of the design levels and the Smallest Space Analysis provide clear evidence of the manual-nonmanual division, giving credence to the descriptions of Sorokin and Giddens.

The second dimension on the vertical axis is weaker and less stable. The meaning of this dimension is not beyond dispute but it apparently reflects the extent of residual immobility caused by sources other than skill differences. For example, farming is a highly immobile occupation (level 2 in the design matrix). Farmers are midway on the horizontal dimension for skill and highest on the vertical dimension for immobility. The large capital outlays required for entrance, or the inheritance of family property are strong and likely inducements for staying in this occupation. At the other extreme, crafts, proprietors, and retail sales are by comparison, relatively open, less immobile (levels 4 and 5 in the design matrix), and located at the bottom of the immobility scale.

The next results provide further insight about the clustering properties of occupations and validate the SSA findings. These findings are obtained from a simple cluster analysis of the interaction parameters. This exercise also provides a guide for constructing boundaries around the occupational groupings displayed in Figure I. In Figure II, at the far right, the most apparent result is a confirmation of earlier findings: the manual-nonmanual dimension is the major distinguishing feature among occupations. Clerks and proprietors form a dyad to which managers, other sales, and retail sales occupations are added; these are the occupations located in the



FIGURE I *Smallest Space Analysis of mobility parameters, two dimensional solution*

lower left quadrant of the SSA plot. Professionals form another dyad which are subsequently joined with other nonmanual occupations at a later stage in the analysis. A third strong dyad is formed with Operatives, other and Service workers. Manufacturing operatives are added to this dyad and the resulting triad is joined to the coupling of Laborers and Other Farm Laborers. Craftsmen, other and Craftsmen, construction are also dyadically linked and in successive steps Manufacturing Craftsmen and Laborers are added. This reflects the isolation of craft occupations in the lower part of the right quadrant in the SSA. Finally, the distinctiveness of farmers shown by the SSA is reconfirmed. This occupation forms a cluster of one which is later attached to the other manual occupations.

The information from the design level composition, the SSA, and the cluster analysis repeatedly demonstrates that a major division between manual and nonmanual occupations exists within career mobility and by extension, in working-class structure. The majority of occupational shifts in the first eight design levels are manual to manual, or nonmanual to nonmanual exchanges. The first dimension of the Smallest Space Analysis shows a clear differentiation between



FIGURE II *BMD-P2M cluster analysis of mobility parameters, Euclidean distance*

manual and nonmanual occupations, and the cluster analysis produced two large clusters — one for manual and another for nonmanual occupations.

While the manual-nonmanual division is largest, there are further divisions possible within each of these groups. These subdivisions represent a second tier in the organisation of worker mobility. Among nonmanual occupations, there is a division which separates professionals from other nonmanual occupations. In the design matrix, the amount of mobility between salaried and self-employed professionals is substantially greater than for other combinations of occupations. The cluster analysis places salaried and self-employed professionals into a single dyad. Likewise, in the SSA plot, these two occupations are the sole inhabitants of the upper left quadrant, separated from other nonmanual occupations. This suggests that professionals are a unique group with highly distinct mobility patterns. One likely reason

for the exclusivity of professions is their relative success in erecting occupational barriers. Far more than any other nonmanual occupation, professional occupations require special credentials in the form of licenses, education, and other titular distinctions. These credentials serve as barriers to potential, yet uncertified recruits in the nonmanual ranks, isolating professionals as a special type of nonmanual worker, sheltered from the competition of other nonmanual workers.

Besides the subdivision within nonmanual occupations, a similar cleavage is present among manual occupations. This subdivision separates craftsmen from other manual operations. The crafts occupations share a strong commonality in the SSA and are located together in the lower right side of the coefficient plot. In the cluster analysis, Craftsmen, other and Craftsmen, construction form a dyad to which manufacturing crafts was added to create a cluster of three. Like professionals, crafts workers claim special skills not easily acquired through ordinary manual work experience. Consequently, they enjoy a measure of exclusivity from other manual workers. The organization of crafts unions reinforce this isolation by establishing membership criteria which limit entry in a manner not unlike the restrictive practices of professional associations. Professionals and crafts are similar in the way which membership is restricted to the owners of special talents and/or credentials. More significantly, these occupations have in common gatekeeping organizations designed to limit entry and protect the privileged occupational standing of their membership. In this respect, manual and nonmanual occupations are dominated by elite segments which perpetuate their exclusive status through the use of formal organizations and special credentials.

There is one remaining subdivision which can be made among the manual occupations. Besides the subdivisions between craftsmen and other manual occupations, there is a smaller cluster which appears among the noncrafts manual categories. This fissure separates operatives and service occupations from laborers. This distinction can be inferred from exchanges in level 6 of the design matrix and from the SSA which distinguishes laborers from operatives and service occupations. Differences in skill levels most likely account for this division; operatives and service workers are generally considered better skilled than laborers. However, this cleavage is less pronounced and reflects small differences between these occupations. Another factor is that these occupations are also less organized. There are fewer formalized hurdles facing a laborer aspiring to an operative position than one desiring membership in a craft union.

Finally, farmers are a unique group isolated from other occupations. The log-linear model shows a large interaction between farm laborers and farmers but apart from this single linkage they are isolated from other occupational roles. This is most evident in the SSA and the cluster analysis. Farmers are distantly connected to manual occupations

but most accurately, they inhabit a special niche in the occupational structure.[39]

Figure III summarizes the preceding points. In this drawing, farmers are located on the side of manual occupations but are otherwise outside the main sphere of career mobility. Within this sphere, the principal division dominating mobility and characterizing immobility is the gap between manual and nonmanual occupations. In the half-spheres of manual and nonmanual occupations, craft and professional workers enjoy a protected status; claimed by virtue of special qualifications and perpetuated by credential requirements and the practices of professional and trade unions. Lastly, there is a minor division separating laborers from their better skilled brethren in manual occupations. In this system, workers are differentiated by five major 'classes': (1) professionals, (2) other nonmanual occupations, (3) craftsmen, (4) operative and service workers, (5) laborers.



FIGURE III *The structure of men's career mobility*

The boundaries around these five major groups should not imply that they are insular and immutable. Figure III conveys the image of a structure which is marked by a singularly large division, and then by successively smaller subdivisions. From this figure, it should be evident that structures consisting of two, three or four classes are also plausible configurations. Using a classification larger than seventeen categories, it also might be possible to observe finer subdivisions within the class categories uncovered by this research. Nevertheless, heeding these results leads to the conclusion that analysts of career mobility should assign primacy to the manual-nonmanual skill distinction. Behind this distinction, the ability of professional and

crafts workers to insulate themselves from other occupations is another major consideration. These findings are noteworthy because they show the principal dimensions of working class differentiation, and because the importance of credentials has been previously undocumented.

CLOSING REMARKS

In describing the class structure of advanced capitalism, Giddens carefully avoids being specific about the number and content of class categories.[40] For an exact determination, Giddens defers to empirical research; assigning it the task 'of determining how strongly . . . the "class principle" has become established.'[41] As far as male workers are concerned, the argument leading Giddens to recognize blue- and white-collar workers as separate classes is largely upheld by the data. Class boundaries indicated by discontinuities in mobility are most pronounced around the manual-nonmanual division. This is a traditional distinction within sociology dating back to Sorokin's classic studies, and recent critics who discount its importance should carefully reconsider their position. Without question, the empirical evidence suggests that class structuration generally, and the closure of mobility chances specifically, are closely tied to skill differences.

Skill differences are especially important because they correspond to processes governing class formation and reproduction. Skills and the productivity they imply are sources of market power parlayed by workers to influence bargaining outcomes. Some workers are better skilled and have more market power than others. This basic inequality sets in motion a complex set of processes leading to the development of social classes around central locations in power structure of the market. The results are observable in the fractures and discontinuities of career mobility.

While instructive, this image of class structure and its heavy emphasis on the role of skill differences is unnecessarily limited. Regarding the market as a structure of power, the sources of power and the parties involved in the bargaining encounter are construed much too narrowly. Skills provide workers with a competitive edge and better skilled workers command an advantaged position in the negotiations for their labor. However, there are other sources of power available to workers besides acquiring valued qualifications. For example, organized action is another power resource. Secondly, market exchanges do not transpire in a vacuum and numerous actors are present during a bargaining encounter. The ability to influence bargaining outcomes, the imprimatur of market power, depends on the strength of workers in relation to potential consumers, *and* their strength in relation to other competitors in the labor market. Among

workers, a critical influence on market power is the ability of certain groups to insulate themselves from the competition of other workers.

The organizational characteristics of specific occupational groupings such as crafts are an alternative source of market power which also insulates against competition from other workers. Skill and other factors being equal, well organized workers are better able to influence the terms for their labor than disorganized ones. Likewise, an effective organization increases the probability of successfully enforcing entrance requirements which will fend off unwanted competition and raise aggregate bargaining power. Licensing and apprenticeship requirements, recognition of educational credentials, and other forms of certification, especially those enforced by legal authorities narrows the pool of potential competitors. As market capacities, gatekeeping organizations and their certificates are closely associated with special skills that are jointly responsible for the discontinuous social groupings observed in career mobility. The market strengths of professional associations, licensing boards, and trade unions also provide their constituents with benefits not enjoyed by lesser organized occupations. Workers in the professions and crafts generally receive higher wages, more job authority, and better working conditions than most other occupations. Managers and proprietors may be the exceptions to this rule but among nonmanual occupations, these positions are generally more accessable than slots in the professions.

Finally, the relationship between social mobility and the search for the 'true' number of working-class segments is worth considering. In this regard, analysts concerned with the structural causes of social inequality should carefully consider two questions. First is whether mobility is the best vehicle for examining class structure, and second is how much of a blockage is sufficient to constitute a distinct class? They are related questions because accepting discontinuities in mobility as *prima facie* evidence of class structure, the 'true' number of classes will vary as a function of the level of mobility or immobility one deems as a significant barrier. Social classes *should* be expected to restrict mobility, but how much is an unanswered question in most theorizing. Empirical research can show, as the preceding analysis did, where the divisions are greatest and where they are located, but not where such divisions cease to represent significant social groupings. Locating classes on the basis of occupational mobility will continue to frustrate analysts until agreed upon standards can distinguish significant barriers from the trivial sorts of occupational inertia which exist for even the most detailed job titles. Until some agreement is reached, the search for the 'right' number of classes will threaten to become a sociological holy grail.

In the meantime, applications of the myriad operational versions of social class are neither unproductive nor bereft of meaning. At a

minimum, structural conceptualizations are useful heuristic devices for capturing important sources of social inequality previously overlooked by earlier research traditions, namely status attainment and human capital. Ideally, the findings reported in this paper will inform and guide future research.

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NOTES

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1. Giorgio Gagliani, 'How Many Working Classes?', *American Journal of Sociology*, no. 87, 1981, pp. 259–85.

2. Orthodox Marxists and neo-Marxists express little interest in the connection between class structure and occupational mobility. One reason is that a plausible argument can be made against using conventional occupational classifications (usually based on gradients of skill or status) for operationalizing Marxist class concepts based on differentials in capital ownership and power. They are fundamentally incompatible. Discussions of this subject are available in Larry J. Griffin and Arne Kalleberg, 'Stratification and Meritocracy in the United States: class and occupational recruitment patterns', *British Journal of Sociology*, no. 32, 1981, pp. 1–38; and Erik Olin Wright, Cynthia Costello, David Hachen, and Joey Sprague, 'The American Class Structure', *American Sociological Review*, no. 47, 1982, pp. 709–26.

3. Max Weber, 'Status Groups and Classes', in Roth and Wittich, *Economy and Society*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1978, p. 302.

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5. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, New York, Harper, 1927.

6. Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*, New York, Harper & Row, 1973.

7. Ibid., p. 100.

8. Ibid., p. 103, italics in original.

9. Ibid., p. 105.

10. Ibid., p. 107, emphasis in original.

11. Sorokin, op. cit., p. 107.

12. Ibid., p. 108.

13. Gagliani, op. cit.

14. Frank Parkin, *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1979.

15. Ibid., p. 44.

16. Ibid., p. 45.

17. Without question, these organizations also serve more benign purposes such as upholding worker's rights and benefits, and protecting the public from charlatans and incompetents. These aims are their manifest goals. However, as this argument suggests, they serve other, more latent purposes as well.

18. Ibid., p. 45.

19. Giddens, op. cit., p. 110.

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22. K. I. McDonald, 'MDSCAL and Distances Between Socioeconomic Groups', in Keith Hope (ed.), *The Analysis of Social Mobility: Methods and Approaches*, London, Clarendon, 1972, pp. 211–34.

23. Reeve Vanneman, 'The Occupational Composition of American Classes: results from cluster analysis', *American Journal of Sociology*, no. 87, 1977, pp. 783–807.

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29. Thomas Pullum, *Measuring Occupational Inheritance*, New York, Elsevier, 1977, emphasis added.

30. Hauser, 1978, op. cit.; Hauser, 1979, op. cit.; Featherman and Hauser, op. cit., ch. 4.; Goldthorpe, op. cit.

31. Hauser, 1979, op. cit.

32. James Lingoes, 'A General Survey of the Guttman-Lingoes Nonmetric Program Series', in Shepard, Romney and Nerlove (eds), *Multidimensional Scaling: Theory and Applications in the Behavioral Sciences, Volume I*, New York, Seminar Press, 1972, pp. 52–68.

33. Ibid.

34. Featherman and Hauser, op. cit.

35. The most regrettable feature of this sample is that data for women are available only for the spouses of respondents. The occupational origins of these women are also unavailable so it is impossible to use the OCG-II data to analyze female career mobility. For this reason, a parallel analysis women's mobility could not be done. Comparable alternative data sources which equal the size, coverage, and quality of the OCG-II survey do not exist for women. Subsequent findings apply only to the US adult male labor force and in all probability, the structure of women's career mobility is substantially different.

36. In an unreported analysis, the model of quasi-symmetry fits Table I with 202.12 L^2 and 120 df, see C. Matthew Snipp, 'The Structure of Mobility', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1981, pp. 120–201.

37. B. S. Everitt and G. Dunn, *Advanced Methods of Data Exploration and Modelling*, London, Heinemann, 1983, p. 64.

38. McDonald, op. cit., pp. 211–34.

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41. Capitalists very likely experience similar competitive pressures when bidding for labor.

Jonathan Kelley and Ian McAllister

Class and party in Australia: comparison with Britain and the USA*

ABSTRACT

One of the most familiar theories about politics in Australia, as in Britain, is that the political parties are divided fundamentally on class lines. But the strength and nature of the link between class and party remains both controversial and unclear. This paper brings new evidence to bear by applying powerful multivariate techniques to national sample survey data from Australia, Britain and the USA. We distinguish three separate aspects of class: the *categorical* distinction between blue- and white-collar workers which informs the standard definition of class in political science; an *occupational status* aspect which ranks jobs on a continuum running from low to high; and *conflict* aspects, based on 'ownership of the means of production', on the 'exercise of authority in the workplace', and the cleavage between public and private employees. We show, first, that these quite distinct aspects of class have different effects. In Australia occupational status has important effects on income and class self-image but is politically irrelevant. The much maligned blue-collar/white-collar distinction is, indeed, financially irrelevant but, none the less, has appreciable effects on class self-image and political preferences, while the conflict aspects have modest but clear effects on income, class self-image and politics. Whether or not an individual is a public employee is consistently important in all three countries. Second, the impact of class on party is relatively modest, albeit cler. Finally, these patterns are quite similar in Australia, Britain and the USA.

1 INTRODUCTION

One of the most familiar models of electoral behaviour posits a party system sustaining two parties divided on class lines, with the control of government regularly alternating between them. This model has had considerable currency in Australia for many years.[1] For example,

in 1914 Lord Bryce concluded that Australia was an example of what happened to a nation's politics 'when party coincides with class'.[2] Half a century later Alford argued that 'Australia's politics have been dominated by class cleavages before and since its foundation as a nation in 1901', while Encel claimed that 'the correspondence between class identity and voting is so close . . . that the two may be regarded as largely alternative measures of the same general outlook'.[3] By contrast, others have challenged the accuracy of the class model for Australia. Aitkin has shown that the relationship between social class and party preference is hardly as close as has been claimed: 'Australian politics is the politics of parties, not of classes.'[4] And an important argument by Kemp suggests that the class basis of politics has been slowly eroded: embourgeoisement and the decline of class consciousness among manual workers have weakened the class-party link.[5]

The nature of class and the links between class and party in Australia thus remain unclear and controversial. The purpose of this paper is to clarify it. We present a new and more differentiated conception of class and apply it to large, representative national surveys using powerful multivariate techniques. Class is not a simple concept but a broad label, indiscriminately applied to concepts with diverse meanings, varied intellectual origins, and different empirical referents — as Hughes and others have observed.[6] There are three main traditions of empirical research.

Categorical Aspects of Class The predominant treatment in the 1950s defined class in terms of a few simple occupational categories: white-collar, blue-collar, and farm (often identified by different names).[7] The white-collar workers typically hold non-manual, middle-class jobs in the professions, management, administration, sales, and clerical work. Blue-collar workers are those in largely manual, working-class jobs in production and service occupations. The remainder are farmers and farm laborers, an historically important but often fragmented and now shrinking class with distinctive concerns somewhat apart from the fundamental white-collar/blue-collar conflict. Although much maligned in modern sociology and quite ignored in the now dominant Blau-Duncan paradigm of stratification research[8] this tri-partite *categorical distinction* is still the dominant conception of class in political science. We will show that sociologists have abandoned it too quickly.

Status In the last decades the categorical view of class has been superceded in sociology by a more comprehensive and differentiated view associated with the seminal work of Blau and Duncan.[9] This tradition posits a 'socio-economic' or 'status' continuum which ranks individuals from low to high with no clear discontinuities.[10] This does

not measure class in the categorical sense; rather, distinctions between white-collar, blue-collar, and farm occupations are ignored. Moreover, although blue-collar occupations are generally low in status and white-collar jobs high, the two groups overlap; many skilled blue-collar occupations are higher in status than routine clerical and sales jobs. There is strong evidence that this ranking of occupations is much the same in all modern and many historical societies — with the partial exception of socialist societies[11] — and that an individual's occupational status is the crucial determinant of his or her social position.[12] In this tradition occupations are regarded as only one of several distinct aspects of class all of which need to be taken into account simultaneously. Crucial among the others are education and income.

Research in the status attainment tradition has rarely concerned itself with politics.[13] When it does, the continuous distribution of status, without sharp boundaries to separate one conflicting class from another, often suggests images of consensus and stability (especially in the eyes of the tradition's critics). Furthermore, people are not simply born into their status in life: social mobility is more the rule than the exception in Anglo-American societies.[14] This turnover is also thought to inhibit political conflict crystalizing along status lines.

But in the last few years the status tradition has been roundly criticized for ignoring the inheritance of property, various ascriptive elements in the class system, and conflict in general.[15] Critics have advocated conceptions of class that stress conflict arising from the hierarchical organization of work: Marx's 'ownership of the means of production' and Dahrendorf's 'exercise of authority in the workplace'. Although Marx and Dahrendorf's class theories have long been subject to theoretical evaluation, only recently has there been a concerted attempt to subject them to systematic empirical analyses.[16] These empirical results suggest that modern industrial societies have not one but two distinguishable class systems: one focusing on status the other on authority and on ownership of the means of production. They are based on different aspects of the organization of work and are only loosely related; while the advantages are passed from one generation to the next mainly within each system rather than between them. But both have substantial effects on income, class self-images, and politics.[17] We will call this the *conflict* view of class.

Conflict Ownership and authority have only recently been included in quantitative analyses and consequently there is a good deal of uncertainty about how they should be measured. One problem concerns whether 'capitalists' should be defined only as those who actually own the means of production (as Marx would have it) or should include those who exercise day-to-day control over them

(which would include managing directors of public companies and the like). There are reasonable arguments for both views and opinion in the field remains divided.[18] But there are very few managing directors even in a large national sample; so for the purposes at hand using either definition leads to the same substantive conclusions.[19] We use the ownership definition because it is the only one for which data are available in all three of the countries we wish to analyse. A second problem is the distinction between large and small capitalists, a distinction we could not make in all three surveys. However, in a national sample there are too few large capitalists to matter much and, in any case, they are little different from small capitalists in their politics or class self-images. Following Dahrendorf, our definition of supervisor is broad, including all those who claim to have a subordinate. Hence bureaucrats and blue-collar foremen, for example, are included along with the directors of large companies.[20] We have elsewhere argued for further distinctions among supervisors and shown that such distinctions have an important impact on earnings.[21] But Dahrendorf rejects these distinctions (personal communication): and, in his defence, it must be said that they are not relevant either to people's class self-images or to their politics.[22] In this paper we have followed Dahrendorf's original definition because of limitations in the data. Note, finally, that our measurement of the conflict aspects of class is deceptively simple. We posit a simple additive model, while analyses in the now ubiquitious 'multiple regression Marxist' tradition typically use much the same underlying information to generate elaborate typologies (usually distinguishing capitalists, workers, managers, the petty bourgeoisie and, perhaps, other intermediate classes). We believe that simplicity is theoretically preferable and have shown for the USA that more elaborate typologies are empirically no more discriminating.[23]

A related aspect of this conflict view of class focuses on state or public employees. The idea that conflict could develop between those who work for the government and those who do not derives from Djilas's observations of eastern European communist states: rather than withering away, as Marx predicted, the state appeared to flourish and generate a new class of political bureaucrats.[24] A parallel development in most western societies has been the growth of the state as an employer, not only directly through the bureaucracy, but indirectly through ownership of large parts of the industrial sector. As a result, it has been argued that traditional conceptions of class conflict are no longer valued and that the political consequences of class conflict increasingly stem from the divisions between public sector employees, on the one hand, and private sector employees on the other.[25]

This chapter extends existing research in several ways. First, we show that the Blau-Duncan tradition's abandonment of the white-

collar/blue-collar/farm categorization of class was a grave error. It should be included (together with the newer status and conflict aspects) since it strongly influences people's own subjective images of their class position and their party preferences, net of other aspects of class. Second, we provide closely comparable results for three Anglo-American democracies, Australia, Great Britain and the USA. Finally, the analysis provides systematic evidence on the influence of authority and ownership of the means of production on earnings, class identification, and partisanship in Australia.[26] The data and methods used in our analysis are described in the appendix.

2. CATEGORICAL AND STATUS ASPECTS OF CLASS IN AUSTRALIA

We begin with a description of the Australian class structure, showing the kind of job Australians do, the education they have, and the income they earn. Then we go on to analyse partisanship among the different classes.

Distribution In its categorical and status aspects the Australian class structure is similar to other modern industrial societies.[27] White-collar jobs account for just under half the total: slightly higher than the international average (Table I). High ranking professional occupations are the largest single group among them, comprising 14 per cent of the total labour force, twice the normal figure for industrial societies. Higher ranking clerical and sales jobs are next in size, each with about 10 per cent of the labour force, which is again about twice the comparable international figure. Administrative and managerial jobs are only 5 per cent of the labour force: equal to the international average. Lower ranking professional and technical jobs are about as numerous. Lower ranking clerical and sales jobs, the most routine types of work in the white-collar labour force, make up an even smaller fraction; they are less numerous in Australia than elsewhere. In sum, the composition of the Australian white-collar class is much like that found in other industrial societies, except for having more high ranking professional, clerical and sales occupations.

Similarly, the Australian blue-collar class is typical of that found in other industrial societies. Ordinary blue-collar production workers make up a quarter of the labour force. Skilled production workers — mostly highly skilled craftsmen, machinists, and the rest of the working-class elite — are about half as numerous. Unskilled production workers are few, about one worker in twenty, and service occupations are even fewer. All of these figures are virtually identical to the international average. Finally, farmers represent about 5 per cent of the labour force: well below the international figure.

TABLE I *The Australian class structure: categorical and status aspects*[a]

Status	Occupational group	Examples of titles included	Percent of labor force: Australia (1)	Percent of labor force: Nine nations (2)	Education (mean): Australia (3)	Education (mean): Nine nations (4)	Income (ratio)[b]: Australia (5)	Income (ratio)[b]: Nine nations (6)
White-collar								
100.	High professional	Lawyer, scientist, clergy, engineer	14	7	14	15	1.7	1.9
75.	Administrative and managerial	Government leader, business executive, politician	4	5	12	11	1.6	1.8
70.	Low professional	Nurse, technician, primary school teacher, artist	6	7	12	11	1.3	1.5
60.	High clerical	Civil servant, secretary, office clerk, bank teller	12	5	12	11	1.2	1.2
51.	High sales	Retail or wholesale proprietor, insurance agent, salesman	10	5	11	10	1.5	1.4
38.	Low clerical	Cashier, telephone operator, file clerk	1	4	9	10	0.8	1.1
32.	Low sales	Sales clerk, street vendor, routeman	3	2	11	10	1.2	1.1
	(Sub-total)[c]		(47)	(36)	(12)	(11)	(1.4)	(1.5)

Blue-collar							
37. High production	Master craftsman, foreman, machinist, jeweller	12	16	10	9	1.1	1.1
33. High service	Restaurant proprietor, cook, hairdresser, undertaker, policeman	4	3	10	10	0.9	1.2
24. Medium production	Plumber, carpenter, factory worker, motor vehicle driver	21	23	10	8	1.0[d]	1.0
18. Low service	Janitor, waiter, bartender, bellboy	3	2	10	9	0.7	0.7
14. Low production	Unskilled worker, longshoreman, garbage collector	5	7	9	8	1.0	0.5
(Sub-total)[c]		(48)	(51)	(10)	(8)	(1.0)	(0.9)
Farm							
10. Large and medium farm	Farm owner, farm manager, farm foreman	3	11	9	8	1.3	0.8
0. Farm laborers	Farm labourer, tractor driver, logger, fisherman	1	2	10	8	0.6	0.6
(Sub-total)[c]		(5)	(13)	(9)	(8)	(1.0)	(0.8)

[a] Figures for the male civilian labor force, aged 21–64 For Australia, N = 2016. The nine nations are Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Britain, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the USA (Note that the Australian figures are, for the sake of comparability, for all males rather than (as in most other tables) for heads of household)

[b] Income divided by the average income of middle production workers.

[c] Weighted average for cols. 3 to 6.

[d] Equals $9,313.

Education and Income White-collar workers average about 12 years of schooling in Australia, slightly more than in other industrial societies (Table I, columns 3 and 4). Higher professionals have more than the average, roughly the equivalent of two years of university, while clerical workers have several years less. Of course, blue-collar workers usually have less education than white-collar workers, but their average (10 years of education) is still two years more than blue-collar workers elsewhere in the world. There is little variation in education among blue-collar workers, save for the slightly lower levels among unskilled production workers at the very bottom of the hierarchy. Farmers, as elsewhere in the industrial world, have only a little less education than blue-collar workers. In sum, the only noticeable difference between the Australian pattern and that of other industrial countries is that the educational level of blue-collar workers is several years higher in Australia and, hence, the educational gap between blue- and white-collar workers is rather less.

White-collar workers in Australia earn about 40 per cent more than blue-collar workers: an advantage 10 per cent less than the international average (columns 5 and 6).[28] Higher professionals and administrators in Australia earn 60 or 70 per cent more than middle production workers (whose earnings are used as a benchmark) while their counterparts in other industrial societies earn 80 or 90 per cent more. Other white-collar groups earn rather less, especially those in low ranking clerical and sales jobs. Income differences among blue-collar workers are modest, with skilled production workers earning some 10 per cent more than ordinary production workers, while service workers earn less. Farm owners and managers earn 30 per cent more than ordinary production workers, which is noticeably better than most of their counterparts elsewhere in the industrialised world. Farm workers are at the bottom of the hierarchy, earning noticeably less than blue-collar workers.

Status Occupational status is central to the status conception of class, but its theoretical meaning is uncertain — not so much a matter of debate as of somewhat embarrassed silence. We know it when we see it, we have a fair idea of how to measure it, but precisely what it is we are not quite sure.[29] It has to do with prestige, income, education, and the socio-economic success of one's children; that much is agreed. But the jobs that have high prestige, income, and so on, are also distinctive in many other ways. They involve more complex and intellectually demanding work, more job-specific training and provide more power and autonomy. This theoretical complication means, however, that ranking occupations on any one of these criteria is likely to produce much the same practical results as on others.

For the USA, Duncan's SES scores probably provide the best measure of status.[30] They reflect the education typically required of

people in an occupation and the income and prestige they receive from it. But these scores are unique to the US census occupational classification and are not suitable for other countries. We therefore use an alternative procedure that assigns status scores to the 14 groups used by Klatzky and Hodge in the USA and Duncan-Jones in Australia; details are given in the appendix.[31] For the USA this procedure gives results similar to Duncan's. The status hierarchy measured in this way is much the same throughout the world — the average correlation between status hierarchies in 16 diverse societies is .85 — and we therefore use the average of the results for these 16 societies as our measure of status. The scores are shown in the left hand margin of Table I.

The status hierarchy closely follows the education and income hierarchies in Australia and elsewhere.[32] The main difference between the Australian hierarchy (which is not shown in the table) and the worldwide hierarchy (which is shown) is that farmers have a noticeably higher status in Australia, reflecting their substantial income and ability to secure good jobs for their children. In spite of this difference the worldwide scores are used here in the interests of comparability with Britain and the USA; in practice this makes no appreciable difference to the results, because farmers are so few in the population as a whole.

Class and Party In Australia, the key political division is between the Labor Party, on the one hand, and the Liberal and National Parties, on the other.[33] Labor is broadly similar to the British Labour Party. The Liberals are ideologically conservative and in national politics have for decades governed in coalition with the National Party (a conservative sectional party which previously, and more revealingly, called itself the Country Party, subsequently the National Country Party). In our analysis we accordingly combine Liberal and National supporters, which greatly simplifies the presentation with little loss of nuance. The politically salient class cleavage is between blue-collar production workers on the one hand, 60 or 70 per cent of whom support Labor, and administrators and farm owners on the other, 70 or 80 per cent of whom support the Liberal-National coalition (Figure I). There are many status groups with divided loyalties. Service workers, although blue-collar and low in status, are not especially sympathetic to Labor. Only 55 per cent of lower ranking service workers favour Labor and higher ranking service workers are mostly opposed, albeit by a narrow margin.[34] On the other hand, higher clerical workers and lower professionals, although white-collar and well above average in status, are evenly split. Even higher professionals, clearly white-collar and at the top of the status hierarchy, are almost evenly divided. Higher ranking sales workers give nearly 60 per cent of their support to the Liberal-National Coalition, while low sales

workers give only a little less. The traditional conflicts between farm owners and farm workers do not lead to sharp political differences; the majority of farm workers identify with the Liberal-National Coalition as do farm owners.

These differences are not all due to class *per se*. There are differences between classes in ethnicity, religion, age, sex, and (crucially) parents' political preference which exaggerate the apparent influence



FIGURE 1: *Per cent of each class voting Liberal-National Coalition (solid dot) and per cent adjusted by regression for differences in ethnicity, religion, sex, age and parents' political preferences (open dots). Australia, 1979; men and women combined. Figures in parentheses based on fewer than 50 cases; capital letters indicate blue-collar class.*

of class in simple comparisons of the sort just made. These confounding factors can be adjusted using regression techniques, deriving the predicted vote of each class on the assumption that they are average in all other characteristics.[35] The results of these adjustments are shown in Figure I by the open circles. The true class differences are evidently rather smaller than they would seem from the unadjusted figures. Production workers are rather less likely to support Labor (by 3 or 4 per cent) while administrators, farmers, and higher sales workers are more likely (by roughly the same margin). After these adjustments, many classes are left evenly divided between Labor and the Liberal-National Coalition. Toward the bottom of the status hierarchy, service workers are evenly split while at the top professionals and higher clerical workers are also evenly split. Whatever conflict is being fought out in the political arena among those groups, it is not a class conflict.

But other aspects of class than these also provide a link to party. Two of them are central to the status conception of class: education (or human capital) and income.[36] To introduce them into the analysis in a clear and statistically reliable manner, we will shift from the fine grained analysis of Figure I to the more parsimonious regression representation shown in Figure II. This treats the categorical aspects of class as separate dummy variables for white-collar and farm occupations.[37] The status aspects are captured by continuous measures of occupational status, education, and income. Details on measurement are given in the Appendix. The path analysis is estimated in the usual way and the results shown (not quite in the usual way) in Figure II.[38]

This analysis provides useful information on how various aspects of the class system are related. Education has, as is well known, a major influence on occupational status, each year of education providing an increase of 5 status points (out of 100). So, for example, a college graduate with 16 years of education could be expected to have an occupation 40 points higher than someone with only 8 years of primary schooling (viz, $[16 - 8] \times 5 = 40$). Those with more education are also more likely to become white-collar workers, each year of education increasing the chance of becoming a white-collar worker by 7 per cent. Family income in turn reflects both education and the head of household's occupational status (and whether the spouse works). Each year of education, other things (including occupational status) being equal, increases income by 4 per cent. But the main influence is occupational status: those at the top of the status hierarchy get incomes 61 per cent higher than those at the bottom. But, interestingly, the categorical aspects of class have no appreciable influence on income once the status aspects are taken into account: white-collar workers earn no more than would be expected on the basis of their moderate status. In short, education and occupational



FIGURE II: *Categorical and status aspects of class. Metric partial regression coefficients (standardised regression coefficients in parentheses) for men and women, aged 18 and over. Only statistically significant paths are shown. See Appendix for details.*

[a] multiplied by ln(2) to reflect the effect of doubling of income

status are the central aspects of class in determining who is rich and who is poor.

But in politics it is not status but the categorical aspects of class that are central. White-collar workers are, other things being equal, 15 per cent more likely than blue-collar workers to support the Liberal-National Coalition and farmers are some 25 per cent more likely than blue-collar workers to support the Coalition. That 15 per cent difference between white- and blue-collar workers is a compact statement of the degree to which social class determines party preference in Australia. Clearly, so small a difference means that much else besides class is involved.

The other things involved are not, to any substantial degree, those envisioned by the status model. Education is irrelevant. Australian politics is not a conflict between those at the top of the status hierarchy and the unskilled workers at the bottom *except* in so far as status is linked to the categorical distinction between white- and blue-collar workers. Among white-collar workers, high professionals at the very top of the status hierarchy are no more likely to support the Coalition than lower ranking administrative, clerical and sales

workers. Similarly, among blue-collar workers the high status skilled production workers are neither more nor less likely to support the Coalition than low status unskilled workers. Incomes does matter, but not by much. Comparing two people, one with twice the income of the other (but both with similar education and jobs) the richer person is 1 per cent more likely than the poorer to support the Liberal-National Coalition.

If Australian politics is a class conflict, it is on this evidence only a very muted one. The status aspects of class, crucial to the income people earn and to their children's life-chances, are of little relevance to politics. Only the classical categorical distinction between white- and blue-collar work and farming is politically relevant. But it remains possible that none of these are the important aspects of class. Rather, it may be the conflict aspects of class that matter, as Marx and Dahrendorf argued, and it is to these that we now turn.

3 CONFLICT ASPECTS OF CLASS

The Basic Model In the Marxian class model, classes are distinguished using two criteria: ownership of the means of production and purchase of the labour power of others. Marx defines three classes in modern bourgeois society. Capitalists own the means of production and purchase the labour power of others; workers neither own the means of production nor purchase the labour power of others but instead sell their own labour power; and the minor and transitional class of the petty bourgeoisie own the means of production but do not purchase labour power.[39] In Dahrendorf's analysis,[40] which he viewed as an extension of Marx's although it is in fact quite separate, classes are distinguished on the basis of their relations to authority. Members of the command class, supervisors as we shall call them, exercise authority, regardless of whether they are subject to it themselves; i.e. they have subordinates in the workplace; subordinates are subject to the authority of others and exercise none themselves; i.e. someone supervises them at work and they do not supervise anyone,[41] and individuals in the small classless group neither exercise authority nor are subject to it; i.e. they work on their own.[42] For Dahrendorf, as for Marx, class relations inherently involve conflicting interests, supervisors having an interest in maintaining the authority structure and the subordinates having an interest in overthrowing it. However interests may be only latent or they may be manifest, in which latter case class members may mobilize around them.[43]

Note that Dahrendorf's concept of class is quite different from Marx's. Marx's model stresses the *control* dimension of hierarchical position in the workplace while Dahrendorf's emphasizes the *authority* dimension. Marx's distinction between capitalists and workers is lost

within Dahrendorf's supervisory class; similarly Dahrendorf's distinction between supervision and obedience is lost within Marx's worker class.

Government workers are defined as those who are employed, either directly or indirectly, by the government. Although the power of this 'governing class' is most evident in the communist states of eastern Europe, the growth of the state sector through welfare capitalism in the years after the Second World War has meant that in Australia, too, large proportions of the workforce are employed by the government.

In practice, capitalists are found throughout the occupational structure. Some 10 per cent of white-collar workers are capitalists but the proportion among blue-collar workers, 8 per cent, is not much lower. The largest proportion is among farmers, 40 per cent of whom own their own farms and hire help. Aside from that, the largest concentration is in the administrative and managerial class and among the higher sales occupations (which include small shop owners), 19 per cent of whom are capitalists. But just under 10 per cent of professionals and lower sales workers are also capitalists. Only in clerical occupations are capitalists virtually absent. In the blue-collar ranks, capitalists are most common among higher service and ordinary production occupations, but rarer among both the skilled and unskilled production workers. It is striking that so many blue-collar and modest white-collar workers are capitalists; they are mainly skilled craftsmen and salesmen running their own small businesses. Note that in a national survey of this sort, the capitalists are almost all small businessmen (and might be called 'entrepreneurs') not industrial magnates. However important magnates are in other ways (such as finance), they are too few for their votes to bulk large in electoral politics or for their numbers to be large in representative surveys.

The petty bourgeoisie, those who are self-employed but without workers, are also found throughout the occupational structure. Some 7 per cent of white-collar workers and 49 per cent of farmers. Aside from farmers, they are most numerous (21 per cent) among higher sales workers, most of whom are small shopkeepers and proprietors. Among blue-collar occupations, the petty bourgeoisie are concentrated in the high and medium production categories, in occupations such as carpentry, plumbing, and maintenance.

Supervisors are the most numerous 'conflict group'. More than half of the white-collar class are supervisors but so are over a third of blue-collar workers and half the farming category.[44] Within the white-collar class, supervisors are most common in the administrative class, slightly less so among higher ranking professionals, relatively rare among higher ranking clerical and sales workers, and least likely to be found among lower professionals. But even there over 47 per cent are supervisors. In the blue-collar class, supervisors are most common

TABLE II *Conflict aspects of the Australian class structure: capitalist, petty bourgeoisie, supervisors and government employees*

Status	Occupational group (per cent of all heads of household in the group shown in parenthesis)	Per cent capitalist (1)	Per cent petty bourgeoisie (2)	Per cent supervisors (3)	Per cent government employees (4)
White-collar					
100.	High professional (14%)	9	5	65	45
75.	Administrative & managerial (4%)	19	5	73	10
70.	Low professional (6%)	7	4	47	59
60.	High clerical (12%)	1	0	55	52
51	High sales (10%)	19	21	53	3
38.	Low clerical (1%)	c	c	c	c
32.	Low sales (3%)	8	8	51	4
	(Sub-total)[b]	(10)	(57)	(7)	(35)
Blue-collar					
37.	High production (12%)	5	10	34	2
33.	High service (4%)	15	5	53	36
24.	Medium production (21%)	10	16	35	20
18.	Low service (3%)	4	4	23	21
14.	Low production (5%)	0	6	26	33
	(Sub-total)[b]	(8)	(11)	(34)	(24)
Farm					
10.	Large and medium farm (3%)	40	49	60	2
0	Farm labourers (1%)	9	0	35	18
	(Sub-total)[b]	(29)	(32)	(51)	(18)
	Total[a] (N = 2016)	10%	10%	47%	29%

[a] Heads of household, except for supervisors which refers to respondent. Men and women
[b] Weighted average.
[c] Too few cases (20 or fewer) for reliable estimates.

among higher service occupations, followed by skilled and unskilled production, and finally by lower ranking service and production occupations. Even here, in the least skilled part of the blue-collar class, one worker in four is a supervisor.

Government employees represent almost one in three of the Australian workforce. Contrary to the stereotype that government workers are predominantly white-collar, sizeable numbers are also found in manual occupations, particularly in unskilled production, where one in three are government employees. Among white-collar workers, there is a clear distinction between higher and lower ranking professionals and higher clerical workers, where anything from 43 to 59 per cent are employed by the government, and administrative and managerial workers, higher and lower ranking sales workers, where they are rare. Even among farm labourers, around one in every five are employed by the government.

Economic Consequences Neither Marx nor Dahrendorf offers an explicit

theory of the relation between class and income, a matter tangential to their primary concern with delineating the structural bases for political organization and mobilization. Marx insists that classes must not be equated with income groupings; they are not defined by either the 'source of revenue' or the 'size of purses'.[45] Yet the exchange relationship between the capitalist and worker is inherently unequal and Marx expects the capitalist's profit generally to exceed the worker's wages in bourgeois society.[46] Dahrendorf also views classes as 'not based on the level or source of income' and, although he expects that class and income are highly correlated, is quite ambivalent about the existence of a causal connection between them.[47] Thus, neither Marx nor Dahrendorf is particularly informative in analysing the class bases of income inequality.

As we have seen, being a capitalist has little to do with occupational status. The results in Figure III show that, similarly, it has little to do with education. The poorly educated are about as likely as their highly educated brethren to own the means of production. Being well educated does, however, make it easier to become a supervisor. Each year in school increases the chance by about 3 per cent. Similarly, each year of education increases the likelihood of being a government employee by 2 per cent. But except for this, the conflict and status aspects of class are essentially separate. Where they come together is in their consequences for income: and capitalists have higher incomes than workers (Figure III). Other things being equal, they get some 28 per cent more than workers, a substantial figure.[48] Supervisors also earn about 11 per cent more than subordinates, other things being equal, which is similar to the 10 per cent gain in earnings enjoyed by government employees.

So in all, the conflict aspects of class stressed by Marx and Dahrendorf and the idea of a governing class have a great deal to say about who is rich and who is poor. But what they say is essentially an addition to, not a modification of, what status has to say about the same topic. This is because being a capitalist or a supervisor or a government employee has little to do with education or occupational status, and vice versa. Hence the financial consequences of education and occupational status as estimated in Figure III, taking the conflict aspects of class into account, are essentially identical to those of Figure II which ignored the conflict aspects of class. So there are two quite separate sources of income, stemming from two quite separate aspects of the class system.

Which of these is a more important influence on income and income inequality is another matter. The metric regression coefficients in Figure III can not be compared directly. In the first place, the units are often different (e.g. 0 or 1 on the capitalist variable but years for education). The answer also depends on how many capitalists there are. If there are many then differences between capitalists and



FIGURE III: *Conflict aspects of class. Metric partial regression coefficients (and standardised coefficients in parentheses) for men and women, aged 18 and over. Only statistically significant paths are shown. See Appendix for details.*

* multiplied by ln(2) to reflect the effect of a doubling of income

workers could say a great deal about income inequality; but if there are very few, then it cannot say much about income inequality, in the society as a whole, no matter how distinctive the few are. What can be compared are standardized regression (or path) coefficients, which in effect convert all variables into standard form (with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1). They show the *relative* importance of different variables, regardless of units and distributions in these terms: the impact of capital on income inequality is only about half that of education or occupational status and somewhat less than education (see, the standardized regression coefficients shown in parentheses in Figure III). Dahrendorf's distinction between a supervisory and an obedient class is, in these relative terms, also about half as important as education and a third as important as occupational status in explaining income inequality. In sum, the conflict aspects of class, while undoubtedly important in explaining income inequality in Australia, are less important than the status aspects. Thus if it is policy to reduce income inequality, reducing the inequality that springs from education and occupational status would, other things being equal, have more of an impact than reducing the inequality that springs from authority and ownership of the means of production.

Political Consequences Marx's arguments that 'every class struggle is a political struggle' and that 'progressive political parties are the advance troops of the revolution' have been so influential that it frequently has been assumed that the political struggle is mainly a struggle between classes.[49] There is, however, hardly any evidence for Marx's theory since virtually no empirical studies use class in his sense. In contrast to Marx, Dahrendorf argues that in 'post capitalist society' there has developed an 'institutionalization of industry' and an 'isolation of industrial conflict' from political conflict with the result that 'the participants of industry, upon leaving the factory gate, . . . leave behind their industrial class interests . . .'[50] He concludes that in most modern societies industrial class membership will have no effect on political attitudes or behaviour. However, he does make an exception for Britain, where he expects a fairly high correlation between class and politics because of the high politicization of the labour movement. Whether or not this qualification should apply to Australia is unclear. More recently, political conflict has been interpreted in terms of consumption cleavages, and the conflict between government employees and those working in the private sector.[51]

Marx's argument gets some support from the Australian data. Capitalists are 21 per cent more likely than workers to support the Liberal-National Coalition, other things being equal (Figure III). This is an appreciable difference, larger than the difference between

white- and blue-collar occupations. But it is far from the yawning gap between capitalists and workers that is prominent in Marxist rhetoric. As an explanation for which party wins and which loses elections, the Marxist aspect of the class struggle is no more important than the categorical aspect because capitalists are few. So the capitalist/worker cleavage, although slightly wider than the white-collar/blue-collar cleavage, affects fewer votes (see the standardized coefficients in parentheses). Government workers are some 7 per cent less likely to support the Coalition, an effect which is comparable to being a farmer. Exercising authority seems to have no political consequences, as Dahrendorf argued, supervisors being no more or less likely than the 'obey' class to support Labor. The petty bourgeoisie are some 10 per cent more likely to support the Coalition; about half as important as being a capitalist.

In all, it seems that all three aspects of the class system are important, but in different ways. The categorical distinction between white-collar and blue-collar workers is politically important but economically irrelevant. Education and occupational status are economically very important but politically irrelevant. The conflict aspects, especially ownership of the means of production, are moderately important both economically and politically. But all three are important in yet another way: in shaping people's images of where they fit in the class system.

Class Self-Images and Party Preference The imprecision of some of Marx's and Dahrendorf's conceptions preclude a strong test of their theories of class consciousness and politics. Nevertheless, we can perform a limited but useful test of the extent to which objective class position leads to a sense of awareness of belonging to a particular class. Education, occupation, and income have long been recognized as important determinants of class self-image and more recent research in both the USA and Britain confirms their importance.[52] None of these studies, however, has examined the effect of objective class position in either Marx's or Dahrendorf's sense. We present the results of such an analysis for Australia in Figure IV.

In practice, almost everyone identifies with the middle or working-class and that provides a rough but adequate measure of people's images of the class to which they belong.[53] The question was: 'Now I would like to talk for a moment about social classes in Australia. First of all, to what class would you say you belong?'. The answers were: upper (fewer than 1 per cent said that); middle (56 per cent); working (26 per cent); lower (4 per cent); other (2 per cent); no class (8 per cent); and don't know (4 per cent). So more than four ordinary Australians out of five voluntarily label themselves are middle or working class, and we took them at their word.

It seems that people's images of their class position are influenced



FIGURE IV: *Subjective aspects of class. Metric partial regression coefficients (and standardized regression coefficients in parentheses) for men and women, aged 18 and over. Only statistically significant paths are shown. See Appendix for details.*

[a] multiplied by ln(2) to reflect the effect of a doubling of income.

by their actual class position in the sense of both Marx and Dahrendorf. Capitalists are 10 per cent more likely than workers to identify with the middle class while the petty bourgeoisie are 14 per cent more likely to think of themselves as middle class. Supervisors are also more likely to identify with the middle class by about 8 per cent. But although real, these differences are far from enormous (as indicated by the quite modest standardized coefficients shown in parentheses): class images have to do with more things than authority and ownership of the means of production. The categorical aspect of class is more important, and people in white-collar jobs are more likely than those in blue-collar jobs to identify with the middle class, by a margin of 20 per cent. This is a substantial but far from dramatic effect. The status aspects of class are also relevant. Occupational status is important, although the difference is hardly enormous (higher professionals at the top of the status hierarchy are 17 per cent more likely to identify with the middle class than are farm workers at the bottom of the status hierarchy). Education is also important; each year of education increases identification with the middle class by two per cent. Income matters only marginally. In sum, a person's image of where he or she fits in the class hierarchy is shaped by *all* aspects of his or her objective class position. The most important single influence is the much maligned categorical distinction between white- and blue-collar work, while status aspects are next in importance and conflict aspects least important.

The images people construct of their class position in turn affect their political views.[54] Those who think of themselves as middle class are 16 per cent more likely than the working class to support the Liberal-National Coalition (Figure IV). This difference is larger than the capitalist/worker cleavage, and so of some appreciable importance. Note that this effect is *net* of the objective aspects of class — ownership of the means of production, white-collar versus blue-collar, education, occupational status and income — and net of ethnicity, religion, parents' party preference, and other control variables which are not shown in our model. It therefore reflects the effect of self-images purged of the confounding influences of other aspects of class, influences which would greatly exaggerate its apparent effect had they not been controlled. Previous estimates did not control for these confounding influences[55] and hence over-estimated the effect of self image.

Self images provide the means through which many of the objective aspects of class exercise an indirect influence on political preference. For example, working in a white-collar occupation tends to increase identification with the middle class and, since anyone who identifies with the middle class tends to support the Coalition, indirectly leads to support for the Coalition. Indeed, a significant fraction of the political effect of working in white-collar jobs comes about this way.

The total effect (Figure III) is 14 per cent when class self-images are not taken into account but is only 11 per cent when they are (Figure IV) and it can be shown that the difference between these, 3 per cent, reflects the indirect influence through self images.[56] So roughly a quarter of the political consequences of working in white-collar jobs comes about indirectly through its effect on the class image you adopt for yourself. Ownership of the means of production also has an indirect effect in this way that accounts for about a third of its effect on party preferences (compare Figures III and IV).

Income also has an indirect effect in this way, more prosperous people being more likely to think of themselves as middle class and therefore less likely to support Labor. This is in addition to the modest direct effect income exerts on party preference. Several other aspects of class have small indirect effects of this sort, effects that are too small to reach statistical significance in the analysis of Figure III. Authority, education, and occupational status all have modest effects on class self images and, hence, must have small indirect effects on party identification.

In a sense, self images sum up the subjective consequences of many aspects of class and it is only through their subjective effects that they influence party preference. This is analogous to the mechanisms Marx and Dahrendorf had in mind with their distinctions between objective class interests and the subjective awareness of these interests (class *an sich* versus *fur sich*). As they argued, it is not only the objective but also the subjective aspects of class that matter politically.

4 A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: BRITAIN AND THE USA

We have seen how class and party are linked in Australia but it is useful to examine these findings in a comparative context. Parallel analyses are reported for two other Anglo-American democracies. Britain and the USA, which are broadly comparable to Australia in history and political institutions. Comparative studies of this sort raise technical difficulties in establishing comparable measurement across societies, particularly in measuring the status aspects of class. For the most part, earlier researchers have ignored issues of measurement but they have paid the price of not being able to tell whether the differences they find reflect true differences between societies or merely differences in method. Fortunately, we are able to draw on methods developed in a larger cross-cultural study and data from closely comparable surveys in the three societies to provide analysis using *exactly* the same measures and methods in each society.[57] The results for Australia in Figure IV can be directly compared to those for Britain and the USA in Figures V(a) and (b) (see Appendix B for details).



FIGURE V(a): *Class and party in Britain. Metric partial regression coefficients (and standardised regression coefficients in parentheses) for men and women, aged 18 and over. Only statistically significant paths are shown. See Appendix for details.*

[a] multiplied by ln(2) to reflect the effect of a doubling of income.



FIGURE V(b): *Class and party in the USA. Metric partial regression coefficients (and standardised regression coefficients in parentheses) for men and women, aged 18 and over. Only statistically significant paths are shown. See Appendix for details.*

[a] multiplied by ln(2) to reflect the effect of a doubling of income.

Income and Class Self-Images In all three societies, both status and the conflict aspects of class have substantial effects on income while the categorical aspect is significant only in Britain. Education and occupational status have very similar effects in Britain and the USA. A year of schooling increases income by 7 per cent in Britain and 8 per cent in the USA while the gain in income for those at the top of the status hierarchy is broadly similar; 43 per cent in the USA and 45 per cent in Britain. By contrast, education matters somewhat less in Australia, while a person's position in the status hierarchy matters substantially more. This suggests that earnings are more tied to the characteristics of the job in Australia, while they are tied more to the characteristics of the worker in Britain and the USA.

Authority brings financial rewards in all three countries, supervisors earning an extra 11 per cent in Australia, a substantial 35 per cent in Britain, and 17 per cent in the USA. Government workers gain nothing in income over other workers in Britain and the USA, but make a modest gain in income of 10 per cent in Australia. Being in the petty bourgeoisie in Australia and the USA brings very similar advantages in income, but, perhaps surprisingly, no significant advantage in Britain. There are, however, technical complications in measuring income in absolute figures, rather than relatively, and these can produce different results.[58] On balance, we are inclined to suspect that the economic position of the capitalist class is rather variable both over time in one country and between countries.

In terms of class self-placement, the pattern is broadly similar across the three countries, albeit with minor variations. Education, income and categorical occupation are consistent predictors in all three countries, though the magnitude of their effects vary somewhat. Contrary to stereotype, the categorical distinction matters most in Australia (20 per cent) and least in Britain (12 per cent). Income, on the other hand, matters most in Britain and least in Australia. Among the conflict aspects of class, exercising authority in the workplace or being a capitalist are, again, not important in the USA but are significant in the other two countries, while being in the petty bourgeoisie helps to shape class image in Australia only, and being a government employee in Britain only. It seems, therefore, that an understanding of class images is not to be found in the political history of the country or the nature of the party system, but in the more basic and enduring features of the class system common to many countries.

Politics Once again, there are great similarities in the way class affects party preference. The status aspects of class are irrelevant in all three countries: occupational status and education have no direct effect on party, save for their small, indirect effect through people's class self-images. The categorical distinction between white- and blue-collar workers is important in all three countries, being more

important in Australia (11 per cent) and Britain (13 per cent) than the USA (6 per cent), which endorses Alford's conclusion that of all the Anglo-American democracies, class should be least important in the USA.[59] Farmers are important only in Australia, where they have historically sought their own political representation through the Country Party, renamed the National Party in 1983.[60]

Among the conflict aspects of class, being a government employee has a remarkably consistent effect in all three countries: in Australia and the USA, a government employee is 7 per cent less likely to vote for the conservative party, compared to 8 per cent in Britain. Clearly, then, government employees perceive their self-interest to rest in the parties of the left, traditionally those which have sustained high government growth since 1945. Being a member of the petty bourgeoisie also has political consequences in all three countries, ranging from 13 per cent in Britain to 7 per cent in the USA. Contrary to expectations, there are no consequences to being a capitalist in the USA, but substantial effects in the other two countries, particularly Australia, where a capitalist is some 19 per cent more likely to support the Liberal-National Coalition, net of other things. Finally, being a supervisor has no effect on party preference in any of the three countries.

In sum, the conflict aspects of class are most salient in Australia and Britain (albeit in different ways) and least salient in the USA. In this important sense, there is more class conflict in the political arenas of the two countries than there is in the USA. This is also true in another way as well. Class image has a strong effect on partisanship in Britain, the middle class being 12 per cent more likely to support the Conservatives, and it is also important in Australia. However, in the USA, its impact is relatively small: persons with middle class images are only 5 per cent more likely to support the Republicans than others.

The explanation for the variations might be found in the differences of the political systems of the three countries. As Sartori has argued, parties do not merely reflect social cleavages but are able to manipulate the political environment to their own best advantage.[61] The strong historical and financial links between the trade unions and the two labour parties, and the established rhetoric of class conflict, may well have made these aspects of class politically salient in Australia and Britain. But in the USA the Democratic party has fewer links to unions and rarely employs the rhetoric of conflict, so these aspects of class are not so salient. If this interpretation is plausible, then conflict and rhetoric must turn on questions of capital and authority, and not on white collar versus blue collar, since that distinction is equally important in the USA. It is in the more conflictual aspects of class, and in the personal images of class held by electors, that the difference lies.

The Relative Importance of Class So far we have seen the relative importance of various aspects of class measured against one another; we have not shown the relative importance of all of these aspects of class combined against the other major determinants of party preference. To do this, a sheaf variable is calculated, which combines all aspects of class, weighting each according to its political importance. In effect, a person's score on this is their 'average' class position, where their position on each aspect of class is weighted according to its political implications. The effect of this variable on party preference, for the three countries, is shown in Table III. Examining the standardized coefficients (columns 1 to 3), we see that the combined effect on all aspects of class is substantial, with a sheaf coefficient of .29 in Australia, .26 in Britain, and .12 in the USA. This controls for a wide variety of causally prior variables, including age, sex, region, ethnicity, and parent's political preferences.

We can put this more concretely by comparing those at the bottom and the top of the class hierarchy. To do this, respondents are ranked according to the sheaf variable, which arrays them from those in class positions least disposed to support the conservatives to those most disposed to support the conservatives. We then take the median person in the lowest fifth of the class distribution as representing the bottom, and the median for the highest fifth as representing the top and compare their party preferences, controlling for everything else. For Australia, those at the top are 34 per cent more likely than those at the bottom to support the conservatives — the class cleavage, measured in this way, is 34 per cent. The figure for Britain is virtually identical, 33 per cent. These are substantial differences. But for the USA, class matters much less, the gap being 13 per cent.

We can put this in perspective by comparing it with the effect of parents' party, known to be one of the most important political

TABLE III *The relative importance of class, parents' party preference, and political attitudes: sheaf coefficients for Australia, Britain and the USA*[a]

	Standardized sheaf coefficients			Metric sheaf coefficients		
	Australia	Britain	USA	Australia	Britain	USA
Class (all aspects)	.29	.26	12	34	33	.13
Parents' party identification	.37	.43	.47	45	50	.56
Political attitudes	46	.44	.29	56	52	.32
Per cent of variance explained by all variables combined	42%	43%	35%	—	—	—

[a] Men and women, aged 18 and over; class variables refer to head of household. The figures are total effects, assuming that parents' party and the control variables are causally prior, followed by class, then political attitudes. See Appendix for details

influences.[62] This is done in line 2 of Table III. In Australia, parents' party has a standardized effect of .37. Or more precisely, people born into families where both parents support one of the conservative parties are 45 per cent more likely to support the conservatives themselves, compared to people born into families where both parents support the Labor Party. So class is only some two-thirds to three-quarters as important as parent's party, (depending on whether we compare standardized or metric effects). Britain is, once again, similar, the difference being 50 per cent, which leaves class about two-thirds as important as parents' party. Parents' party in the USA is, if anything, more important than in Australia or Britain, the gap between Republican and Democratic families being 56 per cent; class is less than a quarter as important. So in the USA, class is not only unimportant absolutely, but also relatively.

Further perspective is provided by comparing class to ideology. To do this we have combined a variety of political attitudes into a single sheaf variable.[63] It turns out that political attitudes are more important than class in all three countries. In standardized terms (columns 1 to 3), class is only 60 per cent as important as ideology in Australia and Britain, and 40 per cent as important in the USA. Even in the USA, attitudes are still important in absolute terms, although not so important as in Australia or Britain. This is an important point, for it implies that American politics is not devoid of issues in general, but devoid specifically of issues involving class.

It is useful to put the comparison between class and attitudes concretely (columns 4 to 6). As we have seen, in Australia people at the top of the class hierarchy are 34 per cent more likely than people at the bottom to support the conservatives. We can make the same calculation for attitudes comparing people at the most conservative extreme on attitudes with people in the least conservative extreme. The most ideologically conservative are, it turns out, 56 per cent more likely to support conservative parties. So in absolute terms, the class cleavage is much less important than the attitudinal one. In Britain, the figures are quite similar, 33 per cent for class compared to 52 per cent for attitudes. The attitudinal cleavage in the USA is in fact reasonably large, with a 32 per cent difference between the most and least conservative, while the class cleavage in the USA, 13 per cent, pales by comparison.

5 CONCLUSION

There are at least three distinct aspects to social class: a *categorical* difference between blue- and white-collar work and farmers; *status* distinctions based on education and occupational rank; and *conflict*

aspects based on authority, ownership of the means of production and government employment. Recent survey data from Australia, Britain, and the USA show that all three aspects are important but in different ways.

The income people earn depends largely on education and occupational status and only secondarily on the conflict aspects of class. The categorical distinction between white-collar and blue-collar workers does not matter at all. In this Australia is broadly similar to Britain and the USA, although by no means identical. In Australia, occupational status offers larger rewards than in Britain or the USA. In Britain, education offers the same return as in the USA, but British supervisors receive substantially more than their counterparts in Australia or the USA. Perhaps the most striking difference is that in Britain — unlike the USA and Australia — capitalists earn no more than workers.

Australians' self-images of their positions in the class system are mainly shaped by the categorical aspects of class, with white-collar workers much more likely than blue-collar workers to view themselves as middle class. Status is of secondary importance, with the well educated and those in higher status jobs a little more likely to think of themselves as middle class. People seem only rarely to think of class in Marxist terms, with capitalists and supervisors only a little more likely than workers to identify with the middle class. The factors shaping people's subjective images of class seem remarkably similar in all three countries, although the white-collar/blue-collar distinction is less important in Britain.

The links between class and politics are broadly similar in all three countries. The categorical aspects of class are important with white-collar workers 6 to 13 per cent more likely to support the Conservative party once other aspects of class and family background were taken into account. The status aspects of class were not important politically, with well educated, high status workers with high incomes little different from the poor in their partisan preferences. The only effect of status was small and indirect: high status workers in Australia and Britain were more likely to identify with the middle class and therefore support the conservative party. By contrast the conflict aspects of class were extremely important, especially ownership of the means of production and government employment. In all three countries, the petty bourgeosie were somewhat more likely than workers to support the conservative party. Class self-image was also important, with people who identified with the middle class more likely to support conservative parties. The key difference among the three countries is that class is more closely linked to politics in Australia and Britain than in the USA. But in all, it is the relative weakness of the links between class and party in all three countries that is most striking as was shown when class was compared to

parents' party preference and political attitudes in the ability to determine the party preference.

Since social classes in Australia are broadly similar to those found in the USA and Britain, it seems probable that their major features are typical of industrial societies generally. It is not Australia's recent settlement, the frontier tradition, the lack of an hereditary aristocracy, the export oriented economy, the relatively equalitarian distribution of income, the strong unions, or the policies of her government that explain social class in Australia: much the same pattern emerges from very different circumstances in Britain and the USA. The causes must lie instead in basic features common to many societies, perhaps in the imperatives of industrial organization and democratic politics. And if the causes lie so deep, it is unlikely that they can be readily altered by government policy. Changes in educational policy, in taxes or pensions, in the regulation of business, and the like, may be central to party politics but they are tools too feeble to change the basic features of social class.

But there are none the less differences in degree between Australia and other societies and these may reflect things unique to Australia. The strong link between occupational status and income in Australia compared to the USA, for example, may reflect the strong policy of equal pay for equivalent work enforced by the arbitration system and Australia's strong unions. Similarly, the stronger link between class and politics in Australia and Britain in comparison to the USA may reflect the two labour parties' explicit emphasis on class and class conflict. And it is precisely in these areas where change may be easiest. Abandonment of the arbitration system, for example, might lead to greater differences in pay for the same job and hence a weaker link between status and income. Or, if the Labor Party continues its gradual de-emphasis of class issues, Australian politics may diverge from the British pattern toward the American.

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APPENDIX

DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND METHODS

Data They are from the 1979 Australian National Political Attitudes Survey (N=2, 106),[64] the 1979 British Election Study (N=1, 893),[65] and the 1980 United States Presidential Election Study (N=1, 614).

TABLE IV *Variables, Scoring and Means*

Variables	Scoring	Means Australia	Britain	USA
Status aspects of class				
Head of household education	Years	11.1	10.5	12.4
Occupational status	From a low of 0 to a high of 100	47.8	40.8	45.9
Annual family income	1,000s (natural logarithm)	9.3	8.1	9.8
Categorical aspects of class				
Head of household white-collar worker	1 = yes, 0 = no	.51	.38	.46
Head of household farmer	1 = yes, 0 = no	.04	.04	.05
Conflict aspects of class				
Head of household capitalist	1 = yes, 0 = no	.10	.05	.07
Head of household petty bourgeoisie	1 = yes, 0 = no	.10	.06	.10
Head of household supervisor[a]	1 = yes, 0 = no	.47	.37	.43
Head of household government employee	1 = yes, 0 = no	.29	.31	.13
Class Placement				
Middle class self-image	1 = yes, 0 = no	.58	.34	.47
Party preference				
Party identification	(Australia) 1 = Liberal-National, .5 = Australian Democrat; 0 = Labor	.49	n.a.	n.a.
	(Britain) 1 = Conservative, .5 = Liberal, 0 = Labour	n.a.	.44	n.a.
	(USA) 1 = Democrat, .5 = Independent, 0 = Republican	n.a.	n.a.	44

[a] In Australia refers to respondent, not head of household.

Measurement The major class and party variables, together with their scoring and means for the three countries, are shown in Table IV. Wherever possible, class measures refer to the head of household, which avoids difficulty in defining class for the many women who do not work, or work only part-time. The conceptual background to the various measures of class are described in the text. The categorical class measure distinguishes white-collar, blue-collar, and farm workers, following the International Labor Office's International Standard Classification of Occupations.[66] Occupational status is measured by assigning status scores to Treiman's 14 category nominal classification of occupations (see Table I). These scores are derived by a canonical procedure, and are essentially identical to Duncan (1961) scores for

the USA. They reflect the average education, income and family background of people working in each category of job in 16 societies throughout the world.[67] Supervisors, capitalists, the petty bourgeoisie, and government employees are all treated as dummy variables, and defined as given in the text.

A series of control variables are used in the analysis. Age (scored in years), sex (scored 1 for male, 0 for female), and Catholic (1 for yes, 0 for no) are all controlled. Parent's partisanship is measured by a variable combining father's and mother's partisanship, scored 1 if both parents supported a party of the right, .5 if only one supported a party of the right, and 0 if both supported a party of the left. In addition, specific controls for each country are used. In Australia, control variables for whether or not the respondent was born in a Mediterranean or eastern European country are used (scored 0 or 1). In Britain, residence in Wales or Scotland is used, as well as non-white race (all scored 0 or 1). In the USA, variables to measure those who live in the south, or are of black or Hispanic race are included (again, all scored 0 or 1).

In Table III, combined measures of political attitudes are used. These were originally identified by factor analysis, and then constructed into scales. Since the items used to construct the scales differ in each survey, the coefficients reflecting their effect are not directly comparable between countries.[68]

Method The analysis relies on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression methods. They assume that relations among variables are, to a reasonable approximation, linear and additive; tabular analyses suggest that those are reasonable assumptions here. There is some uncertainty in the use of OLS methods with dichotomous dependent variables (such as class self-image) but theory as well as practical experience suggests that the problems are minimal except when the marginals are highly skewed, which they are not here.[69] A few of the variables are ordinal rather than interval, but that is of no practical importance.[70] Missing data are treated by the 'pairwise present' procedure which is statistically preferable to the usual alternatives.[71] For stylistic convenience, the partial regression coefficients reported here are multiplied by 100, so they reflect percentages instead of proportions.

The sheaf coefficients used in Table III were calculated by multiplying the metric partial regression coefficient of each variable in the model by its mean, summing the results, and re-estimating the regression equation.[72] Since the resulting variable has no natural metric, it was transformed using a linear transformation as described in the text. Because sheaf variables cannot be calculated where there is missing data, the sheafs used here are estimated only for cases where there is complete data for all variables in the model. To

minimise the resulting loss of cases, we have included only class variables which have a statistically significant effect on party preference in at least one country.

Correlations between variables are too extensive to report here, and are available from the authors on request.

NOTES

* The data used in this paper were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research and the Social Science Data Archive at the University of Essex. The 1979 Australian National Political Attitudes Survey was originally collected by Don Aitkin, the 1979 British Election Study by Bo Sarlvik, Ivor Crewe and James Alt, and the 1980 United States Presidential Election Study by Warren E. Miller. Neither the original investigators nor the distributing institutions are responsible for our analyses and interpretations. Our thanks to Don Aitkin, Mariah Evans, and an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft of the paper

1. This model is also the standard one in Britain, though it has been the focus of a sustained critique in recent years. See, *inter alia*, Ivor Crewe, Bo Sarlvik and James Alt, 'Partisan Dealignment in Britain, 1964–72', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. VII, 1977, pp. 129–90, William L. Miller, 'Social Class and Party Choice in England: A New Analysis', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. VIII, 1978, pp. 257–84, Richard Rose, 'From Simple Determinism to Interactive Models of Voting: Britain as an Example', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. XV, 1982, pp. 145–69, and Bo Sarlvik and Ivor Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

2. James Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, London, Macmillan, 1921, p. 266.

3. Robert R. Alford, *Party and Society*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963, p. 172; Sol Encel, *Equality and Authority*, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1970, p. 96.

4. Don Aitkin, *Stability and Change in Australian Politics*, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1977, p. 142.

5. David Kemp, *Society and Electoral Behaviour in Australia*, Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 1978. Others have noted the declining relationship between occupational class and party in Australia. For example, Alford (op. cit., p. 178) observed 'a secular erosion of the class bases of politics under the impact of a period of prosperity and social mobility', but he suggested that the process had reached its peak by 1961, which was the last date for which he had data. See also Craig McGregor, *Profile of Australia*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1966. For critiques of Kemp's thesis, see R. W. Connell and Murray Goot, 'The End of Class Rerun', *Meanjin*, vol. XXXVIII, 1979, pp. 3–25 and Paul Reynolds, 'A Consideration of Aspects of the Kemp Thesis', *Politics*, vol. XV, 1980, pp. 114–18.

6. Colin Hughes, 'Electors and Elections' in Henry Mayer (ed.), *Australian Politics*, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1966, p. 170.

7. Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959.

8. See Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure*, New York, Wiley, 1967, Leonard Broom, F. L. Jones, Patrick McDonnell and Trevor Williams, *The Inheritance of Inequality*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, and Donald J. Treiman and Kermitt Terrell, 'The Process of Status Attainment in the United States and Great Britain', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LXXXI, 1975, pp. 563–83.

9. Blau and Duncan, op. cit.

10. See Otis Dudley Duncan, 'A Socioeconomic Index for All Occupations' in Albert J. Neiss *et al.*, *Occupations and*

Social Status, New York, Free Press, 1961, and Donald J Treiman, *Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective*, New York, Academic Press, 1977.

11. See Treiman, op. cit.

12. See Blau and Duncan, op cit., Broom, Jones, McDonnell and Williams, op. cit., Otis Dudley Duncan, David L. Featherman and Beverly Duncan, *Socioeconomic Background and Achievement*, New York, Seminar Press, 1972, David L. Featherman and Richard M Hauser, 'Prestige of Socioeconomic Scales in the Study of Occupational Achievement', *Sociological Methods and Research*, vol. IV, 1976, pp 403–22, and Treiman and Terrell, op. cit.

13. But, for an important exception, see David Knoke, *Change and Continuity in American Politics*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

14. Blau and Duncan, op. cit., pp. 429–30, Treiman and Terrell, op. cit.

15. See Anthony B. Atkinson, *The Eonomics of Inequality*, London, Oxford, 1975, Michael Buraway, 'Social Structure, Homogenisation and the Process of Status Attainment in the United States and Great Britain', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LXXXII, 1977, pp. 1031–42, and Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of Advanced Societies*, New York, Barnes and Noble, 1973. However, for critique, see Zui Guilliches, 'Estimating the Returns to Schooling: Some Economic Problems', *Econometrica*, vol XLV, 1977, pp. 1–22 and Jonathan Kelley, 'Health and Family Background in the Occupational Career: Theory and Cross-Cultural Data', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXIX, 1978, pp. 94–109.

16 Theoretical critiques of Marx are too numerous to mention here For Dahrendorf, see Giddens, op cit., Lawrence E. Hazelrigg, 'Class, Property, and Authority: Dahrendorf's Critique of Marx's Theory of Class', *Social Forces*, vol. L, 1972, pp. 473–87, and Jonathan H. Turner, 'From Utopia to Where? A Strategy for Reformulating the Dahrendorf Conflict Model', *Social Forces*, vol. II, 1973, pp. 236–44. For empirical analyses, see Robert V. Robinson and Jonathan Kelley, 'Class as Conceived by Marx and Dahrendorf: Effects on Income Inequality and Politics in the United States and Great Britain', *American Sociological Review*, vol. XLIV, 1979, pp 38–58 and Erik Olin Wright and Luca Perrone, 'Marxist Class Categories and Income Inequality', *American Sociological Review*, vol. XLII, 1977, pp. 32–55.

17. The analyses in this tradition have so far focused almost entirely on income, ignoring both the subjective aspects of class position and its consequences for electoral behaviour (save for a brief analysis in Robinson and Kelley, op cit.).

18. Ibid. pp. 39–41.

19. Robert V. Robinson and Jonathan Kelley, 'Synthesis and Comparisons of Stratification Theories: A Reply', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XXXXV, 1980, pp. 328–9.

20. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Societies*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959, pp. 171, 256, 262, 287.

21. Robinson and Kelley, 'Synthesis and Comparisons of Stratification Theories'.

22. Robinson and Kelley, 'Class as Conceived by Marx and Dahrendorf', pp. 52–3.

23. Ibid., pp 47–9.

24. See Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, New York, Praeger.

25. Patrick Dunleavy, 'The Political Implications of Sectoral Cleavages and The Growth of State Employment: Part 2', *Political Studies*, vol. XXVIII, 1980, pp. 527–49.

26 Previous empirical work in the conflict tradition has focused narrowly on one society, the USA, save for some work on Britain by Robinson and Kelley, 'Class as Conceived by Marx and Dahrendorf'.

27. These figures in Table I are from a larger project in collaboration with Donald J. Treiman

28. The figures for other societies were obtained by expressing the income of each class as a ratio of the income of middle production workers in the same country (as was done for Australia) and then averaging the figures for the nine nations.

29. See Duncan, op. cit., Paul Dun-

can-Jones, 'Social Mobility, Canonical Scoring, and Occupational Classification' in Keith Hope (ed.), *The Analysis of Social Mobility*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1972, Treiman, op. cit.

30. Duncan, op. cit.

31. Sheila R. Klatzky and Robert W. Hodge, 'A Canonical Correlation Analysis of Occupational Mobility, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, vol. LXVI, 1971, pp. 16–22 and Duncan-Jones, op. cit.

32. There seems something slightly incestuous in using a measure based in part on education and income in an analysis involving education and income. But this difficulty is more apparent than real (Blau and Duncan, op. cit., pp. 124–8). It is not the individuals's education and income that are used but the average income and education of others who work in the same job. And in our case, it is not so much the average income of Australians as the average of people in 15 other societies throughout the world that is reflected in the status scores used in our analysis.

33. See Aitkin, op. cit., Kemp, op. cit., Jonathan Kelley and Ian McAllister, 'Immigrants, Status Attainment, and Politics in Australia', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXXV, 1984, pp. 387–405.

34. Low clerical workers appear anomalous, supporting Labor much more than their status and white-collar membership would suggest. But there are only 23 of them in the sample, so the results must be treated with great reserve.

35. This is done by estimating a regression equation predicting party preference on the basis of ethnicity, religion, age, sex, parents' party, and a set of 13 dummy variables reflecting membership in each of the 14 classes. Ethnicity and the other control variables are then evaluated at their means and the resulting value is then the predicted party preference of the omitted dummy variable (low production workers in our case), on the assumption that they were average in age, ethnicity, etc. The regression coefficient for each dummy variable is then added (or subtracted) from that value to obtain the predicted party preference for that class, again assuming they were average in other respects. These are standard methods (see, for example, E. A. Hanushek and John A. Jackson, *Statistical Methods for Social Scientists*, New York, Academic Press, 1977, pp. 105–6).

36. The *average* education and income of people in different occupational classes is reflected in the occupational status measures but that is by no means the same as the education or income of individual respondents, which is what we are concerned with here. Many well educated people are in jobs that make little use of their education while, conversely, many poorly educated people possess jobs where most of their co-workers are better educated. Equally, many people earn much more or much less than the average for others in their kind of job. In the status tradition, therefore, we are concerned to know not only what kind of jobs people have (which may be one which is or is not generally well paying or educationally demanding), but also whether they themselves are well educated, and what they earn.

37 In such representations, the dummy variable representing one category must be omitted. The effect of omitting white-collar workers is to make the regression coefficients for the farm and the blue-collar classes reflect the difference between them and white-collar workers. Of course, nothing essential is lost and choosing to leave out another of the dummies would lead to logically equivalent results. For example, in the analysis of party preference, the coefficient for blue-collar workers in +14, indicating that they are 14 per cent more likely to support Labor than are white-collar workers. If we had instead omitted the blue-collar dummy variable and included white-collar instead, then white-collar would have a coefficient of −14, indicating that white-collar workers were 14 per cent less likely to support Labor than are blue-collar workers. That is obviously the same fact in slightly different dress.

38. The effect of education on occupational status is estimated from an OLS regression equation with occupational status as the dependent variable and

education as the sole explanatory variable. The coefficient shown in the figure, 4, is the metric partial regression coefficient It indicates that a one year increase in education can be expected to increase someone's occupational status by 4 status points (out of 100). The estimated effect of education on becoming a farmer is estimated similarly from a regression equation with farmer as the dependent variable and education as the independent variable; the estimate for blue-collar workers is obtained similarly from yet a third regression equation. The effect on income is obtained from a regression equation predicting income from education, status, farm, and blue-collar variables (only statistically significant paths are shown in the figure, however). Finally, the effect of party is estimated from a regression equation with party as the dependent variable and education, status, blue-collar, farm, and income as independent variables. This and subsequent figures show metric partial regression coefficients (and also standardized in some cases). For stylistic convenience, the metric coefficients are multiplied by 100 so that they reflect percentages rather than probabilities.

39. Although Marx never defines the petty bourgeoisie as anything but smaller capitalists, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, New York, Pathfinder, 1970 [original edition 1848], p. 25, it seems reasonable to define them as owners of the means of production who do not purchase labour power, as do Wright and Perrone (op. cit.) and Robinson and Kelley ('Class as Conceived by Marx and Dahrendorf').

40. Dahrendorf, op. cit., pp. 166–74.

41. Dahrendorf (ibid., pp. 256, 262, 287) notes that some positions, such as foreman and bureaucrat, are especially difficult to classify, but after some discussion handles them as we have.

42. For Dahrendorf (op. cit , p 198), all 'imperatively coordinated associations' (for example, the family, unions, sports club) are characterised by two authority classes, a position which has generated considerable criticism (for example, Giddens, op. cit., p. 73) However, he does mention that authority relations in industrial production, which we here consider, tend to overshadow the authority relations of other associations since they occupy so large a space in people's lives (Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 142–3). Dahrendorf has considered some objections to his original formulation in his 1967 edition but these do not affect the basic scheme.

43. Ibid., pp. 174–9

44. For simplicity, we are being somewhat imprecise here. The supervisor measure gives those who are unambiguously supervisors (defined as those who supervise 6 or more workers) a score of 1 and marginal supervisors (defined as those who supervise 5 or fewer others) a score of one half. The effect of this is to count marginal supervisors as half a 'full' supervisor. So if we say that 10 per cent of some groups are supervisors, that means that 10 per cent are full supervisors, or that 20 per cent are marginal supervisors (more realistically) some combination of the two. Note also that supervisor refers to respondent's own occupation regardless of whether they are heads of household, while capitalist (and also the occupational figures) refers to heads of household only Unfortunately, the data do not contain information on whether the head of household is a supervisor.

45. Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' in R. Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader*, New York, Norton, 1972, pp. 862–3.

46. Karl Marx, *Capital. A Critique of Political Economy*, Vol. 1, Chicago, Kerr, 1926, pp. 708–9, 715–16

47. Dahrendorf, op. cit., pp 138–40.

48. Almost all capitalists will also supervise their employees and so get the bonus all supervisors get (24 per cent) plus their capitalist bonus of 29 per cent for a total of 53 per cent. Robinson and Kelley ('Class as Conceived by Marx and Dahrendorf', pp. 47–9) have shown that these relations are additive, so that this simple calculation is approximately correct. We have run similar analyses on the 1973 ANU Social Mobility Survey, which has a larger sample and very detailed and reliable measures, and found capitalists no more than 10 per cent

better off than workers. We suspect that both figures are substantially correct, and that in 1973 capitalists earned much less than they did in 1979. If so, then their income is remarkably variable compared to the great stability that characterises the earnings of different educational groups and occupational classes. That would be an interesting difference but must remain speculative until tested in more definitive ways than is possible with our data.

49. See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1960, p. 234.

50. Dahrendorf, op. cit., pp. 272–6.

51. Dunleavy, op. cit.

52. See Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes*, New York, Russell and Russell, 1949, Robert W. Hodge and Donald J. Treiman, 'Class Identification in the United States', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LXXVIII, 1968, pp. 535–47 and W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966.

53. Don Aitkin, op. cit., pp. 121–5 and Brian Graetz, 'Images of Class in Modern Society: Structure, Sentiment and Social Location', *Sociology*, vol. XVII, 1983, pp. 79–96.

54. It is sometimes argued that political preferences shape people's class self-images rather than the other way round, and there are doubtless some cases in which this is true. For the bulk of the population, however, it seems more likely that such socialising effects would occur in childhood, when children acquire party identification from their parents. We have, however, largely controlled for this by including parents' party preference in the regression.

55. Aitkin, op. cit., pp. 130–5 and David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*, London, Macmillan, 1974, pp. 77–80.

56. For technical details, see Duane F. Alwin and Robert M. Hauser, 'The Decomposition of Effects in Path Analysis', *American Sociological Review*, vol. XL, 1975, pp. 37–47.

57. Jonathan Kelley *et al.*, 'Social Stratification in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Preliminary Analysis of Survey Data from Fourteen Societies'. Paper presented to the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association, 1980.

58. The log specification we have used, which is valuable for comparative purposes and customary in economics, is particularly sensitive to changes at the low end of the income distribution while a specification in absolute figures (e.g. dollars or pounds sterling) is particularly sensitive to differences at the high end. Using the pounds sterling specification in Britain suggests that capitalists do earn appreciably more than workers. We suspect that what is going on is that very small capitalists — small merchants, craftsmen with small shops, and the like – earn a little less than workers (many unionised and working in large, profitable industries) while a few larger capitalists earn much more. The small capitalists would dominate the log version of the regression while the large capitalists would dominate the pounds sterling version. So in a sense both results are true, depending on whether you stress the experience of the small capitalists (who have the numbers) or the large ones (who have the money).

59. Alford, op. cit., p. 94.

60. Don Aitkin, *The Country Party in New South Wales*, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1972.

61. Giovanni Sartori, 'From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology', in Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.), *Politics and the Social Sciences*, London, Oxford University Press, 1969. See also Peter Mair, 'Adaptation and Control: Toward an Understanding of Party and Party System Change', in Hans Daadler and Peter Mair (eds), *Western European Party Systems*, London, Sage, 1983.

62. See M. Kent Jennings and Richard Neimi, 'The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child', *American Political Science Review*, vol LXII, 1968, pp. 169–84 and by the same authors, 'The Persistence of Political Orientations: An Overtime Analysis of Two Generations', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. XVIII, 1978, pp. 333–64.

63. For details, see Jonathan Kelley and Ian McAllister, *The Australian Voter in Comparative Perspective*, London, Rout-

ledge & Kegan Paul, forthcoming.

64. See Aitkin, op. cit. (second, 1982, edition), for details.

65. See Sarlvik and Crewe, op. cit., for details.

66. International Labor Office, *International Standard Classification of Occupations*, Geneva, International Labor Office, 1969.

67. See Donald J. Treiman *et al.*, 'Coding and Occupational Standing in Pre-Existing Data Sets', Canberra, Working Papers in Sociology, Australian National University, 1981.

68. Full details are given in Kelley and McAllister, op. cit.

69. Jan Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics*, New York, Macmillan, 1971.

70. Jae-On Kim, 'Multivariate Analysis of Ordinal Variables', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LXXXI, 1975, pp. 261–98.

71. Bradley R. Hertel, 'Minimising Error Variance Introduced by Missing Data Routines in Survey Analysis', *Sociological Methods and Research*, vol. IV, 1976, pp. 169–84.

72. For details, see David R. Heise, 'Employing Nominal Variables, Induced Variables, and Block Variables in Path Analysis', *Sociological Methods and Research*, vol. I, 1972, pp. 147–73.

Terence C. Halliday°

Knowledge mandates: collective influence by scientific, normative and syncretic professions*

The relations of professions with the state have been an enduring problem in the macrosociology of professions. Yet professional collective influence on the state remains poorly understood, principally because most attention has been directed to limited domains of action and a case by case treatment of a very few professions. This article proposes a broader frame of reference which seeks to account for variations among six established professions — law, medicine, the clergy, engineering, the military, and academe. It is argued that the scope and intensity of influence these professions actually do, and potentially might, exert on government is a partial function of their relative standing on four dimensions: their epistemological foundations; the forms of authority they can exercise; the institutional loci of professional work; and the organizational properties of collegial associations. Several profiles of influence emerge with different consequences for prospective relations between professions and their publics.

Although the intellectual traditions on which they draw may differ radically, a fragile consensus exists on one point among contemporary macrosociologists of the professions: the major professions in advanced western societies have had substantial influence on areas of public policy by virtue of their distinctive relationships with the state. In the 1930s, Carr-Saunders and Wilson suggested that professions might be a source of salvation by expertise for governments of troubled democracies.[1] In a different guise, and sometimes with differing political overtones, residues of that position have contemporary expression in notions of the 'expert' or 'professional' society.[2] The nexus between governments and professions has been stressed even more strongly by scholars who point to the dependence by professions on the state for control of their respective markets.

Central to all these approaches is the problem of collective influence. An understanding of the significance of professions for advanced liberal democracies demands an explication of the conditions

under which professions can bring concerted pressure to bear on the state. That understanding will be contingent on answers to the critical, and rather vexing, question addressed in this paper: What are the attributes of different professions — cognitive, institutional, organizational — which affect their varying ability to engage in successful collective action?

Efforts to develop genuinely comparative theories of professional collective action have been impeded in three ways. First, a preponderance of case studies on single professions has rarely led to supercedence of the particular. Second, the application of analytic qualifiers to exclude 'non-market' professions, such as the military or clergy, is conducive to theoretical tendentiousness.[3] And third, a monistic emphasis on economic monopoly, the market, and collective upward mobility, constricts vision from other arenas, and alternative models, of professional collective action.[4]

This essay draws together an array of professions seldom treated in the same analysis, acknowledges monopoly but goes beyond it, and explores more comprehensively the breadth of spheres in which professions exercise influence collectively, especially on the state. It considers effects of knowledge mandates on profiles of influence. The knowledge mandate of a profession comprises its capacity to exert influence in virtue of the substance, form, transmission, efficacy, mobilization, objects and legitimacy of its cognitive core. It is an epistemological warrant for public influence mediated by occupational and organizational politics.

Influence may be defined as a subspecies of power, short of coercion, which is 'the ability to get others to act, think, or feel as one intends.'[5] The actions of one party, whether individual or collective, are partially determined by another through persuasion (whether on rational or irrational grounds), the exercise of authority, the invocation of obligations, the definition of responsibilities and the provision of ideals or programmes of action. Influence can slide into coercion, as in the doctors' strikes in England, or through the manipulation of monetary inducements by political action committees in the USA. Influence can be conveyed directly — to legislators, the civil service or government administrators— or indirectly — through the media and pressure on constituents. Influence varies in *scope* and *intensity*. The former refers to the breadth of action, to the number and variety of domains in which professions can act; the latter concerns the force of its action in a given area. Consequently collective influence can be comprehensive in scope but attenuated in intensity, just as it may be narrowly focused but highly concentrated. The attributes of some professions are conducive to one or another of these types of influence but rarely both.

In order to deal with six professions simultaneously, some limits are placed on what can be attempted in the confines of this article. The

paper concentrates not on the myriad ways that practitioners affect clients in everyday practice, nor on action by work organizations within a profession, but on those occasions when the profession acts collectively as a profession, usually through collegial associations. The prime institutional focus of professions' collective activity remains the state. For present purposes, however, attention must be limited to attributes of professions rather than characteristics of the state,[6] even though it is obvious that there are many consequential differences between the two countries of primary concern here, Britain and the USA, including relations of church and state, legislative procedures, the effects of a federal rather than unitary system of government and the state's intervention in the delivery of professional services.[7]

Within these limits, I contend that the differences among professions in the scope and intensity of their collective action can be understood, in substantial part, by knowledge mandates as they are specified and qualified along four dimensions: the epistemological bases of professional knowledge; the forms of professional authority; the institutional loci of professional activity; and the attributes of national professional organizations.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASES OF PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE

The continued appropriation of medicine as the ideal-typical, best-researched and most-discussed profession still points to science as the prime cognitive foundation of professionalism. Although an emphasis on knowledge as a 'core generating trait' of professionalism is entirely correct, the failure to set scientific knowledge within a more comprehensive epistemological context flaws any theoretical formulation of collective relations between professions and the state.

The success of contemporary professions cannot be attributed primarily to science *per se* because two of the three longest standing professions — law and the clergy — are not scientific in any narrow sense of the term.[8] And although it is true that, since the Enlightenment, the star of religion shines less brightly, the church continues to wield considerable influence over diverse areas of contemporary culture and society.[9] Law by contrast has enjoyed virtually the same spectacular success as leading scientific professions on most indicators of professional success, whether they be completeness of occupational monopolies, expansion of the market for professional services, or rise in monetary and status rewards.[10] If professions' achievements are to be explained, therefore, it is appropriate that stress be laid on aspects of knowledge that include science and non-science.

Some formal properties of knowledge may be common to several professions. Hence Larson's description of the optimal cognitive base

for a monopoly of skill is as apposite for law as it is for medicine: this knowledge 'must be specific enough to impart distinctiveness to the professional commodity, it must be formalized or codified enough to allow standardization of the product, and ultimately of the producers, and yet it must not be so clearly codified that it does not allow a principle of exclusion to exist.'[11]

None the less, what is *common* to established professions does not enable us to explain *differences* in collective action. To do that requires a consideration of epistemology. A useful starting point is the well-known (and much debated) philosophical distinction in Hume's moral philosophy between judgments of fact and judgments of value. The dichotomy has been stated in numerous ways. Judgments of fact are expressed in descriptive statements which assert what *is* the case; judgments of value are prescriptive statements that assert what *should* be the case.[12] Judgments of fact can usually be verified by recourse to experience or empirical inquiry; judgments of value, or 'ought' statements, cannot be ascertained by empirical investigation. The extent of logical entailment between one class of statements and the other, is encapsulated in the assertion that 'moral discourse is an autonomous mode of discourse' such that 'no moral or normative claim is derivable from, or depends for its validity on, purely non-moral or non-normative statements.'[13] Obviously certain facts may provide good reasons for a moral position; but they are not value propositions in themselves. At a fundamental level, there remains a *logical* gap between facts and values, science and morality.

At once it must be acknowledged that the fact-value distinction has scarcely escaped attempts at controversion. Naturalistic theories of meta-ethics would relate values to facts by defining 'good' in terms of observable criteria, such as the utilitarian test in one of its positive or negative formulations. Within social science some theories would reduce ethics to a mode of production or ideological hegemony, and others would maintain that facts are subject to, or permeated by, 'value impregnation.' Marcuse views science itself as ideology; Habermas insists that science contains its own implicit values.[14] Alternatively, some meta-ethical philosophers, such as Toulmin and Rawls, have been reluctant to discard the 'is-ought' distinction out of hand, but they acknowledge that it is a muddle, that facts are often good reasons for certain moral stances, and that the division of moral utterances into descriptive and evaluative statements is far from neat.[15]

These debates cannot be resolved here. I will take the position that philosophical grounds remain for holding that prescriptive and descriptive statements are logically distinct. I want broadly to characterize scientific modes of discourse and inquiry as different from normative statements and the logic by which they are produced. The distinction between different kinds of professional knowledge that

is developed here rests on this fundamental philosophical divide, albeit one with jagged edges and numerous dissentients.

The logical distinction between the two areas of discourse is critical for comparisons of collective professional influence. To put it over-simply, the professions themselves divide into classes depending on whether the cognitive core of the profession is primarily descriptive or prescriptive. For scientific professions, knowledge is empirically derived from observation and experimental inquiry in methods epitomized by the natural and biological sciences. For normative professions, the substance of discourse and the manner in which it is derived are concerned primarily with matters of value — how one should attain salvation, how to live ethically, and how relations among individuals and groups should be regulated by the state. On these grounds, *scientific professions*, such as engineering and medicine, can be distinguished from *normative professions*, such as the clergy and law. In Shils' terms, all of these professions share a fundamental ordering-power of those 'very central features(s) of man-existence and the cosmos in which he lives.' But whereas one class of professions is concerned with 'law or laws governing the universe' established by scientific discovery, another class of professions concerns itself with 'ultimate principles of law which should govern man's conduct.'[16]

This preliminary distinction between classes of professions makes no claim to a discovery *de novo*.[17] It has either been presaged or lain implicit in scholarly work on professions. But if it is to be applied to collective action, the scientific/normative dichotomy must be qualified or elaborated in several respects.

Consequences for professionalism do not emanate from philosophical paring alone. Social constructions are made of underlying epistemological differences, such that a profession and its public layer the philosophical underpinnings with a veneer of perceptions. Epistemological foundations are mediated to the public through the profession's manipulation of the knowledge to which it stakes an exclusive claim. For instance, Gieryn persuasively maintains that in addition to the intrinsic intellectual authority that inheres in science, its practitioners must constantly engage in *boundary-work* 'to promote their authority over designated domains of knowledge.' They develop 'repertoires' or ideologies of self-description to advance their interests.[18]

Moreover, the scientific-normative distinction is not advanced as an adequate description of practitioner-client exchanges. In everyday practice all professional work, whether scientific or not, is infused by normative elements just as normative professions rely heavily on factual information. The Christian clergy have grounded their theology and ethics in an historical revelation, engineers are readily embroiled in normative issues over nuclear power or pollution; and lawyers, according to a survey, counted among their most important skills the capacity to marshal and order the facts.[19] Bodies of codified

knowledge stand in a factual relationship to all professions: medicine has its physiology textbooks; lawyers have *The All England Law Reports*; theologians and clergy have recourse to Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*, or Paul Tillich's *Systematic Theology*.

The division of professions into two classes rests on a generic authority: when its legitimacy is questioned fundamentally, a profession retreats to the distinctive means by which its knowledge is created and produced. At this irreducible point of legitimation, engineers and doctors claim a knowledge generated by the application of the scientific method, principally experimental, to natural and biological phenomena. In their turn, lawyers point to the law-finding of judges and the law-making of legislatures. Whatever the admixture of normative and scientific elements in everyday practice, the contrast between classes of professions is most emphatic at their epistemological foundations. When professions act collectively, or in representations before government, cognitive bases of influence are more manifest than in everyday practice because interest groups are better informed and more skeptical than clients or patients. Indeed, the more consequential its collective recommendations, the more likely a profession's authority will be challenged, and the more it will be compelled to fall back on the legitimacy of its cognitive foundations.[20]

The military and academic professions are less susceptible to categorical distinction. They evince a *syncretist* epistemological foundation.[21]

Apart from historical and traditional claims to the mantle of professionalism,[22] the core of military expertise now comprises an amalgam of scientific and normative elements.[23] Science and technology are a central component of the profession of arms. Much knowledge needed by the armed forces is identical to that in the private sector and scientific and technological advances frequently originate in civilian society.[24] Nevertheless, the military deploy and develop their own technology, military engineers are a core component of modern armies, and some of the earliest military academies — the French École Polytechnique (1794), the Woolwich Royal Military Academy (1741), and the Dutch Military Academy (1814) — began essentially as military engineering schools.[25]

Distinctive to the military, however, and giving them an esoteric epistemology quite apart from other occupations, is the incorporation of science and technology into military doctrine. Doctrine can incorporate national military policy and strategy, broad battlefield operational plans (whether or not to give primacy to offensive or defensive operations, whether to emphasize firepower attrition or manoeuvre), and the tactics of integrating particular weapons systems into optimal forms of organization.[26] In Abrahamsson's terms, the doctrines of the military, comparable to other professions, are 'strategy, tactics, and logistics'.[27] At the broadest level, battlefield

doctrine is set within an embracing framework of strategic doctrine — the principles which govern the place of military power in the international relations of a country.[28]

C. von Clausewitz exemplifies the way in which the profession of arms formulates strategy and tactics through the distillation and codification of the lessons provided by military history,[29] thus condensing wisdom from previous instances of armed conflict.[30] Yet, even when the data are collected, 'in a true spirit of unfettered scientific inquiry,'[31] the doctrinal statements that emerge describe not the shape of the last battle but prescribe the form of the next. Doctrine is a moral philosophy of military action, an 'art' as much as a 'science'.[32] It must be emphasized that doctrine cannot be reduced to technology. Technological advances frequently have failed for want of an embracing doctrine: the development of the machine gun, the tank, aircraft — all point to Holley's conclusion that superiority in weapons requires a coupling *both* of 'the best ideas from advancing technology . . .' *and* 'a doctrine or concept of their tactical or strategic application'.[33]

The academic profession spans the epistemic divide most strikingly of all. It remains 'the sole profession in an increasingly specialized world which still embraces the whole gamut of knowledge and professional skills.'[34] The science faculties of the university and its scientific professional schools on one side of the dichotomy balance the normative professional schools on the other side. In between lie the humanities and the social sciences, the latter of which, in certain of its disciplinary segments, approach a scientific epistemology, but of a kind (it will be assumed here) which is philosophically distinct from that which prevails in the natural and biological sciences. More important are the powerful normative components of the humanities and social sciences. Since it has developed extensive apparatuses of criticism, especially about values, this non-scientific center of the academy 'can do society's fundamental thinking for it, not least about the nature and purpose of society itself.'[35] With its epistemological inclusiveness, the academic profession, consequently has a unique potential for influence.[36]

The distinction between grounds of professional knowledge has significant consequences for the scope of collective professional influence: scientific professions draw upon the charisma of science but are thereby circumscribed in the transparency and scope of their normative contributions to public policy; normative professions that specialize in moral or normative discourse are able legitimately to engage the spectrum of policy issues but with a cognitive base that is possibly less secure, and wanting more in legitimacy, than of science.

Ironically, quintessentially modern professions, whose claim to professionalism rests on a rigorous science, by that very appropriation demarcate their cognitive domains from moral terrain and thus circumscribe their scope of moral influence.[37] Normative professions

lose the authority of science but thereby obtain a broad mandate to range extensively over moral terrain. Although English barristers and solicitors have less desire or opportunity to do so, American lawyers, and the clergy in both countries, can directly and legitimately address almost all matters of public policy, despite the fact that for each profession, over long periods, this legitimacy has possibly been eroded.[38] Indeed the mandate for clergy has been so broadly construed that some Christians have publicly bemoaned 'the internal transformation of the faith itself . . . such that it comes to be defined in terms of political values.'[39] In other words, although its epistemological foundation may be somewhat insecure, the more normative the profession, the more expansive its potential collective influence.

From this line of reasoning it would follow that a profession which incorporates both epistemic bases, giving it the authority of science but the breadth of normativeness, should have most scope of action. In fact, however, the academy, and perhaps the military profession, probably do not have as much impact as the argument might presume. Furthermore, differences persist within classes of professions. The epistemological dimension must therefore be elaborated in terms of its interaction with three other dimensions.

TECHNICAL AND MORAL FORMS OF PROFESSIONAL AUTHORITY

Two forms of authority can be exercised by a profession whatever its epistemological base: expert or technical authority; and moral authority. At best, the distinction is blurred. Yet there is a consensus, sometimes explicit but more often implicit, among quite different theoretical traditions, that the narrowly technical skills a profession masters are significantly different from the authoritative application of those technical abilities to public policy pronouncements where moral and ethical issues assume as much importance as technical virtuosity.

The distinction receives a classic formulation in the argument by Carr-Saunders and Wilson that 'there are certain broad issues of public policy' which can be grasped by an educated citizenry where 'educated judgement rather than special knowledge is involved.' For professional associations to take sides on these issues is more 'political' than 'professional'. Thus, 'professional associations of lawyers should not concern themselves' with capital punishment; nor should doctors' groups comment on prolonging the lives of the incurable: 'all these matters are broad issues of public policy.'[40] Everett Hughes, speaking from another perspective, also recognizes that 'esoteric knowledge and high skill are quite different to moral authority expressed on public issues.'[41] Formulated somewhat differently, Freidson clarifies the nature and limits of medical expertise by

the example that 'we can all agree that how a road is to be built is a technical question best handled by engineers,' but an evaluation of whether it should be built is 'normative in character.'[42]

To define the difference between these two points of authority is more difficult than to declare it. *Technical authority* refers to a high degree of facility in the manipulation of professional knowledge; but it is manipulation of a quite restrictive nature. For scientific professions, highly developed technical expertise is readily understandable — the surgeon is perhaps the most vivid example in medicine.[43] But normative professions also have their areas of narrow technical authority. Lawyers may exercise techniques in drafting contracts and executing corporate mergers without taking an explicit stand on what the law should contain. Clergymen may be 'technically' versatile in exegesis without also being moral theologians. Military officers may concede that whether, where, and when to use force is a political decision; implementation of the decision 'is a technical function that must be left to the tacticians.'[44]

The exercise of *moral authority* occurs when a profession exceeds narrow technical activities to intervene in more general ethical areas. When doctors attempt to shape the health system, when lawyers make recommendations about the substance of constitutional revision, when engineers advocate certain standards of safety in public housing, when nuclear physicists enter the debate over uses of nuclear energy in ways which are intended to form public policy,[45] or when academics exchange the cloak of 'scientist' for that of 'sage',[46] then the profession acts, or seeks to act, as a moral authority. Technical issues shade into political issues. Professionals become public moralists. This is not to prejudge the direction of professional moralizing or a moral judgment on the goodness of its action; it is to state that it acts prescriptively.

Although they may be disentangled analytically, values and technique are intertwined in practice. For instance, theologically conservative scholars have been much more reluctant to employ the methods of form and redaction criticism than their theologically liberal counterparts. Moreover, technical innovations can have sweeping practical ramifications, and not only in medicine and engineering. F. W. Maitland long ago demonstrated that innovations in legal technique, such as the creation of fictions, may open up new substantive domains that can be 'reached' by law.[47] Nevertheless, expert and moral elements in professional action are not only analytically separable but they frequently vary independently of each other in practice.

The distinction between the two forms of authority has considerable significance for the role and influence of professions. In an increasingly complex society that depends on advanced technical expertise, the scope for professional action is substantial and

expanding. If professions can add moral authority to their already significant technical expertise, then they may exert enormous influence in great tracts of social life. Stated propositionally, the greater facility a profession displays in adding moral authority to its technical claims, the wider its scope of putative influence.

The capacity to attain this additional influence turns in part on the blurring between the two forms of authority, an image that frequently recurs in contemporary writings. Betts observes that 'the boundaries between policy, strategy, and tactics are rarely clear for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.'[48] Handler points to the 'confusion of the role of scientist qua scientist with that of scientist as citizen . . . blurring the distinction between the intrinsically scientific and intrinsically political questions.'[49] David Martin's comments that clergy 'feel footloose, castaways without proper moorings',[50] or indications that Church of England clergy are confused about the roles they should play,[51] hint at the authority crisis among many Christian ministers. Further, it seems consistent to expect that the more hazy the line of demarcation between expertise and morality, the more easily a profession can convert expert into moral influence. The legitimacy it is granted for one type of authority almost imperceptibly is transferred to the other, at least in zones of conceptual transition.

The varying capacity of professions to make such a transition turns in major part on their epistemological foundations. It can be posited that: the more normative (or syncretic) a profession's epistemology, the more it can exercise moral authority in the name of expertise, and thus the greater its potential breadth of influence. The harder the science, the higher the barrier between technical and moral authority. By contrast, normative professions have their expertise in materials that are infused with normative elements; they are practitioners in normative discourse where the technical and moral are easily melded over.

The boundary between the two forms of authority is not only blurred, but flexible and undergoes constant redefinition.[52] Just as professions have historically negotiated expansions of limits on their monopoly over areas of work, they have also negotiated the extent to which they can influence public policy under the pretext of technical insight.[53] In fact, it is probably more accurate to speak of the active effort by professions to obliterate the analytic barrier than it is to cast the distinction in a passive form where the difference takes on an unduly ontological status. The distinctiveness of normative professions lies in their enhanced capacity to smuggle in moral orientations under the cloak of technical complexity.

In professional politics, the distinction between normative and technical advice becomes opaque to professional elites themselves, leading to confusion, and even to intra-professional factionalism. Sometimes the two types of authority are so bound up together that a

profession's advocates may be only semi-conscious of value ramifications implicit in their expert representations. None the less, such a degree of definitional imprecision and conceptual vacuity can provide a singular opportunity for collective action by normative and syncretic professions.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY INSTITUTIONAL SPHERES

A third dimension determines differences in influence, yet cross-cuts the technical-moral distinction and elaborates the contrast between scientific and normative professions.

Each profession has a primary and secondary institutional sphere of activity. Institutional spheres can be defined by two criteria — an objective criterion which concerns the principal institutional locus of professional practice; and a subjective criterion in terms of what are considered by professionals and their public as legitimate domains of activity. Hence the *primary institutional sphere* is that institution, and the organizations which comprise it, in which most of a profession's work is undertaken and in which, therefore, it is thought to have a legitimate and particular interest. This is the field in which, Elliott indicates, a profession's 'judgement may appear absolute'.[54] Each profession presides over a primary institutional sphere, usually from a position of dominance over other subsidiary occupations within the institution.[55] Doctors have a primary interest in the health system, engineers in the manufacturing sector, lawyers in the legal system, clergy in the religious system, the military in defence, and academics in higher education. Each institution comprises a complex of organizations from hospitals and health clinics for doctors to a West Point or Sandhurst for the military.

Yet all professions include some specialties or segments which practice in other institutions. Just as engineers, like doctors, are to be found in the armed forces, so too are lawyers located in corporations and clergy minister as chaplains in hospitals. The syncretic professions have a special status in this regard: as an almost total community in its own right, the military draws within itself professionals from every other area; the academic profession, by virtue of its special function of education and research for other professions, finds itself incorporated into virtually all other institutions. Where the practice of professionals is limited, and they have a circumscribed legitimacy *vis-à-vis* the principal focus of an institution, that will be defined as a *secondary institutional sphere*. All professions have such spheres; and every primary institutional sphere for one profession is a secondary institutional sphere for another. However in their secondary spheres, the scope of professional authority is severely limited.

Professions vary in the extent of practice and degree of legitimacy

they have in secondary institutional spheres. It may be argued that: the more normative the epistemological base of a profession, the more extensive will be its breadth of influence in secondary institutional spheres. Although research support for this proposition remains wanting, a brief contrast of engineering and medicine with law and the clergy suggests that such evidence could be adduced. Engineers, it is true, are involved in construction of the physical sites for much professional work. Even so, it is likely that their collective contribution to policy in health, education, law, and religion is minimal; their special relationship with the military provides the principal instance where their authority is substantial in a secondary institutional sphere. The medical profession is not so circumscribed: medical associations can have an impact on limited areas of the legal system, on environmental and public health issues, and even on the psychiatric implications of various length combat tours and front-line fighting. But they have little practice and even less legitimacy in religious and educational institutions, the economy or foreign policy. Although the British Medical Association was welcomed by the state into a 'partnership in the administration of a national health system,' that arrangement extended little beyond the health system.

Contrast those scientific professions with law and the clergy. Law governs, with varying degrees of generality and specificity, all social relations in a given society. It extends from the primary sphere of the legal system to an almost all-encompassing secondary sphere. As Tocqueville once presciently observed, in America 'there is hardly a political question which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.'[57] The legal profession can intervene in the distribution of power between branches of government, between federal and state governments, and between state and local municipalities. Law defines relationships between the state and the economy as, for instance, in the kinds and levels of taxation; between the state and the individual, as in the practice of religion or free speech; between consumers and producers, parents and children, churches and schools. No legislative area is considered outside the purview of the American Bar Association, something that cannot be said of the American Medical Association which defines its public legislative activity in a more limited manner.[58] In the UK, the privatization of government agencies, like British Airways and British Telecom, the expansion of lawyers' involvement into planning inquiries, and the interpretative issues that have arisen from the Treaty of Rome and EEC membership, have opened up considerable avenues of opportunity for lawyers not to mention many others if a Bill of Rights were to be implemented.

The clergy's spheres also seem unbounded. The Fourth Assembly of the World Council of Churches (1968) reported that 'no structures — ecclesiastical, industrial, governmental or international' lie outside

the churches' prophetic task, a sentiment echoed in a bold hermeneutical leap by the Anglican Consultative Counsel which appropriated the Magnificat as a justification for 'radical changes in economic, political, and social structures'.[59] The papal encyclical, *Larorem Exercens* (1981), goes from considerations of doctrine on work to recommendations for joint ownership of the means of work and the sharing of workers in management and profits.[60] Theological underpinnings of the 'sustainable society' reach to issues of urban sprawl, advertising and population distributions.[61] The concept of the 'prophetic church' draws clergy into the complete array of secondary institutional spheres.

The two syncretic professions also have broad capacities for legitimate action in secondary institutional spheres. Modern armies, according to Finer, are a 'microcosm of the state.'[62] Indeed, the number of areas of potential military interest in western armies has increased so sharply during this century, that under the rubric of foreign policy the military can claim interests in the negotiation of alliances, foreign loans, arms support and arms control.[63] In domestic policy, their involvement is manifest in the economic infrastructure (roads, power plants), industrial production, scientific research, public education, mass media, and labour and management organizations. The growing intrusiveness of the military stems in part from the size of its budget and its direct and indirect effects on the economy as well as from the inability of civilian leaders to be able to assess military strategy and doctrine as they have in the past. While it appears that the military may have experienced diminished acceptance by publics in many western societies, keen observers believe that their 'power potentials' have actually increased.[64]

The academic profession, too, has extraordinary putative institutional reach. Much scientific research can be relevant, even germinal, to applied programmes; and a good deal of social science superficially appears pertinent to social problems. And, as Schumpeter once commented, the humanists have expanded their zones of activity into the 'fields of manners, politics, religion and philosophy,' such that 'from the criticism of the text to the criticism of a society, the way is shorter than it seems.' As a corporate body, the professoriate seldom acts collectively in its entirety on wider political issues; neither does the university take political stands.[65] Yet Nisbet labels as the 'politicization of the university'[66] the extensive involvement of academics, as individuals and consultants, in political and economic affairs. In the USA, Lipset found that 47 per cent of 'higher achievers' in academe had advised national corporations, 72 per cent federal government, 16 per cent local business and 11 per cent local government.[67] Journals of opinion, like *New Society*, *The Public Interest* and the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, attest to the readiness of academics, usually acting without official or institutional endorse-

ment, to exert influence far beyond the confines of the university. Thus the academy and the military, albeit by entirely different organizational — or non-organizational — means, have secondary institutional spheres almost as expansive as those of the normative professions. As distinct from the latter, however, the syncretic professions very frequently have their initiatives in secondary institutional spheres sapped by a loss of legitimacy.

Legitimacy is a crux of collective professional influence.[68] I have argued that the relative success of professions in their influence on government depends, in the first instance, on their ability to establish expert credentials, and in the second instance, on their success in securing legitimacy for attempts to affect policy through the exercise of moral authority. Because a mandate of authority for normative orientations is much less readily extended to professions, the more a profession can dress its normative contributions in technical clothes, the more legitimacy, and the greater effect, it will secure. Collective influence thus depends, first, on a profession's sophistication in representing moral authority as technical expertise and, second, on extending either or both forms of authority from primary institutional spheres, where again legitimacy is more assured, into secondary institutional spheres, where it is not.

Professional influence thus moves along two axes whose conjunction poses problems of legitimacy and, consequently, problems of collective influence on government. Table I exemplifies the proposition that: the more grounded professional collective action is in expert authority in primary institutional spheres, the more complete its legitimacy, and thus the more assured its effectiveness.

TABLE I *Bases of legitimacy for collective professional action*

	Primary institutional spheres	Secondary institutional spheres
Expert authority	[1] Complete legitimacy	[2] Contested legitimacy
Moral authority	[3] Contingent legitimacy	[4] Marginal legitimacy

Complete Legitimacy Where a profession attempts to use its expertise in a primary institutional sphere it will usually have full legitimacy: its authority will be assumed within the profession, recognized by other occupations within an institution and acknowledged by government and the public. As professional efforts move away from Cell 1, however, legitimacy becomes progressively more attenuated and the task of collective influence more formidable.

Contested Legitimacy In secondary institutional spheres (Cell 2), a profession's claim to special knowledge will more probably be contested, since a secondary sphere for one profession will be a primary sphere for another. For example, doctors and lawyers conflict over expert medical testimony in trials — whether there should be one court expert or conflicting plaintiff's and defendant's experts. A struggle for legitimacy among several professions can be found over the vexing issue of abortion where at least three professions — medicine, law, and the clergy — are drawn into dispute.

Contingent Legitimacy A not dissimilar problem arises when professions attempt to affect policy, by recommending policy options, in their primary spheres (Cell 3). In practice professions can be highly influential. Yet their legitimacy remains contingent: neither the profession expects, nor do legislators or the public grant, a blank cheque to a profession so that it might explicitly implement its own conception of policy. Success in such an instance therefore depends on the erasure of the already indistinct line between Cells 1 and 3, full and contingent legitimacy respectively.

Marginal Legitimacy When professions venture forth to shape policy in their secondary institutions (Cell 4), then they face a double liability. In a vacuum of legitimacy, they might appear impotent. Yet a residue of legitimacy from expertise remains, especially for normative professions. Lawyers, the clergy and academics can and do make moral pronouncements in all manner of areas outside their own special bailiwick. Moreover, the first two professions make such attempts through their collective organizations and, in the case of the legal profession, may experience some success.

While it can be asserted that all professions have legitimacy and influence on expert matters in their primary spheres, differences among classes of professions are quite manifest: the more normative a profession, the greater its probability of securing legitimacy for moral interventions in primary and secondary spheres. Put another way, as we move from Cell 1 through to Cell 4, normative and syncretic professions will be more efficacious in exercising collective influence on government than scientific professions.

THE ORGANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

For most professions, effective professional influence requires collective professional action. Ultimately, to realize the full advantages to a profession of a profession's standing on the preceding dimensions depends on organizational factors. Bar associations and medical societies, councils of churches and engineering societies, become

intervening links in a logic of action extending from epistemology to power. Differences in the means by which professions confront these organizational problems, differentiate, and interact with, the effectiveness of professions within epistemological classes. Organizational factors constrain knowledge mandates.

1 National Professional Integration Scholars who have emphasized the monopolistic proclivities of 'market' professions have correctly assumed that, apart from a very few elite associations, a profession attains political authority to convey its collective interests from a representative or inclusive national association.[69] The point holds equally well for interests beyond monopoly. Yet even established professions have had mixed success with peak associations. The political efficacy of the British and American Medical Associations has required more than a century of sustained effort, an enterprise which cannot be relaxed because of powerful centrifugal forces, like specialization. BMA membership dropped from 85 per cent of the working profession in 1950 to 70 per cent in 1973; other groups, such as the Medical Practitioners Union, have sprung up to complement, irritate, stimulate and prod the massive dominant organization.[70] The American Bar Association has had difficulty in obtaining a majority membership of individual lawyers from its founding in 1878 to the present day. None the less, through a federal structure that draws state and local bar associations, specialty and special interest groups, into its governing House of Delegates, the ABA has achieved an enviable facility in aggregating interests that can be conveyed to government through a single organizational conduit.[71]

There are of course important differences between the organization of professional associations in Britain and the USA. The bifurcation of the profession likely makes united action by the Law Society and the Senate of the Inns of Court and Bar Council less easily attainable than by the American Bar Association which, in any case, appears to construe its role *vis-à-vis* the state with greater expansiveness than its British counterparts. None the less, when the Law Society and Bar Council act in concert, as in their response to the Royal Commission on Legal Services, they can be extremely forceful. Arguably, the Royal Colleges and the British Medical Association have also been less effective than the peak associations of American doctors — the nationalization of medical services being the most notable case in point — although even here the doctors did manage to preserve what is now a growing private health sector invigorated by private insurance companies.

The military is the 'most highly organized association in the state' through its imperative systems of hierarchical co-ordination. Yet it has a virtual absence of the collegial bodies characteristic of other professions.[72] The political roles of military associations, which

include veterans' groups, such as the American Legion, and services' professional societies, such as the Air Force and Army Associations and the Navy League,[73] are poorly understood, but are widely supposed to have considerable political influence in some Commonwealth countries. Both in the USA and Britain, engineering has a woeful record of united action, presumably because it has been 'broken up by the prism of history into a spectrum band of professions, each qualified by an adjective.' The thirteen major engineering institutions in England described by Gerstl and Hutton had only the loosest form of co-ordination, a situation that has resulted from the 'Balkanization' of the occupation.[74]

Councils of churches provide the principal supra-denominational means of expressing clerical opinion to government. Yet these bodies, comprising laity as well as clergy, are not purely professional organizations and their collective expression is weakened immeasurably by the 'scandal of sectarianism.' Even when trans-denominational stands are taken by the British Council of Churches or the N.C.C., those positions will frequently be at odds with their theologically more conservative counterparts — the Evangelical Alliance, the National Association of Evangelicals, and kindred inter- or supra-denominational bodies.[75]

Moreover, individual denominational leaders are equally likely to be opposed by their own laity. The official Roman Catholic position on contentious issues like abortion and birth control is quite at variance with a substantial proportion of its own adherents.[77] For conservative British commentators, the attempts of clergy to make Christianity relevant economically are said to be so much 'shallow silliness' and create a gap between 'the higher Anglican clergy and decent Englishmen.'[78] Clergy may also be alienated from clergy. One survey found only 39 per cent of ministers saw other clergy of their own denomination, and 24 per cent clergy of other denominations, more than 3 times in a given month. Neither may ecumenism prove a solution if, as Bryan Wilson has provocatively maintained, the ecumenical tendency implies 'surrender' of vital principles and therefore is a measure of a denomination's weakness — not its strength.[80]

Consequently, it appears that national political integration is largely independent of epistemology such that professions in the same epistemological class, as for instance, medicine and engineering, can have radically contrasting organizational infrastructures.

2 Professional Mobilization Solving the structural problem of political integration may contain the collapse of its own promise. The more successful a profession in its integrative goals, the greater the heterogeneity of its association's membership, and thus the more difficult will be the problem of internal decision-making and

mobilization. The internal diversity of professions has become manifest in those professions where the concept of professional community once seemed most apposite.[81] English lawyers are divided into two branches; yet divisions on the basis of class origin, gender, type of practice and client, not to mention compensation and actual legal work, have been extensively underscored.[82] Heinz and Laumann conclude that the urban American legal profession is effectively sliced into two hemispheres, one primarily serving corporate clients, the other principally occupied with individuals and personal plight.[83] Several other professions now face the critical problem of converting such occupational community as exists into a vehicle for political mobilization.

Epistemology constrains a profession's ability to mobilize such that the more normative the epistemic foundation of a profession's knowledge, the less readily it can mobilize. A narrow epistemological base confines professions, such as engineering and medicine, to a narrower spectrum of issues on which to agree, issues, furthermore, which will more often be concerned with self-regulation and economic preservation where consensus can be achieved with greater ease. Normative professions encounter two impediments to mobilization: they have a wider range of issues on which they can become engaged (moral *and* technical authority in primary *and* secondary institutional spheres); and a broader focus on moral concerns and secondary spheres brings into play conflicts of religious and political values which yield less pliantly to compromise and trade-off. Beliefs of normative professionals may also be more heterogeneous than their scientific counterparts.

Syncretic professions — the clergy and academics — exemplify this proposition. Compared to the relentless political mobilization that has characterized organized medicine, a very limited capacity for mobilization exists to bridge the theological gaps between conservative and liberal clergy, between the Moral Majority, for instance, and the mainline councils of churches. And except for the narrowest trade union considerations — and this is less so in the USA than Britain — academics show no inclination to form a single peak organization that allows coherent political mobilization consonant with their potential scope of moral or expert authority. Although academics in the USA have no lack of organizations, any impulses towards action are expressed in forms more individualistic and solitary, through ad hoc committees and occasional well-publicized petitions, than through institutionalized organizational channels.[84] Standing organizations cross-cut each other and impede associational 'coalescence' for broader collective action. The Association of University Professors (AAUP) and National Education Association focus on trade-union matters;[85] the academies — the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences — serve as societies of distinguished

scholars; disciplinary societies integrate professionals with common substantive interests; the American Council of Education and the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, among others, represent the interests of particular segments within the higher educational establishment before federal government.[86] In a metaphor comparable to Heinz and Laumann's hemispheric image, Ladd and Lipset demonstrated that academic unionism in America is a phenomenon of the 'lower tier of academe',[87] whereas certain expressive and exclusive societies — the Royal Societies and National Academies — clearly recruit from another tier altogether.

Finally, although constraints on mobilization may inhibit more normative professions, engineering demonstrates that some professions with an epistemology conducive to ready mobilization may not, for historical and other reasons, take advantage of it.

3 Coalition Formation The third problem militating against influence concerns a profession's capacity to draw organizations into coalitions. This is partly a function of the breadth of networks that exist between a profession and potential allies. Professions will have an advantage in two circumstances: when their mandate brings individual professionals into contact with a cross-section of society; and when the members of a profession participate in voluntary associations which may subsequently join political alliances. Law and medicine, a normative and scientific profession respectively, both have extensive personal contacts through practice, although in the case of law that practice is increasingly with corporate entities and they provide incremental advantages for the exercise of power. In the case of professionals in voluntary bodies, however, the available evidence suggests that normative professions have much in their favour. Engineers and doctors display nothing like the degree of associational involvement which characterizes lawyers and the clergy.[88] There are both 'push' and 'pull' factors which help account for the prominence of normative professions. Attributes common to professionals — prestige, income, leadership experience — will always be welcome to voluntary associations. In addition, however, normative professions have special organizational abilities. The skills of lawyers in dealing with rules, constitutions and laws, in coping with the labyrinthine complexities of governmental bodies, together with their experience in negotiation, parallel in certain respects the mastery of clergy in conciliatory and interpersonal activities. If there is a 'pull' factor to draw normative professionals within voluntary associations, there is also a 'push' factor from within the clergy, who may see voluntary associations as another legitimate sphere in which to work out their spiritual calling or social conscience, just as lawyers who wish to attract clients or make their way in politics are motivated by 'pull' and 'push' factors.[89]

Furthermore, because the epistemology of normative professions

gives them a wider-ranging license to influence policy in secondary institutional spheres, and they are thereby attractive to other political associations as prospective allies, normative professions have a more extensive array of inter-organizational linkages which can be mobilized for action. The third organizational factor, the ability to build coalitions, suggests two propositions for inquiry: first, the greater the breadth of individual and organizational networks in which a profession is embedded, the more extensive its potential scope of influence outside its primary institutional sphere; and second, the more normative a profession, the greater will be its external networks and thus the better equipped it will be to exert influence through coalition formation.

These propositions also appear to hold for one of the syncretic professions but not the other. The military have particularly close relations with industry, finance and politics; and the high attrition rate of the military officer corps assures the armed services that contiguous institutions will be staffed by professionals who have knowledge[90] of, and sympathy for, the military. The links of academics, by contrast, seem for the most part to be more tenuous.

The efficacy of coalitions in political representations may also be influenced by the proportion of legislators in Westminster or Congress who are drawn from a given profession. Lawyers are heavily over-represented, particularly in American state and federal legislatures, although their numbers are declining.[91] In the 1970 House of Commons there was about the same percentage (19.5 per cent) of lawyers as all other professions combined.[92] Of eighteen members in Edward Heath's Cabinet of July 1970, seven were lawyers, a proportion usually higher in Conservative than Labour Cabinets.[93] While the consequences of lawyer-politicians for professional collective action are far from clear, the commonality of skills they share with bar leaders may provide an increment of advantage not available to other professions. By contrast, both engineers and doctors are far less prominent. Indeed, Glaser concludes that 'very few physicians in recent American history have held full-time and non-medical public office.'[94]

In sum, what then of epistemology and organization? On two of the dimensions, professions in similar epistemological classes experience comparable organizational capacities or incapacities. Normative professions enjoy extensive coalitional opportunities; but they face severe problems of internal consensus. Scientific professions may have lesser difficulties with consensus; but they also have fewer opportunities for coalition formation. Epistemology, in other words, endows contradictory effects on these aspects of professional bodies. On the dimension of national political integration, organizational success appears to cross-cut epistemology, thus offering some face validity for the independent significance of organizational factors, while not

obviating entirely an approach which emphasizes the significance of knowledge mandates. Each class of professions can be divided into one profession which is highly organized and another which has a lower level of national integration. Within the scientific class, engineering is poorly organized whereas medicine is well organized;[95] within the syncretic class, the military are highly integrated (albeit in their 'work' organization) and academics are not; and within the normative class, the fractured pattern of the clergy stands in stark relief against the organizational sophistication of the lawyers.

PROFILES OF INFLUENCE

The ordering of professions along the preceding dimensions leads back to an earlier distinction — the relationship of a profession's attributes to the scope and intensity of collective professional influence. Two summary propositions may be advanced. First, a differentiation among professions in terms of the *scope* of their influence will be a principal, but not exclusive, function of *epistemology*, and its implications for authority and spheres of influence. Second, a differentiation among professions in terms of the *intensity* of influence will be a principal, but not exclusive, function of *organization*. With respect to the first proposition, it has already been implied that scientific professions, on the one hand, may have a narrower scope of influence, while normative professions, on the other hand, may have a broad scope of influence, with the military and academics having a somewhat equivocal intermediate status. That is, because a scientific epistemological base impedes the translation of technical into moral authority and largely confines such a profession to primary institutional spheres, the horizons of its influence will be severely circumscribed. The obverse case obtains for normative professions.

With respect to the second proposition, because the intensity of influence is very much a function of organization, the concentrated deployment of influence bears some independence of epistemology, subject to the proviso above that a normative profession may face more difficulty in solving its internal integrative problems. Doctors and lawyers, at opposite ends of the epistemological continuum, have both managed to exert tremendous pressure on the state to attain control of their respective markets and achieve success in their bid for upward collective mobility. Through organization, the intensity of their focus on government has had noteworthy effects, at least in the limited domain of monopoly. That intensity of influence has been noticeably absent, for the most part, in the exertions of the engineering profession or the clergy. We can suggest, then, that the greatest scope of collective professional influence will be exemplified

by the normative professions while the greatest intensity of influence will be evinced by the better organized professions.

It becomes plain there are multiple routes to professional influence. *Individual* approaches rely on the diffuse effects of professionals acting on their own behalf, a pattern most notably evinced by academics. Of collective approaches, one type proceeds through *client* organizations where work organization provides a sufficient infrastructure that the need for supplementary associations is reduced. Doctors for the most part, and even the majority of lawyers in Anglo-American countries, continue to work alone or in small firms. For either profession, collective action, to be successful, requires voluntary association. By contrast, the military are so united in their 'client' organizations that the need for complementary voluntary associations is much less pressing. It may be that there is an inverse relationship, therefore, between the degree of client organization, and voluntary or synthetic association.

Of collective approaches, another type proceeds through *synthetic* organizations — voluntary associations specifically formed to articulate interests which cannot be expressed readily through the settings in which professional work takes place. These are in turn subdivided into two discernable forms of interest articulation represented by doctors and lawyers respectively: the former, through highly developed national groups that direct an intense, but narrowly focused, effort on their objects; the latter, through equally developed national groups that exert a rather more diffuse political influence over a broad sweep of issues. The clergy represent an untidy combination of client and synthetic forms of collective action. They aspire to influence through their work organizations, if or when they are aggregated into denominational hierarchies, and they also attempt to act through synthetic organizations. Whatever their epistemological mandate, however, they fall short of the military in its client approach and short of medicine and law in their synthetic approaches.

It is clear, therefore, that medicine is an important exemplar of one — but only one — profile of collective influence. By concentrating on economic monopoly, and its successful pursuit by doctors, the efficacy of the medical model of influence is plain to see. If, however, the ends of influence and knowledge mandates are considered in the context of an eclectic group of several established professions, then it is apparent that the medical model represents a quite limited case. When the criteria upon which professions might affect the state are widened, then profiles of collective influence, typified by other professions, become more appropriate. Indeed, the central significance of the epistemological criterion for classifying professions is that professions which rely on science as their prime cognitive authority, are thereby highly confined in their breadth of putative influence. Completely and partly normative professions have variously legitimate mandates to

press government across the full range of its agenda and to persuade the public across its terrain of concerns. To emancipate the discussion of professionalism from medicine, therefore, is also to recognize that the significance of professions for the state and society cannot be exhausted with economic foci or ideological functions in the service of economic ends.

The thrust of this argument is not confined to analytic niceties. Rather, it is to maintain that an understanding of advanced western societies demands a look beyond the remunerative pretensions of professionals to the immense possibilities that normative and syncretic epistemologies endow upon certain contemporary professions when collectively organized. It must be reiterated therefore that, although my emphasis has been upon epistemology and knowledge mandates, the organizational factors that affect a profession's collective vigour demand close attention. Few professions have produced highly integrated, national cohesive peak associations or profession-wide polities. But whereas the epistemology of a profession is rather intractable and may take generations to change, the organizational dimension is amenable to manipulation and adaptation, although that may be the work of decades. Organizational and internal political processes are likely to be primary objects of professions' efforts to wield a more expansive influence.

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NOTES

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1. A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, *The Professions*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1933.

2. Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, New York, Basic Books, 1973. Cf. T. J. Johnson, *Professions and Power*, London, MacMillan, 1972.

3. See Maureen Cain, and Eliot Freidson, in Dingwall and Lewis, *The Sociology of the Professions: Lawyers, Doctors and Others*, New York, St Martin's Press, 1983.

4. Cf. Terence C. Halliday, 'Professions, Class and Capitalism', *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, vol. XXIV, 1983, pp. 321–46; N. Parry and J. Parry, *The Rise of the Medical Profession*, London, Croom Helm, 1976; Jeffrey Berlant, *Profession and Monopoly: A Study of Medicine in the United States and Great Britain*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975.

5. E. C. Banfield, *Political Influence*, New York, Free Press, 1961, pp.3–5.

6. On similarities and differences among western states, see Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983.

7. Cf. A. G. Fielding and D. Port-

wood, 'Professions and the State Towards a Typology of Bureaucratic Professions', *Sociological Review* vol. 28, 1980, pp. 23–53.

8. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 'Doctors and Lawyers: A Comment on the Theory of the Professions', in Freidson and Lorber, *Medical Men and their Work*, Chicago, Aldine-Atherton, 1972, pp. 5–19.

9. How much influence is debatable. See M. Cowling, *Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980; P. J. Wogaman, 'Churches and Legislative Advocacy', in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 446, 1979.

10. Cf. the English Royal Commission on Legal Services.

11. M. L. Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, pp. 30–1.

12. W. K. Frankena, *Ethics*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963; Klappholz, K., 'Economics and Ethical Neutrality', in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Paul Edwards, New York, 1967, Vol. 2, pp. 451–4.

13. Kai Neilson, 'Ethics, Problems of', ibid, vol. 3, pp. 117–34. On G. E. Moore's refutation of ethical naturalism, see R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964; Frankena, op. cit.

14. K. Klappholz, 'Value Judgments and Economics', *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, vol. 15, 1964, pp. 97–114; J. Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, Boston, Beacon, 1970; H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, Boston, Beacon, 1964.

15. On muddles, note Alasdair MacIntyre's characterization: '. . . every modern moral philosopher is against all modern moral philosophies except himself and his immediate allies.' In 'Why is the search for the foundations of Ethics so Frustrating?', *Hastings Center Report*, August, 1979, p. 18.

16. Edward Shils, 'Charisma, Order, and Status', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 30, 1965, pp. 199–213.

17. Eliot Freidson, *The Profession of Medicine*, New York, Dodd & Mead, 1970; Philip Elliott, *The Sociology of Professions*, New York, Herder and Herder, 1972, pp. 143 ff.

18. T. F Gieryn, 'Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 48, December 1983, pp. 781–95.

19. C. Bosk, *Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1979; C. Perrucci and J. Gerstl, *Profession without Community: Engineers in American Society*, New York, Random House, 1969; F. Zemans and V. Rosenblum, *The Making of a Public Profession*, Chicago, American Bar Foundation, 1981, pp. 123–6.

20. Cf. William Goode: 'Even if doctors do not use the full scope of scientific knowledge in normal practical medicine, they can always fall back on it or appeal to it', in Etzioni, *The Semi-Professions*, New York, Free Press, pp. 287, 289.

21. The nature of the syncretism varies: for the military, science and normative components are interwoven in doctrine; for the academy, scientific and non-scientific disciplines co-exist with limited effort at systematic integration.

22. H. C. B. Rogers, *The British Army of the Eighteenth Century*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1977; G. Harries-Jenkins, *The Army in Victorian Society*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977.

23. The military profession in this paper is identified with the officer corps.

24. Albert D. Biderman, 'The Retired Military', in Little (ed.), *Handbook of Military Institutions*, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1971, p. 153.

25. Jacques van Doorn, *The Soldier and Social Change*, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1975, p. 18ff.

26. J. S. McKitrick, 'A Military Look at Military Reform', *Comparative Strategy*, February 1983, pp. 50–62.

27. B. Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalism and Political Power*, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1972, p. 60.

28. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1960 (1971).

29. C. von Clausewitz, *On War*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Vols. I–III, London, 1949.

30. E. M. Earle (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1943; F. R. Kirkland, 'Integrating Technology and Doctrine: The French Experience', paper read at International Conference of IUSAFS, Chicago, 1983.

31. I. B. Holley, 'The Doctrinal Process: Some Suggested Steps', *Military Review*, LIX, April 1979, pp. 2–13.

32. Cf. D. W. Brogan, 'The United States: Civilian and Military Power', in Howard, *Soldiers and Governments*, Westport, Greenwood, 1957, p. 184.

33. I. B. Holley, *Ideas and Weapons*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1953, p. 14.

34. H. J. Perkin, *Key Profession: The History of the Association of University Teachers*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 227.

35. Id., pp. 227–8.

36. Talcott Parsons, 'Professions', in Sills, *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1968, vol. 12, pp. 536–47.

37. Cf., however, Ivan Illich, *Medical Nemesis*, Pelican, 1977, on the 'medicalization of life'. See W. H. G. Armytage, *A Social History of Engineering*, London, Faber and Faber, 1961; Paul Starr, *The Social Transformation of American Medicine*, New York, Basic Books, 1981.

38. See, e.g., Harold E. Quinley, *The Prophetic Clergy*, New York, Wiley, 1974.

39. Edward Norman, *Christianity and the World Order*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1979 (1978 B.B.C. Reith Lectures), p. 2.

40. Carr-Saunders and Wilson, op. cit., p. 486.

41. Everett C. Hughes, *The Sociological Eye*, Chicago, Aldine, 1971, p. 376.

42. Freidson, *Profession of Medicine*, op. cit., pp. 121–215.

43. Bosk, op. cit.

44. R. K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesman, and Cold War Crises*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. 12–13.

45. J. T. Edsall, 'Two Aspects of Scientific Responsibility', *Science*, vol. 212, April 1981, pp. 11–14.

46. Cf. F. J. Evans, 'Toward a Theory of Academic Liberalism', *Journal of Politics*, vol. 42, November 1980, pp. 993–1030; Edward Shils, 'Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectual', in *The Intellectuals and the Powers*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972.

47. F. W. Maitland, *Equity, also The Forms of Action at Common Law*, Cambridge, 1929.

48. Op. cit., 1977, pp. 12–13.

49. Philip Handler, 'Public Doubts about Science', *Science*, vol. 208, June 1980, pp. 1093ff.

50. 'Revived Dogma and New Cult', *Daedalus*, vol. 111, Winter, 1982, pp. 53–71.

51. Paul (1973), quoted in S. Ransom, A. Bryman and Bob Hinings, *Clergy, Ministers and Priests*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 62.

52. Cf. Hughes, 1971, op. cit., and Illich's argument (*Medical Nemesis*) that medicine's attempts to suppress and smother pain have displaced moral and spiritual systems of meaning.

53. Note Gilb's (*Hidden Hierarchies*, New York, Harper and Rowe, 1966, p. 153) observation that professional associations, to be effective, 'must either keep proposals narrowly technical or create an aura of impartial service to the commonwealth — preferably both'; and T. C. Halliday, 'The Idiom of Legalism in Bar Politics: Lawyers, McCarthyism and the Civil Rights Era', *American Bar Foundation Research Journal*, vol. 1982, Fall 1982, pp. 911–89.

54. Op. cit., p. 137.

55. E. Freidson, *Professional Dominance: The Social Structure of Medical Care*, Chicago, Aldine, 1970.

56. R. Jones, *Doctors and the BMA: A Case Study in Collective Action*, Westmead, Gower, 1981, p. 158.

57. *Democracy in America*, New York, Anchor, 1969, vol. 1, p. 270.

58. Albert Melone, *Lawyers, Public Policy and Interest Group Politics*, Washington, University Press of America, 1977.

59. Quoted by Norman, 1979, op. cit., pp. 22, 74.

60. P. Hebblethwaite, 'Popes and Politics: Shifting Patterns in Catholic Social Doctrine', *Daedalus*, vol. 111, Winter 1982, p. 85.

61. R. L. Stivers, 'The Sustainable Society: Religious and Social Implica-

tions', *Review of Religious Research*, vol. 21, Fall 1979, pp. 71–86.

62. S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, London, Pall Mall, 1962, p. 12.

63. Abrahamsson indicates the army is a virtual 'replica of civilian society' with its own legal, educational, transportation, health service and engineering systems, among others. Op. cit., pp. 141–2.

64. Van Doorn, op. cit., pp. 87–107; Abrahamsson, op. cit., pp. 18, 125–8, ch. 13.

65. Hansen, op. cit., 1975, p. 265.

66. Robert Nisbet, *The Degradation of the Academic Dogma: The University in America, 1945–1970*, New York, Basic Books, 1971.

67. Seymour Martin Lipset, op. cit.

68. By legitimacy I refer to the belief in the rightfulness of an *object* of action (such as professions approaching a legislature), a *mode* of action (such as the particular means by which representation to a legislature is accomplished), and the *content* of action (the particular end the profession seeks through efforts to influence government). The warrants for legitimacy inhere in attributes of the profession and they are accorded by professionals themselves, by the institution which is the object of action, and by other interested or affected parties and constituencies.

69. Berlant, 1975, op. cit.; Parry and Parry, 1976, op. cit.; Larson, 1977, op. cit. I cannot deal here with the extensive literature on collective choice theory following Mancur Olsen, *The Logic of Collective Action*, 1965.

70. Jones, *ibid.*, pp. 8–9. This has become an increasingly acute problem for the American medical profession. Cf. Paul Starr, op. cit.

71. Albert P. Blaustein and Charles O. Porter, *The American Lawyer*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954.

72. Finer, op. cit., preface; Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Charles Moskos, Jr., 'Trend Report: Armed Forces and Society', p. 21.

73. Research on military associations has been very limited. Cf. Janowitz, op. cit., pp. 257–77; and articles on military unionism in *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 4, 1976.

74. Armytage, 1961, op. cit., p. 314.

74. Joel E Gerstl and S. P. Hutton, *Engineers: The Anatomy of a Profession*, London, 1966; see also W. M. Evan, 'The Engineering Profession: A Cross Cultural Analysis', in Perrucci and Gerstl, *The Engineers and the Social System*, New York, Wiley, 1969, p. 122.

75. W. C. Roof, 'America's Voluntary Establishment: Mainline Religion in Transition', *Daedalus*, vol. 111, Winter 1982, pp. 165–84; *The Evangelicals*, edited by D. F. Wells and J. D. Woodbridge, Nashville, Abingdon, 1975.

76. Martin, op. cit., 1982:70 reports that a 1980 survey of English Roman Catholics found that about three quarters accepted artificial contraception, one-half married priests and one quarter women priests; R. P. McBrien, 'Roman Catholicism: E. Pluribus Unum', *Daedalus*, vol. 111, Winter, 1982, pp. 73.

78. Enoch Powell quoted in Maurice Cowling, op. cit., p. 437; ibid., p. 449. More generally see R Towler and A. P. M. Coxon, *The Fate of the Anglican Clergy*, London, 1979; A. J. Russell, *The Clerical Profession*, London, 1980; Ranson *et al.*, op. cit., Paul, 1964, op. cit.; 1973, op. cit.

79. Quinley, op. cit., 1974.

80. Bryan Wilson comments that '(T)he political influence of the clergy, which sometimes amounted to actual power, has also gone', and that the 'West . . . appears to have passed beyond the point at which religious teaching and practice can exercise formative influence over whole societies, or any significant segment of them'. In *Contemporary Transformations of Religion*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1979, pp. 16, 96.

81. A. H. Halsey and M. A. Trow, *The British Academics*, Harvard University Press, 1971; David Podmore, 'Bucher and Strauss Revisited — The Case of the Solicitors' Profession', *British Journal of Law and Society*, vol. 7, Summer 1980, pp. 1–21; T. C. Halliday and C. L. Cappell, 'Indicators of Democracy in Professional Associations: Elite Recruitment, Turnover, and Decision-Making in a Metropolitan Bar Association', *American Bar Foundation Research Journal*, vol. 1979, Fall

1979, pp. 699–767.

82. David Podmore, *Solicitors and the Wider Community*, London, Heinemann, 1980; Michael Zander, *The State of Knowledge about the English Legal Profession*, London, Barry Rose, 1980; John Flood, *Barristers' Clerks: The Law's Middlemen*, Manchester, MacMillan, 1983.

83. J. Heinz and Edward Laumann, *Chicago Lawyers*, Chicago and New York, Russell Sage Foundation and American Bar Foundation, 1982.

84. Academics in the USA, including Jean Kirkpatrick, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Edward Levi, George Schultz, are frequently drawn into the executive branch. Daniel Moynihan, 'The Politics of Higher Education', *Daedalus*, vol. 104, Winter 1975, p. 129, indicates that 'academics have been playing an increasing role in public affairs, much as a certain kind of lawyer does'.

85. Cf. E. V. Ladd and S. M. Lipset, *Professors, Unions and American Higher Education*, Berkeley, Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1973; J. W. Garbarino, 'Faculty Unionism: The First Ten Years', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 448, March 1980, pp. 74–85.

86. King, op. cit.; Patrick M. Morgan, 'Academia and the Federal Government', *The Policy Studies Journal*, vol. 10, September 1981, pp. 70–84.

87. 'Faculty Unions Find Greatest Support on Most Conservative Campuses', *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, February 2, 1976, p. 14.

88. Systematic comparisons of professions are rare, but see Podwell, 1980, op. cit., pp. 57; Perrucci and Gerstl, 1969, op. cit.; C. Smith and A. Freedman, *Voluntary Associations*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972, ch. 6; W. A. Glaser, 'Doctors and Politics', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66, 1960, pp. 230–45.

89. Cf., David Podmore, 'Lawyers and Politics', *British Journal of Law and Society*, vol. 4, Winter 1977, pp. 155–85.

90. Biderman, op. cit.

91. H. Eulau and J. D. Sprague, *Lawyers in Politics*, 1964.

92. W. L. Guttsman, 'The British Political Elite and the Class Structure', in Stanworth and Giddens, *Elites and Power in British Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 28, Table 1.

93. Podmore, 1977, op. cit., p. 156.

94. Glaser, op. cit., p. 233.

95. Note that a profession such as engineering may have a very high degree of national integration in one or other of its constituent specialties without the profession at large achieving a commensurate level of collegial unity.

Jennifer Platt

Weber's *verstehen* and the history of qualitative research: the missing link[1]

ABSTRACT

Weber's name is commonly invoked in connection with qualitative research methods. This association is historically misleading about the process of emergence of participant observation and its predecessors at the University of Chicago. Many American sociologists did not read German well, and some key works were not translated until after World War II. Before then, those actively interested in his work and promoting it were theorists or especially interested in German sociology. Interviews and documentary sources show that he was not influential in American sociology generally or in qualitative research before the war. It is argued that one reason for Weber's lack of influence on qualitative researchers was that there were American theorists, in particular Cooley, who were much more widely known at the time and whose ideas could serve some of the same purposes. The importance commonly attached to Weber now has been projected backwards to suggest a process of intellectual influence which did not actually occur. The importance of studying social relations as well as intellectual content when imputing influences is emphasized.

The name of Weber is commonly invoked in connection with qualitative research methods emphasizing understanding, of which participant observation tends to be seen as the archetype.[2] This paper argues that this is a historically misleading association, and that the importance now attached to Weber's work has blotted out both the much lesser importance attached to it at the relevant times and places, and the availability of functionally alternative theorists whose work actually was influential. Many of the points made will not be novel to Weber specialists; but it may, none the less, be useful to bring them together in relation to this issue.

Detailed documentation of the extent to which the association with Weber has been made will not be attempted; it is a theme which is

sufficiently 'in the air' to make this unnecessary. A few sources will, however, be drawn on to show some of the ways in which the connection is made. Bruyn in his important book on participant observation invokes Weber as a key representative of the tradition on which he focuses.[3] McCall and Simmons, in the introduction to the first section of their useful reader on participant observation,[4] see controversy over the value of *verstehen* as important in the décade 1920–30; Filstead in the introduction to his similar reader[5] equates the tradition of *verstehen* with qualitative methodology and cites Weber as his first reference on it. Easthope,[6] and Ackroyd and Hughes,[7] in their more strictly historical works, both convey the impression that Weber was relied on at a later period to a much greater extent than he really was through a simple historical error. Each correctly quotes an article by Howard P. Becker[8] as strongly emphasizing the importance of Weberian method, but wrongly imputes it to the well-known advocate and theorist of participant observation Howard S. Becker (no relation to the senior Becker).[9] John Hughes in his methods textbook[10] invokes Weber as articulating the rationale for participant observation. Plummer, in his book on the life history,[11] describes the tradition which emphasizes the necessity of grasping subjects' own perspectives as extending 'all the way at least from Weber's notion of *verstehen*. . .', and then immediately mentions as a central figure in clarifying this position Znaniecki in *The Polish Peasant*.[12] In such sources, the line between retrospectively providing a rationale and historically having given the inspiration is easily blurred, and even when they make the distinction clearly one has the impression that it is the collocation rather than its precise context which sticks in the notes and minds of most students.

Crucial steps in the emergence of qualitative research methods are generally agreed to have taken place at the University of Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s, and then more specifically in the elaboration of participant observation as a distinct method in the decade following World War II, and classic exemplars were produced there; the argument will, therefore, focus mainly on that body of work, and on the extent to which Weber's '*verstehende soziologie*' was known to those producing it, drawn on by them in their thinking about it, and was necessary to produce the research outcomes.

KNOWLEDGE OF WEBER

For Weber to have been influential, he must first have been known. For anyone who did not read German, his major relevant works were only directly accessible after World War II. The dates of the English translations are: *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 1930;[13] *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 1946;[14] *The Theory of Social and*

Economic Organization, 1947;[15] *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, 1949.[16] (Indirect access through secondary sources is, of course, also possible; this is discussed below.) Some American sociologists could read German, but certainly not all of them, and not all of those would have been able to grapple with Weber's notoriously difficult language. No systematic data are available on this point, but some suggestive statements by knowledgeable people may be cited:

(i) Edward Shils says that in the 1920s some of the older generation had studied in Germany, but the younger had not — and later on American academics could commonly read no language but their own.[17]

(ii) Robert Angell, a graduate student at Michigan in the early 1920s, reports that, although French and German were required, what sociologists writing in those languages had to say was generally learned from secondary sources; he himself went to Heidelberg in 1938 to read Weber in the original, feeling that he could only grapple with the difficulties in such a conducive environment.[18,19]

(iii) Parsons and Barber, writing in 1948, say: 'Max Weber's work, which is more recent in its influence in this country, has been handicapped by the fact that hitherto only fragments have been available in English translation, and few American scholars are competent to read his difficult German'.[20]

It would no doubt also have helped Weber's influence within sociology, without being a necessary condition for it, if he had been generally regarded as a sociologist — rather than as an economic historian or an economist — which, in the earlier period, he was not. The very earliest translation into English was that by Frank H. Knight, an institutional economist, of the *General Economic History* in 1927. Of the items in the Gerth bibliography (see note 49) not by authors named below which appeared before 1930 the great majority are in non-sociological journals or, if books, by non-sociologists. (Apart from those which are obituaries or reviews of recent German work, the majority relate specifically to *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.)

But, despite this, some sociologists in America did read Weber and did publicize his views; who were they, and what did they do? One of the earliest interpreters was Theodore Abel. He came across Weber quite accidentally: a fellow-student when he was a graduate student at Columbia was, for some reason, given the works of Weber, could not read German himself, and so passed them on to Abel who, as a Pole of German origins who came to America only as a graduate student, spoke it fluently. Abel was deeply impressed by what he read and incorporated a section on Weber into his thesis, published in 1929 as *Systematic Sociology in Germany*, as well as writing later articles on Weber.[21] Alexander von Schelting, the author of a study in German of Weber's thought very warmly reviewed by Parsons,[22] came to

Columbia in the late 1920s[23] and presumably taught about Weber, though he does not appear to have written much on him in English. Sorokin, a Russian refugee and then at Minnesota, gave an extended and respectful discussion of Weber's ideas in his *Contemporary Sociological Theories*[24] in 1928. Howard P. Becker was of German origin, although born in America, and studied towards his Ph.D. at Cologne with Paul Honigsheim in the later 1920s; he taught for much of his career at Wisconsin, and published a lot on Weber (and other German sociologists, especially von Wiese).[25] Honigsheim was German, and took his Ph.D. at Heidelberg, where he was a member of Weber's inner circle; he reached the USA, at Michigan State University, in 1938, and continued to write and teach about Weber.[26] Talcott Parsons went to Heidelberg in 1925 as a graduate student, and discovered Weber's work there;[27] on his return he both translated and wrote about Weber's work. Albert Salomon was another German who took his Ph.D. at Heidelberg, in 1921; he came to America in the New School for Social Research in the mid-1930s publishing some important articles on Weber in its journal *Social Research* in 1934–5.[28] Carl Mayer, another German refugee and member of the New School, did not publish much but is described in a memorial issue of *Social Research* as 'the lifelong bearer of Weber's sociology to successive generations of students at the New School for Social Research.'[29] Hans Speier, who wrote a number of articles on Weber, took his Ph.D. at Heidelberg in 1928 and was by 1933 at the New School. Hans Gerth, who translated and wrote about Weber, was born in Germany, studied at Heidelberg in 1927–9, reached the USA and a teaching post at Illinois in 1939–40 and then went to Wisconsin. Reinhard Bendix left Germany in 1938; a friend gave him Weber's *Economy and Society* as a going-away present, and in consequence he discovered Weber after reaching America.[30] The discovery led him to become an important Weber scholar.[31]

The general pattern is clear: the proponents of Weber spoke German well, had usually done graduate work in Germany (especially at Weber's own university, Heidelberg — see Parsons[32] on the 'Weber circle' in Heidelberg even after his death), and were most often of German origin.[33] They wrote about Weber in English from the later 1920s onwards, but it was not until the late 1930s that more than a handful of them were active in the USA. They taught at Harvard, Columbia, Wisconsin and the New School for Social Research, all well-regarded graduate schools but not known for their qualitative empirical research. The centre of work on Weber was in New York, at Columbia — the traditional centre of quantitative work, as contrasted with Chicago's qualitative style — and the New School, heavily theoretical in its concerns. A majority of them were theorists rather than researchers who would themselves produce exemplary research work that might have served as models. Honigsheim[34] and Shils[35] are

clearly right when they suggest that before the war it was primarily those who had some special interest in German sociology who gave close attention to Weber. But their works were published and they taught students, so they must have diffused knowledge of him more widely.

WEBER'S INFLUENCE

How well known and influential did Weber's work become as a result of the advocacy and exposition of these men? Three kinds of evidence can be brought to bear on the question: statements by participants or informed commentators, archival data, and references in published work. First, some statements by participants in qualitative work. In interviews with a number of those who were in the Chicago department or involved with qualitative research in the 1920s and 1930s, or involved in the later efflorescence of participant observation, I raised the question of Weber's significance to them, and received the following answers. Ruth Shonle Cavan (Ph.D. Chicago 1926) said she was probably not aware of Weber as a student, and did not think the idea of *verstehen* had any influence in relation to the case-study method.[36] L. S. Cottrell (Ph.D. Chicago 1933) says that Weber was mentioned as one among other theorists, but without special emphasis or attention to his methodology.[37] Herbert Blumer (Ph.D. Chicago 1928) confirms this impression, saying that although people in the department knew the work they did not really understand the ideas, and were not methodologically sophisticated.[38] Faris, in his participant's book on the Chicago department, does not mention Weber, although Durkheim is referred to.[39] Philip Hauser (Ph.D. Chicago 1938) gives a somewhat different impression, but there is reason to believe that this testimony blurs periods whose differences are important for this paper.[40] Hauser, too, was primarily a demographer, as contrasted with the others working in more qualitative styles, and to the extent that we are concerned with actual rather than potential influences their perceptions are more relevant for our purposes. (Two graduates of Minnesota, a methodologically self-conscious but very quantitatively oriented department, give a yet stronger impression of the lack of interest in Weber there. C. A. Anderson (Ph.D. 1932) saw all systematic rationale for qualitative method as the postwar product of the influx of German refugees;[41] William Sewell (Ph.D. 1939) says he did not read a word of Weber as a graduate student.[42] Anderson 1984; Sewell 1984.)

Coming to the later period, William F. Whyte said that he did not read any Weber until he had finished the fieldwork on *Streetcorner Society*,[43] and ideas on *verstehen* were not salient to him in relation to participant observation.[44] Anselm Strauss (Ph.D. Chicago 1946), Howard Becker (Ph.D. Chicago 1951) and Robert Habenstein (Ph.D.

Chicago 1954), all committed to qualitative work and participant observation, agree that when they were graduate students they knew of Weber's translated work and the word *verstehen* but it did not make any particular impact. *The Structure of Social Action* on Weber was used as a cribbing device to pass theory exams,[45] and recent Weber translations were used more as ammunition when required in argument than as a significant influence.[46] Herbert Gans (M.A. Chicago 1950) said Weber was taught in theory, and thought of as concerned with capitalism, class and power and value-free sociology, but he has never read him on *verstehen* and does not think he ever heard of that then.[47] Murray Wax (Ph.D. Chicago 1959) does not recall significant reference to verstehen in the classes of Blumer or Hughes in 1951.[48] Raymond Gold (Ph.D. Chicago 1954), another committed qualitative researcher, on the other hand, says that he was taught about Weber on fieldwork courses.[49] The Chicago department was large and varied enough for it to be possible for people passing through it at the same time to have divergent experiences, but this difference seems more likely to be a personal one. It seems safe to conclude that, although by the postwar period Weberian ideas were much more current than before, *verstehen* was by no means an important part of the inspiration of participant observation and fieldwork.

Among those with more theoretical interests, Weber was not necessarily better known in the earlier period. Parsons, when he went to Heidelberg as a graduate student in 1925, had never heard of Weber.[50] Abel's book on Weber and three other German sociologists says that 'the works of the writers discussed, excepting Simmel's, are comparatively unknown in this country. . .'[51] Re-analysis of data collected by L. L. Bernard in 1927 on who American sociologists claimed to have been influenced by showed none mentioning Weber.[52] Well-informed commentators agree that it was only later that he became generally influential even among those with theoretical interests: Bendix and Roth say that Weber's reception did not become significant until the 1940s;[53] Roscoe and Gisela Hinkle refer to Weber as arousing interest in the late 1930s;[54] Bierstedt says that Weber was not a great name in the USA until Parsons gave him fame and that 'the history of American sociological theory up to Parsons is as independent of Durkheim and Weber as it is of Marx. To most of our Americans the holy trinity is neither holy nor a trinity';[55] Shils also argues that Weber had been largely unknown to indigenous American sociologists until Parsons took him up.[56]

If we turn now to references in published work, it is obviously impossible to undertake a complete review, but some strategic observations may be made. First, no reference to Weber has been found in the classic Chicago qualitative empirical studies.[57,58,59] Park and Burgess' famous *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924)[60] has

only three references to Weber, none of them involving discussion in the text (Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer are mentioned more often); Bernard's (1934) compendium reviewing the field[61] has references to Weber only in the chapter by H. P. Becker, despite the obvious opportunities provided by other chapters on 'The field and problems of the sociology of religion', 'The sources and methods of the sociology of religion' and 'The sources and methods of historical sociology'.

Weber appears in Appendix E of Rice's 1931 compendium *Methods in Social Science*[62] where books and articles of importance in sociological method and standpoint are listed, but it is his *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* which is picked out, under the subheading 'History of Social Institutions'. A series of important textbooks on research methods, chosen to include the major ones of the period paying special attention to qualitative methods,[63,64,65,66] have no index references to Weber — even though Odum and Jocher have specific chapters on economic and historical approaches, and Bogardus refers to Weber elsewhere as a social thinker.[67]

A sequence of publications listing the most widely cited authors in general textbooks, and sometimes also other sources, has been examined, with the rollowing results:

(i) Hart, investigating who were regarded as the most important social thinkers, did not find Weber mentioned enough to be even included on his list.[68]

(ii) Odum does not have Weber on his list of authors mentioned 20 or more times in textbooks published from 1883 to 1951.[69]

(iii) Levine *et al.* find no reference to Weber at all in 5 selected sociology texts published over the period 1924–33.[70]

(iv) In three consecutive postwar studies of the authors mentioned in 10 recent leading introductory textbooks Weber appears in these positions: mentioned 50 times in four texts, with those most mentioned scoring 108[71]; mentioned 115 times in nine texts, ranking second only to Merton[72]; mentioned 98 times in seven texts, after Parsons, Merton and Lipset.[73]

(v) In a study of citations in the *American Sociological Review* and *American Journal of Sociology* in 1955 and 1970 Weber does not appear among the 26 most cited authors in 1955, while he is fifth on the list with 17 citations in 1970.[74] An analysis of the extremely thorough Weber bibliography produced by Gerth and Gerth in 1949 shows only 17 works in English before the 1930s, as compared with 183 in German.[75]

Thus these sources too confirm the impression that Weber's influence was not significantly diffused before the 1940s, which is at least consistent with the suggestion made by several writers that Parsons, and particularly his *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), played a crucial role in making Weber's ideas salient to the general sociological public in America.[76,77,78,79]

Pure ignorance of Weber's work no doubt made a significant contribution to this neglect, but it does not alone provide a sufficient explanation. Some central figures who were *not* ignorant of his work, but were important in inspiring qualitative research, did not make any use of his ideas in that connection. Robert Park, the central figure guiding the early Chicago research, worked at Harvard in 1898 when Munsterberg, a friend and former colleague of Weber's at Freiburg who was responsible for inviting him to the U.S.A. in 1904,[80] was there in the same department, and took his Ph.D. at Heidelberg in 1904 when Weber was there. He thus had some of the personal contacts, as well as the linguistic skills, which might have led him to take an active interest in Weber's work — but clearly they did not do so to more than a very limited extent. Robert Angell, who was Cooley's nephew as well as graduate student, reports that although Cooley could read German well, and was responsible for ordering *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* for the University of Michigan library, he did not suggest to his students that they study Weber: 'I really believe that he did not see them [the statement also covers Durkheim and Pareto] as central figures in the development of sociology'.[81]

One might speculate that, for writers to become considered really important, it is among the necessary conditions that their work be relatively easily available and that a few people in the field actively expound and publicize it, but that to complete the set of conditions jointly sufficient to produce the end result something else, which might weakly be labelled '*Zeitgeist*' or 'readiness', is required. What that might consist of in this case, which was present by the 1940s but not earlier, is a fascinating question, but beyond the scope of this paper. (However, an alternative explanation of the observed outcome could be simply that it takes time for exposition and publicity to have its effect, and that it was only by the later 1940s that the efforts of Weber's early supporters had had the time.)

INFLUENCE OF ALTERNATIVE THEORISTS

Why, when it might seem that there was such a good fit between Weber's methodological ideas and the intellectual interests and needs of qualitative researchers, was there so little interest in them among this group? I suggest that one prime reason is the existence of alternative and more familiar theorists who satisfied those intellectual needs. (This implies that to explain the neglect of Weber in terms of the *content* of his relevant ideas is unsatisfactory to the extent that they overlapped, or were felt to overlap, with those of these other theorists.) There were home-grown theorists, well-known to all American sociologists before the war and particularly to those at

Chicago, who provided whatever theoretical inspiration and justification was needed for qualitative research: Dewey, Mead, Thomas, and perhaps especially Cooley. Dewey, Mead and Thomas were all members of the Chicago faculty, and Cooley was at nearby Michigan (where Dewey and Mead were for a short time his colleagues[82]) and in close contact with Chicago.[83]

If we return to the sources of evidence used earlier, we may trace the greater significance of Cooley's influence in the earlier period. Faris refers frequently to him, along with Dewey, Mead and Thomas.[84] Park and Burgess have 26 index references to Cooley, of which 5 are to passages directly quoted.[85] Odum found Cooley mentioned in more textbooks than any other author, and second only to Park and Burgess in the total number of references.[86]

Levine *et al.*[87] report that Cooley was the author most often mentioned as influencing them by Bernard's sample, with 56 mentions from 258 sociologists, and that he was referred to from 7 to 49 times in the textbooks studied. Hart did not find Cooley in a leading position, but he scored 37 per cent of the maximum possible on the index used.[88] (Top scorers were Spencer, Comte, Ward, Ross, Giddings.) Bain found Cooley mentioned 68 times in 8 different texts.[89] Only in the studies of work published from 1963 onwards[90,91,92] does Weber take the lead — a very marked one — over Cooley. (Thomas figures in none of these lists.)

The Bernard *Fields and Methods* volume cites Cooley 13 times in five different chapters;[93] among the methods texts, Cooley is referred to by all but one: by Odum and Jocher, nine times;[94] by Young, 13 times;[95] and, most significantly, by Palmer, the one arising directly from the Chicago work, only three times, but always very precisely in the context of the case study.[96] (Table I summarizes these data for Weber and Cooley.) The earliest source found which explicitly cites Weber on *verstehen* in relation to a discussion of concrete methods of qualitative empirical research is House in 1936, and this is only in a footnote.[97]

In the interviews from the prewar Chicago department, Ruth Cavan mentions *The Polish Peasant* and Cooley as methodologically important,[98] Cottrell mentions Thomas and Mead,[99] Hauser cites Cooley and Mead as among those authors one was expected to read[100] and Herbert Blumer sees Thomas and Park as influential on method, with the general ethos being one of 'getting out and getting close to what one wished to study' rather than of theorizing about refinements of method.[101] Perhaps surprisingly, the interviews from the postwar department still give the same impression: Howard Becker and Robert Habenstein agreed that Cooley and other writers in that tradition were more important than Weber,[102] and Anselm Strauss said

TABLE I Mentions of Weber and Cooley in various sources

Sources and date(s) referred to	Weber	Cooley
Key Chicago textbook:		
Park & Burgess 1924	3	26
Studies of textbooks.		
Hart c. 1927	below minima for	37% of maximum
Odum 1883–1951	inclusion on lists	434 in 37 texts
Levine *et al*, 1924–33	0	114
Bain 1958–1962	50	68
Oromaner 1963–1967	115	46
Swatos & Swatos 1968–1972	98	41
Influences mentioned by sociologists:		
Levine *et al.*, 1927	0	56
Compendium reviewing field:		
Bernard 1934	5 (all in one chapter)	13 (in 5 chapters)
Important methods textbooks:		
Palmer 1928	0	3
Odum & Jocher 1929	0	9
Bogardus 1936	0	0
Young 1939	0	13
Study of articles in *ASR* and *AJS*.		
Oromaner. 1955	0	0
1970	17	0

> *Verstehen* was a word we knew, and there were some articles on it, but I think that stuff didn't make any particular impact on it, except that it was like Cooley's sympathetic introspection, Park, Mead and the whole business — it didn't mean anything special. We did read Dilthey.[103]

Gans and Gold give more empirically oriented lists, with an emphasis on community studies.[104,105] William Whyte mentioned only anthropological writers as influential on his fieldwork, along with the 'interactionist' (n.b. *not* 'symbolic interactionist') ideas then being developed at Harvard.[106]

It must be concluded that the native American tradition was of much greater practical importance than Weberian ideas in the emergence of qualitative empirical research.[107] Several writers have pointed out that Cooley had independently reached a methodological position similar to Weber's on *verstehen* by the early 1900s.[108,109,110] His works expounding that position appeared from 1918–1928, and his ideas were of course also transmitted by informal networks and exemplified in his substantive publications.[111,112,113,114,115]

Their general gist was to advocate the importance of sympathetic

insight or understanding, and of a holistic and qualitative case-study approach involving close observation and the use of life histories. His introduction of the concept of 'primary group', and emphasis on its importance, was obviously useful and congenial to empirical research. W. I. Thomas, although his only major work on method was the famous 'Methodological Note' written with Znaniecki in *The Polish Peasant*,[116] provided several practical exemplars of empirical work, all of which were influential. There were also, of course, other American writers in the same tradition, both theoretical and empirical. If we look at the actual methods used, they are the 'case study', the life-history and other 'personal documents', and direct observation, as advocated and/or practiced by Cooley and Thomas, rather than the historical work in which Weber exemplified his own principles and for which he is and was best known.[117] Thus even though it was in principle possible for the work of Weber to have been drawn on for inspiration, it was in practice unnecessary in the sense that adequate functional alternatives nearer to home were readily to hand.[118] Strauss, quoted above, is not alone in having seen this aspect of Weber's though primarily in terms of its similarity to Cooley. Read Bain (a theorist, and well known for the breadth of his reading) was reading Weber in German in 1930, and wrote in a letter to a friend 'As nearly as I can get the drift of the first 10 pages or so, his verstehende soziologie is something like Cooley's sympathetic insight. . .'.[119] Anyone already familiar with Cooley's work was likely to detect the similarity, to see the ideas as not altogether novel, and possibly for that reason not to give them great attention.

DISCUSSION

Whether it is in some sense intellectually essential for appropriate theoretical/methodological positions to have been elaborated to provide a foundation for empirical work is not obvious. It may help, but abstract methodological programmes do not invariably bear fruit, and there is some tendency for theoretical/methodological writing to be done by different people from empirical work and for each group to direct its main attention inwards rather than outwards. (I have been struck, in interviewing a number of members of the early Chicago department, by the extent to which this group, commonly seen by others as representing a methodological school, do not themselves treat method as a very salient aspect of what was going on; the main focus of interest was more often on the substantive problem.) One could construct a plausible argument which saw the methods of early Chicago qualitative research as inspired largely by Park's experience as a newspaperman, combined with the influence of existing social-work practices and the large body of data they made available — and

later empirical works as inspired by the earlier ones. This point would hold whether or not theorists are actually invoked in the public work; that can be obeisance to academic convention, or striving for retrospective legitimation, as much as an indication of real intellectual foundations.

The neglect of Cooley in Britain, and the enormous attention paid to Weber, are part of the mysterious processes by which a discipline selects (and reselects) who to regard as its founding fathers, as well as a simple matter of parochialism. This selection is a matter of normative choice, not just of historical description, and as such tends to interfere with accurate historical description.[120] There is always the danger of projecting current preoccupations backwards, looking for what one knows is 'important', and taking intellectual compatibility of standpoint as *prima facie* evidence of influence. (It seems curious that no one working in this style has yet explored the thesis that Cooley was a crucial influence on Weber.)[121,122] This goes together with a tendency to use key names as labels for any position that can be identified as having some resemblance to theirs — as when, for instance, anyone writing on stratification who takes status into account is referred to as Weberian. Such ascriptions provide convenient classificatory devices and mnemonics for teaching, but do not contribute to our understanding of the social processes of intellectual history.

It seems possible that another reason for the British neglect of an important American tradition in this connection is the fact that there is no British equivalent to the American sociological social psychology, which was exceptionally strong at Chicago but by no means confined to that department; over the years, members of the American Sociological Association when invited to specify their main interests have regularly put 'social psychology' in the lead.[123,124] All the influential figures referred to above are commonly described in American sources as 'social psychologists', although their formal affiliations were with departments of sociology (Cooley, Thomas), philosophy (Mead, Dewey) or education (Dewey). Against that background, the idea of understanding motives and subjective meanings is automatically associated with 'social psychology.' (It is hard to imagine a British thesis, like that of Bensman, entitled 'Max Weber as a social psychologist: a critical study.'[125]) British sociology, when theoretically inclined, has had a more structural and macroscopic orientation which makes Weber seem a much more natural reference point.

The material reviewed in this paper might suggest a more general point about the ways in which intellectual influences are transmitted. It has been shown that almost all of the active early proponents of Weber in America had some kind of social connection, direct or indirect, with Weber himself and/or with Germany. It has also been

shown that there were social connections, such as membership of the same university, among the researchers influenced and those who influenced them. It seems likely that such social contacts and connections, whatever the precise mechanisms of their operation, certainly facilitate influence, though they do not ensure it. At any given period there are a large number of potential influences, present or past, many of which may overlap in the possibilities they suggest, but not all of which are equally accessible or likely to become actual influences in a particular case. Several different patterns of influence could be causally sufficient to have produced the observed outcome. To understand influence processes we must look not only at intellectual content, but also at social relations.[126] To look only at similarities in the content of ideas always has weaknesses as a method of study of influence, but these are particularly striking when there are alternative sources available for similar intellectual content.

CONCLUSION

In sum, it is concluded that there is no evidence that Weber's ideas on method had significant influence on those involved at formative stages in the development of qualitative research methods in the USA. His work was not widely known until the 1940s; before then, those who took an active interest in it at all did so as part of a special interest in Germany, and most of them were primarily known as general theorists. Others who knew his work, especially those relatively close to empirical research, did not treat it as especially important or as standing out from the work of many others now hardly mentioned. At the same time there were other writers on methodology and exemplars of research, of a kind adequate and sufficient to inspire and legitimate qualitative research, who were much more widely known, cited and defined as important and relevant. The link with Weber is missing.

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NOTES

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2. This perception is anachronistic for the earlier period, when 'participant observation' in the modern sense had not emerged as a distinct entity, the obser-

vation done by participants did not lay special stress on empathy or understanding, and the concepts used for the qualitative methods then current were 'case study' and 'personal documents'. For detailed discussion of this, see Jennifer Platt, 'The development of the "participant observation" method in sociology: origin myth and history', *Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences*, vol. 19, no. 4, October 1983, pp. 379–93.

3. Severyn T. Bruyn, *The Human Perspective in Sociology*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp. 2–9.

4. George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons, *Issues in Participant Observation*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1969, p. 2.

5. William J. Filstead, *Qualitative Methodology*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1970, p. 4.

6. Gary Easthope, *History of Social Research Methods*, London, Longman, 1974, p. 99.

7. S. Ackroyd and J. A. Hughes, *Data Collection in Context*, London, Longman, 1981, p. 115.

8. Howard P. Becker, 'Interpretive sociology and constructive typology' in G. Gurvitch and W. E. Moore, *Twentieth Century Sociology*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1945, pp. 70–95.

9. The younger Becker had in 1945 not yet got his BA, and his style is very dissimilar from that of the older Becker, so the error is in some ways surprising. It is interesting how such a confusion can lead to over-interpretation of a text. Gary Easthope (op. cit.) imputes to the older Becker a specific point about the superiority of participant observation, to which I am unable to detect any reference. The passage which he probably has in mind (H. P Becker, op. cit. note 8, pp. 72–4) appears to refer, in so far as it is clear on the matter, to external observation and the exercise of empathy ('the interpreter puts himself in the place of the actor as best he can. . .').

10. John A. Hughes, *Sociological Analysis: Methods of Discovery*, London, Nelson, 1976, p. 116.

11. K. Plummer, *Documents of Life*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1983, p. 66.

12. W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press (vols. I, II), Boston, Badger, (vols III-V), 1918–20.

13. M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, tr. Parsons, London, Allen & Unwin, 1930.

14. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946.

15. M. Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, tr. Henderson & Parsons, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press and The Falcon's Wing Press, 1947.

16. M. Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trs. Shils & Finch, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1949.

17. E. Shils, *The Calling of Sociology*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 102.

18. R. C. Angell, Autobiography, 'Science and values in a sociologist's career', box 3, Robert Angell papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, 1970, p. 9.

19. R. C. Angell, 'The joys of modest success', *Society*, vol. 18, 1980, pp. 72–81.

20. T. Parsons and B. Barber, 'Sociology 1941–6', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 53, no. 4, January 1948, pp. 235–57; p. 254.

21. T. Abel, interview, September 1983.

22. T. Parsons, review of A. von Schelting, *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre*, *American Sociological Review*, vol. 1, no. 4, August 1936, pp. 675–81.

23. See note 21.

24. P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, New York, Harper, 1928, pp. 673–84.

25. H. H Gerth, obituary of H. P. Becker, *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, no. 5, October 1960, pp. 743–5.

26. J. A. Beegle and R. H. Schulze, obituary of P. Honigsheim, *American Sociological Review*, vol. 28, no. 4, August 1963, pp. 629–30.

27. T. Parsons, 'The circumstances of my encounter with Max Weber', in R. K. Merton and M. W. Riley, *Sociological Traditions from Generation to Generation*, Norwood, N.J., Ablex, 1980, pp. 37–43.

28. A. J. Salomon, 3 articles on the

thought of Max Weber, *Social Research*, vol. 1, no. 2, May 1934, pp. 147–68; vol. 2, no. 1, February 1935, pp. 60–73, vol. 2, no. 3, August 1935, pp. 368–84.

29. A. J. Vidich, 'Editor's introduction', *Social Research*, vol. 42, Winter 1975, pp 567–9.

30. R. Bendix, 'Western Europe as the object and source of social science research', *Social Research*, vol. 46, Winter 1979, pp. 787–804, p. 787.

31. These names were chosen because they were among the translators of Weber, and/or are referred to by others as significant in propagating knowledge of his works. Edward Shils should also be included on the list, but is excluded by the absence of any information about his career in the usual works of reference. Louis Wirth, whose name some might expect to appear on it, has been excluded on the ground of testimony by a colleague from personal acquaintance in the 1930s, and of the lack of reference to Weber in his teaching materials at appropriate points. E.g. his question for an exam in History of Sociology set in 1928: 'State the chief contributions to sociology of 6 of the following: Wundt, Ratzel, Ratzenhofer, Gumplowicz, Simmel, Von Wiese, Tönnies, Durkheim, Tarde, Le Bon, De Grey, Wallas, Hobhouse, Ward, Cooley, Ross, Giddings, Thomas.'[1] (Park papers, Special Collections Department, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago: Addenda, Box 1, folder 4). (cf also note 40.) Sources of biographical information used include, in addition to those cited in the text, *American Men of Science: The Social and Behavioral Sciences*, The Jacques Cattell Press, R. R. Bowker, New York, vols. 10 (1962), and 11 (1968); David L. Sills (ed), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* and *Biographical Supplement*, vol 18, Macmillan and Free Press, New York, 1968 and 1979; *Who's Who in America 1980–81*, and the membership lists of the American Sociological Association

32. Op. cit., note 27, p 40.

33. Cf Levine *et al.* 'Simmel's influence on American sociology', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 81, no. 4, January, 1976, pp 813–44, p. 820) on the American sociologists who promoted Simmel.

34. P Honigsheim, *On Max Weber*, New York, Free Press, 1968, p. 145.

35. Shils, op. cit., note 17, p. 154.

36. R. S. Cavan, interview, September 1982.

37. L. S. Cottrell, interview, September 1982.

38. H. Blumer, interview, September 1982.

39. Robert E. L. Faris, *Chicago Sociology 1920–32*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967.

40. Philip M. Hauser, interview, September 1982. Hauser's own papers are deposited in the University of Chicago's archives (Hauser Papers, Special Collections Department, Joseph Regenstein Library) and these include many from his time as a student. The negative evidence there includes: (i) Notes on the history of sociology, with no mention of Weber (Box 21, folder 10); (ii) Notes on the history of sociology, in which Weber is described as 'primarily economist', and the total of three-quarters of a page devoted to him contains no reference to method (box 22, folder 1); (iii) in a set of sheets each listing some key names under a heading, the following: 'Methodology // Savigny, Maine, Niebuhr, Ranke, Menger, Comte, Spencer, Simmel, Durkheim, Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Tönnies, Pareto; 'Verein für Sozialpolitik // Scholler [sic], Wagner, Knies.' The dates in the bibliography suggest that this course was taught c.1932 (Box 22, folder 1); (iv) an apparent term paper, on the question 'What seem to you to be the important European ancestors of American sociology?', which refers to other German sociologists but not Weber (Box 22, folder 2); long and detailed typed notes on Wirth's 1932 course 'History of Sociology in the US', referring to the general importance of European influences but not mentioning Weber (Box 22, folder 2). Weber on *verstehen* appears on the reading list for Park's 1932 course 'Methods of Social Research' — though low down — but not anywhere that I could detect in the notes from it (Box 23, folder 7). However, in response to a draft copy of this paper Professor Hauser has sent me a copy of some notes

on Weber (not deposited in the archives), which he made in 1932–5 when working towards his Ph.D. exam. These do mention *verstehen*, and stress the emphasis on the understanding of meaning as one of the defining characteristics of Weber's position. (At two places his view is compared with Cooley's.) This document, unlike the others, suggests that Weber was taken seriously as a leading theorist, though it throws no light on whether his views were treated as relevant to current research. In all relevant reading lists etc. from *after* the war Weber appears and is treated as important.

This detail is laboured, both because of the importance of taking evidence counter to one's thesis seriously, and because it illustrates well a point relevant to that thesis. Those of us with shorter professional careers may invent a plausible history which looks right from our present standpoint; those who experienced the history personally may still rework it unconsciously to fit later intellectual development, perhaps especially on points not central to our own concerns.

41. C. A. Anderson, interview, February 1984.

42. W. Sewell, oral presentation at Midwest Sociological Society meeting, April 1984, on graduate school experience in the 1930s.

43. W. F. Whyte, *Streetcorner Society*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1943.

44. W. F. Whyte, interview, September 1982.

45. A. Strauss, interview, September 1982.

46. H. S. Becker and R. Habenstein, joint interview, September 1982.

47. H. Gans, interview, May 1984.

48 M. Wax, personal letter, May 1984.

49. R. L. Gold, interview, February 1984.

50. Parsons, op. cit., note 27, p. 39.

51. Theodore Abel, *Systematic Sociology in Germany*, 1929, reprinted New York, Octagon Books, 1965.

52. D. E. Sutherland, 'Who now reads European sociology? Reflections on the relationship between European and American sociology', *Journal of the History of Sociology*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1978, pp. 35–66.

53. R. Bendix and G. Roth, *Scholarship and Partisanship*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, p. 48.

54. R. and G Hinkle, *The Development of Modern Sociology*, New York, Random House, 1954, p. 53.

55. Robert Bierstedt, *American Sociological Theory· a Critical History*, New York, Academic Press, pp. 91, 499.

56. Shils, op. cit., note 17, pp. 122–3.

57. Nels Anderson, *The Hobo*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1923.

58. Paul G. Cressey, *The Taxi Dance Hall*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1932.

59. Frederic M. Thrasher, *The Gang*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927.

60. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1924.

61. Luther L. Bernard, *The Fields and Methods of Sociology*, New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1934.

62. Stuart A. Rice, *Methods in Social Science*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1931.

63. Emory S. Bogardus, *Introduction to Social Research*, Los Angeles, Suttonhouse, 1936.

64. Howard W. Odum and K. Jocher, *Introduction to Social Research*, New York, Henry Holt, 1929.

65. Vivien Palmer, *Field Studies in Sociology*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1928.

66. Pauline V. Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Research*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1939.

67. E. S. Bogardus, *The Development of Social Thought*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1940.

68. Hornell Hart, 'A history of social thought: a consensus of American opinion', *Social Forces*, vol. 6, December 1927.

69. Howard W. Odum, *American Sociology*, New York, Greenwood, 1969 (reprinted from original 1951 edition).

70. Levine *et al.*, op. cit., note 33, pp. 840, 842.

71. Read Bain, 'The most important sociologists?', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, no. 5, October 1962, pp. 746–8.

72. Mark J. Oromaner, 'The most cited sociologists: an analysis of introductory text citations', *The American Sociologist*, vol. 3, no. 2, May, 1968, pp. 124–6.

73. William H. and Priscilla L. Swatos, 'Name citations in introductory sociology texts: a note on further research', *The American Sociologist*, vol. 9, no. 4, November 1974, pp. 225–8.

74. Mark J. Oromaner, 'Influentials in sociological textbooks and journals, 1955 and 1970', *The American Sociologist*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 169–74.

75. H. H. Gerth and H. I. Gerth, 'Bibliography on Max Weber', *Social Research*, vol. 16, o. 1, March 1949, pp. 70–89. One article in English, and four in German, were excluded from the count by the absence of a date in the reference given.

The complete figures are:

	up to 1920s	1930s	1940s
English	17	43	54
German	183	88	34

The pattern of these figures obviously confirms the interpretations made in the text. It should be noted that in a number of cases there are articles by the same people in German and in English, usually the former first followed by the latter after emigration. Only 2 of the 20 authors of items before 1930 who are not named in the text appear not to be of German origin. Were it not for Hitler, the pattern would certainly be different.

76. Odum op cit., note 69, passim.

77. Honigsheim, op. cit., note 34, p 145.

78. Harry E. Barnes, 'Historical sociology', in J. S Roucek, *Contemporary Sociology*, London, Peter Owen, 1959.

79. Shils, op. cit., note 17, pp. 118–123.

80. Gerth and Mills, op. cit., note 14, pp. 14, 21.

81 Angell, op. cit., note 18, pp 9–10. Perhaps this is less surprising than it might intitially seem in the light of Schroeter's carefully-argued claim that Weber did not have any significant influence even on German sociology in the period 1920–33, because his definitions and ideas were not congenial to the intellectual climate of the time. (G Schroeter, 'Max Weber as outsider: his normal influence on German sociology in the twenties', *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, vol. 16, no. 4, October 1980, pp. 317–32.) Shils goes so far as to suggest that his ideas eventually became influential in Germany 'in consequence of his elaboration and deciphering in America'. (Op. cit., note 17, p. 187), and Vidich supports this (op. cit., note 29.)

82. Lewis Coser, *Masters of Sociological Thought*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971, pp. 326–7.

83. I refrain deliberately from using the term 'symbolic interactionism' here where it might be expected because, though it serves useful purposes, it was only invented after the relevant period. It is interesting that Mead, like Weber, appears to have been the subject of retrospective overestimation of his influence at an earlier period as postwar interest in his work increased (Coser, op cit., note 82, p. 345; J. D. Lewis & R. L. Smith, *American Sociology and Pragmatism*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1980.)

84. Faris, op. cit., note 39.

85. Park and Burgess, op. cit., note 60.

86. Odum, op. cit., note 69.

87. Levine *et al.*, op. cit., note 33, pp. 840, 842.

88. Hart, op. cit., note 68.

89. Bain, op. cit., note 71.

90. Oromaner, op. cit., note 72.

91. Swatos and Swatos, op. cit., note 73.

92. Oromaner, op. cit., note 74.

93. Bernard, op. cit., note 61.

94 Odum and Jocher, op. cit., note 64.

95. Young, op. cit., note 66.

96. Palmer, op. cit., note 65.

97. Floyd N. House, *The Development of Sociology*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936.

98. Cavan, op. cit., note 36.

99. Cottrell, op. cit., note 37.

100. Hauser, interview, September 1982.

101. Blumer, op. cit., note 38.

102. Becker and Habenstein, op. cit., note 46

103. Strauss, op. cit., note 45. This last comment draws attention to the fact that Weber is not the only possible source of ideas on *verstehen*; it is likely that Dilthey and other German authors have also been relatively underestimated as a result of the growing emphasis on Weber.

104. Gans, op. cit., note 47.

105. Gold, op. cit., note 49.

106. Whyte, op. cit., note 44. On the intellectual background to this, see Platt, op. cit., note 2, p. 385.

107. Cf. Roscoe Hinkle, 'Antecedents of the action orientation in American sociology before 1935', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 28, no. 5, October 1963, pp. 705–15.

108. Coser, op. cit., note 82, p. 310.

109. Hinkle, op. cit., note 107, p. 709.

110. Angell, op. cit., note 18, p. 10a.

111. Charles H. Cooley, 'Social Science', in Cooley, *Social Process*, Carbondale, Ill., Southern Illinois Press, 1918, reprinted 1966.

112. Charles H. Cooley, 'Case study of small institutions as a method of research', reprinted in Cooley, *Sociological Theory and Social Research*, New York, Kelley, 1927.

113. Charles H. Cooley, 'The roots of social knowledge', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 59–79.

114. Charles H. Cooley, 'The life study method as applied to rural social research', *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 23, 1928, pp. 248–54.

115. Charles H. Cooley, 'Sumner and Methodology', *Sociology of Social Research*, vol. 12, no. 4, 1928, pp. 303–6.

116. Thomas and Znaniecki, op. cit., note 12.

117. Weber did actually have some involvement with work using questionnaires, and may even have done something approaching participant observation (Rosalie H. Wax, *Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971, p. 27) but he is not generally known for this. See R. C. Angell, 'Cooley's heritage to social research', *Social Forces*, vol. 8, March 1930, pp. 340–7, for a summary of Cooley's methodological precepts as they were seen at the time.

118. It may also be noted that, insofar as German theorists were of practical importance in this context, Simmel is a more promising candidate. Park was actively interested in him, and did much to diffuse his work (Levine *et al.*, op. cit., note 33.) At least one of the classic qualitative researchers drew inspiration for participant observation from his ideas on the stranger (Martin Bulmer, 'The methodology of *The Taxi-Dance Hall*', *Urban Life*, vol. 12, no. 1, April 1983, pp. 95–120). His micro-sociological orientation is of more obvious direct bearing on the issues of face-to-face fieldwork, and it could be argued that 'the power to reproduce in one's own imagination . . . the thoughts and motives of another' (Park on *verstehen*, from an unpublished work on method, ch. 1, p. 12; Park papers (on which see note 19) Addenda, Box 5, folder 4) is redundant when one has direct access to observational data or, as in many of the early Chicago qualitative studies, is drawing on personal experience.

119. Read Bain papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan: Correspondence, letter to 'Josiphilus', 11 February 1930.

120. Cf. Augustine Brannigan, *The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, ch. 6, on the retrospective creation of Mendel as the founder of genetics.

121. Cf. Robert K. Merton, 'On the history and systematics of sociological theory', in Merton, *On Theoretical Sociology*, New York, Free Press, 1967, pp. 1–37.

122. Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', *History and Theory*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1969, pp. 3–53.

123. G. A. Lundberg, 'The interests of members of the American Sociological Society, 1930', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 37, no. 3, November 1931, pp. 458–60.

124. Nico N. Stehr and L. E. Larson, 'The rise and decline of areas of specialization', *The American Sociologist*, vol. 7, no. 7, August 1972, pp. 5–6.

125. Joseph Bensman, 'Max Weber as a social psychologist: a critical study',

Steve Bruce and Roy Wallis

'Rescuing motives' rescued: a reply to Sharrock and Watson

ABSTRACT

Ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts have based their claim to a status superior to that of conventional sociology on their supposed ability to avoid the problems of attributing motives to actors by concentrating on the 'scenic properties' of social action. In an earlier paper we argued that a close inspection of the practice of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis revealed considerable motive attribution. Two ethnomethodologists have criticised our argument. In this rejoinder we demonstrate that our critics have conceded our main point. Ethnomethodologists may have a particular research focus but their methods are similar to those of conventional sociologists in the matter of imputing motives to social actors.

As debates are even more tiresome for readers than they are for the participants, we will confine ourselves in this rejoinder to Sharrock and Watson's spirited critique of our paper 'Rescuing Motives' to the clarification of our argument with ethnomethodology.[1] First, we have no complaint with the studies produced by ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts. We find much of this work interesting, we draw our students' attention to it, and we do not share the view that the followers of Garfinkel and Sacks have an unhealthy obsession with the trivial. Our only problem with this tradition is the claim it makes to be able to study social action without imputing or attributing motives to actors or conversationalists. It is the claim to be able to confine themselves to the empirically available — the scenic properties of social action — which we contest.

For all their vituperation, Sharrock and Watson appear to have conceded the point of our argument. They recognize that ethnomethodologists do attribute motives:

Of course they do, but the *good* ones will not engage in wholesale,

> irrelevant and unfounded motivational speculations. Instead they will confine such attributions to places where they are integral to the organization of the phenomena under consideration.[2]

Clearly there is still a major difference between conventional sociologists trying to explain social action by reference to the motives of the actors (discerned from their accounts of their action) and ethnomethodologists trying to describe *how* accounting is done or how the appearance of rationality is sustained. The purpose of the two kinds of endeavour is obviously different; we never for a moment doubted that. Sharrock and Watson have misunderstood us if they think that we see ethnomethodology and conventional sociology as pursuing the same objective but using different means. Our argument is almost the reverse of this. We recognize different objectives but we contest their claim to different means. They can claim, quite justifiably, that they do *less* motive attribution than conventional sociologists. They are considerably more circumspect. They probably do manage to confine their speculations 'to places where they are integral to the organization of the phenomena under consideration'. We would only warn against this being upgraded to a claim that somehow the phenomena under consideration are 'self-identifying'. One may be making a far less hazardous guess when one supposes that this or that conversationalist is engaged in formulating or complimenting or opening or closing than when one guesses that this actor is engaged in a moral crusade in order to preserve his social status, but it is still motive attribution. That is what we argued in 'Rescuing Motives' and that is what Sharrock and Watson appear to be conceding in their critique.

The question we wish to pose is this: if ethnomethodologists are going to concede that they are on occasions forced into motive attribution, are there any consistent *theoretical* reasons why conventional sociologists should not attribute motives? If this is now just a practical problem, a problem of plausibility of attributions, then their position is no different to that of the cautious conventional sociologist who would no doubt share their distaste for 'wholesale, irrelevant and unfounded' speculations.

The Sharrock and Watson explication of what Garfinkel meant in his essay on jurors' decision-making is important because it suggests a considerably more flexible and tolerant approach to the link between reasons for action and accounts of action than the one we read in Garfinkel and have found reinforced in arguments with ethnomethodologists. Their reading is that Garfinkel is making the general point that we cannot assume that social actors have perfect prior knowledge, discuss in their decision-making only those things that are relevant in a narrow legal sense, or do not sometimes make any old

decision just for the sake of making a decision. Thus the motives for their actions may be many and varied;

> it is only after a decision has been made that participants in its making will be able to try to explain to themselves; to understand how they came to the outcome that they reached.[3]

To our knowledge few 'good' conventional sociologists would find this at all objectionable or surprising. Is this to say any more than that the connection between motives and actions is complex, that motives may change during any course of action, that 'attaining what appears to be the obvious endpoint' is not the only motive in town, and that some people sometimes may not be able to give themselves or us reasons for their actions? As we argued in 'Accounting for Action',[4] these are common problems of our normal lives and remain problems when we do sociology. The procedures we use in solving such problems in everyday life, and a few others, are available to us when we do sociology. Good sociology requires sensitivity to these problems.

However, it was always our understanding that ethnomethodology was more than a sub-field which could offer some cautionary tales for mainstream sociology. We always thought that 'to this supposedly inadequate sociology (ethnomethodologists) offer an alternative: the study of members' reasoning procedures'.[5] And it was supposed to offer a better alternative:

> According to Garfinkel we cannot discriminate actions from accounts of those actions. For him, in fact, accounting *is* doing. We cannot get to the real explanation of, or reasons for, an action and *must give up the attempt.* All that can be done is to study, as it were, the anatomy of accounts.[6]

It was also our understanding that the basis for the superior status of ethnomethodology stemmed from its ability to circumvent the myriad problems of attributing motives to actors, for if it is possible, or even necessary, to attribute motives to actors, what grounds are there for not using such motives as explanations for their actions? Hence our desire to explore this methodological claim to see if it could be sustained.

We will close with an important point from Yearley's discussion of accounts and action.

> If motives and reasons which purport to explain actions do not in fact do so then surely the obligation is to find out what does rather than to study how these worthless reasons are composed. In significant respects this criticism is exaggerated, ethnomethodology

> does not claim that reasons cannot explain actions because something else does.[7]

True. As we have noted, ethnomethodology's claims are founded, not on a superior answer to the questions that conventional sociology asks, but on a methodological assertion about the futility of conventional sociology's use of accounts to impute motives. We have, to our satisfaction, demonstrated that the methodological claim was exaggerated. This leaves us free to turn to the problem that Yearley raises. We would find the claims to superiority of the ethnomethodological programme (and its implied criticism of conventional sociology) considerably more convincing if it accepted Yearley's challenge and gave us some clue as to what *does* produce social action. Is it the working out of innate psychology? Genetic programming? The holy spirit abroad in the land? Or is it our old friend the social structure? As the tabloids would put it, the public has a right to be told.

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NOTES

1. W. W. Sharrock and D. R. Watson, 'What's the point of "rescuing motives"?', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 35, no. 3, 1984, pp. 435–51. S. Bruce and R. Wallis, 'Rescuing Motives', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 34, no. 1, 1983, pp. 61–71.
2. Sharrock and Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 439.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 441.
4. R. Wallis and S. Bruce, 'Accounting for Action: defending the commonsense heresy', *Sociology*, vol. 17, no. 1, 1983, pp. 97–110.
5. S. Yearley, *Science and Sociological Practice*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984, p. 93.
6. *Ibid.* p. 93, our emphasis. See also on the supposed superiority of the enterprise, Garfinkel's comparison of sociology and ethnomethodology to alchemy and chemistry, as reported in D. Benson and J. A. Hughes, *The Perspective of Ethnomethodology*, London, Longman, 1983, p. 199.
7. S. Yearley, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

Paul Tibbetts

In defense of relativism and the radical programme: a critique of Jarvie

In a recent contribution to this *Journal*, Jarvie[1] has attacked cultural and epistemological relativism on a number of counts. The present paper is a response to two criticisms he deploys against epistemological relativism (or *ER* for short). It will be argued that at least one recent variation of *ER*, the sociology of scientific knowledge programme (or *SSKP*) largely escapes these particular criticisms. Accordingly, adoption of *ER* need not entail the dire consequences Jarvie suggests. The criticisms singled out for discussion are:

(1) 'cognitive relativism, by denying *absolute truth* even as a relative idea, evacuates the possibility of criticism, and hence the project of co-operative progressive, learning from experience. . . Ultimately relativism leaves no room for criticism at all. In other words, behind relativism nihilism looms.'[2]
(2) 'a relativist may . . . claim he captures naive realism within his relativism . . . [However,] what is at issue is the naive realism that rules out relativism because peoples communicate on the supposition that they are communicating about something fixed and given.'[3]

Re. Criticism (1): In this passage, and indeed throughout the entire article, Jarvie over and over again recites the litany of 'absolute truth.' Unfortunately, the expression is left undefined. Nor is the expression 'non-relative truth'[4] any more informative. The problem is not solely with the adjective 'absolute'; some nontautological unpacking of the label 'truth' would also help.

Perhaps this whole discussion should be shifted to theories of truth. At least I have some idea of what scientific or, say, political theories are about (elementary particles, beta-decay, coalition formations, etc.). Minimally, such theories (on one account) function as conceptual maps and generate inference tickets; on another account they are descriptive in some sense. However interpreted, such scientific or political theories have (i) evidential import, (ii) license warranted inferences, (iii) increase explanatory coherence, and (iv) (and perhaps

most importantly) such theories are theories about something. *Question: What are theories of truth theories about?* I would like Professor Jarvie to answer this — but without simply begging the question, e.g., by replying, 'Theories of truth are theories regarding what it is that makes propositions true or false.'

Regarding the first part of criticism (1), then, rather than denying absolute truth (sophisticated) relativism should rather remain unimpressed by tautologies. Although Jarvie is I think right in associating traditional relativism with such a denial, Jarvie's criticism will leave unmoved those relativists subscribing to the *SSKP* who take an agnostic stance toward 'truth' and, in turn, toward 'theories of truth.'[5] I would even claim that talk about theories of truth is a positive nuisance and even a hindrance to understanding what science as a cognitive inquiry is about, namely, constructing, warranting and critiquing empirical inference claims. On this reconstruction of science, an empirically-relevant epistemology should accordingly focus on (i) the extent to which epistemic criteria and associated knowledge claims are socially-contingent constructions, (ii) whose warrant is negotiated and renegotiated over time, (iii) in specific investigative and historical contexts. No reference to 'truth' let alone to 'absolute truth' is necessary to this task; we can get along perfectly well with such conceptual tools as the 'degree of warrant,' 'legitimacy' and 'credibility' associated with a given empirical claim.[6]

Consequently, I would maintain that the concept of 'truth' is semantically bankrupt. What is not needed is another theory of truth but conceptually- and empirically-formed reconstructions of the knowledge-generation, -definition and -legitimation processes associated with the various sorts of cognitive claims constituting scientific inquiry. The *SSKP* is a significant beginning in this direction.[7] By denying that there are absolute truths the (unsophisticated) relativist continues to play the 'truth game.' References to truth should simply be bracketed and suspended once and for all. Until a nontautological reply is received to the question raised earlier ('What are theories of truth theories about?') absolutely nothing is to be gained by asking as does the rationalist, 'Apart from the context and conduct of inquiry and the knowledge-legitimation process, are empirical claims true or not?' Our focus should rather be on reconstructing empirically- and socially-informed models of cognitive justification in science.

There is the further comment in the first quotation from Jarvie that relativism 'leaves no room for criticism' and ultimately entails nihilism and an 'anything goes mentality.'[8] Now, it is not at all clear how an empirically-informed account of warranting strategies in science entails nihilism. On the contrary, it is becoming apparent from recent sociological reconstructions of science that constructivists (i) are certainly critical of one another's reconstructions,[9] (ii) learn a great deal from the historical development of science[10] and (iii)

construct interpretations of scientific inquiry which are to some extent cumulative and progressive.[11] (*Sociology of the Sciences Yearbooks*, 1977 on, together with *Social Studies of Science*.) In what sense then could the constructivist enterprise associated with the *SSKP* be said to endorse a Feyerabendian anything goes mentality? Once the claim is suspended that science supposedly tells us something about 'reality' and 'truth' then the nihilistic label is emptied of cognitive significance.[12]

Re. Criticism (2). According to Jarvie, communication and language presuppose a belief in naive realism, that is communication is about something fixed and given.[13] Not all forms of sociological relativism need reject this notion of an external world. Barnes,[14] for example, though associated with the *SSKP* recognizes that 'the world in some sense constrains what it is believed to be' and that the issue is 'what is the nature of this constraint and how strong is it?' The problem is, however, once any direct access to this external world is denied then the problem arises of disentangling the social, cognitive and evidential elements that jointly constitute and inform our conception of this 'external world.'[15]

I do not take the (sophisticated) relativist position to be that empirical knowledge is not observationally grounded in some sense or other but that the social, cognitive and evidential dimensions cannot be conceptually isolated from one another. There is of course a relativism here in the sense of (i) a denial of both naive realism and naive empiricism and (ii) a corresponding defense of a relativism which simply suspends on methodological grounds belief in an external reality. I therefore differ with Barnes' notion of an external world which 'constrains what it is believed to be.' The (sophisticated) relativist could simply treat that 'external constraining world' as a metaphysical reification from scientists' constructions and reconstructions.[16] What *is* relevant to a sociological reconstruction of science is not an external world *per se* (whatever that might mean!) but what various scientific communities believe at any given time regarding this so-called external world. In other words, what is of interest to the *SSKP* should be scientists' beliefs and belief-claims and how these are constructed, negotiated and revised rather than questions concerning 'ultimate reality' and the 'real world'. In neither the short nor the long run do I see anything of value in such metaphysical issues, particularly for the *SSKP*! Barnes' remarks simply reintroduce the metaphysics game and leaves advocates of the *SSKP* open to critics such as Jarvie. Nothing is to be gained by playing this reality-and-truth shadow show.

As to Jarvie's claim that communication presupposes 'something fixed and given',[17] relativism need not deny this once qualifications have been introduced. But to avoid too abstract a discussion here, let us examine the following passages from *The Double Helix*[18] regarding communication in science. The first quotation obviously represents a

breakdown in such communication. James Watson is attempting to explain to Rosalind (Rosy) Franklin that

> since DNA molecules form crystals, the nucleotide order must not affect the general structure. Rosy by then was hardly able to control her temper, and her voice rose as she told me that the stupidity of my remarks would be obvious if I would stop blubbering and look at her X-ray evidence.
>
> I was more aware of her data than she realized. Several months earlier Maurice [Wilkins] had told me the nature of her so-called antihelical results. Since Francis [Crick] had assured me that they were a red herring, I decided to risk a full explosion. Without further hesitation I implied that she was incompetent in interpreting X-ray pictures. If only she would learn some theory, she would understand how her supposed anti-helical features arose from the minor distortions needed to pack regular helices into a crystalline lattice.
>
> Suddenly Rosy came from behind the lab bench that separated us and began moving toward me. Fearing that in her hot anger she might strike me, I grabbed up the Pauling manuscript and hastily retreated to the open door.[19]

In the following incident in *The Double Helix* we find quite a different exchange.

> Thinking that Rosy wanted nothing to do with him [i.e., Francis Crick], he spoke largely to Maurice [Wilkins], until he slowly perceived that she wanted his crystallographic advice and was prepared to exchange unconcealed hostility for conversation between equals. With obvious pleasure Rosy showed Francis her data, and for the first time he was able to see how foolproof was her assertion that the sugarphosphate backbone was on the outside of the molecule.[20]

What is the 'something fixed' which is presupposed in this latter example of successful scientific communication? Is it standards and criteria of meaning? Theoretical assumptions? Data? Reality? Measurable properties? Truth? Clearly, in the second conversation Franklin and Crick mutually presuppose: (i) relevant background knowledge (of X-ray crystalline lattices, of molecular genetics), (ii) a common puzzle (the structure of DNA), (iii) at least tacit agreement regarding viable as against non-viable puzzle solutions, (iv) some measure of technical competence, and so forth. In other words, what the participants above presuppose is entirely contingent on community-endorsed criteria regarding what will count as a warranted knowledge claim, competent experimental verification, viable puzzle solutions,

technical competence, and so forth. Nothing here is fixed in the sense of 'beyond revision' or what is 'absolutely true'! The first conversation breaks down simply because one or more of these criteria are challenged; e.g., Watson's suggestions regarding Franklin's technical competence, interpretation of data, lack of appropriate theoretical knowledge, etc. Given this challenge the conversation is fated to breakdown. Notice that in the second conversation the parties assume that these criteria have been satisfied and that all that is in question is how to interpret the X-rays. What is presupposed for successful communication in science (at least in the case cited above) is that the criteria listed in (i) to (iv) are not challenged. Once the challenge is made the conversation accordingly shifts from the data (X-rays in this case) to the credentials of the participants and questions of competence and understanding. In other words, it is not reality or truth that are fixed and presupposed so much as the cognitive and technical criteria by which members of the scientific community evaluate and assess one another's claims and competence.

In understanding successful and unsuccessful communication in science I for one believe that references to 'something fixed,' to 'absolute truth,' or to 'reality' are simply too abstract to be of much value. I have suggested that both forms of communication can be reconstructed in terms of adherence to or challenging of cognitive and technical criteria.

In conclusion, the *ER* sketched here attempts to (i) reconstruct scientific knowledge without reference to truth or theories of truth, (ii) renders innocuous the supposed nihilistic consequences associated with *ER* and (iii) can account for successful as well as failed scientific communication without reference to an external constraining reality or to 'something fixed and given.'

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NOTES

1. I. C. Jarvie, 'Rationality and Relativism', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 34, no. 1, 1983, pp. 44–60.
2. Ibid., pp. 44–5.
3. Ibid., p. 58.
4. Ibid., p. 46, *passim*.
5. E.g., B. Latour, 'Insiders and Outsiders in the Sociology of Science; Or, How Can We Foster Agnosticism?' in R. Jones and H. Kuklick (eds) *Knowledge and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture*, vol. 3, Greenwich, Conn., JAI Press, 1981, pp. 199–216; H. Collins, 'What is TRASP?: The Radical Programme as a Methodological Imperative,' *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 215–24.
6. P. Tibbetts, 'The Weighted Coherence Theory of Rationality and Justification,' *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*,

vol. 10, no 3, pp. 259–72.

7. E.g., K. Knorr-Cetina, *The Manufacture of Knowledge*, New York, Pergamon Press, 1981; K. Knorr-Cetina and M. Mulkay (eds), *Science Observed*, London, Sage, 1983; and E. Mendelsohn *et al.* (eds), *The Social Production of Scientific Knowledge*, Boston, D. Reidel, 1977.

8 I. C. Jarvie, op. cit., pp. 45 and 48.

9. B. Latour, 'Review of the Manufacture of Knowledge,' 4S Newsletter, vol. 7, no. 4, 1982, pp. 30–4; K. Knorr, 'Reply to My Critics,' 4S Newsletter, vol. 7, no. 4, 1982, pp. 40–6; and M. Grenier, 'Cognition and Social Construction in Laboratory Science,' 4S Review, vol. 1, no. 3, 1983, pp. 2–16.

10. B. Barnes and S. Shapin (eds), *Natural Knowledge: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture*, London, Sage, 1979; and K. Knorr *et al.* (eds), *The Social Process of Scientific Investigation*, Boston, D. Reidel, 1981.

11. E.g., *Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook*, 1977 on, Boston, D. Reidel; and the periodical, *Social Studies of Science*.

12. H. Collins, 'Special Relativism — The Natural Attitude,' *Social Studies of Science*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1982, pp. 139–43.

13. I. C. Jarvie, op. cit., p. 58.

14. B. Barnes, *Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory*, Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, p. vii.

15. E.g., K. Knorr-Cetina, *The Manufacture of Knowledge*, op. cit.; H. Collins and T. Pinch, *Frames of Meaning*, Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982; P. Tibbetts, 'The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: The Constructivist Thesis,' *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (in press); and B. Latour, 'The Three Little Dinosaurs, or a Sociologist's Nightmare,' *Fundamental Scientiae*, vol. 1, pp. 79–85.

16 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, *Laboratory Life*, London, Sage, 1979, esp. pp. 81–4 and 174–83; B. Latour, 'The Three Little Dinosaurs,' op. cit.

17. I. C. Jarvie, op. cit., p. 58.

18. J. Watson, *The Double Helix*, New York, Atheneum, 1968.

19. Ibid., pp. 165–6.

20. Ibid., p. 212.

BOOK REVIEWS

Hegel Contra Sociology *Gillian Rose* Athlone 1981 261pp. n.p.

Hegel *contra* Sociology? The preposition is less curious, perhaps, than the deliberate insistence upon anachronism, for Hegel himself obviously never tangled with sociology. Gillian Rose is clearly tossing gauntlets off in all directions. Her general thesis is that sociology has grown from neo-Kantian philosophical premises and can never, in its existing form, escape the sterile antinomies of those premises. This general thesis, however, is set in the form of a historical reworking (critique? metacritique? or, since it criticizes metacritiques, metametacritique?) of Hegel's response to Kant. 'Freedom', we learn, 'cannot be concretely conceived by Kant and Fichte because it depends for them on an absolute difference between the realm of necessity (theoretical reason) and the realm of freedom (practical reason)'. (p. 55) In the Hegelian concept of reason, the argument runs, we may find a unity of theory and practice which has been sundered in the Kantian insistence on the primacy of the will. That Hegelian unity, however, seems ultimately to reveal a practical character, since the resultant 'presentation of the contradictory relations between Capital and culture' is said to be the only way to 'link the analysis of the economy to comprehension of the conditions for revolutionary practice'.

All of this clearly raises major problems. Dr Rose starts by an attempt to ward off the kind of critic who might think she was being merely 'ingenuous and ahistorical' (p. 1) in her concern with Hegel. What must to the reader look like an argument that the truth once appeared, as if by the lakeside of Galilee, back in Jena in 1803, ought actually to be read, she tells us, as an attempt to retrieve Hegelian speculative experience by recognizing (a useful achievement word!) 'the intellectual and historical barriers' to reading Hegel that way. But the thing called 'retrieving the Hegelian speculative experience' need not quite be the same as simply getting Hegel right. Dr Rose's Hegel follows a strong recent tendency (going back, as Anthony Arblaster reminds us on the cover, to Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution*) to discover the essentials of Marxism within Hegel's thought; and for this purpose, the younger the Hegel the better the fit, perhaps. What seems to surface, through a prose which, in sticking close to Hegel's own manner of writing, does not notably improve upon him in lucidity, is a Hegel who thinks that freedom cannot be actualized in modern society because of the contradictions involved in something (never here actually plucked from the flow of speculation and examined) called 'bourgeois property relations'. It would be perilous to treat lightly Dr Rose's knowledge of Hegel, but it must be said that there is no sign in all this of the Hegel who treated property as the actualization of will, and for whom the fact that the principle of freedom of property took a millenium to emerge 'may serve to rebuke the impatience of opinion and to show the length of time that mind requires for progress in its self-consciousness'. (*Philosophy of Right*, addition to para. 62). In *my* Hegel, to put it with the brutality required by a short review, practice must always entail abstraction, and, to challenge Dr Rose's central formula, 'thinking the absolute' can have no social import at all. When Dr Rose writes that 'the fundamental paradox of Hegel's thought is that he was the critic of *all* property forms . . .' she is betrayed

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by the accursed word 'critic' which is responsible for so much mush in contemporary theorizing Hegel was concerned not with 'criticism' (a word with which, to his credit, he seldom bothered), but with philosophical understanding.

Although Marx himself is rapped over the knuckles for attaining no better than a non-speculative reading of Hegel, *Hegel contra Sociology* belongs in the contemporary tradition of arguments which take any of the established university disciplines, and by exhibiting the supposed contradictions lurking in their premises, demonstrate that nothing less than grasping the totality — or thinking the absolute, as it appears here — can get us past all sorts of barriers which currently imprison us. There is no doubt that this is a formidably intelligent performance, but it demands from the reader total submission to Dr Rose's every intellectual whim: He must work his way through endless Hegelian opacities yet at the same time accept, without comment or explanation, such crudities as 'bourgeois cultural hegemony' and 'revolutionary practice' without a whimper. Dr Rose's underlying critical metaphor is that of the tradition within which she writes: entrapment. In these terms, one may perhaps suggest that her own project has entrapped her within an essentially incoherent mix of analysis and history As history, it is defective because Kant and Fichte (on whom she approvingly quotes Lukács: 'the supreme representative of bourgeois thought'!) are merely set-ups for the Hegelian counterpunch; and the analysis gets lost in recapitulating Hegel One may hope that in the future she will come right out and say just what she means. Meanwhile, if I were a sociologist, I should not spend too much time worrying that my work is merely sterile because of failure to liberate myself from the barriers of neo-Kantianism.

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Outcast Cape Town *John Western* Allen & Unwin 1982 372pp. £13.95

Radicals and reformers who are frustrated by the innate conservatism and inertia of human beings and their institutions may take some slight comfort from this compassionate study of the application of a nasty and vicious attempt at social engineering in a major multi-racial city and the obstacles and challenges it met from ordinary people. In 1936, 37 per cent of the area of the 'mother city' of White South Africa was integrated. In 1950 the Afrikaner Nationalist Government set out a blueprint to segregate an atypical South African city, whose gradient of colour resembled that of Brazil and whose level of *de facto* segregation was similar to northern cities of the USA.

In Cape Town apartheid, which clearly aimed at domination through segregation, was pursued at the expense of the local majority group, the Cape Coloured people. The trauma it caused to individuals and families among the 'Brown Afrikaners', who were evicted from their homes and traditional communities, is sympathetically recorded in this well written book. The fact that it took thirty years to enforce the Group Areas Act into the suburbs of the city and that, in 1977, seven of Cape Town's eight white parliamentary constituencies elected liberal anti-apartheid MPs, suggests that local political traditions and social mores are hard to destroy. Moreover it appears that even the beneficiaries of apartheid found *de facto* partial segregation preferable to the rigours of *de jure* total apartheid. Certainly a sense of shame and stigma alienated white property investment in the famous, former coloured District 6. At another level it demonstrates that even the South African government is not omnipotent and 'cannot tear down the accreted fabric of the city everywhere and begin over anew'.

Urban ecology, particularly the extent and significance of ethnic differentiation in the patterning of residential areas, is a subject of continuing interest not only to social demographers, such as Western, but also to sociologists. Much recent American and British sociological research in race and ethnic relations has been directed towards analysis of the impact of residential segregation among ethnic groups It is widely recognized

that residential distribution is an important component of the social integration process and that there is a territorial base to the delivery of services and life chances. Western's analysis concentrates on the human and social costs to the victims of the apartheid system in the interplay of colour, socio-economic status and space. He largely overlooks the Marxist critique of apartheid which emphasizes that white controlled capital benefited directly from population removals without bearing any of the costs.

The treatment of Cape Town's small Indian population, who suffered over 90 per cent of the business displacements and the current under-provision of commercial facilities outside white areas, demonstrates the importance of the economic motives in apartheid policy. Along with the Group Areas Act went a massive involvement of the public sector in housing which provided very real gains to skilled white labour and white industry and construction. On the other hand consistent removal of non-whites to the outskirts of the metropolitan area added to their transport costs which can be seen as a further tax going to the benefit of the white state and white-controlled economic interests.

Even if one does not regard the analysis as rather old fashioned, certainly its plethora of tables, maps, and photographs will evoke memories of a more lavish age in academic publishing. It clearly demonstrates the benefits of gaining outside subsidies for publication. One can only hope that the presentation will enhance and widen its readership and so spread knowledge about the tragic history of the Cape Coloured people among those of us who up to now have been largely ignorant of their fate.

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A Treatise on Social Theory Volume 1, The Methodology of Social Theory
W. G. Runciman Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1983 350pp. £25 00

Despite being, as he himself says, a part-time capitalist and part-time academic, W. G. Runciman has his life sufficiently well planned for the next six years to be able to tell us that this is the first of three volumes of a total treatise. While the first volume deals with methodological questions (i.e. questions of the logic of empirical science, not questions of techniques and methods), the second to be completed in 1985 will offer a substantive theory of social relations, social structure and social evolution, and the third, put off for a completion date in 1990 will provide an analysis of society in twentieth century England. It is good that the author appears to be youngish and fit and well, because it would be a pity if our appetites whetted by this volume were in the end not to be satisfied. Still worse, we might be left not fully undestanding even this volume because the pay off of its meaning is reserved for other volumes.

The aim of the first volume can be simply stated. It is argued that there are four stages involved in research and argument in the social sciences which may be called reportage, explanation, description and evaluation which may be thought of as answering the questions 'What?', 'Why?', 'What — like?' and 'How good or bad?' Runciman believes moreover that there are no differences in principle between social sciences and natural science so far as the first two questions are concerned, but that it faces unique questions when it comes to what he calls description (i.e. any attempt to answer the question 'What was it like?')

The meat of Runciman's argument and the part which will have the most influence in arguments about social science in Britain, both amongst social scientists and amongst philosophers is, of course, to be found in the substantive chapters dealing with reportage, explanation, description and evaluation. It will not be possible to review all the details of that argument in the space of a short review. There is no short way in which they can be presented because they do not flow from any single master argument but come rather seriatim each argument standing on its own feet. What can be done here is simply to indicate some of the main features of what is said

under each head and to comment on its relationship to orthodox and classical literature in sociological theory.

Under the heading of reportage, Runciman is prepared to allow quite a lot. He certainly does not demand of the social scientist that he confines himself to statements about coloured shapes that move, about pointers on dials or about human behaviour not interpreted as action. He believes that one can have 'primary understanding' of actions and institutions and indeed societies, provided that one confines oneself to 'dictionary definitions' of the phenomenon concerned and refrains from imposing explanatory theories under the guise of definitions.

Under the heading 'explanation' we are told that Runciman, 'will not offer any general account of scientific explanation as such', but that instead he will 'try to answer four connected questions of a different kind'. First, how do the various kinds of explanation offered by sociologists, anthropologists or historians relate to the presuppositions which underlie them? Second what kinds of contrast do they draw between what has actually happened and what otherwise would or might have? Third, do the provisionally plausible explanations find adequate theoretical grounding: and fourth, is there a particular form of explanation appropriate to and characteristic of history itself?

There is much in the detail of the arguments here which is interesting but three points stand out for the reviewer. First, Runciman means centrally by explanation or 'secondary understanding' causal explanation, second he does not believe that such explanation depends upon the existence of laws, and, thirdly, he is not prepared to concede that explanations in terms of plans, strategies purposes or intentions present problems of verification logically different from those which exist when non-purposive theories are involved. Strangely there is no discussion here of the problems of the use of ideal types in causal explanation.

The third set of problems in this volume relates to 'description'. This is a very difficult chapter to understand because of the odd examples which Runciman uses to illustrate his argument. Description, however, is given the unusual meaning that it is an attempt to answer the question 'What was it like?' It is not easy to say what the criteria of an authentic description are. It is not simply good enough to take the actor's own account as valid. He may be wrong and the observer might well be able to improve upon his description by drawing attention to elements which the actor failed to take into account. Obviously, too, the observer may distort the reality by selection and in other ways and he may introduce further elements of error in 'putting the description across'. But, they are all features of 'misdescription'. It is much more difficult to set up criteria by which a description can be judged as 'authentic' or 'representative'.

What Runciman means by description, of course, has no obvious parallel in the physical sciences. He believes that the problems which he discusses under this head are unique to the social sciences and altogether too much is taken for granted. Here, again there is much detailed argument about such topics as the use of metaphor and analogy and of the relation between description in this sense and evaluation. The whole discussion however, leaves one asking whether the kind of activity involved in Runciman's 'description' is not more relevant to literary criticism and history than it is to social science.

Finally, there is a chapter on evaluation. Somewhat surprisingly, Runciman allows that social scientists are entitled sometimes to use evaluative terms without justifying them. There is an evident criterion of benevolence which entitles one to speak of improvement if people are better fed and generally suffering less pain. But this does not mean a general endorsement of evaluation in social scientific reports. One may refer, of course, to values more specific than benevolence, but in this case one should make clear what one is doing and not pre-empt the possibility of ones discussant disagreeing with ones values. Westergaard and Reisler on the left and S. M. Lipset on the right are accused of having buried their value judgments under the guise of facts and

Huw Beynon and Theo Nicholls, on the left, and Lord David Cecil on the right of pre-empting value questions.

The task of a reviewer, is, in the first place, to invite other readers to make a more detailed study of an argument whose outline has been presented reasonably and fairly and that, so far, I have attempted to do. It remains however, to place and evaluate the contribution which the author is making to the discipline of sociology. Here, however, one faces two problems with Runciman. First, sociology forms only a small part of his enormously wide-ranging culture and the examples which he uses are not always relevant to sociology. Second, he fails to relate what he is saying to a cumulative tradition of writing by sociologists about methodological problems so that it is not possible to say how this argument compares with that of, say, Weber or Durkheim or Simmel.

It would be easy to be sarcastic about the parade of Mandarin culture in the flow of examples which Runciman produces. They range through history, literature, economics and quantitative social science and there are even instances where he bursts out into verse or music. This presents difficulties to the reader, as, for instance, when at *the* crucial point of the argument when, he is telling us what he means by 'tertiary understanding' or description, he gives us a poem by Angela Carter describing an adultery hotel in Japan. Does this really help the reader to achieve anything but a fuzzy confusion? It has often been said that a sociologist is someone who spends £50,000 to find the way to a brothel. Runciman finds it necessary to take us to a brothel to make a methodological point. More generally, however, one may ask without being too Philistine whether this parade of irrelevant learning and urbanity is not a technique of exclusion to keep less cultivated even though possibly clearer minds out of the argument.

Far more seriously, however, is Runciman's failure to relate his argument to well-developed themes in sociological literature. Weber wrote about all of the topics which he discusses and came up with very different answers. None of the nine references to his work, however, tackles the crucial points of differences. If this *is* to be a text for sociologists, surely the reader, might like to know what Runciman has to say about them. Certainly, they are of more interest than what he has to say about music, classical scholarship or Japanese brothels.

The following points on which Weber wrote are relevant here. (1) His relatively austere notion of what was acceptable as 'direct observational understanding'. (2) His inclusion of much of what Runciman includes under 'reportage' under the heading of explanation, particularly the interpretation of long sequences of behaviour as 'action'. (3) His distinction between two kinds of explanatory understanding, namely that which was causally adequate and that which was adequate on the level of meaning. (4) His use of ideal types and their relation to causal analysis. (5) His discussion of the problems of hermeneutic as they were posed by Dilthey and his insistence that the sort of explanatory understanding which he sought was not emphatic understanding and (6) His conviction (which he shared with Simmel and the Neo-Kantians) that the categories as well as the concepts required in systematic sociology were philosophically speaking different from those used in natural sciences.

One poses these questions because Runciman's answer to them would be interesting, the more so because his systematic theory in the second volume is to deal with social relations and structure. Will that be as clear as Weber's *Economy and Society* or will the issues be clouded with a further flood of literary examples? One would like to see a mind as good as Runciman's applied to those central problems of sociology. Less is to be gained by requiring the sociological tradition to justify *its* presence at the High Table of urbane and literary learning.

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Introduction to Criminology *Hugh D. Barlow* Little, Brown and Co. 2nd ed. 1981 528pp. n.p.

Comparing Female and Male Of-

fenders *M. Q. Warren (ed.)* Sage 1981 141pp. £10.00 (£4.95 paper)
The Kenya Penal System: Past, Present and Prospect *L C. Kercher* University Press of America 1981 334pp. £23.25 (£13.25 paper)

Introduction to Criminology, a typical product of American publishing, is an attempt at a comprehensive review of the entire subject, well produced, interspersed with glossy photographs and complete with excellent bibliographical references (including, unusually for a trans-Atlantic text, to a dozen or so British academics). It can certainly take its place among several other similar texts as recommended reading of its type even though such books are not likely to find central places in the structure of the teaching of criminology in this country. It surveys the main theoretical perspectives on crime during the last 100 years in a single chapter, with seven further chapters in Part II each devoted to the analysis of a particular type of crime — from 'Robbery' and 'Occupational Crime' to 'The Drug Scene' and 'Criminal Sexuality'. Despite the length of this book the chapters on the police, the judicial process and punishment are relatively short and much more superficial with, for instance, only two pages on contemporary imprisonment in the USA. Surprisingly, yet symptomatic of this kind of 'comprehensive' but selective type of survey, it makes no mention whatsoever of the subject of female offenders, which is the major focus of *Comparing Female and Male Offenders*, a selection edited by Margerite Q. Warren of seven papers from the 12 sessions devoted to female crime at the 1980 meetings of the American Society of Criminology. Like so many books in the prolific SAGE series this promises much but delivers relatively little. The most substantial contribution is by Josephine Figueira-McDonough *et al* entitled 'Normal Deviance: gender similarities in adolescent subcultures' This study (based on self-report data) shows that there may be little difference between teenaged girls and boys in America with respect to 'status-subcultural' behaviour (e.g. truancy, alcohol and drug use), but confirms that boys commit more serious criminal offences than girls, and more frequently. The authors present a general 'resistance-provocation' model of delinquency, with their data suggesting various differences in the factors affecting the resistance of boys and girls to delinquent involvement. Another self-report study, by Feyerherm, also supports the view that in most types of criminal behaviour (except, in this case, hard drug use) the pattern of sex differences that emerges from official police statistics is not substantially challenged by self-report data. An unusual study by Diane Lewis, comparing the involvement of black and white women in the criminal justice system, shows that the former are much more likely to be proceeded against for crimes of violence, with the blame being attached not to any cultural, social or personal differences but to the dominant society's reaction to black women offenders (p. 99). Two other chapters consider the treatment of female offenders by the criminal justice system: Sheldon presents a historical study of juvenile justice in Memphis during the Progressive Era (1900–1917), which predictably reflected the sexual double standards of that (and many subsequent) periods; the Tjadens analyse the handling of a sample of felony charges in Colorado in 1976, showing that at almost every stage of the penal process females appear to be treated more 'leniently' than males, attributed at least in part to the different types of charges which they face. A preliminary report by Kruttschnitt of her study of prison codes and inmate solidarity in a female prison presents new and potentially valuable findings of a different relationship between loyalty to the inmate subculture and opposition to staff norms in this prison than in previous studies of either male or female prisons. Finally, Williams *et al* investigate the factors associated with the ownership of firearms by 1 in 6 of the single women in urban America, representing more than 1¼ million gun-toting females.

The third book in this group, *The Kenya Penal System*, presents a detailed account of the prison system in Kenya, concentrating particularly on the period

since independence, and drawing on the author's close personal knowledge of that system and the people who administer it. It is thus an addition to the descriptive literature on African prison systems and of some value for that alone. Beyond that, however, it cannot be said to make a major contribution to the study of penal systems at either a theoretical or empirical level since crucial statistical data is often not available while opportunities for comparative analysis are frequently missed (as in the brief treatment of the relationship between the role of women in Kenyan society and female criminality, and the tantalising, passing references to facts such as that the charges against more than 60 per cent of those remanded in custody before trial are dropped due to lack of evidence or that Kenya's population is currently increasing faster than any other country in the world — with little speculation on the effects this may have on the crime rate and the ever-increasing prison population). This book raises expectations about the kind of questions that should be addressed by comparative penology but provides little in the way of answers.

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Norman Street: Poverty and Politics in an Urban Neighbourhood *Ida Susser* Oxford University Press 1982 230pp. £13.50

To Dwell Among Friends: Personal Networks in Town and City *Claude S. Fischer* The University of Chicago Press 1982 451pp. £7.70 (paper)

Over the past fifteen years urban sociology has shifted from the Chicago School's concepts of 'urban society' and 'community' to the political economy of cities and regions. Here are two studies which display links with past traditions; very different kinds of links and certainly not uncritical of the older approach but both showing that concepts of community and urbanism have some empirical resilience still.

We have heard much of New York City's 'fiscal crisis' and its macro level causes — the decline of manufacturing industry and its migration to the suburbs, the flight of the affluent to the frontiers of large cities, etc. Susser's study takes this political economy of cities as a framework but focusses on how all these large-scale forces work out in a particular locality — the Greenpoint-Williamsburg area of New York City. The strength of the book is her analysis of the structure of social relations within the locality and how people organized, successfully, and unsuccessfully, to counter the larger forces at work. In short we have a 'community study' set within the context of a larger political economy.

Susser's early chapters outline the social structure of Greenpoint-Williamsburg in terms of its situation between the affluent suburb of Brooklyn Heights and the infamous ghettoes of Bedford-Stuyvesant, the pattern of employment with the decline of manufacturing and port-related industry and the rise of public employment schemes, the complexities of the welfare system — a major source of income, and the implications of various different forms of landlord-tenant relations. These structural facets set the scene for Susser's analysis of neighbourhood movements. Some of these were successful in achieving their objectives — particularly keeping the local firehouse open despite the cutbacks; many were unsuccessful — the Block Association was a poorly supported façade, the City was able to push through a range of policies detrimental to the interests of local residents. A major theme of Susser's study is the conditions facilitating success. In general two such conditions are emphasised — the exploitation of favourable opportunities and grounding in neighbourhood support systems. If a movement could latch into some wider opportunity — tap a federal aid fund or become an election issue — then the chances of success increased. Similarly Susser argues that movements only worked if they based themselves on the informal network of support provided by relatives and friends and described in an interesting chapter detailing the interconnection between four households.

The small number involved here indi-

cates a weakness of Susser's study. Her methods are participant-observer and 'event analysis'. Throughout one feels that the number of informants is very small, Susser focuses on the network around ten individuals and one wonders just how representative this little system is of the 176,000 1970 population of Greenpoint-Williamsburg. A second worry concerns Susser's treatment of ethnicity and racism — at some points in the book this seems a central basis of social organization — for example in the allocation of housing. Yet Susser gives an overall impression that racism is a 'false consciousness' foisted on to the population by the machinations of politicians. The reasons for Susser's emphasis here is her claim that the problems of Greenpoint-Williamsburg are *working-class* problems, that the neighbourhood movements she analyses are not 'pre-political', i.e. pre-class, but part of the wider struggle of capital and labour, and that the radical consciousness developed is a specific form of class consciousness. All of this seems to me rather ambitious. The heroes of Susser's book would in Marx's terms be 'lumpenproletariat'. Whilst Susser might help to correct Marx's rather unsavoury picture of the poor I think she should have tackled more directly just how the efforts of welfare recipients and marginal workers are *structurally* linked to other workplace based struggles and just how this form of radicalism develops *class* consciousness

One certainly cannot doubt the methodological thoroughness of Fischer's book. It is based on a major sample survey described in meticulous detail in an 80-page appendix and each and every claim in the book is grounded in careful examination of the data. Fischer's subject is the personal network of relations that each of us live within, the primary social world of kin, neighbours, workmates and friends. He is well aware that a range of factors — income, education, gender — influence the variation in such networks. However his focus is on the impact of urbanism, understood in its 'elementary' sense of 'the number of people living in and near a community' (23) on the nature of networks. The theoretical foil employed is the Chicago School's thesis of the detrimental effect of urbanism on communal networks. Fischer's counter-thesis is that urbanism does not destroy community but facilitates greater choice of network which makes for a pluralism of subcultures. Cities thus generate not personal disorganization but the competition and clashing of subcultural styles.

The site for this investigation is Northern California taking a careful sample of communities and individuals across a range from semi-rural, through towns, metropolitan areas to the regional core of San Francisco. Fischer provides a detailed analysis of the impact of urbanism on an enormous range of facets of networks — their psychological supportiveness, involvement of the individual, their link with traditionalism, the variation in membership as between kin, neighbours, co-workers, organizational members and 'just friends', the formal structural features of networks. This then leads into an examination of how networks foster varieties of subcultures around ethnicity, religion, occupation and pastime. All of this involves a close, careful yet witty analysis which cannot be summarized briefly. Suffice it to say that the recurring theme is the weakness of the 'decline of community' in the city thesis and general support for the pluralism of subcultures alternative. Whilst Fischer's consistency of theoretical focus is a merit of his book I was rather disappointed by its narrowness of range. The Chicago School's theoretical claims were undermined some years ago with Manual Castells adding the *coup de grace*. They thus appear something of a straw man. Yet along with Castells's rejection of the specific Chicago School claims went a more generalized rejection of the influence of 'urbanism' portrayed, now, as an ideological camouflage for industrial capitalism. Fischer would clearly be unhappy with this and he argues that urbanism does make important differences to peoples' lives. It is a pity that he did not address his data and analytical skills to the 'urbanism is dead' school as well as to the 'community is dead' thesis.

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Assist and Befriend or Direct and Control: A Report of Probation Services in Poland and England *John Harper, John Simmonds, Thelma Wilson and Maria Ziemska* (eds) North East London Polytechnic 1982 211pp. £2.50 paper

This is the fifth report in the NELP series of Comparative Probation Service Studies Reports and is a compilation of papers prepared by academics and probation officers from Poland and England who were involved in a programme of exchange visits during 1979 and 1980.

Thirteen of the nineteen chapters represent the perceptions of various aspects of the English system of criminal justice and probation by Polish members of the scheme. Whilst it is interesting to read such externally formed views however, the reader is left wondering whether the accounts of the Polish system, provided in the remaining chapters by English contributors, are similarly sometimes lacking in depth, appreciation and, indeed, accuracy. This possibility is raised, for example, by the view expressed in chapter 6 that, in British prisons, 'Prisoners showing behaviour disorders are ensured of psychiatric help . . . in many penitentiary institutions abnormal personality features are corrected through psychotherapy.' (p. 66). The accuracy of this view would be disputed by many.

Perhaps of most interest to British readers are the chapters which attempt to explore the cultural context of the Polish system, the development of Family Courts and Probation Centres, and sentencing policy in Adult Courts in Poland. From these emerges an interesting picture of Polish life in which the maintenance of social order relies on the effective working of the major informal social institutions — the family, the community and the Church — and their links with the formal systems, including the inquisitorial system of Polish criminal justice and the reductivist penal policy, aimed at the resocialization of offenders, in which almost all the supervisory work with offenders is carried out by volunteers, employers, trade union representatives and others.

The analysis steers well clear of any overt reference to the possible impact of recent events in Poland and discussion about possible links between the causes of criminal behaviour and structural elements in Polish society remains brief and speculative. The papers offer a mixture of description and analysis with no identifiable framework to link them; but for those interested in comparative penal policy in particular this book will be a welcome addition to the currently limited range of material available; perhaps even more so because it refers in part to policies in a socialist state.

Adrian L. James
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Making Good: Prisons, Punishment and Beyond *Martin Wright* Burnett Books 1982 316pp. £12.95 (£5.95 paper)

Few people can be better qualified than Martin Wright, former Director of the Howard League for Penal Reform, to write a book which offers a thorough and comprehensive review of current penal policy and practice and the alternatives to them.

The case presented in the first half of the book is an orthodox reformist one which discusses public attitudes to crime and punishment, the harsh realities of prison life, conventional alternatives to imprisonment and important improvements which could be made to the prison system. Orthodox reformism or not, however, this analysis is thorough, well-balanced and well-illustrated, leading on to an informative discussion of why reforms have been so hard to achieve. Key issues are in the areas of funding, administration and sentencing policy, where, the author argues, changes might facilitate more fundamental shifts in attitudes and policies.

The objectives of sentencing and the roles which punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation play in this are then reviewed, highlighting the dilemma that 'what rehabilitates does not deter, what deters does not rehabilitate, and what compromises does neither' (p. 17). The concluding chapters of the book, therefore, offer a fundamental reappraisal of the current approach to penal reform, suggesting that, since deterrence and

rehabilitation have proven to be ineffective responses to crime, attention should now be focused on the prevention of crime and reparation by offenders, in which community involvement would be of central significance. The success of many existing crime prevention initiatives makes heartening reading against the otherwise gloomy backcloth of current policies; so that the proposals for treating many minor crimes virtually as torts and developing mediation procedures in which the community would be involved, as a means of reconciling offender and victim, have much to commend them. Nor should such ideas be dismissed as unrealistic in view of the success of some American schemes.

Sadly, however, regardless of the merits and viability of such radical ideas, which are well-argued and developed by the author, political, public and judicial attitudes to crime and punishment will probably override the persuasive rationality of the arguments presented in this book which, none the less, deserves to be widely read and debated.

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Drinking and Crime: Perspectives on the Relationships between Alcohol Consumption and Criminal Behaviour *James J. Collins (ed.)* Tavistock 1982 376pp. £20.00

Aggression and Violence *Peter Marsh and Anne Campbell (eds)* Blackwell 1982 249pp. £16.00

Substantial bodies of literature exist on both alcohol use and criminal behaviour Comparatively little research has investigated the precise relationship between the two, which often appears quite close in terms of simple measures of association. The importance of *Drinking and Crime* lies in the impressively rigorous way in which it documents the serious limitations of most previous attempts to provide valid causal connections between alcohol consumption and crime. It is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the nature of this relationship or embarking upon research into this subject. Each of the eight chapters presents a 'state-of-the-art' review, with the key contributions being the first two chapters on theory and methodology (by Kai Pernanen and Stephanie Greenberg respectively), and the overviews by the editor, James Collins. There are also valuable surveys of alcohol use among black offenders (Roizen) and its role in domestic violence (Hamilton and Collins). The association between alcohol use and criminal behaviour amongst blacks is generally lower than for comparable white offenders; although when blacks do drink there are often more severe problems associated with it. Surprisingly few studies of domestic violence have investigated the role of alcohol: the indications are that it is more prevalent in cases of wife-beating than child abuse, but that there are additional complications due to the frequency with which wife victims also abuse alcohol and to the extent of 'deviance disavowal' in this setting (i.e. where alcohol is put forward as an 'excuse' for violence). The reviews in this book may appear somewhat repetitive in their insistent criticisms of the atheoretical and simplistic nature of much research; but this serves to emphasize the authors' conclusions. New theoretical frameworks and research agenda are proposed. Collins stresses the age variable and the need to focus more attention on the drinking behaviour of young adult male offenders whilst, at the same time, recognizing that there are proportionately more problems of drink and alcoholism amongst older offenders. Interdisciplinary research is seen to be essential: with particular emphasis upon social psychological factors, the phenomenology of alcohol use, and comparative studies of (sub)cultural norms relating to drinking behaviour. The modest claim is made, and fully substantiated, that this book presents the bare 'logic scaffolding' for the integrated research that is so badly needed. Where are the builders?

The editors of *Aggression and Violence* make a similarly strong plea for interdisciplinary research to break down academic compartmentalization and to broaden the theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of violence and aggression. Their selection of

papers include contributions from neurobiology, clinical psychology, sociology and anthropology, as well as from those with practical personal experience of violence or its treatment, such as John McVicar, Masud Hoghughi and a New York police officer attached to a Gang Information Unit. They eschew any attempt to impose a single coherent framework and, as a result, the book is rather uneven and unsystematic in terms of integration. The value of some of the anthropological and physiological work on aggression seems more limited than that of the social psychologists and sociologists, from whose contributions (often all too short in a modest-sized book that has 13 chapters) there emerge some common central themes, such as the relevance (or otherwise) of the distinction between 'instrumental' or 'normative' and 'expressive' or 'hostile' aggression, discussed by Berkowitz, Campbell, and Frude and Gault. Significantly, there are only two brief references to the possible contribution of alcohol to aggressive behaviour, which is a good illustration of the problems highlighted in *Drinking and Crime*. Crucial issues surrounding the definitions of, and language used about violence and aggression are dealt with by several contributors, including Peter Marsh in his preliminary but valuable critique of personal accounts of violence and its motivation. There needs to be greater clarification as to what exactly is being explained. is it violence, perceptions of it or verbal descriptions? As Marsh says: 'Once we have separated out the talk, we might find that there is less action to be explained' (p. 116)

Interesting attempts to describe and analyse female aggression are made by Anne Campbell, in reporting some preliminary findings from her survey of 16 yr-old girls, and in the account of Frude and Gault of their investigation into children's understanding of aggression. These last authors put forward an 'aggression incident model', which has great potential as an integrating framework, incorporating situational and personal variables for which there is considerable empirical and theoretical support. Encouragingly, also, this 'academically'-derived model is closely compatible with the 'map of aggression' developed by Hoghughi from his practical (and widely respected) work in the treatment of aggressive adolescents at Aycliffe School. All readers will gain something of value from this book, and the consolidation of some of the theories and research described here could lead to real progress in understanding the nature and extent of anti-social aggression in contemporary society

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Worker Capitalism: the New Industrial Relations *Keith Bradley and Alan Gelb* London Heinemann 1983 186pp. n.p.

Bradley and Gelb are to be congratulated on a lucid and splendidly well-focussed book — even if the focus is not the one suggested by their title. It is an exploration from every angle, and an attempt to answer, a single central question: how far is the worker buy-out — or, rather, the reconstruction of firms with a substantial element of employee share ownership — a useful response to enterprise failure in declining industries? Can subsidy and other types of encouragement for such ownership patterns form a useful arm of industrial policy?

Hence all the cases of 'worker capitalism' they look at in some detail are of firms rescued from closure — five in the US, two each in Canada and France, and in Britain the three 1974 Benn co-operatives — Meriden, Kirkby and the Scottish Daily News. There are no John Lewises or Scott Baders, no Mondragons (on which they have written elsewhere). For the most part they rely on secondary sources, but for Manuest, the French kitchen equipment manufacturer, and the SDN, their account is amplified by interviews with key participants in the reconstruction together with postal questionnaires from employees and, in the case of the SDN, investors.

Outcomes are mixed. The one common feature seems to be that X-efficiency

improves. How far due to the sense of crisis, how far to the sense of ownership, one cannot tell, but people work harder, more conscientiously and more co-operatively and drop restrictive practices which formerly were the main means of protecting their jobs. Wage costs are further reduced because workers frequently agree to, often substantial, wage cuts. But that does not guarantee success. The unpromising market prospects which caused the problems in the first place; debt service burdens; restrictions on access to working capital (in Britain because of compromises with the opponents of state aid) all serve to make the lives of some experiments nasty and short. The US firms — far more numerous than elsewhere — have a better record of reaching long-term viability, but even there the most resounding successes are more the result of windfall changes in the market environment than of internal reforms.

The analytical parts of the book concentrate on two things. First, there is an interesting and well-argued examination of the thesis that state support for worker buy-outs may be justified even where there is high probability of failure. *Ex ante*, they calculate, the subsidy for the Scottish Daily News, taking account of all social welfare and taxation costs, opportunity costs of factors, displacement effects, etc., could have been expected to yield a net gain to government revenue, and a net increment to social welfare, even if the firm had stayed in operation for only one year. (Instead it collapsed in six months and led to loss on both counts.)

The other part is an examination of how economic rationality should dictate the actions of all participants — workers, managers, former capitalist owners, their creditors, government and the local community. This involves images of po-faced workers calculating whether they would get more from wages and employee share dividends in their reconstructed firm or from finding a job elsewhere and putting their redundancy money in an alternative high-level investment — but never workers calculating the option of using it on a couple of weeks in Benidorm. But it does usefully analyse (also algebraically in an appendix) the combined effects on the composition of the work-force and on their work-effort and wage-demanding motivations, of self-selection influenced by the availability of alternative job opportunities and degree of optimism about success. Less amenable to modelling but just as interesting is their suggestion (which one has to go to a footnote to find) that poor journalism was the death of the SDN and that this is explained by two factors: journalists could more easily get jobs elsewhere than printers could, and journalism is a lonelier, less chummy job, less subject to peer-group pressures to do good work.

Industrial relations do play a small part in the analysis. A point brought out by both their detailed case studies, Manuest and the SDN, is that the leaders of the union protest struggle which forces political intervention to find an alternative to plant closure, do not necessarily provide, and frequently thwart, the leadership best calculated to bring the firm of their creation to viability. The ideology of the class struggle which fortifies the first activity, does not have much to do with the ideology of cooperativeness, brotherhood and efficiency which the second activity needs, and all discussion of the way in which the experience of a struggle to save jobs might 'radicalize' hitherto privatized and apathetic workers is nonsense as long as it uses such a vague concept as 'radicalize' to gloss over that fact.

In this matter of ideology, Bradley and Gelb are particularly good on the difference between the USA, whose individualistic form of capitalism cheers everybody on to achieve the status of capitalist, including workers, and Britain with its class-divided form of capitalism. To both orthodox boss and orthodox unionist it is neither acceptable, nor even possible, that workers on the one side should ever simultaneously be on the other. Hence the advocates of employee ownership tend to be either radical paternalists or — more familiarly in the last decade since the Institute of Workers Control and Tony Benn — apocalyptic advocates of the end of capitalism, who cannot accept that modern businesses require

any kind of technical or managerial expertise which cannot be subject to continuous, populist, worker control. Bradley and Gelb are very good at rehearsing the historical causes of this difference between USA and Britain. But, as one looks around the world, one wonders about their following the tradition of calling this 'the problem of American exceptionalism'. Might 'British' or, possibly, 'Anglo-French exceptionalism' not be more appropriate?

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Georg Simmel *David Frisby* Chichester Ellis Horwood Limited and London Tavistock Publications Key Sociologists Series Editor: Peter Hamilton 1984 161pp. £3.25 (paper)

The Holy Trinity of classical sociology should be challenged, and the balance between pygmies and giants recast. That is the core idea of Frisby's book; in adding a text on Simmel to a series on Key Sociologists that opened with Marx, Weber and Durkheim the reassessment is begun. Our previous reception of Simmel has been seriously distorted, Frisby maintains, by our failure to see his intellectual development as a whole and by the fragmentary and episodic character of the translations. The book goes some way to rectifying this by careful attention to Simmel's intellectual development. A detailed account of the early works and a summary of the main texts draws out Simmel's more persistent themes: the primacy of interaction, the nature and scope of social differentiation, the reification of culture in the rise of modernity. Frisby points out that these parallel more familiar versions, differentiation links to Durkheim, the philosophy of money to Marxism, the stress on meaning and form to Weber. But the question still remains, why should we prefer Simmel's version to the 'giant' ones? In pointing to the universality of super- and sub-ordination, conflict and competition, exchange relations etc., Simmel overlooked the fact that it is precisely the detailed modes in which these express themselves that is of interest to us. We gain more from Weber's account of the distinctiveness of the Western bourgeois city in detailed contrast to other types than from an approach that sees the city as a 'sociological entity formed spatially' within a general 'spatial' theme; we gain more from Marx' account of the laws of capitalist exchange than from a general phenomenology of money. Nor does Frisby convince me (or himself) that a more careful attention to Simmel will recover a unity to his work. The text *Soziologie* was related by Simmel to *three* sociological aprioris, by Levine to *four* presuppositions, by Nedelmann to *five* sociological principles. Frisby wisely concludes that the issue of the text's coherence remains 'open'. Frisby's book is most readable (in spite of a few misprints) and most scholarly. It is scholarly enough to cite Durkheim's and Weber's criticisms of Simmel, and it is hard not to conclude that they were right.

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Theoretical Logic in Sociology Vol. 3: The Classical Attempt at Theoretical Synthesis — Max Weber *Jeffrey C. Alexander* Routledge & Kegan Paul International Library of Sociology 1983 240pp. £20.00

Max Weber and Contemporary Social Theory *Susan J. Hekman* Martin Robertson 1983 213pp. £16.50

The problem with sociology, in Alexander's view, is a tendency to 'unidimensionality'. The aim of his four volume work is to expose the limitations of reductionist thinking and to redirect social thought. This, the third volume, is perhaps the pivotal text, for Weber had allegedly tried to do the same thing but with uneven success. Alexander describes Weber's achievement as 'world-historical' and his own reading of it as an attempt at a more 'objective' view than that of any predecessor. In fact the reading is deeply reminiscent of Parsons who, ominously, is the subject of the

fourth volume. Alexander claims that sociology operates at a multitude of levels each relatively autonomous In practice it is the 'presuppositional' level that interests him: in Weber's case, the theory of action. Alexander's metaphysic of levels leads him to the delphic utterance that 'The questions of action and order are themselves relatively autonomous, although they are thoroughly interdependent.' (xvii) Weber's success lies in his 'multi-dimensional synthesis' and his failure lies in his inability to sustain it. Synthesis of what? Of idealism with materialism, the normative with the instrumental, the voluntaristic with the deterministic, 'internal' with 'external'; these are the crucial antinomies, the failure of Marx and Durkheim lay in their adherence to only one pole. These pairs are moreover, for Alexander, only one; they are the *same* antinomy. Like Parsons, before him, Alexander has an unhappy manner with English (to 'subjectify' to 'theorize'); but this is more than irritating for, in the end, his case rests on reconstruing Weber in a non-Weberian vocabulary. Thus we have 'normative order' where Weber had a range of types of order. We have 'ideology' where Weber generally eschewed the term; its teasing counterpart, elective affinity, is nowhere cited by Alexander. In particular, Weber's pessimistic vision of an iron cage of bureaucratic authority in a demystified world is seen by Alexander as a *theoretical* failure, the product of a collapse onto the 'instrumental-determinist-materialist' pole engendered by a *presuppositional* ambiguity in the idea of *zweckrationalitat*: 'purpose rationality can be read either as a pragmatic and substantively rational form of action that is still ethically committed or as rationality of an instrumental type that has eliminated normative reference altogether.' (p. 124). In fact it cannot be read this way; the problem is that the term 'normative' has a different extensional range from that covered by Weber's purpose-value distinction. The various relations between the two are detailed by Weber and the critical case for the modern world is where values become treated as wants to be optimized alongside others. The theoretical possibility of a value-rational and democratic community is not only present but is a persistent *leitmotif* in Weber's work. It is the empirical possibility of sustaining such a commitment under specifically modern conditions that Weber denied. Alexander is unable, properly, to confront this denial precisely because of his insistence on seeing classical sociology in terms of a unidimensional/multidimensional opposition. The arena in which Weber tried to unite the various elements and 'levels' of his analysis, the ideal type, is not treated by Alexander at all. In the end, the presuppositional failure is his.

By contrast it is the ideal type which is the central focus of Susan Hekman's discussion. She has correctly recognized that it was precisely here that Weber sought to resolve and mediate the antinomies of 'internal', 'external' and so on. Weber's ideal type conception was an attempt to resolve the great dispute over method in *fin-de-siècle* Germany in a way that would find an effective centre ground between positivism and idealism. Hekman argues that it is just this feature which makes the ideal type a suitable basis for a synthesis of post-positivist accounts of method. The dissolution of positivism has engendered a 'subjectivist' critique which emphasizes the actors' meanings and an 'objectivist' critique stressing the need for a critical appreciation of structure and its institutional alternatives She takes phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy as typical of the former, Althusser and Habermas as typical of the latter. The difficulty, of course, is the apparently irreconcilable character of 'meaning' and 'structural' approaches. Just such a synthesis was, in her view, Weber's objective. She seeks to supplement Weber, to overcome his various philosophical naiveties by reference to modern anti-positivist developments, whilst simultaneously seeing in the ideal type the basic frame to permit a resolution of the contemporary impasse of apparently opposed methodologies. The familiar objection here would be precisely that Weber himself failed to resolve his structural ideal types with his methodological accounts or with his formal

model of action. Hekman recognizes this and seeks to rebut these objections. Her arguments are not always convincing but, nevertheless, this is high quality theoretical work in which the classical models are made to address current theoretical issues in a dialectic that enriches our understanding of both. Though her objectives are more modest than Alexander's Hekman's achievements are proportionally the greater.

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British Social Attitudes: The 1984 Report *Roger Jowell and Colin Airey* (eds) Gower; and Social and Community Planning Research 1984 221pp. £9.95 (paper)

A former Secretary of the Social Science Research Council once said, in describing British sociologists as a group, that 'there is one thing they seem to share in common and that is a distaste for empiricism'. The implication is that they share little else and, though perhaps overstated here, it is none the less unexceptionable that only a very small minority of British sociologists would not be offended if labelled as empiricists, such is the general pretension to theoretical competence. The great majority of British sociologists, if they notice this book at all, are therefore likely to react to it with tut-tutting noises, if not worse forms of abuse. For it is unashamedly empiricist. The enterprise that produced it and its overall intention (if not always some of its actual operationalizations) should bring joy to the hearts of those everywhere who are aggressive in their willingness to be labelled empiricists.

There do exist in this country several projects that, in intention or by default, amount to ongoing surveys of the British population. There are OPCS's Family Expenditure Survey and the General Household Survey, to name only two; even the British Election Study, despite its recent star-crossed history at the hands of the ESRC, qualifies as an ongoing project. Then there are the regular political surveys by the major polling organizations, although their repeated questions are confined to a few basic subjects. All these examples, however, have fairly specific focuses. Until now there has been nothing to compare with the enterprises in a number of other countries that have produced ongoing surveys of their national population's attitudes on a whole range of social, political and economic issues, as well as the important background variables. Social and Community Planning Research, financially assisted by a number of different sponsors, is co-ordinating a series of annual surveys that are promised for at least a further three years. This is their first report. One hopes that this will be a continuing project and that it will be much longer-lasting than the only other recent attempt to present data on the year-by-year evolution of public attitudes, *viz.*, *The Gallup Report*, which appeared for 1980 and 1981 and was then discontinued by its publisher.

The survey was designed to yield a sample of the eighteen-or-older population living in Great Britain. Fieldwork was conducted mostly in March and April 1983. A total of 1,761 interviews were achieved. Some of the data were collected by self-completion questionnaire and there is a panel component in the design. The questionnaires were the product of a number of individuals and the basic results of the survey, in univariate form and by some basic background variables, are presented in separate chapters by different authors (with appendices for larger tables): Political Attitudes; Economic Policy and Expectations; Social Policy and the Welfare State; Educational Issues and Priorities; and Social and Moral Values. Additional tables are supplied on microfiche with the hardback version.

Confronted with such a wealth of data, one has to be selective in making comments or criticisms. I was, however, struck by the odd commentary in the chapter on Social Policy and the Welfare State by Nick Bosanquet. Describing (p. 80) the results of a question about three different spending options on the welfare state (reduced taxes and expenditure/the same situation as now/increased taxes and expenditure), he

remarks that the majority preference (54 per cent) for the *status quo* contrasts with some earlier findings in which, when confronted with only the first and third alternatives, a majority opted for the first. However, the predominant finding of recent years (e.g., N. Webb and R. Wybrow (eds), *The Gallup Report* (London: Sphere, 1981, p. 48) is that majorities or substantial pluralities, when presented with the three-option version of the question, have favoured increased taxes and expenditure. Thus, the findings reported by Bosanquet, if now generally valid, are a distinct and perhaps disturbing departure from recent earlier public opinion on this matter.

The data from the survey are available for secondary analysis from the ESRC Data Archive at the University of Essex. However, I did wonder what form such analysis might take and whether there would really be many interested in pursuing it, despite the American precedent cited (p. 1). A major analysis of any one particular subject might want to ask questions that were more detailed than those in this survey and anyone contemplating this would surely first seek financial support for an independent study. Anybody simultaneously interested in a number of subjects that are covered might well be content with the analyses available with this publication.

The full value of a series of annual surveys is to be seen over the longer term, measured in decades rather than years. Year-on-year social change is frequently difficult to detect, although it is often far from being as glacially slow as some commentators say — look at the marked change in patterns of housing tenure since 1979 or the increase in unemployment, for example. In any case, some attitudinal change can occur at a very rapid rate — look at variations in the public's relative aversion to inflation and unemployment throughout 1980. Yet, whether one's perspective is long- or short-term, an enterprise such as that reported in this book cannot but be worthwhile.

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Evolution of French Liberalism, 1870–1914 *William Logue* DeKalb Illinois Northern Illinois University Press 1983 278pp. $22

The development of French liberalism in the years of the Belle Epoque from Renouvier's philosophy to the sociology of Bouglé and Duguit is essentially, according to Logue, a movement of critique and renewal, in which Durkheim's sociology is a major figure. The older liberalism had sought to build its defence of the individual around the philosophical notion of the rights inhering naturally in that individual himself or herself. But, in circumstances of rapid economic and industrial expansion, such notions could not provide an intellectual basis for the limitation of the egoism arising in the unrestrained play of market forces; on the contrary, the old style liberalism became precisely the ideology of a bourgeois ruling class, an ideology that contained the intellectual risk of anarchy and unregulated struggle. Against this, Durkheim and his school emphasized the primacy of solidarity, that is, the falsity of the society/individual dichotomy and the untenability of a simple opposition in political philosophy between the individual and the state. Instead, they insisted on the social character of individualism and sought to show that it is in the state that rights find their expression and protection. The growth of the state in its range of activities is the growth of a regulated individualism, this was the principle which guided their various programmes of political and institutional reform. Logue's work is one of intellectual rather than political history, but when he states that the lasting heritage of Durkheimian liberalism lay in unfolding the intellectual grounds for individual liberty rather than in lasting political reforms, he necessarily avoids the question of whether the failure to secure such reforms did not lie in the weakness of the intellectual case. Durkheimian liberalism requires the state to re-regulate society to free it from the immediacy of egoistic interests, whilst its critique of the state is just that it is insufficiently distant from

such interests. Durkheim was aware of this problem, but felt that the logic of organic solidarity creates a pressure towards a reshaping of institutional life which ultimately would prevail. Three quarters of a century later we can view this with some scepticism; nevertheless, Logue is right to stress the contemporary relevance of the questions posed by the renewal of liberalism. In all, this is an interesting book and a useful contribution to the revaluation of the relationship between classical sociology and political liberalism.

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Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit: Max Weber's Protestant Ethic *Gianfranco Poggi* Macmillan 1983 121pp. £10.00

Gordon Marshall's *In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: an essay on Max Weber's Protestant ethic thesis* (Hutchison, 1982) asks on its first page 'Can there possibly be anything left to say about Weber's Protestant ethic thesis that has not already been said?'. There probably was before Marshall's excellent book; there probably isn't now. The bad timing of Poggi's book is unfortunate because it contains a good clear exposition of the Weber thesis. It avoids turning the question into a first year essay asking for 'a compare and contrast of Marx and Weber' and it also avoids the silliness of 'How come there's capitalism in Japan?'. Poggi shows what Weber meant by the 'spirit' of capitalism and details the elements of the ethical posture that results from a certain reading of predestinarian Calvinist Protestantism. He also deals with the quite different theme that is introduced in Weber's later essay on the Protestant sects: that it is not the psychological consequences of certain *ideas* that is important but the patterns of religious *association*.

The novel element of this essay is the final chapter which links the PESC to other parts of Weber's work on the development of the city and the rise of the bourgeoisie.

Those people with a keen interest in the PESC arguments will enjoy this book; but it is too dense for most undergraduates. What most disturbs me is not that this is another PESC book (after all anyone can be unlucky enough to be writing the same book as someone else) but that it appears in a series called 'New Studies in Sociology'. I like the PESC argument; but we ought to be worried about a discipline that offers as 'new studies' yet another debate about what Max really meant eighty years ago.

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Power, Crime and Mystification *Steven Box* Tavistock 1983 257pp. £12.95 (£6.50 paper)

Box's earlier book, *Deviance, Reality and Society*, highlighted the way in which the processes of deviancy definition are mediated so as to produce race and class differentials in enforcement; and it introduced the author's abiding concern with aetiology and motive. His analysis had a part in the feeling of revelation with which the topic of deviance was being received fifteen years ago. Now the test is how his particular and suggestive mix of control theory, interactionism and emphasis on the actor's rationality, has been elaborated. *Power, Crime and Mystification*, takes a 'crimes of the powerful' focus, arguing that the crimes which are the most serious in magnitude of harm are those committed by persons in positions of power: the organization men, control agents, senior politicians and judiciary. The art of the argument is such that Box denies the unsympathetic the chance to dismiss this analysis as being akin to a catchy but superficial slogan; a determined use of official sources and sophisticated marshalling of criminological research provides a solid base to support the heckling.

This volume also focuses more firmly on Britain than the earlier book, although there are still aggravating lapses in UK data on certain issues, which necessitate

insistence that the American case is parallel. While Box attempts to bring corporate crime to centre stage, he does not deny the harm caused by street crime. However, the negligence of safety by employers, the low priority governments give to environmental health, the cavalier research and bribery by drug manufacturers, the calculation by Ford that civil damages over the 'Pinto' would be less than the cost of recalling the model, are put as evidence that serious crime is more than legally-defined murder and robbery. Box's core argument that crime and criminalization are social control strategies may be familiar but, as he notes, the indignation with which this prospect is generally met reveals the resilience of mystification, and the need to bring each generation of students over this ground.

The chapters on 'corporate crime' and 'police crime' bear the main force of the argument. There are illuminating commentaries on 'intention' vs. 'indifference (to harmful consequences)', and the way motives are affected by socialization into an organizational 'way of life'. Box has collected numerous examples of financial and personal injury and deaths attributable to negligence, collusion and penny-pinching by corporations, which augment his calculations comparing occupational-related deaths with homicide. Compensating for the different at-risk populations, there is a ratio of seven to one. He is less convincing when he seeks to meet the argument that street crime is more inimical to the community; because he must argue that corporate crime fractures business morals, having already depicted businessmen as a shameless lot. Ironically, Box's account of the motives of corporate criminals restores the analytic utility of Merton's model to the one group to which it applies. The scale of corporate crime is shown by the entertaining but doomed suggestions of 'novel strategies' for controlling it, including anti-company advertising paid for by the offending company, or 'imprisoning' the corporation by 'nationalizing' it for a period of rehabilitation.

The 'police crime' chapter concerns brutality and corruption. The data are limited by deficiencies of UK statistics but there is a perceptive attempt to 'explain police crime'. Like his earlier book, this makes much of social isolation, married to a more sophisticated discussion of the effects of organization membership. Good analytic play is made with police attitudes to law and justice and their mediation by the officer's own (sometimes indulgent) morality, consciousness of hypocrisy, and justifications of 'fitting up' on the grounds that the law is too soft. The discussion of the police role under capitalism eschews the ahistorical 'guard labour' interpretation by acknowledging that the police have often acted for themselves and, being perceived as dangerously close to the dangerous classes, have been subject to an elite strategy of profession-building that has, paradoxically allowed the police to drive a hard bargain with the State

The ensuing discussions of rape and of female crime sustain the broad thesis that deviance, as Durkheim wrote of suicide, is 'merely the exaggerated form of common practices'. Box's exorcism of the spirit of Brownmiller examines the typology of rape but without indicating how legal definitions could specifically be attuned to these types The analysis of female crime is more consistent with his overall thesis; the social location of females constrains deviancy (control theory), and differential association and opportunity theory also reflect their low power and thus lower involvement in crime. The book's conclusion traces the growth of coercive force through the putative relation of unemployment, crime and imprisonment; what appears in the practice of the judiciary to be self-fulfilling prophecy is put as plain conspiracy on the part of the Executive. The government has used fear of crime to strengthen the state, appearing responsive to public concern while assuaging its own fear of the unemployed. If the analysis sounds strident at times there is much evidence in this book that it is not without cause.

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Unfairly Structured Cities *Blair Badcock* Basil Blackwell 1984 395pp. £27.50 (£8.50 paper)

This is an ambitious book. If it does not achieve its ambition, it is none the less a welcome addition to a maturing corpus of work on the contemporary city in capitalist societies.

The scope of the book reflects the challenge the author sets for himself. In the first part, he provides a comprehensive, if fairly routine, critique of theories of space. None of this is very new, and just a little irksome, given the author's reliance on secondary accounts. Some of his statements are naive. The reader's reaction to 'the Marxist position holds that the determination of life chances is monopolised by the labour market' (p. 46) is 'yes, but . . .'. And the author's desire to touch as many bases as possible (1½ pages on the Capitalist Mode of Production, a quick dash around 'theories of the state', a scoot through Rawls on justice) leaves us breathless and rather nonplussed.

The book really begins on page 87, with two impressive chapters on urbanization under competitive and monopoly capitalism. Here the author mobilizes his considerable grasp of historical processes to present one of the best accounts available. The success of these chapters lies in the use of comparative material — on American, British and Australian cities — the latter warranting the wider publicity which urban studies Down-Under deserve. Badcock marshalls his data to excellent effect, and has some new and interesting things to say about the corporate city and the service it provides to transnational capital.

Sadly, the comparisons get a bit out of hand thereafter, as the pace of the book increases, and we jump from country to country without due warning. The author's style in places is his downfall. What are we to make of: 'The provision and location of urban resources was implicated in the previous chapter about spatial externalities and the income effects associated with access to jobs and services' (p. 240)? This is a pity because Badcock has some interesting things to say about structured inequality in contemporary cities if only he had the confidence to say it clearly, and without the crutch of his one thousand references.

The final section of the book is an account of the rise and fall of urban policy. The author is fairly gloomy about the failure of Labour and Democratic attempts to ameliorate the worst effects of capitalism, but believes that once the monetarist 'aberration' is past, social democracy will resume the task of making cities human places. Whistling in the dark?

The 'magpie' strategy of packing into the book as much relevant literature as can be found, makes it a bit overweight. One can admire the industry, but wonder at the purpose of the craft. What is its future? The 'urban' literature is congested, and only the novel or the brilliant makes it to the bookshelves these days. Sadly, this one is neither; a pity, because it is a monumental effort, and the comparative material on capitalist cities deserves more attention than hitherto given.

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Notes to Contributors

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

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